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Univnrstt,, ý- oL Glaskow 
_ 
bý-JOhn -Laird" *JZ", A., 
Title: The)_Concept of Rational Action with Spocial Reforonce 
to the Problem of Voral Obliwatton. 
Tile -main ai',, Y. "'of the t?, nsie' 'i .3Yt90 'tq 0 liri"ry "what we moan mi 
talk of some'oneuicting rat fonally, ", 'ý-Th i d"tt sr aken by' meam 
of a critical oxamination of cortain principles used by dommon 
seriso as critoria of rational action. 
2hap. l. A preliminary chaptor: the 
, 
term "action" definedand 
actions proper distinguishod from behaviour. The use of the) 
concopt of "doltboratenoss" as the criterion of actions 
Pýopar critict3ed. 
Chap. II. The prinoiplo of the bla"sural, as a criterion of rationality., 
oriticised. Tho radical ambiguity of tho torm "natural" 
discussod at aomo length. 
Chap.. 11-1-. Tho principle of accordance with the facts, acceptod as 
a very common criterion of rational aotion, and the 
apnlication of tho principle discussod in soTae-, 
', 
do, tai_1., 
_ 
_The, point, 
is-irado, 4, tliat-*--ýtho'coir7non sonse 
t1liat it alwayu in our inIterosts to conform 
to tho facts is not valid. The question is raised whother, 
however, we can bi said to have an obligation to trj to 
conform our actions to the facts -further comments on 
this noint loýft over until a later chaptor. 
Chap. IV. The ariterion df conalatoncy discussed, and Its importance 
as a rational principlo e-, aDhas1sad. A clear distinction 
is drawn b, )tween 3ituationa in which thq prinoiploý, of 
aCCOT, danco with tho) facts is the rolovant critorionjand 
thos, r) in which the iprinci-, ple of consistgnoy ir, relevant. 
It is pointed out that it is not nocossarily for our 
happiness to conform to the principle of cons Istency, but 
that we may think we have an obligntion to conform. 
ChaD. V.. Tho -principle of the greatest good, interpreted-here-in 
tr-mm of the satisfaction of dosires, diecussed an a 
criterion of rationality. Thi idea of happinnes as a 
rational end of action analysed, and the quertion whotlinr 
it is ever sensible to "aim at happineso diroctly" 
discuaEied. In connection with this latter point, some 
oriticisma are made of the "paradox of , hedonism" 
argument. 
ChaP. VT. 7110 function of tile faculty or reason in our conception 
of rational action diecusse-d. The ciliestion raised whether 
roason is JUGt a "SlaVe Of t1le ppLSI 14 one", or whether it 
can move to action of its ovm accord. An attempt made to 
link the "desire for system" with the faculty of reason. 
Chap. VII. In this second part of thesis we deal specifically with 
the relation of the concept of moral action to the 
concept of rational action. 
First we discuss whether duty really is a "good 
reason" for action. Various attempts to explain away the 
idea of duty are criticised; also criticised is the view 
that the authority of duty is imposed on us from "without! 
It is argued that the motive of duty is as much a voluntary " expression of the personality" as any motive of desire. 
Chap. VIII. In this chapter we discuss whether the assumptions 
underlying the notion of duty are based on the facts. 
The first assumption is that we have freewill: here we 
argue that the idea of duty can itself be used as an 
qrgumont in favour of freewill. 
The second is that there are certain fundamental moral 
principles accepted by all men. In respect to this point 
it is suggested that. on the whole. the evidence seems to 
be against thi6 assumption. On the other hand we can say 
with some confidence that all normal men are able to 
appreciate the idea of moral obligation. It is further 
suggested that all men, "having reason", will appreciate 
the obligation to conform to the principle of consistency, 
and this principle may be used by reflective men to iron 
out differences in. moral standards arising from subjective 
factors. 
Chap. IX. We discuss here the question whether we have an obligatiOIN 
to act rationally. Firstit is suggested that we might 
sometimes have an obligation to pursue our own happiness. 
Second, we try to show that in all cases in which we say 
that we have an obligation to conform to the facts, the 
operative principle is really the principle of consistency- 
The view that we have an obligation to conform'to 
the principle of consistency is defended. 
Chap. X. The use of the principle of the greatest good as a 
criterion of "rightness" is defended with critical reference 
to the view that we cannot come to know our obligation by 
any process of general thinking, but simply by placing 
ourselves in the moral obligation situation. 
Chap. XI. In regard to the problem of a possible clash between 
duty and happiness we defend the view that the rational 
thing to do is to follow the course of duty. 
It is argued that the treatment of this problem 
is often confused because we tend to deal with it as 
though the real point at issue is whether the concept of 
duty"makes sense" in a world which seems indifferent to 
moral values. This powever, is quite a distinct issue. 
iii. 
PR 'R F0r, ýI 
That I havo tried to do in this thosis is to analyse 
wliat we mean when'we talk of someone "acting rationally or 
irrationally"JoY rain aim, in other words, has been to clarify the 
concept of rational action. I have taken as a starting point for 
discussion certain principles which common sonse uses as 
criteria-of rational actionand subjected each in turn to 
critical analysis. in doing this I have not been primarily 
concerned to discover whether any one of theso principles is I 
more fundamental than another; nor have I attempted to establish 
a sot of definitive rules for judging what constitutes a rational 
aotion in this or that nituation. My main task has been to try 
to romove ambiguities in tho common sense Use of thooo principlest 
and to discuss problems of philosophic interest arising out of 
the employment of these principles as oriteria of rationality. 
This nay not soom a vory oxciting programmotbut in so 
far . as much confusion is caused by the loose uso of the 
cognato-terms "rational" and "reason* in ordinary spoechpour 
taskpthough porhaps somewhat 'podostriannovortlieleas seems 
worthwhile. I 
Though I have not attempted to arrive at-a set of neat, 
and possibly "original" conolusions. I have been led to take up certain 
iv. 
positions which are hilfaly controvoraial. and which I, cannot hope 
to havo defended natisfaotorily. A neconaary-brovity of treatment 
of these pointo-of view han-sometimos resulted in statements 
being made more dogmaticalLy and confidently thanIs, I-thinkj 
'warranted; it-mig'atithoroforo,, be in order to-summarisoýnow-_ 
the partioular'Droblems which fall, into this catogoryand which, ý 
hadrI the time. -I should liko, to havo, examined more thoroughly. 
(1). In defending both. the autonomy, of morality and- 
the, rationality of., the duty motive 1-haveperhapstended, to blurýý 
the distinotion-b-9twoon, desire-and duty,, and to, have fallen into 
theýerror of, interproting-duty, as. a, "specialý,, kind of. dosiro". 
This hasmot been, intentional -1 have emphasised 
several times-that duty and dnairoýaro distinct Motives of. aotion- 
but diffioulty, in-giving preoisqýexpression to mY, O'wn interpro- 
tation of duty may well have resulted in my giving the impression 
that I regard duty as a special kind of desire. 
(2). In emphastatng thl Practical valuo of-tho, principle 
of the greatest good, -both in-pursuing-, our-own happinoas and in 
the discovery of what is morally right, 'I, have undoubtodly 
undereotimatodýthe very, great practical difficulties that are 
involved in any attempt to, omploy this principle. On the other 
hand, it--is, alpo true that philosophers have sometimes used the 
fact of those, difficulties, to,, dismiss the principle, altogether 
As being quite useless, and it was this-point of view that I 
was chi0flY conoornod to-dispute. 
ve 
(3) In my disounsion of tho problem 'of an llabsoluto 
conflict" between the claims ofduty and tho claims of happiness 
I may seem to have ovaded the real issue by assorting that, since 
the motive of duty by its very-nature claims, prcceAonce over., 
any motive of dosire, thorefore we have nO, option but to choose 
tho, course of, duty. But I have vioved-the problem as a-problom of 
competing motivea, each of which is, in itself, intrinsically 
reasonable; t 
I 
ý--Zaave not interprotod tho problem, as is so'often tho 
caso. asýtho problem of whether the concept of duty "makes sense" 
in a world whtoh seems toýba indifferent to moral-values. That, is 
a separate protýlem, whloh I have dealt with elsewhero. In disoussing 
tho, conflict of duty and-happiness I have taken it for granted - 
that the conoopt of duty does "make cense", and I have thus. 
interpreted the, problom in that oontoxt. k 
(4. ) In this assay I have constantly stressed the key 
position of the obligation to conform to the principlb of 
oonsistonoy. I. have also tried to show how thia obligation may 
be said to havo its source in reason. but whothor I have boon 
oucces3ful or not in showing the relation between this 
obligation and 
- 
reason, I should hope that my emphasis on the 
importance of the principle of consistency will commend itself 
to the reader. 
(5). Tho most controvorsial part of the thesis is 
possibly tho chaptor in which I discuss the possibility of 
roason0s, boing an original motive of aotion. (chapter VI). j am not 
hopeful that I have been able to put forward a really convinoing 
vi. 
case for the linking of the 'desire for system" with the faculty 
of reason; but T am sure that there is'a nood for a much more 
dotailed and pr, ýcise analysis of the term Yreaaon"'than van 
possible in thin thesis. Hume did some important pioneering work 
in this field, but his analysis does not take us far enough. One 
is constantly amazed at the loose employment of this term even 
by philosophers who are noted for the precision and accuracy of 
their writing. 
In writing the thosis I have received constantmental 
stimulation from a'study of those parts of Humets Treatise most 
relevant to my theme(Tik. TT. Part III -ohapteral3flO; BK. III, Part 
I 
and Part IT). Whore I have disagreed with TiumoI have discovered 
that he haa nearly always anticipated my objootionstand though 
I have not always boon satisfied with his answers I have found it 
extremely difficult to demolish them to py own, satisfaotion. 
sliould like to mention also the help I have rcooived 
from Mrs. Xyddis scholarly work on Ijumo -Reason and Conduct in 
Humole Treatise -the mora so as my only references to her in 
. 
tho thosi6 are all oritioal. 
Of the other philosophical writors whom I have studied 
in connection with the thesis I owo most to Sidgwick and to 
H. A. Prichard. My debt to the formor will bo obvious, but I have 
also rocoived muoh holp from the latter notwithstanding the fact 
that I disagroo with his general emphasis in ethics. 
It remains for me to thank Profooror T. G. Ynclagan 
for his acute criticisme and ready oncouragement. I should also 
like to thank Dr. D. D. Raphael for his willingness to discuss many 
difficult points in the argument. 
J. L. 
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1. 
INTR0DUCT10 11. 
The main aim of the present study being to olarify what 
we mean when we talk of a" rational action" or of someone "acting 
rationally", it will be necessary for us to examine critically the 
varioun ways in which we employ the term "rational", (and the cognate 
term "reason") when these terms are used to describe actions. T 
therefore propose to begin our encluiry by summarising briefly the 
criteria used(explicitly or implicitly) by common sense in 
describing actions as rational or irrational. 1 shall also note 
what seem to be the more important of the assumptions underlying 
the common sense position. In the chapters which follow I shall 
be concerned to explicate what is outlined below. 
I. 
The minimum requirement of an action which claims to be 
rational is that it should have a "motive" -that it should be 
done for "some reason". 11"his seems, however, so obvious -it is 
taken for granted that any action, howover irrational it may be in 
other respects, at loast has a motive -that it would scarcely 
appiar to be worth considering as a criterion of any practical 
importance. Novertholoss, as we shall see lator, oortain assumptions 
imPlicit in the common sense use of this oritnrion require 
careful attention; in particular, the assumption that non-deliber- 
ative actions are necossarily irrationalarioreover, in so far as 
tho question of motive, or rather "lack of motive"q is often 
relevant to the problem of distinguishing between sane and insane 
acts, it is important that we should be clear as to what we moan 
Whan we say that an action is "without motivo", tho more so as 
cornmon sense often tends to confuse a "motiveless totionO with 
an "unnatural action". 
91. If we examine any action we find that the-motive of the 
a 
action can be classified under one of two goneral heads, namelyp 
undor the heading of desiro or of duty; in. other words, when we 80t 
we do so either booause we are moved by the thought. of some 
satisfaction or else because we are moved by the thought bf-sOme 
moral obligation. nrinia If'sote these tWo kinds of motive seem to be 
quite distinct from each other each in its own way providing a 
ngood reason" for actionibut of coursetaz; ve all know, such a 
point of view is strongly criticisqd by some philonophers. This 
criticism takes the form of an attack on the notion of"duty"P(SO' 
far as I know no one has attempted to explain away the notion of 
"desire") in which we try to show either that the concept of 
duty itself to r. caningless, or, and this is perhaps the same thingg 
that "duty" is merely 'the product of conditioning or the name 
we give to a certain kind of desire. 
The philo3ophio stispicion of tho notion of duty is 
refloated in a certain ambiguity in the common senee attitudo to 
the idea of moral obligation; for9though we accept dx, Xty as a 
'good reason" for action, andmoroover, hold as a matter of 
principle that duty ought to have precedence over desire if the I 
two clash, yot in practice we tend to question the rationality of 
I. It is not denied of courso-that the two fields of duty and 
desire may sometimos ovorlap: e. g. that wo may sometimes 
desire to do the action which we are morally obliged to do. 
7.. 
the duty motive in a way in which we should nover think of 
questioning the motive of desiýe. Not only do we sometimes ask 
the question, IVay ought I to do my duty", but. more significantly 
porhaps, wo do not doscrilbe an action as irrational if it is the 
product of a preference for self-interest as against duty -we say 
it is selfish, or wiokedbut not irrational -and thisteven though 
we 'believe in principle that duty has a prior claim on us. 
The issues involved here will be the first with which T 
we shall have to deal when we come to consider the relation 
between moral action and rational action. 
3. The assertion that actionsto be rational9must have 
a motive does no more than give us a very obvious criterion of 
rationality with a very limited application. vore positive 
criteria are required if we are to be able to makegnot only tho 
broad distinction between sane and insane actions9but alsopwithin 
the general class of sane actions, to distinguish the various 
kinds of rational and irrational conduct. And it is with these 
more positive criteria that we shall in the main be concerned 
in this thesis. 
The first of thene criteria we may describe as 
the criterion of the Natural., or, since, it is usually applied in 
the negative form, it might be more accurate to nare it the 
criterion of the Unnatural. Its use is exemplified most clearly, 
porhaps., when we describe an action as irrational because its 
motive is such that we think no "normal" person would have been 
1. Whother this-is a proper question or not is a matter which 
will be discussed lator. (seo ps. zo-sJd. ). 
49 
moved by it. or at least not moved by it in these particular 
circumstances. An unnatural action(i. e. an action whose motive 
is "abnormal") is prima facie an irrational nction. The criterion 
of the "naturaly is also very often used to defend actions which, 
on other grounda, migilt seem to be irrational. we say, "it was only 
natural that so and so should have acted in the way he didgiven 
his temperament and the tenseness of the situation etc. " 
It is not to be expected that such ambiguous terms as 
"natural" and "Unnatural" would be used with any consistency by 
common sensetand indoedaa we shall coo. the unsatisfactorinoss of 
this criterion arises mainly from tho radical ambiguity of the 
tormt"naturalo. wo oan, I think, distinguish at least four senses 
of "naturaln, as used by common sense, which are relevant to our 
main thome. The most usual of these is to be found in the idea of 
what is "common" or wnormal", An action is "natural" if it is what 
all men. or tho groat majority of men would do in the same 
oircumstances. A second meaning of "natural" refers to what is 
original or innate as opposed to what is artificial and conditioned) 
and this sense of "natural" is sometimes usedindirectlYpas a 
criterion of rational action: o. g. when we extol the virtues of 
"simple living", of living "according to nature", or when we argue 
that the right way to live is to give "free expression" to one's 
original propensities. 
A third meaning of "natural" which is of some relevance 
is, "so constituted by naturo". This is the meaning which is 
employed when we defend abnormal actions on the ground that the 
agent could not really help doing what he did. 
5. 
Fourthly, thero is the definition of "natural' which is 
particularly important in respect to the moral problomtviz-o 
"that which io based on an innate moral sonseff. Thussquoting 
St. Paul, we often talk of the "natural law written in the heart 
of man". 0 
Common sonsetof coursoldoes not always distinguish 
clearly between these different senses when it uses the term 
"natural". In consequence arguments about what is natural or 
unnatural always tend to become oonfusod; it is not always 
appreciated that what may bo natural on one definition of the 
term may "oo unnatural on another. 
4. ' The 'second of our criteria is, I thinkp the most widely 
acoepted of all the oriteria of rational aotion. Ige may desoribo 
it as the criterion of *accordance with the facts". Whenoverpfor 
instanco, wo use expressions suoh an Obased on reaconw or "aoting 
according to roason' we usually mean "acting in acoordanco with 
the facto". 
It is to be noted that coi4mon sense does not consider an 
action to be necessarily irrational if It proves to have, been 
based on a false judgment, for mistaken judgments about the facts 
are Often reasonable or "natural", i. e. mistakes which all or 
most men would have made in similar aircumstancoo. From the oommon 
sonso point of view this criterion is violated most obviouslY in 
the following cases: (a)Whore we refuse to examine the facts bofore 
coming to a dooision, or to "face up to facts* which we do not 
wish to accept; (b)wiiora we allow obviously subjective factors 
to influence us in our judgments of the faots; and(c) vhere, 11aving 
C. 
admitted that certain things are the case, we doliberatoly act 
as though they were not the oaso. 
Another critericn of rational action which is 
froquontly used is the principle of "consistency". If a person 
*acts inconsistently" then there is a prima facie case for saying 
that he acts irrationally. 
Vhen., in ordinary spench, we talk of peoplo "aoting 
inconsistently" WO usually mean, either that there is a discrepancy 
bntw-ýen belief and practicog(espocially bo. itween moral precept and 
moral practice) or that there is a lack of consistency in the way 
we act at dIfferont times in situations which seem to be of the 
same type. This atatement of the application of the principle of 
consistency io, however, noither satisfactory in itself nor does it 
cover all the cases in which the criterion of oonsistoney is 
involved. We cannot enter into a detailed disucsBion of thOSO 
points now, but must content ourselves with a summary of the main 
aritici3ma. Thoce are: first, that the above account of "inconsis- 
tent actions" does not clearly distinguish between the situation 
'where the operative criterion is the principle of "accordance 
'with the facts",, and the situation where the operative criterion 
is the principle of consistency; second9that the expression, 
"inconsistent action' is. strictly spoaking, improper since it is 
only propositions which can be Gelf-contradiotory or inconsistent 
with one another; third, that in using the expression, "so and so 
acted inconsistently" we do not distinguish clearly enough 
between those cases whoro we do not reallse that we are being 
inconsistentsand those oases where we knowingly refuse to conform 
'7. 
to the principle of oonsistency. It is only in the lattor case thftt 
we can pronerly say that the porson has aotod irrationally; fourtho 
the common sense emphasis on inconsistoncies between belief and 
Dractice tends to obscure the fact that the criterion of 
oonsistonoy is applicable to what is known as the theoretical 
field as well as to the field of practical action. Thus a person 
would bo said to act irrationally in the sense of not conforming 
to the principle of consistency if, being oonfrontedwith an 
inconsistency botwoon two beliefs each of which he holds to be 
true, he refuses to do anything to try to remove the inconnistency 
ar, d maintains the beliefs as before. 
In our examination of this critorion we shall try to 
doal With Close oritioisms; WO shall also try to show that the 
principle of oonsistoncy is of much greater practical imDortance 
than is usually realisod by common sense# 
C'. The last of those criteria is the principle Of the 
"greatost good". This is most evident as a oriterion of rational 
action in those cacces where we praise a person for choosingo 
as 'between various alternative courses of action, that course 
which will give him the greatest pleasure or which will help 
him'to obtain happiness. In particular we tend to praise a person 
for acting rationally if he foregoes come presont pleasure for 
the sake'a greater pleasure "in the long run*. 
The application of the principle of the greatest good 
to tho fiold of moral actions is not so obvious or clear-outtfor 
though it is in general true'to say that reflective common sense 
tends to adopt some form of the utilitarian prinoiple as a 
8. 
criterion, porhaps one should say as "the criterion"l of the 
rightness of actions, yet, novertlioless. in actual practice we 
rarely use the principle of the greatest good as a means of 
discovering what our duty is; rioreover we do sometimes justify 
ac, tions which would appear in tho oirouastancos to produce more 
evil than good on the ground that we intuitively know them to be 
the right actions. (e. g. we may defend our telling the truth whore 
it seems wiser not to do so by using this argument). One of our 
main problems then in respect to this criterion will be to 
discover whethorand to what degroo, it ia applicable to the 
field of moral decisions. 
To a lossor dogree the same problem oonfronts us when 
we are concerned only with the pursuit of our own happinoss. Wo do 
not doubt that it is rational for a person to choose the course 
of action which will give him the greatest pleasure; nor do we 
doubt that happiness, considared as our "greatest good" is an 
intrinsically desireable end - but it is questioned whether we 
can attain happiness by a policy of deliberately pursuing it, and 
to that extent it is claimed that the principle of the greatest 
good has severe limitations as an instrument of practical value. 
7. The above, then, seem to me to be the main criteria 
'which We use in determining the rationality of actions. The 
question may be asked, howovor, why we have omitted from the list 
what seems to be the most. obvious criterion of all, viz., "what is 
l. Cf. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 150. "It seems 
fair to conclude that common sense has always been implicitýY 
and unconsciously utilitarian, and that it tends to become mOrO 
and more explicitly so as intelligence, sympathy, and oxperienoo 
grow, " 
9. 
in accordancewith reasonv or 'what in based on roason". It is 
clear enough that these oxpressions, or equivalent expressions, 
are often used when we are describing the rationality of an action, 
I- but it is not so clear that they are useful as precise criteria. 
Besides. it io, I think, possible to show that when the term 
"reason" is used in any proposition stating a oriterion of 
rational action tt is alwaya analysable into one or other of the 
torme imed in the criteria given'above. Then we talk'of a *good 
reason"'for action we often refer to a motive approved of by 
all normal mengor approved by an innate moral sense; Whon we say 
that someone based his action on reason we usually mean that 
he based his action on the facts or on soundpoonsistent reasoning; 
when wo say that someone was Omovod by reason" we very often' 
mean, as Hume in a famous passage pointed out, that he was moved 
by the thought of what was conducive to his "greatest good*. 
vention, of tho torm Oreason", howevert dooo bring 
to mind a problem which is of some importance, viz., what role 
reason, in the strict sense of the term as roforring to the 
faculty of reason, plays in the "rational lifo", and in particular 
, what the relation is between reacon and what Hume called the 
"passionn't. 1t Jej when we oonsider a problem of this nature that 
we roalise tho oonfU31on which is caused 'by the fact that the 
term "reason" is used very loosely in ordinary spoeoh. Thus when 
we say that a man acts rationally if he is "moved by reason" 
we tend to give the impression that it is only when reason itself, 
in-soma sense. is the original and solo motive of action that we 
can call the action rational. And this view of the matter is 
10.. 
further, encouraged by the loose way in which we talk of the 
rational man as one who keeps his passions under the control of 
reason or as one whose life is controlled by reason. Thun reason 
and desire seem to be placed in opposing camps as if they were 
inovitablo enemies. 
Yet such a view is misleading even as, an interprotation 
of tkie essential common sense position. Desire and reason are not 
I 
competing motives of action in the sense that we can claim to be 
acting rationally when we are moved by roason, but not so when 
we are moved by some desire. The argument has only to be stated 
baldly like this for its falseness to become apparont. There is 
nothing, per se, irrational about being motivated by a dosire(indeed 
there are some who would assert that we can only be moved by 
a doeiro); it is only when our desire is based on false judgments 
as to the facts that we can introduce the question of irrationality. 
The faot of the matter is that the general bias of the 
common sonso, viow is towards the Humean position that the proper 
role of reason is to be a "servant", or perhaps, mbre accurately, 
a guide and advisor of the passions; it in the instrument by moans 
of which we are able to discover ways and moans of satisfying our 
desires. The main difference between Humets view and that of 
common sense is that whereas Hume hold that reason "is and ought 
only to be a slave of the passions" common sense sometimes Dooms 
to modify this by claiming that reason can be an original motive 
of action on its own account. The "particular passion" which is 
linked with, reason is usually thought to be the desire for 
knowledgeor intellectual curiositybut it is necessary to add 
ii. 
that oommon sense is 'by no means (3onsistont in respect to this 
mattar; for sometimes it is assumed that there is Guoh a thing as 
the desire for knowledge for its own sakegand at other times it 
is assumed that we seek knowledge only as a means to the 
satisfaction of other doeires. If the latter be the case then, of 
course, reason only operates,, here ae elsewhere, as the servant of 
the passions. 
It is with this question of reason as an "original" 
n, otive of action that we shall "be primarily concerned when we 
oome to deal with tile general problen. of the relation between 
reason and desire. 
In the chapters which follow I propose, first of all, to 
consider the criteria listed above only within the context of 
actions whose motive is some dosire. In other words I intend to 
excludo, so far as it is possible to do so, those problems which 
are raised by the fact that we apýear to be moral beings capable 
of being moved to action by the thought of a moral obligation. 
Such a sharp division is bound to be somewhat artificial, 'but for 
the purposes of our discussion it is convenient to koep the two 
kinds of action distinot, and this for two reasonn: firsttthat the 
quention of the relation of moral actions to the concept of 
rational action raises special problems of its own which are beat 
dealt with separately; and secondly, that these problems can be 
discussed most profitably in the light of what has already been 
said in explication of the criteria of rationality, in so far as 
they are applied to actions motivated by desire. 
12. 
In the first section we shall follow closely the Out- 
lino of tho programme suggeatod by the summary of the common 
sense view given above. In Chapter I we -sliall. consider the 
preliminary question of what we mean by the term "action"tand then 
go on to discuss vory briefly certain problems that arise out of 
this question of definition - in particular, the assumption that It 
is only deliberate actions which can be described as actions 
proper or to which the term "rational'" could be ascribed. 
In Chapter 11 we chall criticise the value of the 
notion of the "natural" as a criterion of rational aotion, and in 
Chapters III and IV respectively we shall analyse in detail tho 
criteria of "accordance with the facts" and of "consistonoy". In 
Chapter V we shall discuss the criterion of the "greatest good" 
in so far as it is applied to actions whose motive is some desire 
- which moans, in effect, a discussion of happiness as a rational 
end of conduct. 
Then, in the next phapter we shall conclude the first 
section by considering the relation between desire and roason. Undnr 
this heading we shall critioise the adequacy of Hume's viewpoint 
on the question, and try to clarify the 8uggestion. implicit in 
ordinary language. that reason, as well as being a "servant of the 
passions", sometimes operates as an originator of action in its 
own right - an a particular kind of"passion". 
10. In the second section, where we obnoidor speoificallY 
thn rolation 'between moral action and. rational action, we shall 
not follow quite so closely the programme outlined a"bove. For one 
thing this would reault in a certain amount of repetition-, but, more 
13. 
importantlygaOmO Of thO Snecial problems which we have to examine 
in this section can be more adequately dealt with if we discuss 
timm in the order 'whioh naturally suggest6 itself without worrying 
too much whether this order parallels the order of criteria 
given in the introduotion. 
Thn first problem to be considored In this ocotion is 
one which did not arise in the first: it is the problem of the 
rationality of the "duty motive" itsolf. As we 
have already 
noted we do not see any point in asking why it is rational to 
be moved to action by the thought of'something we desire, but we 
do sometimes "rebel" against the authority of t'he duty motive, 
especially when the course of duty requires a sacrifice of our 
own happiness. We wonder whother the authority of duty might not 
be OillusOrYft, to be explained away as a produce of social 
conditioning etc., and we seek for some naturalistic theory of 
moral obligation whichwill account satisfactorily fozý it's 
main' charaoteristion, and at the same time give us a good reason 
for taking a rather more relaxed and modorate view of the 
demands of duty. 
Tho rationality of tho idoa of moral obligation is 
further attacked, indirectlypby questioning the aesumptions 
whioh undorlie, or seem to underlie our oommon sense reasoning 
about and discussion of moral questions. Thus when we argue about 
moral problems, -or censure somebody for doing what is morally 
wrong we seem to assume at least two thinga: first, that we cannot 
be said to bo under a moral obligation to do something unless we 
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are frooin every sense of that torm, to do the action required 
of us; and sooondly, that there are objective standards of moral 
I 
rightness. Thi, s latter assumption is espootally relevant when we 
argue with others about moral questions, for such discussion would 
zoom to be pointless unles3 there is some objective standard of 
reference. 
Now it is very often asserted that neither of these 
assumptions 13 juatified in that they are not founded on the 
facts; and if this is so then, of coursotmuch of our conduct in 
rospact to moral questions would seem to be irra! tionaljudgod 
by the criterion of "accordance with the facts". It is with thisgand 
rolatod questions, that ve shall doal in Chapter VIII. 
Having dealt first with these basic problems we shall 
next consider some spocifio questions that arise in connection 
with tro relation between moral and rational aotion. In Chapter 
IX we shall examine the question whether we can be said to have 
an0obligation to try to act rationally". Under this heading we shall 
deal mainly with tho criteria of "accordance with the facts" and 
Of "consistency", but we shall also consider briefly whether we 
can be said to have an o'bligation to seek our own happiness. 
Then next, in Chapter X. we shall discuss the use of tII0 
criterion of the "greatost good" as a criterion of "rightness" 
We have already mentioned some of the difficulties inherent in 
this problem, but there is one further related problen. Vnioh we 
should note 'hero oince we deal with it in this chapter. The probleT,. 
is whether, as is suggested by some philosobhors, it is only 
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possible to know what is our duty by an intuitive act of moral 
appreciation made at the time when wo are actually involved in a 
moral obltgation situation. Th-) argument is that we cannot come 
to know what is our duty by applying some formula such as the 
utilitarian principle, or by any process of argument and reasoning. 
In its more extrome forms this doctrine would seem to leave the 
way open for the dominance of conventional morality and quasi- 
moral foolingoand it will b, ) part of our task to try to show 
that the intuitional and to some extent non-intollectual approach 
to moral problems is only satisfactory if it is combined with 
the careful employment of general principles of morality. 
F inally, in Chapter XI we t3hall dicouss the oroblem 
that arises by virtue of the po3sibtlity of Viere being an 
absolute conflict between the claims of duty and the claims of 
personal happiness. We ahall ask, first. whothertand in what sensep 
we can talk of an wabsoluto conflict"; and secondlYgwhat we mean 
by the term, "rational" when we say that, in the event of ouch a 
conflict, it is nroro rational to choose one course rather than the 
other. 
16. 
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11 1 propose to begin our enquiry by considering briefly 
what we mean by the term "action". 
First, it is nooessary to make an important. though perhaps 
obvious distinction botwoon the use of tho torm "action" where it 
moans SimplY "the thing done", and its use whero it means "the 
deciSiOn to do something". Thus when wo talk of a "rational action" 
-we may moan only that "the thing done" proved to be the right 
action in the oircumstances, or we may moan that the person acting 
mado a rational deolsion -that ho acted "according to the fAots", 
for the "right reasons", and so on. In other words, in the latter 
case 'we consider not only tho completed action but also the 
motives "bohind" tho action, the way it was dono oto. 
Now though In ordinary speoch Nvo uSO the torm "rational" 
to describe actions in the first sonso given abovo it Gooms clear 
enough that, strictly speakinglit should only be used to qualify 
the term "action" Whore it moans "a decision to do something"gfor 
it is only by considering the decision as distinct from what was 
actually done that we can know what the poroon intended to do, on 
what grounds he based his decision and so on. This is not a rerely 
academic point for what might be considered a rational action if 
we take into account only the completed act, the "thing donewo 
migh t 'well prove to be an irrational action if wo consider what 
tho person decided to do, and Why. Thus a batsman makes the stroke 
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which wins the match andwe congratulate hi-. n on having had the 
skill and presence of mind to make the rtght stroke. Hc then 
confeescs that the stroke was really an acotdontal product of an 
intended stroke which in the circumstances it was the height Of 
foolichnese to attempt. In other wordstthough. the batsman acted 
irrationally, the actual stroke made, "the thing done' was quite 
correct. In contrast to thiswe, may make a rational decision and 
Yet, through no fault of our own, fail to achieve the result 
intondod. The -fact of the mattor is that an action in tl'O sense of 
"the thing done" can bo no more roasonable or unreasonable, 
rational or irrational than the behaviour of a voloano or the 
action of an aoid; it can be dequoribed as useful or useloss, 
dangorous or safe, important or unimPOrtant, evon as right or 
wrong, but not as rational or irrational. If wowish to avoid 
iniounderstanding, then, we should probably novor say *so and no 
was the rational action in the oircumatanoes", but rather, "he 
actod rationally in doing so and so", or "his dootsion to do 
so and ao, was a rational onew. 
2*. Tho zecond point which it is necessary to mako is that 
TO includo within the class of actions not only decisions to 
do som-othing but also decisions to bolieve somothingl and even 
sometimes decisions to be something. Common sense is inclined 
to restrict the use of the term "action" to thone cases in 
which we intend to do something, to "get something going"Opossibly 
bocause, in ordinary speoolithe term "aotion" very often refers 
to the exertion of energy in nome physical movement or serioa Of 
movements. But if we allowsay, that the Chancellor's decision 
to devalue the pound is an action, even though the docision, qua 
docision, is not an action in the more physical nenBe of the term, 
then there aeoms to be no reason for denying that, say, the 
decision to accept the reality of ghosts, or the docision to 
try to be more holy should be regarded as actions too Even if 
the decisions have no practical import -that is, are not intended 
to load to action in the more popular sense of the term -they 
are still actions nonetheleas. 
In some oases. of oourse, it is essential for purposes of 
clear exposition to distinguish between action)in thý sense of 
the decision to do something or tho actual doing of something, 
and action as meaning the dooision to believe something or to 
be something -e. g. where ive are discussing an inconsistency 
I between a porsonts beliefs and his aotual praotico -but this in no 
way affocts the prinoiple given above. 
IT. 
The distinotions made above do not, howover, remove all 
q 
Possibility o4&, ' ambiguity in our use of the torm "aotion". It seems 
important, for instances that we should be able to differentiate 
clearly between actions proper and merely mechanical or automatic 
bOhaviour, though we often use the term "action" to cover both. We 
say that the ants acted in a peculiar way when. we disturbed their 
I. ThUS the expression "man of action" refers either to the person 
who has led a life of physical adventuroke. g. the explorer), 
or, and this is more common, to the porcon who has the power of 
firm decision, who *gets things done". 
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nest, though in fact we do not rank these "actions* above the 
level of instinctive behaviour and certainly would not think it 
proper to apply the terms "rational" or "irrational" to then,. 
Similarly we often use the term "action" when referring to something 
done by a human being where the term "behaviour* or "reflex 
action" would be more accurate. This looseness in the employment 
of the term Oaction" reflects a certain vagueness in tho'comnon 
sense attitude to the question of the distinction between action 
proper and behaviour, and it is therefore necessary for us to 
discuss the problem of the criterion to use to make the distinction 
clear. 
4. Perhaps the most common criterion employed is that of 
wdeliberateneso". An action is something which implies a deliberate 
docision; 'whon we behave, on the other hand, we merely react to the 
strongest stimuli. This ariterion, howevor, is itself ambiguous, 
for "doliborato" can moan either of two things. In the first, and 
more common sense of the term, it means the opposite of impulsive. 
We act deliberately when we consider the issues carefully before 
deciding what to do. In the second, and wider sense of tho torm, 
we act deliberately when the action is explicitly or implicitly 
intentional in charactermhen we do something or decide to do 
nomothing for a reason or with some purpose in view-ITOW if wO take 
the first of these definitions as the correct ono, then ve cannot 
regard "deliberateness" as a good criterion of actions propertfor 
I 
1. Thus see II. A. Prichard: "If we fail to scrutiniae the meaning of 
the terms "and" and"purposo" we are apt to assume unoritioally 0 that all deliberate action, i. o. action proper must have a purposo. 
(Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a ImUstake -I4indJan. 19jnoP-31-) 
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thoro are many non-conaidered acts which ve should hesitate to 
clansify as mere behaviour. I am thinking here in particular of 
those actions which are immediate and spontaneous responses to 
situations and which, though not in any sense planned 'or oonsiderod, 
could hardly be classified as reflexive or reohanical reactions 
to Otimuli. Some of these spontaneous responses ray have a basis 
in training: thus tho trained tennis player "instinctively" 
produoos, the right stroke, the well bred young man immediately 
rebponds to the awkward silence with a tactful question, jn a sense 
theýr are roacting automatically to a situation, but they are 
reacting intsýlligently, and could undoubLedlY 9iVO a satisfactory 
reason for thoir action if questioned later. Other actions of the 
"immediate response" type seem to have a more instinctive basis- 
e. g. a mother jumping into the sea to save her child from 
drowning - but we do not regard them as belonging to a lower order 
moroly because they are impulsive, Indood in the case of the 
mother saving her child we should bo inclined to regard her 
behaviour as irrational'if she carefully weighod up the pros and 
cons before acting. 
6. Pofriapsthenlif we cannot exclude non-conSidorod actions 
from the class of actions proper we ahould. say that the critorion 
is that we should be able to give a reason for what 'we ; dd.. 'WO 
need not be consciously aware of the reason at the time of acting 
but it must be implicit in the aotion. The difficulty with this 
criterion is that we can give reasons for what are really 
behaviouristio responsen as well as for responses vhich we 
usually take to be actions proper. 1 am not thinking here of the 
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I reasons we givO for PhYSiological-refloxos such as sneezing or 
blinking (e. g. "tho reason I sneezed was that a feather tickled 
my noso") where we uao vie term "reason" as a loose synonym for 
"efficient causo", but rather of those cases in Vaioh we explain 
our actions by reference to some motivewhich prompts us to 
do ao-mothing, as we say, "against our will". Thun, when the lion 
leaps out of tho soreen in a three-dimensional film we involuntar- 
ily hide behind the seat in front, and thpugh this is really 
a oonditionod reflex reaction we might possibly give as a reason 
for our behaviour the fact that we "felt frightened". 
6. The only criterion which is capable, I think, of doing 
the job of distinguishing between action and behaviour is the 
criterion Of wrosponsibility", and even this criterion is far 
from being completely satisfactory since it is difficult to give 
precision to the term, and in any case it can only be employed 
with ooMplete effectiveness when we aro dealing with our own 
actions. Wo can novor really bo certain whether another person is 
responsible for a particular action or notothough we can often 
infer the degree of responsibility with a high dogroo of probability. 
What is being contended hero is that it is only those 
actions for which we accept responsibility vIhioh can properly 
be called actions. If we aro unable to accept "something done" 
as beingwour action"jif we claim that it happenod"against our 
will; then it must be classified as bohaviour, (Somotimesof 
courso. wo are prepared to take responsibility for actions done 
*against our will" if we think that we could havo avoided their 
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occurring). 
The important thing to noto in rospect to this criterion 
is that we are often qutte propared to accept full responsibility 
for actions which are impulsive or unplanned. It is because we 
include these "immodiato response" actions under the heading 
of actions proper that it is better to use the criterion of 
"responsibility" rather than the criterion of llwill"; for though 
it is true enough that responsible actions are actions which we 
voluntarily will to do, an emphasis on the fact of 'Willing" 
may tend to givo the misleading impression that the only actions 
which are actions proper are those which are deliberate, in which 
we consciously will to do one thing, rathor than another. 
It seems possible to use this oritarion of "rosponsibility" 
without becoming involved in the philosophical issue of freewill. 
From a common sense point of view we usually have no difficulty 
in deciding what decisions we are responsible for. No doubtpin 
theory, the convinced detorminist would have to say that he is not 
really responsible for anything he does - that he never acts but 
merely reaots. But in practice, certainly in judging his own 
actions, and usually in judging the actions of Others, he adopts 
the common sense attitude. lie does not always feel it to be relevant 
to introduoo problematical considerations about the influenoo of 
heredity and environment wh9never he does something about which 
ho feels ashamed, 
In saying that the oriterion of "responsibility'" Oan 
0-3 used at a common sense lovel without introducing the question 
of "freewill", we are not, howevertimplying that this question is 
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not of some relevance to our general discussion of rational action, 
We shall considor this point later. 
ITT. 
7. Tt is with the above considerations in mind that we 
must consider the truth of the assumptiont*, ýhioh tends to be made 
by common sonso, that the main differenco between rational and 
irrational actions lies in the fact that rational acts are 
doliborateoplanned, considered, whoroas irrational acts are 
non-considered. impulsivo. 
First. we must note that there are many "unplanned" 
acts which we would call neither impulsive nor irrational -eeg* 
the perfectly timed stroke of a bateman, the swift repartee of the 
wit; or, for that matter, intuitive acts of approoiation or of 
knowledge. 
Sooondly, even those aotions which we descrilbo as 
"impulsive" may not necessarilýr be irrational. The term wimPUlSivO" 
is itself somewhat ambiguous: when we refer to an action as 
"impulsive" we may mean eitherl(a)that it *as dono, literallyp 
without thought, without any particular purpose in mindtor(b)that 
I. This is a point forcibly made by Professor Ryle in "The Concept 
of Mindw as part of his general attack on the theory that - 
as he puts it - va performance of any sort inherits all its titlo to intolligonco from some antorior, intornal operation of 
planning what t6 do". ProfQoeor Ryle is, howovar, inclineqG, 
to overstate his case. In particular ho tends to undorestimate 
the'oxtent to which all "knowing-how" activities involve -if 
only by implication -a "knowing-that" element. 
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it was done spontaneously. without prior deliboratIon. In this 
latter case reflective thought is present but it is contemporan- 
eous with the "outward" aotion. Indeed. in some oaLes. it is not 
implausible to say that the action is the thought. 
Now, as we have already noted, impulsive actions-of 
this latter kind(o. g. the mother jumping into the water to save 
her child)are often considered quite rational. lhey may in fact 
be rational in two different ways. They may bo the appropriate 
actions in the circumstances -the action which "meets" tho facts of 
the case -and they may be performed in the mannor which we approve 
of as being "rational" in the circumstancos. rhus the mother not 
only doen what she ought to do, lout she does it as she ought. And 
one can think of many occasions in which it would be considered 
rational to act impulsively in this aecond sense of the torn.. 
There are covoral reasons why we tenI to think that 
it is only planned, oonsidered actions which have any claim to 
the title of rationality. In the first place Viero is the 
ambiguousness of the. terms "doliberate" aTid"impulsive", which we 
have already noted. Secondly, it is easy to bocome confused between 
rationality as a dispositional quality and rationality as a quality 
of a particular action or series of aotions. It is true that w1hen 
we describe someone as "a particularly rational sort of person" 
we usually havo in mind. among other things, his tendency to 
doliberate, to weigh up the pros and cons before acting, and we thus 
contrast him with the impulsive, reckless person. But this can be 
admitted without in any way controverting our previous 
statement that some non-considarod actions may yet be rational. 
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ThIrdly, the use of tho idea of "deliberateness" as 
the criterion of actions proper seems satisfactory bocauSO we 
think t4 at the main diffaronoe between human actions and animal 
behaviour lies in tho fact that whereas human beings are able to 
deliberate between various courses of action before doolding what 
to do, animals are dotermined in their behaviour either by I 
instinot or by conditioned reflexes.. 6ut even if it were true that 
this provided a clear differentia between animal behaviour and 
human behaviourit would not in itself show that the only human 
aotionn which can claim to bo rational are those which are 
"deliberate". 
1D. Reference to imnulsive acta, ospicially impulsive acts 
in the first 3enso noted. above -i. o, those Iona without any 
particular thoilght in mind - does rat3o the important quantion of 
"MOtIV8103S a0tiOW:, xhothar thoro ar3 any such, and if so how 
they are to be doscribed. We have already obsorvad that this question 
plays a prominent part. in disputes as to tho sanitý of a person 
committing certain kinds of criminal acts. 
The answer we give to this question will ObviOuSlY 
depend, to some oxtont, on our definition of the term "motive". If 
Ve mean by "motive" , t1nat which causea movement or that which 
impels to action thon it sooms fairlj clear that all actions have 
1. It in doubtful whpthor there is any critorion which will givO 
us a procino distinction botween animal and human 'behaviour, bUt 
tho critorion of "doliberatonoso, " soomo particularly unsatis- 
factory in this rospoct. -nie Z)ohavlour of many animaln allowB all 
ti, 10 usual Overt signs of "planned action", and it only begs 
the question to explain away such actions by reference to 
"instinct". 
6. 
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a "Motive". If, on the othor hand, we mean by "motive"v the 
thought of a possible satisfaction or the thouglit of a moral 
obligation then it might be argued that ive sometimes act wilthout 
being moved by Oilher desire or duty. This view I howover,,. I am 
inclined to think, can only be made plauuible if we include in 
the class of actions that which would be more accurately descrilood 
as behaviour. 
'Lt is interosting to note that when wo talk of a 
motiveless action we usually refor to the actions of others -in 
particular, to the actions of criminals - and very rarely to our 
own actions. 'What we moan when wo say that someone acted. without 
motive is oither. - 
(a)That we cannot see any reai3on for their action; that 
it -,. mmod to bo without purpoco. 
Thic, of courao, might be merely a confession of ig-noranoe, 
and nood not necosoarily imply thattin fact, the action had no 
. 
motivo; but very often it is really an assertion that we are unable 
to understand how any human being could do the particular action 
9 
under discuosionor that we cannot understand how any human 
being could be moved by, any Of the motives which have boon put 
1.1 am accepting here the common senso assumption that "everythin7 
has a causoO, and that this applies to actions as woll as events. 
I am aware that soma defenders of freewill would deny th-isbut it 
seems to me that provided one defines "cause" widely enough(i. o. 
does not limit its meaning to"officient oauno")then the above 
statoment is more or lose a tautology. 
2. In ordinary upeoch tho term "motive" tonds to be 
synonomous with destro. See p$ wt; 4(-for discu6sion of this point. 
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forward as explaining the action. In other words, what we tend 
to do is to confuse the idea of a motivaless action with the 
idea of an abnormal action or with the idea of a normal action 
done for an abnormal reason. An action vhich is irrational on 
the grounds of being abnormal or unnatural is thought to be 
irrational on the grounds of being without a motive..,, But in faot 
many so called "motivoloss actions* can bo shown to have boon 
1 
done for a very definite reason. 
I(b) That they acted on "blind impulse" -that they 
were "carried along" by irresistable emotional drivon. 
This interpretation of a wmotiveloss aotionw is itself 
ambiguous. We may moan that tho person was tile victim of an 
uncontrollable desire, but was nevertheless, in some measure 
I 
aware of what he was doing and why -i. e. that lie had a definite 
Purpose in mind. In this case, of course, the action does have a 
motive, though in ad far as the person was unable to oontrol his 
desire and was thorefore not responsible for his action, we 
should say that he "behaved" rather than that he "actod". 
On the other hand we may mean that tho emotional drive 
was not only uncontrollable but-also that it producod a state of 
frenzy in vhich the person was quito unaware of what lie was doing 
or why he was acting in the way he did-He actedtor rathor bohaved 
I. Thus in a r, ýcont murder case the judge refused to accept the 
evidence of the defendant that another man, X, had killed his 
'wife on the grounds that X could have had no posai-blo reason 
for wanting to kill her. Later it waa proved that X really had 
killed the defendantPo wife as a means of sexual gratification$ 
a motive which was hardly liRely to occur to the learned 
judge. 
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"blindly". It is probably this interpretation which most POOP10 
havo in mind when they talk of a "motiveless aotion". Vhother it 
is true that a parson in such a state of mind really has no Omotive- 
is, of course, difficult to deiermino. it is quite possible that ho 
does not know that what he is doing is w rong at law. and it is 
evon more probable that the real reasons for his actions are to 
be found in whai we oall "unconsoious motives". But people who 
aot *blindly* in some situation usually do givo some reason, 
however biZarrefor their behaviourvhen questioned afterwards - 
e. g. they might talk of boing moved by the thought of 3omothing 
1 
which they wmust do". 
The difficulty in aeoepting the view that there can 
be "motiveless" actions bocomos more apparent when wo trY to 
discover whother we ourselves have ever acted (in the strict 
sense of ihat term. ) without a motive. Looking at tho question 
from this point of view we find that what we call motivelOSO 
actions fall into one or other of those categories: 
(a)Unaccountable "alipsw of the tongue, failures in taot, 
and so on. 
tb)Certain aotions done under the stress of emotion. Thus 
we Sayp"I didnot have any reason for doing that; I was just in a 
býtd temper". 
tc). Actions done during a "day-dreaming" mood -that ist 
ve are not aware at the time of having done them. 
I. Ono of the limitations of the MoNaghton Rulesqapart from the 
fact that they do not make provision for "uncontrollable imPulsOj 
is that it is almost impossible to find a porson who did not 
have some idea of what he was doing and why at the time he 
committed his orime. As one judge has said, "Nobody is really 
mad enough to be within the definition of madness laid down in 
the rules". 
Tn the first of these categories we are roally only 
saying that we do not knov, what oaused us to do thts or 
that. Tho mgg, ýBtion is that what was done happoned "arminst our 
will" -we wore influenced by factors beyond our oontrolpby I 
physiological factors or unconscious motives. In other words we 
wore not acting but merely reacting. 
Tn the isecond example we mman either 
that vo were the 
, rictims of an uncontrollable emotiono or olse that we 
do not want 
anyono to take seriouslyw-hat r-e said or did while in a tompor. ln 
this latter case we cannot, proporly, say that we had no motive. What 
we should say is that vo"disownO the motive. 
So far aG *day dreaming' aotions are conoerned I think 
it is true to say that, on analysis, wo find that there in come 
motive at work -that our apparently random actions are controlled 
by some "ma3tor" dosire. It is only in drugged or semi-hypnotic 
states of "day-dreaming" that we could possibly claim that the 
behaviour is motivelossthough no doubt the psychologists would 
dispute that. 
The upshot of tills discussion then seems to be that it 
ia not accurate to t&lk of "motivelegs" aotions. "What we Inoan by 
this expression is covored. by tho idea of behaviouristio actions 
outside the control of the agent, and/or by the idea of "unnatural 
actions'; " and for that reason it is botter to deal with the question 
of sanity and insanity in these terms rather than by bringing in 
the confused notion of a "motiveless action". 
I. It ritight seem better to use the term "mottvo" for actions 
influencod by conscious dostros and dutiez, and to use tho term 
"cause" to describe unconscioun influences. On the other hand 
the expression, "unconscious motive" does omphasiso that the 
cause of our behaviour is mental rather than physiological or 
chemical. 
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IV. 
10. There remains one more preliminary queattonqviz. the 
rolevanco of tho froewill problem to our discussion of rational 
aotion. 
I Obviously it is not ponsible h-, re to examin, ý7 the freewill 
problom per. Ge;, wo cannot, that is, attempt to examine the arguments 
for ana againot the proposition that-we "have" fre-mill. Our 
concorn hero i, &-. % simply with the question w-., ether the assumption 
of freewill ia necesaartly implied in the common sense une of 
the torm "rational" as descriptive of actions; and, for the purposes 
of tho discusalon wo shall accept tho interpretation of freewill 
'which isj think, the common sense ono: t. e. "a person acto of 
his own froewill. if his decision is not caused, or not wholly 
caused by antecedent conditions, tnoluding the conditions of his 
Aft- 
own nature COn3idered as a product of onvironmontal and heredity 
influences. 
111. Prima facie it sooms clear enoughkhat when, in ordinary 
OP,? Och, vie descritoo a person an acting rationally or irrationally, 
'we do imply that the person concernod had 3ome frvdom of choice. 
Ift laterwe find that he had had no choico but to act in the 
way he did then we substitute sovo othor descriptive term for tho 
terms 'rational" and "irrntional". Furthermore, it seems to be the 
OSSe that oUr employment of these terms usually has "moral 
overtones" -vo do not uso them in tho meroly doscriptive annso in 
which, say, we would uro terirs like "into 1.1. iggmt""qu i ok" cautious 
etc. 
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1171. Mention of "moral ovortones" b-ings to the fore an 
objoctio' Which r. i,, ht bo ratand aarinst the com-on sense Point of vieW n 
viz. that it is ojily if wo do tntroduce the torms "rational" and 
"irrational* as terms of praiso or blare that the f roovill question 
becomes relovant-. ifhowevor, wo nue those terms as "neutrally" 
deacriptivo terms, thon vre oan by-pAGG the freewill issuo. We 
can simply sny that a p; )rson acts rationally whon hts action 
fulfills certain criteria. 
Yet, evon if we allow that these terms oan be used 
neutrally, or claim that they oft#)n are lised neutrally, does thts 
enable us to avoid the assumption of free-will? Is not this 
assumption inovitably involved whenever we use those terms to 
qualify "actions"? 
In answer to thaeo questions wo should noto, first, that 
if we mean by "action" only "the thing done" thontobviOuSlYp WO 
can describe tt as rational or irrational without implying 
anything about freewill. The freewill tnSila is irrelevant 'bOOausO 
WO are not discussing the how and the why of a person's action; 
vio are discussing only whether the "thing done" was effective or 
ineffective, right or wrong in the oiroumotanoes. 
I 
Secondly, the frenwill iscue need not be involved if we- 
use the terms "rational" and"irrational" to describe a dispooitional 
quality rather than an action. in describing a person as a 
"particularly rational kind of porson" we may be doing no more 
than describing a natural characteristic which we think he is 
lucky to "hava" in the samo way in which we may think a person 
lucky to have a "cheerful temperament". 
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However when wo are dencribinggnot a d1spositional 
quality or the "thinq done' butItho actual doing of something 
by a person then it seems to no that we necessarily ansumo that 
the peruon concerned had SOM3 fro, dom of c1hoice, and this holds 
good over, thoagh we uso tho terms "rational" and 'irrational" 
a3 doscriptiv, 3 terms only 
I 
froe of any moral connotations. It may 
se,, ým at firot sight as if thin contention in not true, for not only 
do Nve somotimes describe a person as acting irrationally whon 
there is a strong Drim& factq case 'for arguing that his dooision 
was completely dotormined(e. g when an habitual drunkard wrecks 
his life through his inability to control his desiro for drink)t 
but, also, we Gtill say that a person rade a rational decision 
oven though we aro'suro that for a person of his Onature" any 
other dociuion would have beer, alma. st impossible in tho circum- 
stancos. Yet vilien wo reflnct further on the common sonse unc of 
the terms "rational" and "irrational" in O&soc JJYe thoso 'we 
always findI think, a. tacit aw3umption that the person concerned 
had the possibility, evon though a bare possibility, of choice - 
it was conceiveble that they migýit have done other than they did. 
In otner worde, wheriever Nye aro, in fact, completely convinced 
that the person had no choice then we ceaý,! e to aesoribi his action 
ab rational or irrational. we saj, of tho drunkard, for examplo, that 
"thorejp a no point in telling hirr, that hof a acting irrationally - 
he'a no longer ablo to control his appatiten". 
13. 
In actual fact. however, it is rare for us to use the 
torm3 "rational" and"irrationall, to describe actions without in 
SOmO sOnSe. implying titat tho action Iv morally. pralSeworthy or 
37. 
or blameworthy as thq case may be, and it is of some interest to 
I 
noto ". ray t%ece tormc should have thene, noral oonnotations. 7here 
FAro at le-ant thron reasonn which come to mind: First, the 
con. c0q, lonces of irrational Conduct are often "oornicious. Secondly, 
tho ability to act rationally often derenda on a degree of control 
ovor lthr,. ý enotionc and wopntitnu -which we f Ind morally - adn, irable. 
Taus wo praiso comoona for acting rationally in that lie resisted 
an immodtate ploacure for tlin sake of hie future hanpiness. 
Thirdly, and most im,? ortantly. there is Implied in the 
common senae position the "bolief that wo have an obligation to 
try to act rationally. T hio being co we are roally failing in a 
moral obligation whanover wo knowingly act in an irrational way ell 
-e. g. knowingly act "agfAnnt thr., - facte", or refuBo to modify an 
r,, rr jum. ont which wo to be celf-contradtctory oto. The caso for 
the use of t1aece torma az torms of pratso an(l blamo roally rests, 
in tho main, on thic third point. "Wo shall discues laterin 
Chapter IX, th(ý wholo question of whst wo mean wion wo talle. of 
"an obligation to act rationally". 
Note. In tar) above &Znction we have argued that the 1"reewill assirnption is still involved even though we use the terms 
nrational" and "irrational' as dpscriotivfý torras only. It 
might be saidthowoverthat the freewill question is only 
relevant in the context of the T. oral problem and is quite 
irrelevant outside this. 
r taink it is in fact true that we usually only discuss 
the problem of freewill within the context of moral issuest 
but I cannot see any logical reason why wo should deny the 
relevance of tho froowill issue to matters which aro. as it 
worev"morally neutral". -, *ion we describe an action as "shrewd" 
forý instance, we do no4nocessarily imply that the porson is 
to 'be morally praised or blamed for acting nhrewdlybut we do 
imply that he had sore choice of action in the circumstances, 
and that ho chose wisoly. 
The Only 'way in which wo could prove the above criticism to 100 sound would be to show that it in only when we 
. 
') 
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are under a moral obligation to do somothing that we have, in fact, 
any freedom of will. It would, in the very nature of the case be 
impossible to prove this one way or the other, though I GUPPOsO 
it is a common experience that we are most consciously aware of 
freedom of choice when we are confronted with a duty, eapecially 
with a duty which we do not want to fulfill. One of the defects 
of emphasising this aspect of t' he problemhowever. is that it 
tends to obscure the religious nature of the freewill problem. 
The desire of the ordinary man to believe in freewill arises 
not only from the urge to make sense of our moral attitudealbut 
also from the urge to find significance and meaning for his life. 
What he is asking for is the assurance that he is not simply a 
plaything of impersonal forces but is a creature, croated for a 
definite purposeand with some froodom. of choice in determining 
his own destiny. 
7,5. 
C`"-APTr,. R IT. 
T IT r, CRTT fy- R10N () F If" 11 r. NATýVRAL 
I. 
It is not so immediately obviouspas it is in the case of 
the other critoria, that we do use the con,.,,, opt of the "natural" as 
a critorion of rational aotion. If we wero to ask the ordinary man 
'what he means whon ho talks of someone "acting rationally* he is 
much more likely to refor to the principle of 'accordance with 
the facts" or the principle of theftgroatest good" than to the 
criterion of tho "natural"; yot it does not require much reflection 
to show that thts latter criterion iS used both directly and 
indirectly. as a standard by vhich we determine Vhat is rational 
und what is irrational. 
The most obvious example of the employment of this 
criterion is in those casos where we dismiss a person's aotion 
as being completely irrational because it was done for reasons 
which wo regard as completely "unnatural* -reasons which no 
normal man would fool moved by in the same oiroumstanoes. As we 
saw in the last chapter,, what we call "motiveless crimes" are 
very often crimes whose motive is unnatural or abnormal. 
1.1n general It is true to say that tho connection between 
tho idoa of the "unnatural" and the idea of the "irrational" is 
much more marked than the connection between'the "natural" and 
the "rational" There is a very obvious reason for this. which 
to some extent applies in the case of the other criteria as 
vOlloviz. )that whereas if an action does not fulfill 
'one of the 
fundamental critoria of rationality it can safely be described 
as irrational, it does not nocosearily follow that when it does 
fulfill one of these criteria it also fulfills the othors. Thus 
a Person may be moved by a "natural" motive, and to that extent 
(see over 
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The motives in question nood not necessarily be of the 
kind which we rogard as b9ing grossly immoral -thoughlas we shall 
see, the "unnatural" and tho "immoral" are often used as 
synonomous terms -but in so far as they are the kind of motives 
which ve can neither understand a person's being influonced by at 
all, or, fit loast, not influenced by in a particular sot of 
ciroumetences, then we tend to assort that the actions which result 
from tho influence of such motives must be irrational. Thus we 
cannot understand a personva being moved by the desire to inflict 
pain on himsolf. or a mothoroa being influenced by nomn very 
abstract notions of justice to give information which will bring 
harm to her own children; sintilarly the average man finds it 
difficult to accept the rationality of the religious vocation if 
it leads a porson to seek martyrdom or to live the life of a 
hermit. 
Sometimes What wo oonsider unnatural is not so muoh 
the nature of the desire per so as the degree of strength which, 
it exerts over a person. Thus it is not unnatural for a woman to 
fool affection for hor dog. but we think there is something 
wrong if she devotos to it aa much attention as a mother would to 
her child. ligain, when we refor to an action as unnatural we may be 
be acting rationally. and yet, in trying to sattsfy the desire which 
has moved him to action, completely ignore the relevant facts of 
the situation. Prom that point of view his action has to be 
considered irrational. 
Ak In the case of the criterion of the "natural" there is 
a further reason why tho connection between the "natural" and the 
'rhtional" is not -oartioularly strongland that is that in some 
cases it is actually more rational to act "against the natural 
motive" than to allow oneself to be influenced by it. For 
discussion of tilis point sea bolow. 
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00m, menting on not so much the motive of 
the action as the way 
it was done. Thore are situations in vhioh it is naturaland 
therefore rational to act spontanoously, without deliberation-, 
there are other situations in which it is natural to act with 
extreme caution. 
2. Another use of the idea of the "natural" as a criterion 
of rational action is found in those casesWaere we excuse or 
defend a person against the charge of having acted irrationally 
by saying that "It was only natural for him to have acted in the 
way he did". Thus we may defend a person against the charge of 
irrational conduct if we discover that the motive of his action, 
though incomprohensible to us, was an accopted motive in the 
mr, 11unity in which he lived; in other words we think it natural 
for a person to bo influenced in his behaviour by the moral 
standards and customs of the society in which he has been reared. 
Then, again, we may excuse a person from the charge of irrational 
behaviour by pointing out that though his action was a foolish 
one in the oiroumstancesyet the "instinctive* pull to act in 
tho way he did was so strong that his action was really a quitO 
natural one. 
3. A more indirect use of the criterion of the natural 
is illustrated in those cases whore we argue that if a person 
wants to be happy thon he ought to live "naturally" or "according 
to nature". 31milarly we sometimes argue, especially since the 
advent of modern psychology, that the proper way to bring up 
children is to allow their "natural" instincts free expression. 
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In argumonts of this kind the actual criterion of rationality 
is the principle of the "greatest good", but the concept of the 
natural is introduced as a subsidiary criterion inasmuch as 
tho means to the achievement of the greatest good is calculated, 
in part anyway, by reference to the concept of the natural. 
*rhat we mean by the term "natural" when used in this contoxtq 
I 
and also in the other cases noted abovesis the question to which 
we must now turn our attention. 
ii. 
4. 'Iho unsatisfactoriness of the concept of the "natural" - 
whatever the context in Vhioh it is employed -has been commonted 
I 
on by many writers so that it may sfýem somewhat superfluous to 
labour the point any further. Tho only reasons for doing so are., 
firat, that notwithstanding these criticisms the terms "natural" 
and "unnatural" are still used very frequently in ordinary speech. 
in dofenoo or in criticism of various kinds of adtions; 'and secondlN 
that a Som0what more detailed analysis of those concepts yields 
a number of quostions that are in themselves of considerAblo 
intorost. 
I. Butlor, flume and Sidg-wick have all made detailed critioinmS Of, 
or analyses of these ooncepts, each from a slightly different 
point of view.. Thus ButlorkSermon q) is concerned with the 
problen, of wliat we mean by "natural" when we claim a "natural" 
supremacy for the oonsoience; 'Hume, on the other hand(Bk3 of 
Treatise, "Iv*oral Distinctions Derived from a 11-ioral Gensd) deals 
with the difficulties of the conceit of the 'natural" in trying 
to answer the question whether moral principles have their 
source in nature; thon, again, Sidgwiak(ChaDtor Vi,? Zethods of 
Ethics) oritioisoa the attempt to find in the notion of the 
"natural" an ultimato ground for ethical prtnoipleB. Both the 
latter writers, though dealing with a somewhat different Droblemp 
follow much tho same line in their criticisms -Sidgwick's1l. boing 
the more detailed and cogent argument of the two. 
&D - 
The most frequent criticism of the Cono0*Pt Of the 
1. 
"naturalff is of course that the term is, radically ambiguouG. TTOt 
2. 
only can it be defined in a number of different ways, some of 
which seem to be opposed to each otherbut these definitions 
themselves, and especially the ones in current uso, suffor from a 
lack of precision and clarity. In consequence arguments which 
are based on the concept of the "natural" are always exposed to 
the dangers of a petitio principti; or else suffor'from the fact 
that the torm "natural" is used in one sense in one ýpnrt of the 
cirgument, and in another sense in a later stage of the argument. *Wo 
commence, aay, by arguing that it is natural(in sense of normal) 
for certain natives to be promiscuous in their sexual relations, 
and9perhaps, conclude by arguing that it is natural(in sense of 
"according to original nature of man") for the natives to be 
promiscuous, and yet not realise that the reaning we give to 
tho term "natural" has shifted. 
6.14"ow, in relation to the particular problem we are 
discussing here, viz the employment of the concept of the "natural" 
as a criterion of rational action, it is possible to note at 
least four senses of the term "naturalff which are relovant; and this 
observation is itself an apt commentary on the ambiguousness Of 
the term. Leaving asidelhoweverlthis general criticism of the 
concept, and coming to more specific criticisms of the ways in 
I-Cf. ITUMOoP, 174: ------ our answer to this question. depands upon the definition of tho wordlVaturethan which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal. " 
2. The Concise Oxford Dictionary lists fourteen sensesin which the term "natural" is used. 
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which the various senses of the term 'natural" are employed, we 
first of all enumerate and define tho four censes which are 
relevant to our general theme: 
(a). The most frequent meaning of "natural", when used as 
a criterion of rational action)is "normalo(in sense of "Viiat is 
usual") or "oommon"(as opposed to what. is rare anI exceptional), and 
we shall find, I think, that this sense of the term is imDlied in 
many instances where other criteria of . "the natural" are also 
onerative. An aotion, then, is natural if it is the kind of action 
wliich all men, or the great majority of men would have done in the 
same circumstances. An unnatural action. on thts deftnition of the 
torm, is one which we could not imagine tho "normal" Tnan(i. e. 
t'ho vast majority of people whom we know) doing at all, or, at 
least, doing in these particular circumstances. 
(b) A second, and much less common, definition of 
"natural" ist"that which is based on an innate moral sonso" - 
a definition which is, of coursog particularly relevant to the 
problem of the relation between moral action and rational action. 
The uce of this meaning of the "natural" as a criterion 
of rational action is not always so obvious as in the above 
definition of the termand in many oases is only indirectly used 
as a critorion. Its most obvious employment is in those oases Where 
someone commits a crime which shocks our moral sensibilitiestand 
1. ThusqHume, op. ojt., p. 474, "But nature may also be opposed to rare 
and unusual; and in this sense of thevord, which is the common 
one9there may often arise disputes concerning wiat is natural 
or unnatural". 
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we say, "It isn't natural for him to do a thing like that -he 
cannot have any moral sonse". Of course the field of actions 
oovered by this sense of "natural" over-laps a good deal with the 
field covored by the critorion of Vhat is "normal v or " coTrmon", 
a point which is seized on by critict of the moral sense theory 
, who sook to show that what "shocks" our so-oallod moral senso is 
merely that which we have been "oonditionod" to regard as v.. *rong 
by the community in 7which ve have been brought up. 
Sometixýes thin sense of "natural" in expressed in 
terM3 Of the "natural law" rather than in terms of the "innate 
moral sense". The two ideas always go together; tho3o who believe 
in the theory of "natural law" alwayn in fact accept the notion 
that this "natural law" is written in the"hoart of mana or is 
recognised by the untainted conscionoe. This conception of 
natural law", with its implications that the universe itself is 
Ostablished on justice and law, is, often used, indireotlyg as a 
criterion of rational action. as for example when we are told 
that a man can only fulfill himself, or roalise himsolflor gain 
true happiness if he obeys the"natural law within himw, or if 
he allows his "true nature" to express itself, or if he obeys 
I 
the"na, tural authority"of consoienoo. We shall Soo that this 
I 
view sometimes gets confused with another view, viz. othat a man 
best roalises'himself if he allows his natural(in the sense Of 
"original") emotions and, passions to be expressed without 
hindrance. Actually the two views are diametrically opposed: in the 
I. Thio is more or lose the point of view of Butler, as expressed 
in the second and third sormons. It isvin other words, part of 
the natural oonstitution of man that., conscionoo should rule 
over the passions and appetites. 
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former the passions and appotites(tho 'natural man") are subjected 
to the discipline of the moral law; in the latter these passions 
are allowed complete froedom. It is only because of the radical 
ambiguity of the term Onatural" that such opýosing viows could 
be confused. 
I 
(O)The third meaning of "natural" is hard to expreas 
precisoly. Tho ouggested definition, viz., "that which is SO 
constitutod or determined by nature" indicates the element of 
*doterminism" which is the essential aE; poct of this definition 
of the natural, 'but it excludes those actions which are natural 
tn the sense that they are the necossary product of a certain 
process of Conditioning. 1fe wish to inolude actions determined by 
the environment as well as by nature. To got round this diffioulty 
it might be possible to define the sense of natural employed here 
I 
as "that which is to be surely expected" In other vords9when we 
'understand the nature of a person and/or the conditions undor 
'which he has been brought up then we are not surprised that lie 
tends to act in certain ways -we say it is natural for him to do 
this or to refrain from doing that. 
This sense of the term "natural" is used in the main 
to dofond persons against the charge'of having acted irrationally. 
Thus when sor"oone does something whioh seow to us morally wrongg 
or foolish, or unnatural(in sense of unusual) we may defend him 
I by saying that it was natural for him to act in tho way he did - we 
say, "well9thatto his naturevorl "when you think of his early environment 
it is to be expected that he would aot in that way. "We may notin 
I J. This is a slightly strongor version of a definition given by the 
Concise Oxford: "not surprising. to be expected". 
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cases like thesoarguo that because the person 
did what was natural 
for hi,. m therefore his actionvas rational espocially 
if what lie 
did was unnatural in the sense of "abnormalff, but ve may nevertholqns 
use this third sense of "natural" to defend him, at loast, against 
the charge of irrational behaviour. Cceasionally, however, wo 
do use this sense of "natural" as a direct criterion of rational 
action. Thus if a person gets pleasure from some activity whicht 
though abnormal, doea not do harm to anyone else, we might defend 
him by saying that "since he is so constituted by nature that he 
does obtain pleasure from this activity, therefore, so long as 
he is not harming anyone else, it is rational enough for him to 
*. ant to satisfy his nat-ural desires. " 
As 'we SlIall see, the main difficultY about accepting this 
sense of "natural" as a'criterion of rational action is that it 
seems to imply a detorministic view of human actions,, andto that 
extent, makes it difficult to talk of rational or irrational 
actions at all. 
(d). The fourth sense of "natural" whioh is relevant 
in this context is "that which is original, untouch. sid -oy ran, as 
opposed to that which is artificial". 
This definition of "natural" is as commongl thinklas 
the first given above, and maypperhaps, be regarded as the basio 
definition. Cortainly, the idea of *original" is involved in 
the other definitions we have listed. Thus many of the actions 
i. Thusthomo-soxual activities batwoen consenting adults are often 
defended along these line3. The propensity is abnormal. yot 
natural to the persons concernod; and thetr attempts to satisfY 
their desire can be defamled as being both natural and rational. 
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which we regard as most normal are those whoso motive force 
Is to 
"ound in some original proponsity; moro obviouslY Still the 'be f 
oonoept of "original" is implied in the notions of an "innate 
moral sense" and of "that which is so constituted by nature". 
Nevortholoo3 the idea ofwhat is "original, " considered by itselft 
is only indirectly employed as a criterion of rational conduct. 
As we have already noted it in the basic concept omployed in 
the various philosophies of a popular nature which rocommend 
simple living". return-to"naturol, "froo-expression" as a cure 
for man)s illa and as thor9foro tho rational course of action. 
And it 13 bocause these popular "philosophioa" continue to have 
a considerable vogue that it is worthwhile nummarising once 
again the difficulties involved in arguments based on the idea of 
, what is "original". 
We shall now deal with eaoh of the above definitions of 
the "natural" in turn. 
7. The first crittoina to be noted against the idea of 
what is "normal" or "common" considered as a criterion of rational 
action is not, perhaps9very important. It. is made by Hume: "But 
nature may also be opposed to rare and unusual, and in tilis sense of 
the word, vhich is the common one. thoro may often arise disputes 
concerning what is natural or unnatural; and one may in general 
affirm, that we are not possess*d of any very precise standard, by 
which thosO'disputes can be decided. Frequent and rare depend upýn 
the number of examplea we have observed; and as this number ray 
gradually encroase or diminish, Ptwill be impossible to fix any 
exact boundaries betwixt them. 1. 
1.0p. Cit. 9p. 474. 
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It may seem as if a preoise standard of roasuremint is 
not roally required since, for most practical purposeSt we kn0'w 
well enough what conntitutes normal conduct and what does not. 
Certainly in the all imnortant, field of moral conduct there is 
usualiy a unanimity of opinion concerning actions which we 
describe as "unnatural". We may differ about all kinds of moral 
issues. but vo agree in listing certain kinds of criminal acts 
or immoral acts as boing abnormal or unnatural. 
On th- oth, )r hand there is some cogency in Hume's 
argument for it is true that we often tako for granted thatwhat is 
common to our own tribe or class or nation is oommon to all 
mankind)only to find on investigation that the habits of men ray 
vary oven in rospect to matters whiolli we rogarded aa fundamental. 
We cannot thorefore assume that becauao a person does something 
which seems unnatural, that "shocks" our sensibilitieSphO ist 
in conse'qu6noo to bo regarded as insanopor as having actedgin thin 
particular situation, in a thoroughly irrational fashion. It is 
Possible that his action is based, saygon the same rational 
oalculation of consequences which, at other timespand for other 
Peoples, has established such an action as a social obligation. 
While this point should not be pushed too far, it has 
1 
to be kept always in mind. The emphasis on the Onormal' in the 
80=0 of Vnat is "statistically common or average" too easily 
loads to the substitution of merely oonventional conduat as an 
idoal, and to the persecution of thoue who have tried to baco 
1. Two obvious examples are the practice of infanticide among the 
ancient Greeks, and tho killing of the aged and infirm by the 
Esquimaux. Some kind of rational justification oould be put 
forward jDX for both these practices. 
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their actions on principles dorived from a thoughtful and objective 
ctudy of human experionce. 
8. A more important critioisr., mentioned briefly 'by both 
Hume and Sidgwick, is that we often pralse, tho porson who acts in 
an uncommon way. Thus we praise the person who "koops his head" 
I 
in a crisis when all the others have panicked -we say tha t he was 
the only one to act in a rational manner. And in gonoral. It might 
be asserted that there are many occasions on which it is only by 
doing the unoommon thing that we are able to aohiove some and we 
desire or fulfill some obligation. tioreover, if we include beliefs 
under tho heading of actions then again it is true to say that 
it is often the "uncommon" belief which happens to be the right 
one. Indeed this is so frequent an ocourrence that wo sometimes 
say, admittedly only half soriouslygthat the Omajority are alvoys 
wrong". 
I 
In answer to this criticism it might be said that in 
using the idea of the "normal" as a oriterion of rational aotion 
we do not intond to imply that it is alvnys rational to do what 
the majority of men would do in the samo oiroumstancespor irrational 
to do what is uncommon, but rathor that we intend to imply that 
a peroon acts irrationally when his action is motivated by a 
motive which the majority of men would not fool, oither at all, 
or in tho, partioular circumstances conoerned. In other words 
the criterion refers to the reaoons for the action rather than 
to Vilat is dono. From this point of viow wo can list throo 
different kinds of unnatural or irrational aotions: 
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(1). Whore we are not movod by an emotion whioh would 
bo felt by all normal men in tho particular circumstances involved 
-particularly if the emotion in question is regarded as "instinct- 
ivo", i. e. an innate feeling common to all men. Thus we regard it as 
unnatural or irrational for a soldier not to feel some fear on 
vie eve of battlolor for a mothor not to feel the emotton of 
love to her now-born ohild, and if this lack of the approppiate, 
emotion affects the outward action then we say that the person 
has acted irrationally. 
(2). Whero we are moved by a desire which, though not 
i=oral, is yet so bizarre that wo'find it diffioult to believe 
that the person so moved is sano. Wo could also include in this 
category actions motivated by desires whoso influence seems OUt 
of all proportion to the true worth of the end desired -whorelin 
other wordstwe expand a disproportionate amount of time and energy 
on trivial objeots. 
(3). Where we are moved by motives whioh offond. the 
moral sense of the majority of the community. Theae motives neod 
not bo desires-sometimes it is the nature of tho moral obligations 
which people claim to be motivated by which "shook" our moral 
oolings. 
9. Whan, hoaevcrve analyao the types of situation outlinod 
above vre find that the notion of what is"normal" again proves 
ineffective as a criterion of rationality, and that in reality the 
the actual criteria used are to be found in some of the other 
PrinciýleB which we are to discuss later. To take each of the three 
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classes in turn: 
(1). Here we noto 'fir3t that there are some"instinctivo" 
foolings(e. g. jealousyangor)Vhioh are felt by all ren but which 
in some oircumstances we feol ashamed of being moved by, even 
though we oxcuse ourselves by saying that it is only "natural" 
to experience them. Jealousy and envy are univorsal foelings that 
most of us would rather not oxperionoo, and wo think a man 
to be particularly noble if he either does not oxperiance such 
emotions or else struggles to avoid their affecting his actions. 
And in gonoral wo think it rational to try to defend ourselves 
against the influonoo of such feel, inga. 
Secondly, in Somo oases whero we do not seem to oxperionce 
the natural emo-tion(i. e that fft. lt by the majority of men)tho roason 
is to be foundrkot in the fact that wo have unnatural feelings but 
rather that we have not judged the facts of the situation 
rightly. Thus a man ruay not experience fear simply becauso he does 
not realise that thore is anything to foar, and in so far as his 
conduct is to be considered irrational on this score then the 
oT,. )erative criterion iS tho "principle of accordance with the facts7 
Thirdly, in so far as vio do really seem to lack somo 
natural feeling(e. g. the fooling of mother-love)then this point 
is not relovant to tho quostion of rational notion, for tho 
experiencing or not experiencing of a particular feeling is 
something whioh is beyond our oontrol and therefoýre oan only be 
regarded an bohaviour and not as notion propor. Tho quention of 
rationality only enters in. if we allow our actions to be influen- 
cod by the feoling or absonce of feeling, and of course it is 'bY 
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no means inovitaole that wo would allow our actions to be so 
influenced. If we do, however, the test of the rationality or 
otherwise of our oonduot would in fact be judged, not by reference 
to what is normal -though this might be the criterion used at a 
first, superficial level -7but by the criterion of happiness; org 
if moral issues are involved, by whatever criterion it is that we 
use for detormining"rightness". Thus a person may be abnormal in 
that he has no sexual feelings butwe would scarcely say that 
lie vias acting irrationally if he took no interest in members of 
the opposite sex. Indeed, using the criterion of happinosswe 
should criticise him for acting irrationally if, in spite of his 
abnormality, ho decided to got married. If, on the othor hand, the 
absence of the appropriate feeling resulted in conduct which 
ve regarded as blamoworthy(e. g if a mother neglected her children) 
it is doubtful whethor we would use the criterion of the "normal" 
in judging the wrongness of her actione. CortainlY we would say 
that the mother's actions were unnatural, but if we were asked 
to say why we regardod her a9tions as wrong we should either 
appeal to the idea of the "natural", defined as "what is based on 
innate moral sense" or else refer to some such principle as 
the obligation td protect the helplesB. Wo shall return to thiS 
point shortly, when we deal with the third class of unnatural 
actions. 
(22)Te do not need to say very muoh about this class of 
actions. There is first of all tho diffioultY of deciding what 
kind of desires really do come into tho category of ecoentrio and 
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bizarro. Secondlyq it is difficult to argue that a person is 
acting irrationally if he obtains pleasure from some acti'vityp 
liowever strange, that is not in any sense morally vioious-We might 
of course argue that he would got more pleasure if he pursued 
some more normal interost. but even if this were true, the criterion 
used here would not be that of normality but rather of "the 
greatest goodw. 'What, one imagines, is the source of much of the 
criticism of occentric activities is the moral conviction that 
people should not indulge in them when there are more "noble* 
pleasures available. Thus we fool that the American business man 
who spends all his spare time with toy trains ought to be reading 
Shakospearo instead, or attending concerts of classical music. 
(3). In respect to tho3o actions which, a3 well as boing 
abnormal, are grossly wrong from a moral point of view it does 
seem clear enough that. overtly at loast, tho criterion of what 
is normal or common is not used either as a method of discovering 
'what is right or as a criterion of rightness. Whon we say that 
it is wrong for a porson to kill children for pleasure we do not 
inean by the term "wrong" "that which the vast majority morally 
disapprove of" -though in fact this would be the case -we moan 
that it is solf-ovidently wrong, that we intuitively know it to 
be wrong. Evon when we use the torm, "unnatural" to describe the 
action it is doubtful whether this term is usei in tho sense 
of "uncommon" -or, at least. thiswould not be its primary meaning. 
Wo aro more likely to moan by it "thatwhich offends our moral 
sense". 
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That the notion ofWhat is common doos'not play a direc't, part 
in determining Vhat we consider to-be right or wrong is shown by 
the fact that we do not give up our moral boliofs simply because 
vo discover that a majority of people disagree with us. Conversely, 
the fact that a very largo numbor of people hold some moral 
boliof is not oonsiderod to bq, in itsolf, a sufficiont reason 
for our accepting it as true. 
10. It seems then that the concept ofwhat is common or 
normal cannot be used directly as a criterion of rational action. 
This -is not to say, ho-wever, that these notions do not play an 
important part, albeit an indirect part, in determining what we 
consider to be rational oonduot. For one thing it is obvious 
enough that we are very greatly influenced, espocially on questions 
of taste and morals, by the prevailing opinions of the society in 
which we live, so that our ideas of what ie rational or irrational 
will usually follow closely the trend of majority opinion. 
More importantlytin considering the question of our 
own happiness it is often rolovant to take into account 'Phat 
is the normal in oustoms, boliefe, mannors oto. Boing "out of stop" 
is never very pldasant, and except where moral considerations make 
(it necessary for one 
4 
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to nonconform, it is usually considered to bo-rational for ono to 
try to oonform to the customs of whatever community one happens 
to be living in. 
Then,, too, it is often essential for the Purposes of 
formulating policies to find out Vhat the majority opinion inpor 
what the averago oapabilitiao of a certain section of the 
oommunity is &f , and so on. Politiciano. poýrohologists#economistS etO 
all noed roliablo statistical evidence as to what is *normal' if 
their theorie3 and policies are to be rationally basod-, and thoughq 
in such cases, the true critorion of rationality is the prinoiple 
of "accordancewith the faots", yet the lprinoiDlo of what is common 
plays an indiroot part in the determination of what is rational. 
Finally, in th03e fields where there is olaimed to be 
objective standards of valuation, tho fact of our differing from 
the majority, or the faot of there lbeing oonsiderable differences 
Of opinion among thoso most qualifiod to know is bound to soem of 
considorable importance. Thus it is assumod by common sense that 
thore are objective standards of right and wrong, and whatever else 
this may be taken to mean, it at least means that all normal von 
would agree on moral quostionG provided all questions of fact and 
definition were settlod and the influence of solf-intorestpprojudice 
I. In this connection we should note that psychologists and 
sociologists often confuse what is statistically normal with 
what is morally normal(i. e according to moral standards). They 
mako"what is"synonomouu with"what ought to be: Thus tho famous 
Kinsey report, having proved statistically that the majority of 
Americans did not "live up to" the official code of soxual 
morality, drow the conclusion that this official code miist 
therefore be wrong. 
2. Soo later(ps-211fl. ) for discusBion of this point. " 
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and non-moral feelings known and countored. This. boing so it is. 
0ound to bo a matter of. some concern if wo find that our moral 
views In come mutter are not shared by thoso whom -we have reason 
to reupect as being sound guidoe in tho field of moralovand 
avmronesu of such disagrooments in ofton a main factor in prompting 
us to ro-examine our own positton. In tho same way, evidonctý as to 
important difforoncos in moral boliofa b^. twoin pooplo? s of differ- 
ant races and creeds forces us to examine the founlations of our 
own moral oodo,, and to try to find somo way in Vaiah theso 
apparent differences In moral sonsibilities can be oxplained and 
reconoiled. To day this is not, howoverto argue that r. ajority 
opinion or oven complote unanirmity to the critorion by which we 
dooide quostions of valuation. We rooomiso the fact that it is 
posoiblo for evorybody to be wrong. That we do assort however is 
that it ought to be pousiblo to obtain agreement on quoutions of 
morale, and that whoro thf3ra is conaidorable agreement On any moral 
qUention thero is a strong prima facie case for thinking that this 
is tho right view. 
Whether, of courze, thore are objective Bt4ndards in 
matters of valuation, and why "we should think it nnOODDArY to 
presuppose that there are -theoo are question(; which vO cannot 
diacuss horn. we are only concerned at this point to omphasice, the 
fact that, given this prosupposition, the concept of thn natural, in 
tho sense of "what is normal; is bound to play a part in our 
judgmont au to viiat constitutoe rational action. 
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110 The second of our derinitions of "naturalO, viz"Ithat 
wiach is based on an innate moral sonsi. " is applicable, as a 
criterion of rationality. only to a very small claso of actions 
those which are so terrible, so "unnatural%that they 'shook" our 
moral Banatbillties. Wn do not say that a person acts Ounnatur4IIY" 
or irrationally when he broaks the moral code or does somothing 
, which we thinIx of as particularly blameworthy -indeed wo regard 
moral failure as only too natural, and somotimos aro tempted to 
defond vrong-doing as rational on th(N grounels that our own 
intoroats are served 'by thie or that act of wrong-doing -it is 
only when hq doin aomothing or acts from. a motive which we annnot 
imagine any normal poroon being influenced by that we say his act 
is irrational. We say of such a person that he must lack a normal 
"moral sonse'. 
12. Tho assumption undorlying this us* of thf) torm "natural" 
is that all normal human beings Posso-88 sOr-'s kind of moral 
faculty by m6nns of vilicli they intuttivoly grasp the truth Of 
certain fundamental moral axioms. Thunvo mig, "A GaY that it is 
Self-ovidont to all normal human beings that it is wrong to inflict 
pain for tho Taere ploasure of doing so. And if a person could not 
"see$ tho truth of this ariom, we should rogard it as futile to 
argue with hir. about moral queationsjust aa we cliould not wasto 
time trying to teach a child wathomatios if hr) could not grasp 
that I and I 
1.1 think-it Is truo to nay that tho ordinary man thinks of thiz 
faculty AD a moral "sensoq, though ho 1008 00motimou doncribo it 
ae "roanonw. 300 lator(pZ4ý`f(-) for discunsion of tilis point. 
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13. in ortticlaing thto use of the concept of "natural" a& 
a critorion of rational aotion we should notolfirzt, that it is 
eas, j to confuse -f,, wo propositions: (a)that a ýqrson iS Irrational 
or insane IV '11v) does thooo unnatural ; ýOtiojjs; a person 
aots irrationally If he doos theco unnatural actions. Only tlie 
firat of thoue proDo3ittons is, I think, proporly Implied when we 
talk of a per3on committing, say, anOunnatural"ortmo, for it does 
ceom to bo tho oase that 'w1v)r-i a parson loos sozo "unwatural" 
aotion wo uoually describo tho aotion in auoh torms tilat 
quo-stion of his rosponsi*bility for tho action is loft very much 
doubt. Eithor wo tn. ply that the per3on "laoks"-a normal moral 
conso, or ia without any moral oonse at all; or olce we arguo that 
though ho know tho action wati vrongho was unable to control his 
dostroo. 19hat we 'Apind difficult to accept to the contention that 
he know he van doing wrong, was able to control his amotionstand 
yot still dootdod doliborately to do tho action-yot it is only P 
on thic lattor aszumptton that we can properly talk of his aoting 
irrationally (uaing tho ooncept of thowimnatural" an tho criterion) 
14. But nyon it ve could accopt the feasibility of this 
latter ntato of affaira ari3ing, tian criterion of rAtionality 
oould be critictsod on the further ground of "vaguonosag. Vo have 
already notod that we tond to include in, thq claus of *unnatural' 
actions not only actions which are considerod to be right by 
"normal" mon of other raoes and oreeds. but also actions Vnich, on 
more thorougil in3-pootiontva riight come to accopt as boing rigNt 
when Judged. say, on some such criterion as the utilitarian 
principle I In other wordevilowever -wf%, descr"b) and 
interpret VIO 
moral 4faculty. one, thing at lsýast is clear about 
itgand thht tG 
that, its judgments can bo oasily influonond by P. 11 kinds, of non- 
moral fActors. Tndoedvas we all %now, ono of tho strwongest argummnts 
againnt the assumption that there to such a faculty 
is based on 
tilts obaervation-! it to arguod that what we call. tho Omoral sense* I 
is StmPly a oonvmlent natre for the feolinqo we oxperionce RG a 
rocult of tho Impsot of tho combined forces 0"61' Gootal prossur, es 
and inherent temperamental and emotional faotors. 11owevor that 
MAY be. it is no. t tobo doubted t%at tho ordinary man assumen 
too easily that any porson dotng an action which shocks his moral 
6 
oonse must necessari . ly bo abnormal or warpod in his moral sonsib- 
ilitins. 
15. It in within thf) context of some kind of reltgiouS 
interpretation of reality that the strongost case for the 
existence of a "moral sonse"I can 'be m4do. 0imilarly it to more 
casy to dofond the various *natural law" theorioutor to defend tho 
Proposition that a man boot serves his own interests by obeying 
the judgmenta of*natural law", if we fir,., %t accept the proposition 
that thin law and tho moral sense whiah intuits it is the croation 
of a God whose concorn it is that the righteous ahould b9 
rewarded and tho wicked punish#, ýd. Evon outsido this context, howevor, 
I. For oxample,, pr3ople in tho West have boon shockod to hoer roports 
that in Communist conntrins young, n-,. ýonlo have been encouragod 
to inform against ovon their parento for anti-communtBt WlvitiP-S 
Yet, unless we aro prnpared to arguo ti, lat family loyalties take 
precedence ovor all otlaers. we cannot condemn such conduct out of 
-hand. Chri-at tana in prrticularowho have been instructed that they 
must "hate" their parents for the sake of tho kingdom of God, 
should havo Boni approcintion of the iusuoa involvodonven 'thougil 
deploring tiio aims of the Communists and their deliberate 
fostering Of an atmosphere 0f,,, zI'3'Ptcion and hatred. 
57. 
we could argue, on empirical groundsthat all men have a moral 
sense in that thoy are oaDable of the experience which wO call 
"being under an obligation". We are probably justifiedgmorcoverg 
in stating that if a person seems to be incapable of understanding 
what is meant by terms like "right""wrong%*moral obligation* then 
he is insane. What is much more difficult to prove is that this 
moral faculty gives us certain knowledge of the content of 
morality. Eut it is this proposition which requires to be granted 
if we are to have any success in defendihg the use of the "natural" 
("that which is based on the moral sonsew). If a person lacks a 
moral sense then we cannot properly describe his actions as 
rational or irýational sinoe, he oannot bo held to be responsible 
for anything he does. If; howeverlho does have some approoiation 
Of what it means to be under a moral obligation to do something 
then we oannot taket'it for granted that he is aoting "unnaturally* 
in the sense of "oontrary to the moral sense" if he does 
something whioh shooks us. It is always possible that vhat- ý10 is 
doing has the approval of his oonscienoe. 
1. When we desoribo a person as insane because he does somothing 
vhich indicates thatho is ldaking in any appreciation of 
moral concepts we tend to use the expressions, "he lacks a 
moral sense" and, "he lacks reason" more or less interchangeably 
One possible justification for this rather loose 
use of the term "reason' is that it appears to be the case 
that those who seem to lack a moral sense are usually found to 
be of very low intolligence. Of course persons of good . intelligence may have "abnormal" desires which they are unable 
to control; it is also possible for a person of good intelligence 
to have what seems to others to be very odd notions of 
right and wrong. common sense often assumes that people who 
come into these latter categories are lacking in a moral 
sense. 
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Tl,,, o use of tho concopt or 41natural" in thO sonse of 
Ithat w1hich is oo conatituted by navire(or by the ýonvironrmnt), 
as a aritorion of rational action Is OP()n to such e0viour, 
obJections that we can consider it very briefly. 
Ac wo laavo stated bofore it iS OIDT. )110d in thot3o situationS 
whore vo seek to defond 80meono against tho ohargo of immoral or 
foolish conduct by emNliasising not so much vhat ho has dono or 
his roasons for so acting but rathor the relationship betwoon 
vhat, wa: 3 dono and thO 00nstttutional and environmental fnotors 
which influonood tbq dociaion. Now if we im9ly, in using such a 
criterion, that tho decision was tho inovitablo product of thoso 
influences(i. o. that the action wan natural in the same aonse as 
thn, falling of tho ripa apple to tho ground is natural) then wo 
can asoort'that it is used in. proporly, for tn a case ltko thin 
thn qixostlon of rattorial or Irrational conduct vould bo irrolevant. 
'Pio porson could not 'bo hold reaDonsiblo for hic action. On the 
othor hand what wo night bo Jr. plying is that thqso facLors made 
it difficult for him to not othorýthan ho didjand that this 
I 011811 to bo taken into aocount in our judgn. ont au to t1io rational- 
ity or Otherwiao o: r his action. Tho reforonco, in tms caco, howevort 
to not So much to tho r4tionality of' cio 1, norsonlo actiongbut 
rath, er to tho rationalit; j of our judamont ac totat&tuo of that 
action;, what ia being asSorted to that wo cannot make a pro,; ar 
jujý;. Lejjt until -wio ; tnow ti,. e) full f&Lctt3 of -Lho porson's horoditxry C) & .4 
make-up" ana hio genoral social background. 31o far as tho 'p-orson 
himself is Concerlif3do only U, 7 could possibly know whothor lie 
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could have acted othor than ho ý3id. lf, in 1-jigs opinion, ho could 
have overcomo tho conatitutional and onvironxontal, liandicaOs, then 
his action, being a renponsiblo ono. vould h3vo to on judgod 
according to some othor critorion. than the ono wo are discussing 
hora, for the question or the influonco of thgoe factors would 
then bo Irrelovant, though they would not be irrelevant if wo were 
concerned not with the rationallty of the action but with the 
quoution of tho attribution orýpraia,,, ) and blarro. 'Ve mightfor 
in3t, rmco, praise somoone for making a great effort to ovorcomo 
great odds even thougla his ýotion wAs in fact an irrational one. 
M Somoti,,.,,. os, whnn U. ". 0 thn term "natural" in tho nonce 
in vlaich wo aro discussing it hero, we sonm. to be reforring not 
so much to the fact that thi action Is determined by prior 
conditions but rathor to the fact that it is natural for a por. son 
to 'want to try to zatlsf7 dosiroa which ho cannot hnlP foolinge 
Ihis kInd oV dofonoo ia oPten uaed in roforenoo to actiono whiolip 
though rogardod ao unnatural by a large 6action. of tile population, 
zvot do not obvtously cauce harm to thoze who voluntarilY 
participato in thom -(). g. tho rjuxual aotivitioa of d hOmO-80xual* 
In this matter hcnievor two propo3itiona tond to be 
conf%iuad. On tho ono hand wo may vioan that it ia natural, in the 
son3s of inovitableifor a pqrson to wunt to zatisfy any dosire 
vhich hanponu to novo him., and on tho. other ýAje -may m4an that the 
doilro ic of auch a nature that t'he porson who orporionoes it 
Will naturally(i. e. inevitably) try to oatisfj it -that hiý 
t0tiOnspin othor viordstwill bi completely determined by the 
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desire-On the lattor tnt-ornrotatton wo would bo dealing vith 
bohaviour and not with action no that tho questicn of rationality 
doos not art3e; on tiia former tnterprotation it would loo rolevant 
to ask whothor it is rattonal lb"or the pornon to sook to sattaf. V 
the doairo whiah lio cannot help, foolingbut tho critortonom7ployed 
vould not in this case by the oritorion of the "natural" , aS 
defined in this cootion. 'Wo might any that it is rational for him 
to try to oatisfy his deatro becauan it will holp him to achiows) 
hapilnous. or we mtght say taat it is not rational beonuse it will 
do lhim spiritual harm 'in th#. % long run", or wIll anoil the 
hapninoas of othoru-, or agaln we might arguo that it in rational 
for him to try to satibfy thtý diairo beoausn it is t1ways harmful 
to reprous a naturalki. e. orlginal) propensity. But it would not 
inako sense to say that it io rational to attempt to satisfy the 
dosiro booause it is natural(i. e. inevitnblf)oin view of his 
I conotitutional"ma%e-up") for him towant to oatinfy it-Thia BOOmO 
14 
so obvious ac to be not worth mentioningobut it4characteristic 
of-tho ooniusiona whioh arise vhenovor tho oonoont of the "'naiur&ý' 
is omploynd that simple logioal orrore Of t1lic kind aro Often 
ovorlooked. Thus when apologists o, #" the"no reProssion" 80hOOl Of 
thought defend thair theorios 'by invoking the authority of the 
01 natural" it in not always clear whether they are asnorting that 
t1loro to something intrinsically valuable in what is "original" 
which we ignore to our oost, or 'whether they are asserting that 
it is Impossiblo to rebel against natural instincts and omotions 
-ttiat they will inovitably dotrýrrntne our bohaviour. oitIvor consotO1,101Y 
or unconsciously. 
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Vi. 
I 
18. This last point brings us to our last definition of 
'Rnatural", viz., "that which is original and uncultivated as 
distinct from that which is artifictal". This sense of the 
"natural" is employeda3 we have already noted, an an indirect 
criterion of rationality inasmuch as it is claimed that if'We 
live *according to nature" or if we allow our "original" nature 
to express itself, unhindered by the conventions and restrictions 
whioh have been artiftoially built up round us, then our ohances 
of happiness will be considorably increasod. 
This balief in the therapeutic value of the "natural" 
is very widespread and has taken shape in a variety of popular 
"philosophies". Though the advooates of the "natural way of life" 
aro often sceptics in religion one suspects that one of the main 
influences behind the current "naturalisms" has boon the Christian 
1 
belief in the world as GodPs creation. "And God saw evorything that 
He had made, and behold it was very good". 1t is only by assuming 
some such influence, albeit an unconscious influence in many cases, 
that one can explain the very oommon'belief that what is "original", 
untouched by man ispqua original, good. Of course, the dofonlors of 
thoories of tho "natural way of lifo" also try to provo on 
empirical grounds that theim-, is tho true way to healthtor 
vitality, or happiness as tho case may be, but I think it is true 
to say that it is very rare for those theories to be founded on 
carefully sifted evidence. 
19. The criticiass ' which can be brought against this 
1.300 
. 
Sidgwick, Mothods of Ethics, p(38. 
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criterion of "the original* are well known and need only be 
sumn. arised here. Piratp there is' the difficulty of distinguishing 
between what is original and what in non-original. Not only has 
man' a Vhole way of life been built up 'r)y moans of his ability to 
"into rf ore"with ' the processes of'naturotbut the development of man 
hiTnself has undoubtedly been affected by his oanacity for 
reflection and for oonsoidus control of his behaviour. Thus the 
instinctivo apparatus which characteriseS th, -, lower animals has 
degenerated in man as the power of reason has incroased, and' it in 
now doubted by some psychologists whother man now has any instincts 
in the strict sense of the torm. And just as it is now difficult 
to tell what is original and what is the product of "interference" 
so far as the nature of man is concerned, so, in rosgoct to al; ost 
all tho products which are of the greatest importance to man, it 
is impossible to separate the original from the artificial. What, 
for instance, is a "natural" food2All the- food products we eat 
today -or almost all -are the result of thousands of years of 
"artificial"cultivation. 
3econdly, if it is right that we should be allowed to 
ex9ress our natural desires without let or hindrance. then are 
we to allow a person whose original nature is abnormal to oxpross 
his own nature frooly? And if we introduce the qualification 
that. wo should be allowed to oxnreas our naturos freely so long as 
we do not interfere with the rights of others, does, not this in 
effect destroy the Whole case of the naturalists? 
Thirdly, if the theorins of the naturalists are carried 
r- 71 . 
to their logical conclusion thoy load to absurd ;, aon6equencese 
Thus the eduoationalist, who argues that t-t-je young child shotild 
be allowed to express his"natural instincts freely" shouldgif 
ho is consi3tnnt. allow parents to express their 'natu. ral instincts" 
freoly when their children are thoroughly oxas"rating. It is as 
natural for parents to want to train their children in tho way 
of life they think desiroable, as it is for children to resent 
an/, -rer, triction on their freedom to do as they pleaso. But to 
admit this point would be to roduoe the more oxtrome forms of 
"new education, theory to absurdity. 
. 
rourth, it. would bo vory difficult, oven if we could 
discriminate between the original and the artificial with some 
precision. to prove that "ýhe natural way of life" is' the best 
way for all men. No, doubt a very good case could be made for the 
proposition that we would all be happier and more virtuous if 
we led a quieter, more simple and p'llaysically vigorous life that the 
conditions of modern city life permit. "But it would be diffl. oult 
to prove that all men would benefit from the kind of life advocated 
by Thoroau, or that in general the more "natural" life of the 
0ountry produces a finer type of man than the"artificial" life 
of the city. 
Fifth, even for those who base their faith in the "naturAl #0 
on a religious faith, thero are many difficulties to overcome. Thus 
the ChrLatian has to explain why, if God oroated all thinge, goodp 
so many things about the univorse, over whioh man has no controlt 
seem to be evil -earthquakesstrifo among animals otc. 1-Toreovertif 
he ACCOD 
ýtS the doctrine or original sin, theft he would have to 
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take the view that the "natural man" was inherently evil, and that 
the only way to Osave ono's soulw was by curbing the natural 
appetites and by destroying the influence of manP s natural 
pride. 
SO. What all this amounts to then is that the idea of what 
is "original" is in itself of no use either in determining Vhat 
we ought to do or what is for our own happiness. It may., of coursep 
ba sometimes true, as a matter of factpthat our happiness lies 
in being guided by the idea of the woriginal*(e. g. we may find 
that we can only maintain our health by concentrating on the 
so-called more "natural" foods) but each case would have to be 
decided on its own morits, and tho criteria employed would havo 
nothing to do with tho conoept of tho natural in any sonse of 
the term. 
Vii. 
To Bum up: -The ariterion of the Onatural", though used 
by common sense as a criterion of rational action, is not adequate 
for that purpoue. Apart from the general dofoot of its ambiguitYt 
we found that, on any of the specific interpretations of the 
OOncept,, we were unabIo to got a criterion which proved effective 
in distinguishing between rational and irrational oonduct. In many 
cases 'where the criterion was used it was found that it was 
applied to bohaviourtatic responses rather than to actions properv 
and in those instances where it was omployed in describing 
actionsvproperly so called, it, seemed very often to be the case 
that one of the other critpria of rationality would have been 
more 'effective. 
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CHAPTER III. 
CRITF,. RION of ACC0RDANCF 
WITH TTlr, ý FACTS. 
I. 
I. In ordinary spoech we often say that a person is acting irration- 
ally if lie doesnf t base his decisions on the facts or doesn't act 
according to the facts. It is with this interpretation of rational 
action that we are concerned here, and for convenience we have 
named the oritorion used in this connoction Vie principle of 
"accordance with the facts". 
What do we mean when we say that it is rational to 
act in "accordance with the faots"Or, to put it in the more common 
negative form: what do we mean when we say that a parson acts 
irrationally if he does not aot in "accordance with the faots"? 
The first point to noto is that we do not mean that our action 
is necessarily irrational if it proves to have been founded on 
a false judgment as to the facts., gistakes as to the facts can 
bo, as we say, reasonable Týistakestdue to unavoidable ignorancol 
chance errors eto., and no charge of irrational conduct is levelled 
at us unless it is thought that we oould have avoided the mistalkes. 
In other words we only use the principle of "accordance with thO 
facts" in those cases whore we think that the porson concerned 
has ignored the facts, or in some vay acted "against them". 
2. A second point to note is that this principle should 
not be interpreted to mean that we act irrationally if we 
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refuse to accept the facts "passively" but try to modify them to 
suit our own oonvenionce. Sometimes. of course, it is necessary to 
accept facts "passively" and it is certainly a characteristic of 
a maturerational person that he is quick to appreciate and 
accept brute factswhich cannot be altered, or which could only be 
modified at too great a cost. 'But it is equally characteristic of 
man, as a rational boing, that he tries, wherever possible, to modify 
and control the facts so that lie may the better achieve his ends. 
Thoro ishoweverno inconsistency in saying, on the one hand. that 
in order to act rationally we must act in accordance with the facts 
and on the other, that it-is often rational(i. e. practicable. and 
in our interests) to try to modify them; forof course, it is 
obvious enough that the possibility of our controlling or modifying 
facts is dependent on our first accepting and understanding them 
as they are in the complex of their relationships with other facts. 
3., Tt is not possiblej think, to give a concise and oxplicit 
definition of the expression "accordance with the facts" 'When we 
use it an a Critorion of rational aotion; wo can only summarlse 
the types of situation in which it is so omployedý. Thus we say a 
person is acting irrationally: 
(a)When he does not examine the relevant facts carefully 
boforo coming to a docision; or does not re-examino them when he 
lWe may define a "brute fact" as one whiohwe cannot see any 
possibility of modifying. This is nothowover, to suggest that it 
cannot bo modified. 14any so-called brute facts have proved to 
be vulnerable to man$s attacks. Ono of the moot difficult practical 
problems concerning rational conduct is the problem of knowing 
how much time and energy chould be spent in trying to modify 
faots'whioh seem completelyl"invulnerable. " 
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has reason to suspect that he has based his action on a false 
judgment an to the facts. 
Thus sometimes we make "spot" deoisions without having 
rrado any real attempt to examine the relevant factors. All of US 
see-T. to be capable of sudden, irresponsible decisions of this 
kind9and often in oonneotion with very important matters. 'When the 
decision happens to have been the right one we usually dignify it 
by the name of "intuition% Then, again, vo sometimes try to avoid 
re examining the facts because, having made up our minds as to 
what we ought to do or believo, wo do not want this first decision 
upsot. We have formed a vested interest in it. 
I (b) When he allows subjective factors to influence him 
in his judgments of the facts. 
By tho expression "subjoctivo factorso -ýe rofor to the 
influence of dosires and prejudioes(i. o. beliefs which WO have 
acceptod on hearsay or by indoctrination 9the evidence forwhich 1 
'we have not ourselven attemptod. to evaluate or even ascertain) 
Thus it would not bo considered a sufficient reason for 
accepting the proposition "God exists" that wo find such a belief 
comfortingpor would we consider it good enough to act on the 
assumption that all black men are inferior in intelligence to 
'white men if the only grounds for the belief wero that it was hold 
to bo true loy the majority of white people in the communitý-. 
0 
1-It is extraordinarily difficult to got a satisfactory definition 
of"prejudice: Tho dictionary definition is a very bad oneCpro- 
conceived notion) inaGmuch as preconceived notions play an 
important part in all knovledgo. Moroovor, as we shall see later, 
thero is a sense in which it is often rational to allow desires 
to influence us in our judgments of the facts. 
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This particular interpretation of the principle of 
'"accordance with the facts" gives rise to certain difficulties 
which we shall discuss later. The difficulties arise from the 
fact that though common sense thinka of the "factual" as something 
oxisting quite indopendently of the observer it is a common place 
of -)hilosophical thought that our experienoe of the world of the 
faotual is relative not only to the kind of sense organs we 
possess but also to certain presuppositions by means of which 
we order and interpret the data of senso. Some of these prosuppos- 
itions soom to bo common to all men -we cannot but think in torms 
of them -but others again, though apparently univorsal, seem, as it 
wore, to have a history, and to be the product of a complex of 
conditions which may pass away. It may oven be possible to show 
that some of thesi "presuppositions of thought" are pragmatic 
instruments only, which have boon fashioned so that we might 
the more easily control th-., ) world in the interests of our douires. 
If this be so then it is obvious that the question 
of the irrationality of allowing subjective factors to influence 
our judgments of the facts is a very complicated one in which 
we might find it very difficult to draw a clear distinction 
between subjective factors which are justified and those which are 
not. 
(c). When ho admits that certain things are the case, and 
thon proceeds to act as though they were not the oase. lle says one 
thing and does another. In theory he accopts X to be truo, but in 
practice acts as though Y were true. 
a 
I suppose it is true to say that when wo talk of 
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so, meone not acting in accordance with the facts we have in mind 
some such situation as this where a person knows what the facts 
are but ignores them or deliberately acts contrary to them when. 
i-t comes to a practical docision. Thus the ctudent knows that he 
cannot pass his examination unlessTdoes a cortain amount of 
study, yot he continues to waste time in various amusements. Sometimn5 
we express such a conflict as a conflict between theory and 
praotioe'or between bolief and practice, but this manner of 
deacribing itand indeed the actual statement of the principle 
given above under ýo), tends to confuse two kinds of-irrational 
conduct: those in which the criterion applied is that of 
"accordance with the facts" and those in which the relevant 
criterion in that of "oonsistenoy". Lt is therefore necessary for 
us,, to bo moro procise in our statement of what we moan Vnen 
we talk of someone acting "against the facts". 
The principlo of connistonoy is relevant only in those 
cases where our acting "irrationally" in some sense involves the 
acceptance of propositions as being true which are really 
contrary. In the practical field, or rather in that aspect of the 
Practical sphere inwhioh we are concerned with the relation 
between theory and practioo, nreoept and example. the application 
of the principle of consistency can be illustrated by examples 
of this type: 
(a)A -person accepts as true the proposition that human 
actions are completely determined; in some of his actions, howoverl 
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(say, Vhen dealing with the misdemeanours of hia oldor children) it 
is clear that there is an implied belief in freewill -i. e. he does 
not adopt the freewill position for pragmatic reasons; at the 
time of action he really accepts it as true. 
(b). A person accepts a certain rule of action(6. g. nover 
to tr,, iýat negroes as "equal"). But in circumstances whore the rule 
is applicable he acts towards a nogro in a way that clearly 
1. 
implies a belief in his "equality: 
Where. howover, we det againat the) faots or ignore them it 
is not a case'of accepting as true propositions vhich are contrary, 
or of believing one thing tobe true in theory and another thing 
to be true'whenve act. Tho position is that we know perfectly 
well what the facts of the case aro, but vo refuse to"bo "bound" 
by them. We say, "I know that X is the case, but for this or that 
reason I intend to act as though it were not the case. * 
It might bo uaid here that in so far aa wo do not act on 
the belief that X in the case we must of nocosaity act on the 
assumption that some other belief contrary to X is true, and that 
thorefore we are being inoonsistont. This criticism however confuses 
two things: an action based on a belief or which implies a belief 
'which is accepted as being indeed truo-and an action which is P 
based on a proposition which is accepted as true for pragmatic 
reasons only, whioh has, in other words, an "as if"status only. 
In a case liko this it would only be possible to bring 
I. Por a more dotailed. desoription of the application of the 
principle of consistency, see lator. (pý-toc, ý-). 
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tho oliarge of inconsistenny if, in making the statement that 
the proposition X gave a true description of the faots, we addedl 
as a rule of actionlthe proposition that one ought always to be 
bound by the facts -and then procooded. to ignore this rule when 
it came to the point. So long as we do not make or imply thiS 
further statement then we cannot be charged with being inconsistent 
if wo deliberately decide to act as if the faots are different 
from what we know them to be -though, of course, we can be 
criticised faD acting irrationally in that we have not acted 
"in accordance with the facts". 
4. This distinction between irrational actions in which 
the principýe of consistency is the operative criterion and those 
in which the principle of "accordance with tho facts' is the 
criterion is not always easy to draw in praction. Several factors 
tend to confuse the issue. In the first Place, thO two criteria 
tend to support oach othor, the one prompting the other into 
action. Thus it is often as a result of our noticing an inconsist- 
oncy between two propositions that we oomo to realise that one 
I 
Of tM propositions is false; on the other hand, tho realisation 
that some proposition is false may force us to break up a 
'Wholo system of theory which we had been building up. In the 
theoretical field in particular the two principles really dove- 
tail into each other. 
0 jecondly, what oonfuses the issue still further is that 
there are some oases in which our practice is at varianoo with 
what we profoas to believe but in which neither of these two 
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principles can be applied. Thus in somo cases wo might find it 
impossible to act according to the facts or according to the 
principle of action we have 'formulated bacauso of external 
or psychological difficulties which we cannot everoome. In other 
oases. again. our failuro to act in accordance with the facts or 
to conform to the principle of consistency might be due. to 
como*woaknoss of character. Wo do not assort that it wan impossible 
for us to conform to these prinoiples; nor do we aseert that we 
were deliberately flouting them -we moroly say that we lacked 
the *will powor" to do as we knowwe ouaht to do. In such oasos 
'we right well say that we acted irrationally. but in so far as 
vo woro not trying to act deliberately against these principles 
then it might be bottor'to use come other descriptive torm. 
5. The difficulty which we have in distinguishing botw#*ýon 
the situations in which the principle of consistency is the , 
proper criterion of rationality, and those in which the principle 
of accordance with the facts is the proper oritorion can be 
illustrated bj taking coveral examples of apparently irrational 
actions where it would soom that either principle would be 
relevant. Thoso examploo. morooverhave the morit of 'being of some 
interest in themselves. 
(1). Somotimoswo aro movod to action. by foolings which 
ve know to bo irrational in that we do not boliovo that the 
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object or objects of the feelings aro"roal". Novertholess we 
cannot soor. to avoid boing influenced by the feelings. Thus, for 
example, we may not believe in ghosto, yet when we are left alone 
in a house roputed to be haunted we begin to fool frightened and 
find oursel-ýes taking precautions and in general acting as though 
ghosts were "real". 
In a case like this can we bo said to act irrationally, 
and if so what is the criterion used? 
We could argue that the actions are involuntary; that we 
are com. pletoly dotermined by "feelings" which we cannot help 
exporiencing. In this case the question of rational or irrational 
conduct would not be relevant. 
Or, again, wo might dosoribe the -position by saying that 
wheroas the feeling of "fear" is involuntarily experienced, yet it 
is possible for us to overcome this fooling and to refuse to 
allow it to influenoo our actions. In giving in to the-feelt'ng 
of fear we are aoting irrationally in that we are not aoting in 
aooordance with the faots as we undorstand them. 
Thirdly, wo may accept the analysis given imtediately 
above, bu, t assort that novertheleas we cannot really be said to 
act irrationally. We are not deliberately refusing to conform our 
actions to the faots; we are simply unable to do as we ought because 
of cowardice or lack of will power and so on.. 
11ourth, the argument may be that the fooling it self is 
accompanied by or prompted by a Judgmontonamelytthat there are 
ghosts, and that therefore the irrationality consists in our 
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being inconsistent -in our holding one thing to be true at one 
time. and the contradictory to be truo at another time. 
Whioh of these is the oorrect interpretation would 
depend partly on how we analyso the difficult psychological 
quoutions involvedopartly on the particular angle from which we 
view the personts behaviour. If we emphasise the omotional tension 
thon we may decide to call the action an involuntary one; if we 
view the action in the whole context of the person's beliefs then 
we mi , ght argue that he was being inconsistont; if we think only 
of the beliefor "half-belief" which forms under the influence 
of the surroundings then we could argue that the irrationality 
consisted in accepting something as true on very slender evidence. 
,j e_ It wouldthowevor, be difficult to defend the view that,, acted 
against the facts in the sense of deliberately acting as though 
what 'we believed to be true was not true. 
(S). The above illustration may bo regardedoperhapspas 
a partioular example of the kind of situation in whiohlas we 
put it, we are intolleotually convinged that something intor is 
not the oace, but not convinced "at heart". In the above caselthe 
bias was in favour of the intellect -ortratherg there was no 
gone 
I 
ral predisposition to suspect the findings of reason -but 
partloular circumstances 'brought to the surface an emotional 
fear that ghosts might really exist after all. There are*othor 
casos, howovor, in which we find it very difficult really to accopt 
and to act on propositions vhich wo know, intells3etuallyto be true 
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Against the evidence we go on half hoping. half believing that 
tho facts are otherwise. We do not actually refuso to accopt VIO 
facts, nor do we deliberately ref'use to act upon thom; nor are 
we carried away by strong emotions to act on contrary assumptions 
as in the case desartbed. above. 'Nhat happens is that we tend to 
act from time to time on assumptions -Which could only bo valid 
if the belief or beliefs which we have accepted as true intellec- 
tually were roalLy false-, or else we conveniently overlook 
obvious implioations of these beliefs. 
In cases liko, these we could argue either that we are 
boing inoonsistent, in that we acoopt one proposition as true 
in theory and a contrary proposition as true in praotice; or Olse 
we could'olaim that we are really by implioationlrefusing to 
accept an true what we know to be truo. Howevor, as we noted in 
the example given above, "so could not striotly sny that we are 
deliberately acting against the facts. 
J. Thus the existentialists(of the non-religious school) makd a 
point of emphasising that modern man has nOt really faced up to 
the implications of believing that God does not exiSt-110 still 
tends to live'on assumptions carried over from the Christian 
era, and has not tackled the problem of living in a universe 
without meaning. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that 
one other form which irrational conduct of the kind described 
above takes is-o the enjoyment of emotions which, intelloctuallyl 
we know to be inappropritte in that we do not think they have 
any Object. Thus the republican finds himself 6njoying the 
Coronation, not merely because of the colour and ginoral speotaolr. ý 
, but also because, for a moment, he shares the sense of awe and of 
spiritual unity which, in a cooler moment, he might despise as 
meaningless or assert to belong to the worship of God alone. 
It is sometimes contended by defenders of religion that 
we cannot experience an emotion which has no objoct; and that, 
therefore. since all men have at some time. experiancod a sense 
of the"holy" there must be some object to which the emotion'-is 
76. 
6. Discuasion of these rathnr complex cases raii3013 
8L 
point. dealt with by Hume in the section on thr-4 
"Influencing 
motives of the will" (Bk. jj, Treatiso)viz. , whether we can 
pronerly 
talk of irrational or unreasonable foelingskor passions, as 
he 
called them). As we know, Hume)s point here is that truth and 
falsity, self consistency and self contradiction can be predicated 
of propositions only; that passionsbeing"original exist-mW can 
neither be true nor false, reaeonable or unreasonable. It is only in 
so far as they are aocomnanted by judgments that we can call them 
reanonable or unreasonable, and than, as Ilume points out, it is the 
judgmont, properly spoaking, which is roasonable or unroasonable. 
In general flume's point neomB to be clear enough butas 
the abovo discussion shows, there do seem to be cases in vhich 
it is the feelings and emotiolis which are irrational rather than 
the aooompanying 
\. 
judgments. Wo find that we oxDorience feelings 
or aro moved to action by feelings which we know to be inapproDriate. 
in that they "imply" a state of affairs which we know does not 
exist. Our intellootual'judgments aro overthrown by our feelings. 
This seems to be a oommon enough oxperinnos; the point 
is whotherin situations of thiskindowe really can s-neak of 
"irrational feelings". Various interpretations and explanations 
can be put forward, none of whichI think justify us in thinking 
that 'we have here an oxcention to Ilume)s rulo,, thougll they do 
referro. d. This argumont, howover, rests on a very simple confusion, 
viz., b9tween the proposition that every emotion has an object, and 
the proposition that it is always clear what the object of an 
emotion is. Thus it is true that most of us experience at times, 
say., in tho presence of grand sconnry, an emotion of awe and majesty, 
but it is by no means clear that this is a religious Omotionithough it may feel the same as the experience of the, rystic. 
'-7 
indicate that the psychological problems involved are more complex 
than Hume thought. 
First, wo may argue that these irrational feelings are 
a. Lwajs caused by irrational judgm. ents: tliat, for instance, our 
fear 
I 
of ghoots in the roputedly haunted house is caused by the fact 
that(perhaps subconsotously) we really do believe that there are 
suoh beings. This belief is brought to the eurfaae by the 
particular circumstances. 
Socond, we may argue that certain emotional states of 
mind can cause us to fom an irrational belief or cause us to 
useo" the facts differently no that a false judgment results. The 
emotional state of mind macy itself be the effect of a true judgment, 
but once it is experienced it upsets us no that we become incapable 
of making further correct judgments. Thus,, ehen placed in a lonely 
house we may experience a reasonable enough fear of burglars, 
but this fear gets a "hold" on us and we find ourselves beginning 
to think of ghosts. In a case like this we should not really say 
that the feeling is irrationalbut rathor that it causes us 
to make an irrational judgment. 
Finally - and thic may oeom to come nearest to the 
position that there are. in fact, irrational feelings -it might be 
said that in some oases the feeling and the judgment are 
contemporaneous -that, in a sense, tho feeling is the judgment. To 
think, with or through our emotions. 
This Interpretation of the situation does not, howevert 
affeot Hume's general point, viz. that the terms rational and 
irrational oan, strictly speakinglbe applied only to propo3itions 
i 
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for it states quite definitely that a Judgment is implied in 
the fooling. The only point at issue would be the psychological 
one whether the judgment must always precede the emotion or 
whether we can, in some sense, talk of the emotion being the 
judgment. 
The main point which Hume soomed to overlook -and this 
is mentioned in the second interpretation above -is that, though 
foolings may not in themselves be irrationalthoy can be the 
cause of or give rise to irrational judgmente. And, poychologically, 
the two may be so contemporaneous -i. e. the'feeling and the 
following judgment -that, for all practical P12rposes we may talk of 
the feeling being irrational. 
7. "go have now summarised. briefly tho main ways in which 
the principle of"accordance with the facts" is used as a criterion 
of rational a0tion, and wo can reitorato our main points 'by 
oaying that there is a prim. & facie case for contending that a 
person has acted irrationally if ho, (a) does not examine the 
relevant facts before coming to a decision, (b)is influenced in 
his judgmonts of the facts by subjective factors, (o)acts as if 
certain judgments which he knows to be true are not true. 
It io now nnocasary to say something about the term 
"facto". Tho point I wish to make here is that in ordinary speech 
the term "facts" tends to bo used as a synonym for "truth", so that 
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when we make statements such as "ono#s actions ought to 'be based 
on the faots" we tend to mean by "faot" something more than what 
is often implied by the expression, "mattors of fact"; in other 
words wo refer not only to propositions about sensory faotspbut 
to any proposition at all stating that somothing io or is not the 
caso. This being so we find that the number of way6 in vhich we can 
act irrationally, judged by this criterionis greater than is 
suggeBted. say, by Hurnelwhenin a well known passage he writen: 
"---tie only in two nonnes that any affection can ba called 
unreasonable. First, whon a passion such as hope or fear, grief or joy 
despakt or security is founded on the suppoattion of tho 
existence of, objecto which really do not exist. Secondlypwhon in 
exerting any passion in action, ve choose moans insufficient for 
the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of 
causes and effects. l. 
In saying, then, that our aotions are not basod on the 
facts we may mean any ono of thn following things: 
(I)That they aro based on falee propositions an to the 
. existence of somo olojoct or obJoota. 
(',, )) That they are banod on fnlno propositions as to the 
existence of cartain qualitios in an objoot. or an to thn lack of 
certain qualitims in an object. 
It is important to note here that, from a common sense 
point Of view, thin would includo statomonta about the existence of 
certain aeathotio or moral quftlitten in an object or in a statO 
of affairs. Thiis the otatement, " Salzburgh is the mont b9autiful 
town in Austria" would 'be regardod as stating a faot about 
I-OP-Oit. p4lG. 
OVq 
Salz"qurgh which ray or may not be true. Similarlytif we acted in a 
oortain situation on the assurption that Jones was a good man, and 
then discovered that we had boon mistaken, we might easily say we 
had been mistaken as to the facts. 
(3)That they are based on false propositions ac to the 
ocourrence of events. 
It is odd that-Hume did not mention specifically 
propositions of this kind for, prima faoiet there does seem to, be 
a clear distinction between propositions about the nature and 
oxibtonco of objects and propositions about the occurrence of 
evonts. Cortainly, for practical purpooos it. ts important to 
distinguish between the two as many actions are based, not on the, 
suppo3ed exietence of an objeot, but rather on the supposed 
oocurrence of an event(e. g. a Christian might 'base his faith on the 
supposed resurrection of Josus from tho gravo). 
(4). That they are based on false propositions as to the 
'rolationo'botwn. on objects. 
The most important of these relations is, of course, 
the causal relation, but faloo 'propositions as to othor relations 
may lead to irrational aotions too, 
Under this heading can be included the relationship 
of nn-, ans-ands, a relation which is of groat importance in any 
l. Thie is not to say, of courne, that "valuo-factaw are just the 
same as other faots. But though, for example. beauty is not a 
property of an object in the same sense as "redness" is, we can 
saylI think, of any object that it has some properties such that, 
when we observe the object, the experience of beauty is aroused 
in us. The difficulty, of course. is to state what these proporties 
aro, 
1* 
discussion of rational action. 
ei. 
(b). That they are based on false propositions as to the 
namas and definitions of things. 
It is usual'to differentiate botwoon propositions stating 
2 
mattors of fact-and propositions stating definitions. llere, however 
we are not concornod with the question of how something should be 
named or defined, but 'with the question as to what, in faot, is the 
accepted name or definition of a thing -the kind of question, in 
other words, which could be settled by looking up a dictionary or 
oncyclopaodia. 
Under this heading we could also include propositions 
which state what the acceoted rules are for this or that situation 
1.11robability relations are of great importance too. Nany of our 
factual mistakes concern qUeStiOnSOf the probability Of this or 
that happening, the probable reliabtlity of a witness and so on. 
It is to be notod here that when we are discufising, ., 
the disposit- 
ional qualities of a person we are really discussing tho degree 
of prd-bability with which we can forcoast whether he will do so 
and so in certain kinds of situation. Thus a person of equable 
temperament is one who "keeps his temper" more easily than most 
in situations where a loss'of temper might be expected. 
I 
2. We usually think of a"fact" as something which impinges on us 
from"outsidou -a datum of exporienoo. Definitionston, the other hand we tend to rogard, eithor as being arbitrary, or else as 
being merely interpretative. It is diffioult, howover, to maintain 
a clear-cut distinction botween. the two., Our docisions as to the 
facts ari; a always in part determined by -.,,,,. tho vay in which we 
define what we mean by the "real";, 44iile, of course, our definitions 
of things are usually basedýonw]hat we conceive to be the 
"real" nature of the things. Even itth^n we are concerned only with 
the meaning of worda it is often necessary for us to discuss tAl 
nature of the thing for which the word stands. Thus if we try to 
say what we mean by "intelligence" or by "intelligent actions" 
we are soon Involved in questions about real things. This is not 
to say that every word necessarily stands for a thing, or that 
definitions cannot be arbitrary; it is reroly to emphasise What 
is obvious enough, namolythat when we are concerned with 
definitions we are not necessarily playing a game onlyin which 
words are simply counters. 
83. 
11. 
8. We shall now discuss the value of the criterion of 
"accordance with the facts" as a criterion of rAtional action. 
And the first question to ask hore is why it should be taken for 
grantnd that it in a criterion of rationality. Can we define more 
precisely -what we mean by"rational" whon we say that it is 
rational to not in accordance with the facts? 
In answer to the abov, 3. question two-possible lines of 
approach suggset thomsolvos. First, tt nAgrat, bo said that tho 
tly used nrinoiplo Waccordance with the facts"is Only indiroc%, 
I 
as a criterion of rationality; that the basic moaning of "rational" 
in this context is "what is conducivo to one's happiness". In other 
words it is obviously rational to act in accordance vit4 the facts 
because it is only by so doing that one can satisfy one's dosires, 
and obtain thq greatest happiness. 
0000n, lly, it might bn said that we oannot analy-le any 
further the statement "it iq rational to act in accordance with 
the facts". Pither ve., see it to be self-ovidently truotor we do 
I 
not. In other wordo, nart of what we nicossarily mean whonwo talk 
of rational Action is that it is action "in accordancO with the 
facts". Voroover it would still be rational to act in accordance 
with the facts oven if'it could be chown that it was not in our 
intnrests to do so. 
In the discuosion which folloragwo ohall deal with each 
Of thece interpretationo in turn. 
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In respect to tho first of these interpretations it 
cort -ainly does seem obvious enough that it is in our interests to 
conform our actions to the facts. Whatever elae. then, we may mean 
by tho term "rational' in this particular context. it seems Safe 
to say that it at least means'"what Is conducivo to happiness". 
But is It, in fact, so o-ovibus, that it is always in our 
intereats to act in "accordance with tho faots". In this c6nnoction 
we havo nf)rhaý)s bo3an Influoncod too much by the tro kindo of 
situations whioh Humn had in mind when he wrote that thern wero 
Only two sanson in which a passion could bo called unreasonable: 
that is, we 
iiave tondod to confine our attention oithor (a)to the 
situation vhere, having discovered that our doeire was based on a 
a false judgment as to the nature or exintnnoo of an objeottwo 
give up the desire as being a hopeless ono; or (b) we 4-Iscovor tha-t 
the means we have been employing for the Durnone of satisfying some 
desire are inadequate, and either adopt new means or elze give UP 
the desire as being impracticablO. Cortainly in. those oases it 
would seem but plain common sense to act in accordance with the 
facts, just as, similarly, it would seem platitudinous to say that 
it is in ono's interests to examine all the relevant facto 
carefully ýbefore setting about tho task of satisfying some dosire. 
Indeed it might be said to to *- self contradictory to say that 
we desire an end X and at the namq time desire to pursuo a course 
which we know will not achieve the and destred; or ) 
to say that 
'we dosire an end X and at tho same time refuse to adopt means 
which we know would enable us to achievo X. 
, 
I. Thus, 'R. M.. Kydd, 'Reason and Conduct in Humalo Ircatise, pID2. "It is 
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10. Whon, howevorwo are concerned, not with thO SPOci: riO 
problem of satisfying a partioular desiro. but with the more general 
commonly assumed that he who desires the end must desire the moans 
also(or else cease to desire the end), and this, it is thoughtlis 
true a priori ---- now I do indoed think that such a conclusion 
follows analytically from its promises". 
-I am inclined to think that Y. rs. Kydd has here fallen 
into the fallacy which sho exposes earlier in the same chapter: 
viz., the fallacy of supposing that existential propositions can 
be necessary or self-oontradiotory. Sho seems to confuse two 
arguments: (i)If x is the only means to y, and I desire y, then 
to achieve yI must do-x; (ii). If I doeire, Y and discover that x 
is the only means to y. then I must desire x or desire to do x. 
The first of those arguments is necessarily truetho 
second is not necessarily true. 
The fact of the matter is that we often knowingly take 
the wrong means or refuse to take the right means to some end 
we desiretand one of the stock situations In which we describe 
a person as having acted irrationally is where he seems deliberately 
to have done the wrong thing from the point of view of achieving 
some end he docires. These situations fall into two typos. In the 
firattwo know what is tho right means to the desired ond, but have 
no desire to adopt the means. Thero may bo moral reasons for this: 
(e. g. we might be faced with a situation in which we know'that 
the only way of defending Western Civilisation against barbarism 
is to use the atomic bomb), or we may find the moans,, unpleasant 
on hedonist grounds(e. g. an athlbtd has no desire to give up 
smoking while in training); but whatever the reason there can be 
no doubt that it is possible to desire an and without desiring 
the means necessary for the achieving of the ond. It might be said 
that in a case like this we really do not dosire to achieve the 
end, or at least do not desire it as much as we desire so-., rothing 
else. But while it is true that in some cases the immediate desire 
(say9to smoke) may, be the stronger desire this would not mean that 
the desire for the end was not still prosent. 14oreover, it is 
sometimes the case that though the desire to achieve the end is 
the strongest desire it nevertheless cannot overcome a habit or 
Some impulse which conflicts with it. 
In the second type of dituationfý we continue to use the 
wrong means after we have discovered that they, are the wrong means. 
There may be several reasons for this. First, the means may now 
have become an end in itselfoompoting with the original and; socond 
we may think we will lose too much prestige if we acknowledge 
our mistake; thirdtthe taking of the wrong means may have bocome 
habitual so that we find it very difficult to change our course 
of action. 
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problem of achieving happinoso, it is by no means obvioUS that it 
is always in our interests to conform to th! D facts. 
We can'ma)ethree general points first: (I)There aro 
many "facts" which boar no littlo relation to our everyday needs 
that we can safely ignore thom or believe the opposite to be true 
without harm. Thus though for a long timo people believed the 
earth was flat, it is doubtful whother nnany Of them wero inconvenion 
-ced by this mistake. 
(2)jt. is safe to believe some things against the run of 
the evidence beoauseleven if our belief is most certainly false, it 
can never be proved beyond doubt that it is So, and in any case 
no obviously bad consequences result from our acting on a false 
belief of this kind. Thus if we find it comforting to believe in 
ý11 
spiritualism. roinearnation, life after death etc., then we are saýe 
in the assurance that it is extremely unlikely that our belief 
1. 
can ever be shatterod. 
(3)A11 matter of fact judgments boing probable onlyland 
therefore liable to error, it may oometimes happen that we can go 
againat tho woight, of ovidenco and yet chanoe, by luck, on come 
exception not allowed for by the ax-oorts, or on some fact overlooked 
oy them. This is not to say, of courzogthat such conduct is justifiod *Y 
1.0ne notes hero the well knam complaint of thO SCnPtIO, n3M5lYv 
that it the believer is right about the existence of life after 
death then ho can say, "I told you so"; but if the atheist is right 
then he cannot do the same to the believer. 
The boliovf. ýr, indoodis to be onviod in this dase. 1,1e 
enjoys the prospect of heavonwhile living on earth, but ho will 
not suffer in any -way in thq noxt lifo. or rather after death, if 
his belief is 'wrong. 
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by the fact thatin the eventlwo turned. out to be right. But it is 
necessary to remind ourselves, in stressing the value of acting 
in accordance with the factsthat even the most apparently certain 
of our matter of fact judgments may actually be falso. And, as we 
chall see, there are occasions when it may be *in our interests' 
to gamble on the chance of such an error. 
I 
11i. We have stated briefly why it is not nnoossarily to our 
disadvantage if we act against the facts; we now come to the more 
positive reasons why it may actually be to our advantage to ignore 
the principle of accordance with the facts. 
I 
(1)we can obtain enjoyment from living in a. world of 
Ymako-believe", henoe wo 3omotimos act as though the factsworo 
different from what they really aro. It is true than in order to be 
successful we must, whilo day-dreaming, have the ability to forget 
that we are only protending; the illusion must seem the reality. This 
being solit could be argued that we are not, at the actual moment 
of day dreamingtaoting against the facts -we are simply living in 
another kind of wworld". But, in so far as we deliberately encourago 
these day-dreaming moods, we are9of courseldeliberately ignoring 
the realýfacts. Moreover -ot sharp distinction cannot always be 
drawn between periods of day-dreaming and periods of "realism". 
The habit of "make-believe" spills over from the moments of 
dhy-dreaming to affect everything we do. 
It may seem so,, newhat trivial to instance day-droaming 
as an example of acting against the facts, yet it 'would be 
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difficult to overestimate tho importance Vhioh our capacity for 
"make-boliove" haz as a factor in th-) pursuitý of happinoss. 1t, ir- 
not merely a question of our boing able to "ecca-pel for brief 
poriods into a "world" that. is nearer to our heart-, a desire; it in 
also a matter of being able to render the ordinary dull routine 
tolerable by the use of the imagination and, negativelyby the 
ability to forget or ignore the "harahor malitios". 2ow of us 
oould bear to bo prenented with a cor,, platoly roalistic view of 
lifo; fundamantal Psychological needs PrO'm-*t us, indeod, to seek for 
ways of interpreting reality that will mako the world seen a 
frtondlier plaoc. No doubt a good doal of this ta, kes placo at a 
sub-conscious'lovel, but wo all, at timos, doliberatoly gloss ovor 
the "harder" f, "acts and lose ourselves in a world of "make-belief". 
Art, itself, in all its forms could be intorproltocd fro,,, t Vnio point 
I 
of view. 
It might be argued of course that while escaping into 
world of "make-believe" providPed & temporary satisftetion it 
cannot in tho long run make for happiness. Sooner or later we Shall 
bo "tripped upO by tho facts, and our only clianco of happiness 
will then depend on our abilitY to adapt ourselves to the facts 
ao they are. 
In answer to this we oan say, first, thatWt is not 
suggested that a capacity for living In a world of imagination 
is; by itself, a guarantee of happiness; it is merely suggested that 
I. One reason for donying the title of "art4 to photograVI hic realiam in all Ito forms is that it doos not i-n any sense re-cronto 
the world ettlier In contont or in forin. Tt rerely preconts a 
photograph of the world in miniature. ý- - 
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make-Ionlin. ve" plays an eDeential roln in the nursuit of ha-, )pinessp 
and in tiome ciroumstances ruay be our only means of obtaining 
happiness, or at least of alleviating our lot. Tho practical 'problem 
is to know wilan it is safe, and to what oxterit it is cafe to 
illdU190 ill D"Antence of this kind. Obviously if oAr "day-dreaming" 
activitiou incapacitate us in respect to our handling of everyday 
affairs then they cannot be jmAified. on rational grounde, but if 
thay do not, then it would be difficult to prove that, even in the 
long run, it is against our interestr, to "wacto ttrm" T)retnnding 
that the factG aro otliar than thoy aro. 
(2). One aspect of this capacity for "mako beliave" whtch 
deaorvoa to bo mentioned separatily is tile use of nome form of 
"pretence" ac a therapeutic measuro. Thlo is'boist oxplained by 
moans of an example. A person is told that 1,, e in suffering from 
an incurable disease, and th&t hie only chanco. of prolonging his ty 
life is totakb- - very Evtringent precaut ions. Tho person accepts 
the diagncsisbut decidrm ho would rather shorton, the term of his 
life and live reasonably well than prolong life at a more existenc,!., 
1OV01-90 far he has not acted against the facto, nor in any way 
actod in What viould*bq considered an irrational way.. But then he 
becomes interested in thi -po3sibility of 'faith-hqaling" or nerhans 
In some form of healin4g by non-lohyritoal miansand ho dr%cidos to 
act as though lie did not have the. disiase at all. Ye trier. to 
banish all thought of thr) disease from his mind, and in general 
to act in a way that *vould be a-ppropriate only on th, -3 assum-Dtion 
Ulat he waa a Vell iran. 1'. Tuw, in a case liko this, are we to hold 
that tho person ooncerned is acting irrttionallY. Pron, one point 
8c. 
of view he certainly does sie-n to be, for he is not onlyvaswe 
say, refusing to face the facts, but he in endangering his chanae 
I 
of even a briof prolongation of life by adopting neasures which 
the experts would agree, to be futile.. On the other hand we might 
argue that he is acting rationally in that, since orthodox medicine 
holds out no hope for him, he might as well try unorthodox imeasuros. 
What makes cases of thic kind- difficult to analyse is 
that wo have reason to believe that mental attituden, under some 
circumstances, can effoct physical changes. It is, therefore plausible 
to argue that we may sometimes be justified in experimenting 
with unorthodox methods such as is instancod above. In any case it 
is doubtful whethor we could classify S1,01, actions as rational or 
irrational'by raference to the ariterion of accordance with the 
facts by itself. It is only in the full context of the perýonle 
circumstancon, and by using tho criterion of happiness alsolthat 
wo oan justly ostimate the rationality or otherWiSO oil the aotion. 
(. 3). The moat usual roanonhowever9for acting in defiance 
of the principlo of accordance with. tho filetS is that we have 
formod a vested interest in certain beliefs which prove to be 
falso. In ot'har words our happiness has becomn so bound up, with 
the acceptance of certain things as boing trme that we cannot face 
tho possibilitj of their boing untruo. Either thorefore vie refuse 
to rn-examine thn factn if vie cuspect they cannot be suT)ported or 
olsotif we are forood to face up to tho woakneoseS in our-poSitiOn 
we look round for every possible excune for maintaining it, in 
all OSSOntials, as beforq. 
go. 
In cases liko tlio-ýýso it is not a nuestion of SaYings"YOss 
I admit that my former beliofs were 'wrong. but I nevortheless intend 
to aot as tf they worc right"; nor is it a queetion of protending 
that the faots are different from what they roally are. It is 
rathor that our desire to maintain a certain belief ic so strong 
that the "true facts" do not got a chance to mako their weig-. 71t 
felt. Very often the struggle takes place at a sub-conscious lOvOl, 
but sometimes the participant is aware of what is going on, and 
there may take place "within him" a con3eicus struggle betreon 
riis deoiro to bo intollootuallLy honest and his desire to matntain 
hin bolimfo. Victory may go to 'one side or the other, or an 
accomodation may be reached by means of a ols3ver"rationalinntion", 
but the point to emphasise is that the person realis-9a that the 
"facts" are a threat to his happiness and that it is in his 
interosts to "got round" them if poesiblese 
1. See Note at end of chapter for brinf discussion of the term, 
rationnlisation". 
2. It to odd that Hume should not have been avare of the pousibility 
of thic kind of conflict, tho more so as he did iýeoognise the 
fact that conflicts could take place loo3tween "calm" and"violant" 
passions. He anamed to thinlk that we would yield to roa3on as 
soon as *rA realioed that -se had been baoing our actions on false 
Judgments: "ti3 impossible that roason and passion can ever 
OPnOne each other __--the moment we perceive the 
falsehood of 
any supposition --our passion yields to our reason without any 
OPPosition". ýIlume is here ascuming, without dou"bt, that it is 
always in ou'r interests to obey reason. In this respoct he seemed 
to share the general view of the latii 0. In r,, -. spf,, ct to t.,, o 
beneficial role of reason. Indood his famous statement that 
wroason is and ought only to b5 a slavo of the , passions" 
is 
a quite misleading exprossion of his own position. As Laird 
Puts it. "Humo re-ard-ld rsason as an astute **amlly solicitor, d. .4 rathor than as an ordinary sort of slavo"(J. Laird,! 1umo13 PhiloS- 
ophy of 1111man Naturo. -j. qjj). It has taken the work of tho 20thC 
-0sychologists to show us to 'what oxtent reason is, in faot, the 
slavO Of tho passions. 
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Thus to take a topical example, namely, the conduct Of 
the intelloctual who has been a supporter of Russian ooTamunismf and 
has begun to have doubts about the value of the Russian experiment: 
At first he rejects all criticisms of Russia as more 
propaganda-then. porhaps. he is reluctantly forced to admit that one 
particular criticism is just. For a time he regrds this as an 
exceptional oase. but the breach in the wall of faith has been 
made, other criticisms are accopted as trueand finally he is 
almost prepared to admit, privately, tliat his belief in Russia has 
been based on false judgments as to the faots. At this point, however 
the desire to beliove in the Revolution reasserts itself. roinforced 
by other emotivo factors. 1t, is bad enough to have to admit that 
one has been the victim of a political illusion for so long, and 
that one's political enemies have been right aftar all. '9ut when 
he contemplates the loneliness of sceptioism, the loss of old 
friends and old loyalties, the sense of meaninglessness that follows 
the breakdown of a central belief -he may then feel that the 
price of intellectual honesty is too greatand that his whole 
well being depends on finding some plausible explanation of the 
apparent weaknesses in the Russian system. lio then starts looking 
foqp'ossible loopholes in the criticisms, for possible rationalis- 
ations. And of course, if he is clever enoughho 'wilt always find 
them; for, in the realm of matter of fact, nothing can ever be 
certain and the so-called "objective facts" can be given many 
very different interpretations. 
I 
129 In considering the influenoo of"vested intorests" over 
our attitudo-to the facts, two motivGS in particular are of great 
importancezthe motive of T)rido(oro"desire for prestige" -concern 
with one's reputation) gand tile motive which we may 
describe as 
"the desire for emotional security"* 
Tho influence of pride as a factor in causing us both 
to cling to unjustified and Irrational doctrines and also to make 
irrational judgments has been insufficiently commented upon by 
I. This Is not, porhaps, the most common definition of "prtdo", whiCh 
is Usually thought of as a feeling of arrogance and concoit-But 
in so far as we think of pride as a motive then the above 
definition seems to stross the essential core of the desire. 
q, 1ý1 . 
moral philosophors, this omission being particularly noticeable 
in political thoorists, wholone would have thouEfattwould have been 
quick to appreciate the importance of pride in the determining of 
political docisions. In general it seems to have been left to the 
theologians and anthropologists to emphasise the role of prido-in 
1. 
human life. 
In particular it Is odd that Hume did not appreciate 
the relevance of thin question of the Influence of Pride to the 
more general question or rational actionfor he begins, Bk. Il of 
tho Treatise with a long dissertation on Pride and Humility and 
undoubtedly regarded it as one of the more important of the 
passions. 11is psychological analysis of pride, howevorlia rather 
shallow, perhaps because he tried to fit it too neatly into his 
. 
ý, of the passions with its two main principles, general schemat@ 
the principle of association of ideas and the principle of 
pleasure and pain. From our point of viow, though, his main mintake 
was in thinking that pride can only be aroused by some external 
catisogand, moreovor, by a cause of a particular kindviz.. tho 
awareness of some "excellency" attached to oneself. The truth of 
the matter is, however, that pride, ltke bodily appetites such as 
hunger or soxual desiro, oan "arise internally, without the 
concurrence of any external objoct". It differs from these bodily 
1.0, nly Hobbos of the classical political theorists has made 
pride(or, as he calls itg"the striving after honour and fame") 
. central in his political thoory. "? , obbes, 
howeverodoes not make it 
completely clear in whatway he considers pride to bo central. 
Sometimes he places the"lust for power" for its own sake at the 
heart Of Political lifo, at other times he seems to argue that 
men lust for power only for the sake of honour and glory. An 
interesting analysis of 11obbesp political philosophy from this 
point of view is to be found in, L. StraussntThe Political 
Philosophy Of Hobbes. 
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appetites. however, in two resp6ots: first, in that it tends to be 
insatiable; and secondly. in . that it is not associated with any 
particular object of satisfaction, but can attach itself to 
anything at all -thwarted in one direction it is never at a loss 
to find means of satisfaction in another direction. 17, ume noted the 
second of these characteristics -"to begin with the causes of 
pride and humility; we may note that their most obvious and 
remarkable quality is the vast variety of subjects on which they 
I 
may be placed" -but denied the possibility of thn first. It is 
in part b,, ýcauso of the insatiable nature of pride, howovor, that 
it tends to be the cause of irrational oonduot. Not only does it 
keep us restlessly on tho movo, seoking fresh honours, greater 
prestigo. whon a more sobor calculation of our interests would 
incourage us to remain content with what we had achieved or what 
we possessedlbut also it often leads us to engage in activities 
, whioh, as the objective observer can see, a re almost bound to lead 
to personal disaster. 
more spociftoally -and with tho principle of"acoordance 
with the facts"in mind -pride is, either directly or indirectlyq 
the oaune of irration4l conduct in tho following w6ys: 
(, I)Our fear of losing prestige will often make us 
oling to beliefs which we have once, supported and now know to 
be. false; or to dofend actions which we now know to be wrong. Ono 
i. Tiume E-dr-Oailse--ihat if pride were aroused by some internal 
movement then it would bo insatiable: ho writes, "tis evident 
pride would be perpotual, if it arose immediately from nature; 
since the objoot is tho sameand thero is no disposition of 
body peculiar to pridotas there is to thirst and hunger".. 
Obviously he regards this as an argument against pride's being 
aroused intornally. but he does not state why it is impossible 
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of the more int, )resting examples of this kind of influence is 
whore the moans to a certain end becomes an end in itself b9cause 
our prestige has become compistely involved in the advocacy of 
this particular mnans-polioy. The more thi3 r. eans-policy is 
threatened by hostile critictsm, the more dogmatic our assertion 
of its nocessity until, indood, tho ultimate aim is lost sight of 
1 
in our concern not to "lose face" over our "means-policy". 
Though, from the point of view of tho prinoiple of 
"accordance with the facts", suah actions are irrationalgit is 
possible to defend them, if not from a moral standpOintlat least 
from the standpoint of onots interests by arguing that in some 
casos the loss of prestige would be so great if one'admitted 
having been mistaken that it is the lessor of two evils to 
oling to the suspnot belief and hope that nothing will happen 
thereafter to make it absolutely imoossible to maintain it. Andpof 
oourse, over a vide area of beliefs about matters of fact one can 
b, ý reasonably confident that no such coup do grace can be delivered. 
The faithful communist has an answer ready for each now devasting 
turn of events in Moscow ; the fundamontalist has always a text 
on hand to counter the latest onslaught of science on the sacred 
text. 
for a passion to be insatiable. 
In this connection it is internsting to note that liobbes 
emphasises that man differs from the animals not merely in the 
fact that he has reason at the service of his passions, but also in 
the fact Chat some of his desires, and partioularly the desire for 
honour'and glory, aro insatiable: "So that, in the first place I put 
for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power that, coaseth only in death". 
I-OnO susPects that something of this kind has happened in the 
case Of the Labour'party)s advocacy of "nationalisatione as a means to the "good society". 
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(2). Pride tends to cause us to place a false valuation 
on objects -, we give undue importance to' those thingswhich are 
closely connected with us, or in which we have aome interostland 
tend to underrate the value of those things which we ourselves 
do not possess or in which we have no interest. ones country is 
better than any other country simply becaune it is one's country; 
one's children cleverer than other children simply because they 
are one' s own children. 
Again, thoiggh from one point. of view it seems obviously 
irrational to allow our pride to influence our judgments in this 
way, it can 'be argued that in so far as we obtain a great deal of 
pleasure from. "taking pride" in those things which are most 
closely attached to us then it does not really matter a great 
deal Vnether our judgments are according to the facts or not. Thus 
I 
we say that it is "natural" for Mrs. Jones to thinIk that her 
ohildron are cleverer than othor children even though it is 
obvious, on any objective standard that they are, in fact, rather 
I 
dull. Indeed, in respect to those matters in which we think it 
is "natural" for us to be influonced 'by "pride" we might argue that 
it is irrational to try to counter this influence-by trying 
to loolt at the facts "cold-bloododly". Irrationalgthat iS, On two 
counts: fir3t, in that it is unnatural; and secondly, in that it does 
not make for happiness, or does not often make for happineaswhon 
we subordinate such 4natural pride" to the discipline of "objec- 
tive facta", Tt may seem rather ridiculous to the onlooker that 
Mrs. Jonos should think her children to be clever, but in so far as 
it obviously makes her happy to think so we do not usually consider 
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it is our duty to force her to 'face the faots". 11oroover -and this 
complicates the queotion still further -it can be argued that in 
many cases the emotion of pride, by its influence, no alters the 
"nature" of the object to which it is directed that it is really 
no longer the name object observed by those for whom it is not 
a matter of pride. 11enoe the excessive value-or what seems to 
others the excessive value -placed on the object by the 
"owner" is 
ueen to be justified when one roalises, that it means something 
to the owner which it cannot xean for anyone elso. Thus a peroon 
may seem to be foolishly wasting money and energy in trying to 
save some trivial object from being dostroyed; but when we roalise 
that it is a souvenir of'somo"famous victory" of his in the pant 
ve understand his conduct more essily. In the same way we 
appreciate that a person of meagre accomplishments will tend to 
play up" any achievements which are to his oredit: that, for 
instance, the winning of the local club tennis championship will 
seem to Bill Smith an event of some national importance. 
In goneral, then, while omphasising the fact that pride 
often leads us to place a false valuation on objects,, xe have to 
romember'that in come cases the factor of pride has to be taken 
into account -and rightly taken into account -+sessing the 
value of a particular object. 
1. *. "*hon we think of pride as an emotion rath6r than as an active 
deciro(i. e. when we contrast the "being proud of something" with 
"the active seeking after prostige")tho question raises itself 
whothortand in what eircumstanoes, it can be considored an 
rational fooling at all. It might be generally accepted that 'we 
are justified in fooling pride only about those accomplishments 
which have boon achieved by sheer effort of will: that, for 
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13. The vested interest which we have termed "the desire 
for emotional security* is more commonly accepted as an influencing 
factor than is pride -perhaps because of the work of the 
psychologists. This desire can cause us to maintain 'beliefs which 
are false in the following kinds of situation: 
(i)When the bolief is concerned with something which we 
find comforting to bolieve: e. g. Vnere a person who has lost a child 
comes to accept spiritualist doctrines as true. 
(ii)When the belief is one which has boon so much part 
of the "accepted order of things*, so much takon for granted)that 
the discovery of its falsity would result in a painful feeling 
of "unoase". We fool unable to cope with the now situation which 
has arisen. Thus, no doubt, the resistance to the new views put 
forward by Copernious was prompted not only by the fear that the 
foundations of religion had been sapped, but also by tho more 
general fear of what is unknown and strange. 
oxample, it is rational enough to feel proud of having overcome 
some physical disability. But, in theory anywaylit is doubtful whethnr 
we should. regard it as proper to feel pride about those things 
which we possess or which have been achieved as a result of luck, 
or of the efforts of others. Yet the odd thing is that we more 
often feel the emotion of pride in respect to the latter class of 
things than in rospect to the first. Wo feel proud of our 
intelligonce, good looks, tho country we are born in eto; but we tend 
to feel humbled when we have achieved something by sheor hard 
work. 
What complicates the position still more is thatwhile, 
from the ordinary point of view, ve may think it justifiable to 
feel pride at something achieved by effort of will, the moralist, 
and cortainly the thoologianicondemns as "sinful" the pride felt 
in one's own aohlovements. The saint who blames himself for his 
sins but givds God the credit for his virtuous actions is held up 
as an example. And even on the Common sense lovel while accepting 
the view that a person should only feel proud of what he has 
achieved by his own effort, wo doin practice, tend to view with 
disfavour the pride of the "self-made" man. 
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(iii)When the bolief is one which has played a "key 
role" in our religion or in our "philosophy of lifew. For examplej 
the anti-evolutionary views hold by religious believers in the 
last contury-, 'or the belief in the beneficial effects of "free 
enterprise" hold by many Americans. Beliefs of this kind need not 
be in themselves of a "comforting nature"9but in so far as we 
have accepted them as true and have built up a philosophy of 
action on them then we tend to resist any arguments which purport 
I 
to show that the beliefs in question are false. 
When, thon, any beliefs which fall into one or other of 
the catogories mentioned above are threatened. the desire for 
emotional security moves us to seek for ways of oountoring the 
threat. We fool that our happiness itself is at stake. In a situation 
like this ve may adopt any one of the following tactics: 
(a)We avoid "facing the facts"; wo refuso to listen to 
the opponing arguments. 
(b)ITe soize on any minor flaw in tho argument, or any 
slight deficiency in the evidence and magnify its importance. 
(e. g. the anti-evolutionists have always over-ostimated the 
importance of the so-called"missing links") 
(o)'Te rationaliso our own position by bringing forward, 
I 
as it wero, ex Post facto, some plausible theory-vhich will 
make our ovgn position moro tenable, or which will explain away 
1. It is not always appreciated that people may derive consider- 
able Pleasure from holding beliefs which in themselves are rathir frigh-taning. In part this is because they pride themselves on being toughlon being able to face the brute facts.!,, 
--. 
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the facto produced by the rival theory. 
This last tacttc is the most fruitful as it is nearly 
always possible to find soma ingenious thoory-with which to defend 
one's own position. And even though it may convince no one elsepit 
servos its purpose if it enables one to m. aintairi onefs cherished 
beliefs without too uneasy an intellectual conscience.. 
TTI. 
Te havo now said suffioient to show that it is not always 
in our intorests to conform to the facts. Not only is it true that 
we can ignore the facts or act against them withouttin every case, 
having to suffer any disastrous consequencos, but also, in some cases 
it may actually be to our advantage to refuse to conform to the 
principle of "accordance with the faots". This is not to say, of 
course, that we can ignore this principle at ploasuro. In general 
it is obviously in our interests to ba3e our actions on the facts, 
and if we ignore this prinoiple indiscriminately then wo are bound, 
in the end, to, suffer for it. But in so far as we must admit that 
there are situations where it is not necessarily to our disadvantage- 
to ignore thin principle then we cannot analyse the sentence 
"it is rational to act in accordance with the facts" to mean 
"it is always in our interests to act in accordance with the facts" 
15. And this brings us to our second interprotation, namelYt 
that the proposition, "X is acting in accordance with the facts" 
is necessarily implied by the proposition, " X is acting rationally: 
In other words, since acting in accordance with the facts is-part - 
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of what we mean by "acting rationally" it is therefore tautologous 
to say that "it is rational to act in accordance with the facts". 
What this interpretation ceems to be saying is that, 
while as a matter of experience we find it to be generally the 
case that it is in our interests to conform to the facts, noverthe- 
less the thought of our happiness is not in our mind when we say 
that it is rational to act in accordance with the facts. In this 
context anyway we do not mean by the torm "rational", "what is in 
our interests or for our happiness*. Moreovervin support of this 
we can point to the fact that ve sometimes differentiate between 
what is rational in conduct and what is for our happiness. The 
sceptio, exprossing his opinion of a friend who has become a 
apiritualist, may say, "thn whole thing's a tissue of falsehoods, 
but it seems to make X happy to bDlinvo in it, so I don't see much 
point in trying to prove to him how irrationally he's acting". 
16. The difficulty with tho above intorDretation is that, if 
it is true. then it must sometimes be the case that it is rational 
to act against our own happiness, for we havo soon that there are 
Situations whero, if we obey the principle of"aooordanoo with the 
facts"faithfully our v#n interests are likO*IY to be jeopardiaed. 
Now there may seem to be nothing particularly troublosoTre 
about this point because. ve are aocustomed, in thtnking about moral 
questions, to the idea that our moral obligations may somotimes 
conflict with our own happinoss; and while it is true that, neithor 
as a theorotical prinoiDle nor as a matter of 'practical living, do 
we take easily to the notion that our moral obligations ought to 
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have Drecedenco over our plans for our happiness, it is rarely 
suggested. at tho cormon sanse lqvel, that it is irrational for 
a person to perform his moral obligations when thoy do conflict 
with his happiness. 
In this particular case, howovergwhore we are concerned 
with the principle of "accordance with the facts' as a; criterion 
of rational action, vie do tend to balk at the idea that there 
really can be a conflict between the 1irinciple of "accordance with 
tho facts" and the principle of "happiness". In other words, though 
the thought of hanpinoss way not be in our mind when we say that 
it is rational to act in accordance with the facts, wo do tend to 
take it for granted that, if not in the immediate future, at least 
in the long run, it will always be in our interests to act in 
donformity to the facts. ie tend to think that a person is bound to 
be "caught out" in the long run if he acts contrary to the facts. 
It is truo that, as wo havo just montioned abovewe do 
nomotimes seen to make a distinction botwenn rational actionvin 
the sense of "acting in accordance with the facts", and "what is 
conducive to our happiness", but this distinction is alwa ys made 
In situations where certain exceptional conditions apply. 1n the 
first Dlace, it is usually when Nve are referring to other people's 
conduct rather than to our own that we differentiate betwoon. 
the principle of happiness and the principle of"accordance with 
the faots". Secondly, it is only when we think that there is 
little possibility of the person concerned boing able to adjust 
himself to the new situation whioh would arise if his beliefs 
were shown to be falsqthat we think it might be 'better to, allow 
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him to continue acting on the false beliefs. In other words we 
take the risk thit he will not suffer for his irrational 
action. Or rather we argue that since lie is going to suffer anyway 
from the discovery that his actionswore based on falsehoodstit 
might be the lesser of two evils to allow him to carry on as 
before in the hope that he will not be found out. It is reasoning 
of this kind, for example, which might lead a clergyman to refuse 
to try to enlighten the minds of older members'of the oongTtgation 
in rospeot to oertain of. their false roligious views. 
17. Common sense doos thon, norhaps, assume too easily that 
it in always in our intiresta to conform to the facte, and that 
therdfore, in this matter anyway9thoro cannot be a conflict 
botwoon the principle of happiness and the principle of "accordance 
with the facts". We have seen that there can in fact be such a 
conflict, and in so far an vio are to regard both of these nrincinles 
as criteria of rational action, t. e. t, a)it is rational to act 
in accordanco with the facts; (b) it is rational to do that which 
will bring ono happinons and as criteria which are quite dintinot 
in meaning, thon we havo to face the problem of what we should do 
'when theso two criteria olash. 11as one of them a prior claim over 
the other; or doas it depend on aircumstancen. whether it is more 
I. In respect to those situations where we say t1hat "so and so's 
beliefs are quite irrational but hoPs hanpy in holding them, so 
why disillusion him", wo have to be careful to distinguish botweea 
tlie problem of what it is rational for us to do(i. e. in resnoct 
to our friendIs situation)and the problem of whother our friend 
is himself acting irrationally or not. Our decision not to 
disillusion our friend may be based on the "principle of 
happinoos" which we think, in this oase, to be more important 
than the truth or falsity of our friends beliefs; but our friend 
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rational to aot on one rather than on tho other. 
In rospoot to'thfmo questions; one answor immediatoly 
suggosts itsolf: narmlythat the prinotplo of "accordance with the 
ftota" hasin such casesthe prior claim becauso the statement, 
"it is rational to act in accordAnco with the facts* concoals 
the azzumption that we have a moral obItgation to act in 
accordanco with tho faots. In othor viordsvin otating that it ts 
not whappiness" which wo aro thinking about whon we say that"it 
In ratiopal.,, to aot In aocordanoo with the faots" we are really 
Ing in a negative form. tho proponition that we 11avo only emphasis& 
a solf ovidont obligation to try to conform our actions to t1ja fact$, 
an obligation ivhioh is binding ch ua whAtover tho effoot on our 
happiness may bo, 
Ilow tho quootion whothor we have. in faot, such an obliga- 
tion, and if so, how it 'to to be interprotod,, is one which we shall 
diacuss fully in Chaptor-1-9wharo wo d,, )al with the more goneral 
problem. whothnr Nve oun 'be said to hava an obligAtibn to try to aot 
ratiotally,, but horo it can bo said that, primm faOje, it would seem 
to be the case that common annao does accept tha notion thatwe 
havo an obligation to try to conform our aotiona to tho facts. We 
cay that so and no ought to "face up to the facts", or that somoone 
olne is a pernon of high intellectual intogrtty who is mver guilty 
though acting on the 10asic of false 
, 
beliefs may novortheleas be 
acting rationally in so far as lie hanso far as lie iu a`blo, rade 
a sincere attempt to establish the truth of those beliefs before 
acting on thom. Indond, oven if ho know that the belAofs were falsot 
we still could not assume th&t he wan noting irrationally0for 
ho may havo decidod that in his situation tho prinoiple of 
happiness was a battor oritorion of action than tho principle Of 
accordance with tile facts* 
of twisting the facts to suit his ovin purposes, and those 
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statemants oortainly coom to imply some kind of obligation to 
conform to tho facts. 
On the other hand, when we examine a little more closely 
the common sense statements in which such an obligation seems to 
be assumed we cannot be quite so certain that the notion of an 
obligation to the facts qua facts is actually accepted. Very often 
the "ought". in those statemonts is hypothetical rather than 
oategorical; in effect we are warning someone that if he does not 
face up to the faots, or examine them carefully before acting then 
lie is liable to suffer for it. And in other cases where there does 
seen. to an-iriplied'eatogorical demand we find that the obligation 
which is being abserted is not the obligation to conform to tile 
-facts as such, but some other obligation the fulfillment of which 
demands that we be obedient to thi principle of accordance with 
the facts. Thus the obligation might be to keep a promise(e. g. 
when the judge rominda'a jury that they are under an oath to 
base their decision on the facts alono); or to prevent our actions 
boing, influenced by a false prido(e. g. "its only pride'vhich 
I 
koops you from admitting that the facto are otherwise); or to 
be consistent in ouruso of the criteria determining the fELctual. 
(o. 
g., if you use the same criterion here as you did thero then you 
must admit that the faots aro so and so). 
The position, then, so far as the common sense attitude is 
conoornodiis nomewhat more complioated than f. irst appears, and later 
we shall be ooncerned to clArify it. What is clear, howovor, is that 
if thore is no such obligation as the "obligation'to conform to the 
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facto" then this, problem of a clash between two criteria of 
rationality becomes a meaningless one. If,, in other words9we are 
not morally obligod to act in accordance with the facts then 
the rational course of action is, obviouslyvto conform to the 
facts when it is in our interests to do so or vhen some other 
obligation makes it obligatory for us to. do so. and to refuse to 
conform when neither of these conditions is fulfilled. The idea 
that it would bo rational to conform to the facts'whether it is 
in our interests to do so or not does not make sense unless we 
I 
accept the notion that we have an obligation to try to aot, in 
accordance with the facts, 
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Note on tho term *rationalize". 
When we say that someone is trying to rationalize an impossible 
position, or that someone is very clever at "rationalizing"twe 
are usually employing the term in the popular sense vhioh it has 
come to have since the psychologists used it in referring to 
oertain(usually sub-conscious) processes of the mind. On this 
definition of the term we rationalize whenever we try to defend 
some belief or action which we suspect to bo false or to be 
morally wrong by finding some plausible explanation which will 
make the belief seem true or the action right. The term has thus 
come to be used in a rather derogatory, manner. In this connection 
it is pertinent to point out, however, that the tendency to 
indulge in this kind of rationalizing is more prevalent among 
highly moral persons than among those who are little concerned 
'with moral prinoiples. It is often said that a moral man is one 
'who confesses his weaknesses and sins openly whereas the wainner" 
tries to make exouses. Aotually the opposite is very often the case, 
Tho shame*with which the moral man contemplates his failings 
exposes him to the temptations of this kind of rationalizing. 
The non-moral man makes excuses so that he will not be found out; 
the moral man makes excuses because he cannot bear to face his 
own faults, 
In the same way it is the man of intellectual integrity 
who is often tompted to find plausible reasons for defending 
beliefs vhioli he suspects to be faloo. If he did not feel under 
an obligation to conform to the facts he would not worry unduly 
about "inconclusive evidence", "small discrepancies" and so on. 
But because he is aware of this obligation he feels bound to 
try to find a good argumont in defence of his belief - so that 
his "mind may approve of what his heart desires" 
In the older sense of the tern, "rationalize" we refer 
to the intellectual process by which we try to systematize a 
number of propositions about particular phonomenaor else to 
the procedure by which we try to find valid reasons for accepting 
what we already believo, intuitively, to be truo. It is easy to 
confuse this latter process with the one doscribed above. The 
difference between them is that whereas in the above case we 
really suspect that our belief is false, in this case we are 
convinced that our belief is true but have difficulty in finding 
a good intellectual explanation of its truth. 
The ironical thing inoof oourse, that whereas we can 
often find ortremely plausible reasons for believing what we 
think to be false, wo are not so skilful at providing good reasons 
for believing what we know to be true(as the history of philosopliy 
shOWS)-It is possible that the exDlanation for this is, si? iply, 
t1lat it is silly to ask questions concerning those things which 
we knows"inatinotively" to be true. 0r, if we do ask questions, they should bo("oiit, \quOstions ýýf 'terminology only. 
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1-1 APTER IV. 
TH R' PRINCIPLofC0NSIS 
I. 
A principle which is sometimes used as a criterion of 
rational action, though not so frequently as the principle of 
"accordance with the facts", is the principle of consistency. '"Lhus 
if we say that "so and SO is acting inconsistently'" this is often 
taken to bo more or less equivalent to saying that *he is acting 
irraticnallyw. Likewise, whon we praise someone for "doing the 
consistent thing" in a certain situation we go on to add some 
such comff: ent as "of course, as a rational being you really had no 
option". 
2. The common 8onse way of using this critorion is, hawevor, 
unsatisfactory inasmuch as expre3sions like "acting consistently", 
or "acting inconalstontly" aro ambiguous, and, if not interpreted 
carefully, can lead us quito astray in our Judgments of what 
con3titutas rational or irrational conduct. 
In the first place -and this is a point which we have 
notF,, d before -those expressions tend to give the irprossion that 
actions in'themselvos can be solf-consistent or self-contradictory, 
or that one aotion can' be consistent with, or inconsistent with 
another action; vhoroas of courso. it is only the propositions 
Tihich accompany the actions that can properly be called consistent 
or inoonsistent. lior is this point academic only, for in some cases 
where a person is said to have acted inconsistently -saj, vhore a 
los- 
teacher has punished a child on ono day and not punished him for 
the same offenoo on tho next day -vo cannot roally toll vhOther 
he liar, really flouted the principle of consistency or not until 
we know all the circumstances of the case., what criterion of 
punishment ho adopts and so on. There, is no contradiction in itself 
between the act of punishing the child one dayand the act of 
refraining frcm punishment the next day. 
In this connection it is to be noted that more unpredic- 
tability of conduct is, not in itself a necessary sign that a 
person is being inconsistint. Thus it may be tho case that our 
principle of action is to act in an unpredictable fashion, and we 
may be very consistent in carrying out this prinoiple. For oxamplo 
a general may decide that the best tactics in a certain situation 
are to act quito unprodictablypoven to the point of acting occasion- 
ally in a roally foolish way. 
Secondly, and again we aro repeating a point noted beforn, 
there are many cases in which we use the expression "acting 
inoonsl3tently", whero it would loo moro accurate to say that the 
person is "not acting in accordance with the facts". Tho vagueneSo 
of the bxprossion "acting inconsistently" tonds to make us 
overlook this distinction. 
Thirdly, though we do in general tend to oquato the 
idoa of inconsistency 'with the tdoa of irrational conduotgthere 
aro situations in which we would describe a perscn as"acting 
inconsistently" and yet not assert that there was even a prima 
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facie case for arguing that he was acting irrationally. Thiieflif a 
person does not "live up to" his moral princtDles in a situation 
in which he would have stood to suffor a great deal if he hadj'wO 
might say that he acted inconsictentlypbut we should. hardly say 
that he acted irrationally. Even if the sacrifice demanded of him 
was not very great, and roe rare inclined to charge him with 
selfishness or cowardice or some other moral fault, it is 
doubtful whother via should also charge him with having acted 
irrationally. 
S. For the abovo reasonspthent it see,, rs unsatisfactory to 
assert that a person acts irrationally if he acts inconsistently. 
'Re need to state the position more, prooisoly if we are to rake 
clear just how the principle of consistoncy can be properly used 
as a criterion of rational action. This may be done as follows: 
Using the principle of consistoncy as th6 criterion we- 
may say that there is a prima faoie case for asserting that a 
person acts irrationally if: 
(J)Ho, knowing that a proposition whiah he holds to be 
true is solf-contradiatbryodoes not give up accepting the propos- 
I ition as true, or try in any way to remove the o6lf-contradiation. 
(2)He, knowing that there is an inconsictoncy botween 
two or more propositions which he regards as true, doos not 
withhold his assont from any of these propositions or'try to 
romovo the inooncistonov. 
(3)11e, knowing that some proposition is a necessary 
implication of some other proposition which he accepts as trues 
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nevertholess refusos to accopt this now proposition as truo. 
As oxDressed in this way, the principle of oonsistencY 
is applicable, as a criterion of rational action both in the 
theoretical field and in the practical. Taking each of those in 
turn we may note the following observations: 
is often very difficult to make a person accept 
tho fact that a certain proposition is self-contradictory because, 
since, in such caces, it is a question of the definitions we give 
to the terms of the proposition, it is always open to the person 
concerned to argue that ho defines the torms in some unusual 
sense. Our only hope of "trapping" him, then, is to shown that he 
normally defines these terms in the usual way, and has merely 
altered his definitions in order to got out of a logical difficulty. 
Another difficulty about self-contradictory propositions 
is that the dofendors of them can sometbros claim that they are 
"paradoxically truol -that, in other wordalthe contradiction is 
apparent only and conceals or, in some cases, emphasiaeB a 
profound truth. The argument is that the "truth" is so stated as 
to appear obviously absurd and self-contradictory, thus"shooking" 
the reader or hearer into thinhing more carefully about something 
he had overlookod or had always taken for granted. 
Nowsno doubtoparadoxicalstatements are sometimou 
justified as a pedagogical dovice, but in so far as it is claimedv 
as it of ton is, thaL there are some trutha which arn so profound 
t. at they cannot be oxproonod in ordinary logical languagolbut 
can only be "hinted at" in the form of paradox, then theaO so-oalled 
ill. 
"truths of paradox" must'be viewed with some suspicion. 17hon 
subjected to a rigorous logical analysis. -with oach term in the 
proposition precisely defined, they either prove to bo indeed 
self-contradictory and therefore false; or, to be arnbiguous 
statements of some truth which can only bo proporly expressed 
by means of A number of propositions; orfinally, to 'bo meaningless. 
The fact of the matter is that if a "truth" is so profound that 
it cannot bo exprossed in ordinary logical languago, then it is 
better not to express it at all; or, if the need to say something 
about it is too insistent, to rely on the language of "feeling" - 
to express the truth in music or art or draira or poetry. As it isp 
paradoxical statements are too often a "cover-up" for half-truths, 
or for ill-digested thoughts. 
(2). In respect to those oases in which it can bo chown 
that thore is an in6onsistonoy botwoon propooitions each ofwhioh 
we accopt as true, wo note that those propositions may be 'IAold to 
be? true within the framework of a particular argumant -i. e. what 
we say at one point in our argument contradiots what we say at 
a later point in the argumont -or else they may be any two 
propositions*which we accept as true but which we have never in 
any sense tried to relate to each other or bring togr-ther for 
purnosen of an argument. In t1mise days of highly upecialised. 
knoviledge$for instance, it is not uncommon for persons. of high 
intelligence to bo quite unaware of the fact that nome proposition 
which they accept, say, as a scientist, contradicts something 
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which they hold trý bo true as a Christian boliever. They may not 
even roalise that thoro ia any connoctton 'botireen the twO "OtliP-fs, 
so that,, in trying to prove to them that Vaese lbeliefe ars) 
'irst have to show how they are logically inoonsistent. we may f 
related to each othor. Por example, we may have to )oInt out to 
the Freudian psyohologl3t that the deterministic assumptions of 
hin paychologioal, techniques e. ro in Conflict with, ar ann, 3ar to 
be in conflipt with the accumptions underlying hin Christ4in 
f aith. 
And this brings 1113 to tllc third, and most iTay)ortant 
typo of inconnietency, naroly, vilioro a Do, )rson does not accent the 
logical of IvIlat lie nocripts an true. 
(3j. There are two kinds of inconsistency horo. In thQ 
first case we show that if A is accepted as true 4-6, hin a certain 
logical consequence of A, nar-ely, 'B ought also Ito b, ) acceptod as 
true. Thun a pacifist may try to prove that if a pernon accOPtS 
the Christian religion as trug then it logically follows that 
he must refune to partioipate in warfare. 
In the second case wo try to show that if X is accepted 
as truethon Y, whioh formorly had been he14 to be true. muot be 
falso. Thus a businessman may advooate tariff barriers against 
Japanese oompetition as b9ing sound ooonomio policy. "WO point out 
that if it is true that this is sound economic policy then his 
formor advoc&cy of com-olete laissez-faire munt, at 1, )ast, be 
Sevorely qualified. 
I 
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In oithor of these 'two cases if the rerson concerned 
refuses to accept the logical consequences then we have a prima 
facie case for saying that he is acting irrationally. 
We can include under this heading those cases in which 
a person refuses to accept the implications of certain criteria 
'which he han laid down for determining something as true or 
falso, good or bad, beautiful or ug'ly'eto. Thus a historian might 
formulate certain rules by whichwo can detormine at what stage 
of dovelopment or decline any particular oivilisation is but 
not apply the rules to determine the particular stage that his 
own civilisation has reached -or else apply them in such a way 
that they become useless as objeotivo criteria. , 
The queatioij- of the consistent use of criteria doest 
however,, raise a special problem to which th6re is no easy answer. 
The problem is this: somotimossin stating that a certain criterion 
is the right one to apply to situations of a certain kindtwe find 
that we must, perforoo, make an exception of the situation in 
'which the criterion itself is stated. The ruleas it woremust make 
an exception of itself. Thus the marxidt who claims that all 
, nhilosophioal. religious, political-doetrinos are determined by 
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tl, ýje modes of production provailing at the tire must make an 
exceDtion of hin own politteal T)hilosopny oth-ýrwise it can )nly 
clain to be relatively true. Similnrly, it is sometimes held 
against the positivist criterion of "significant propositions" 
that the propositions in which the crttorion is stated'have to 
be exempt f ron the rulo. 
Now the question is whether a real inoonsistincy is 
involved here. Logical criticisms of this kind are often made, 
espý, cinlly against theories of a relativist kind, but in themselven 
they do not seem to carry complete conviction. Though we have 
made what seems to be a fatal criticism of the criterion. in question 
'we are still left with the uncomfortable feeling that we have not 
really disposed of it -that`, indoed, it contains a large element of 
truth. Thus, though it is trun that the Rarxist makes an exception 
of his awn philosophy, and though, moreover, it is true, as a matter 
of faot, that a good deal-of marxist doctrine is obviously a 
roflection of the social and economic conditions of thr, time in 
which Marx 'wrote, yet'we do not feel that a logical criticism 
of this kind is necessarily a seriou3 one. 
Nevertheless it can bo mado -and is made -against 
theories of great nignificanoo, and even though we do not regard it 
as a fatal critictsm soino kind of ansvor 'presumably has to be 
given to it; or, at loast, some reason has to be given for treating 
It as an unimportant criticism. Two possible wajs out of the logical 
difficulty can be ouggested. First, we can say thdt our rule has 
a pragmatio. value only -thatehat we are dolng is rocomronding 
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that a certain way of sneaking or a certain way of thinking'about 
a certain class of 6bjects or relations j3 thq most useful. Thist 
I undorstand, is the position adooted by th,, 3 nore cautious of the 
po8ttivists now. and it is one which certainly romovet the sting 
from the logical criticism.. But. at the ssmo time, it roaucna the 
power and prostiga of the theory itnolf. Logical rectitude is 
gained at the oxneme of 0 authority. 
Secondly. we can taks) Vio bold line of olaiming that our 
own theory Is exempt fro*, m the oriterion. Put since this is, in 
erfect, a olaim'to some kind of infallibility it is not a position 
which the cautious theorist would be likely to adopt. lIaving 
claimed some infallible intuition for oneself it is difficult to 
dispute a similar claim by others. 
A thiod va, 7 out. possiblo in scmo oasos, iS to state 
the rule in such a way that it is made clear that we allow for 
the possibility that our own doctrine ray bo affected by the 
critorion which it proolaims. Wo do not suggest that our principle 
han a pragmatic value only; we merely state that we are not claiming 
that it gives us the full truth on the matter in question. Thus 
the cautious marxist may admit that his own doctrines have been 
influenced by the conditions of the ti,, ne, and that even the central 
doctrine may be viewed as a typical product of the economic 
conditions prevailing at the time it was put forwardbut he would 
assert that this is only aý significant point if, the rarxist 
principle is stated as an infallible and all-explanatory dogma. 
1. Thore s 'asonse, I Guppose, tn vhich the rarxist can claim that 
criticiams of this kind merely emphasiso the truth of the 
central principle. Complicated logical questions are involved 
here which we cannot discuss in this thesis. 
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To sum up this particular point; Thn logical charge 
of self-contradiction brought against those who exempt their 
o, vm statements or theories from the critsrion they propound is 
effoctive only if the propositions stating tho criterion are 
formulated in an incautious and doginatic way. To that extent, this 
logical point serves a useful function in "toning down" the over- 
enthusiaotic advocates of some new theory. But 'where the criterion 
is stated cautiously and with suitable qualifications then the 
fact that the advocate of the principle is making an exception for 
himself ceases to be of any importance. 
4. In the practical field the principle of conuictency is 
applied as a criterion of rational action in t1le following oases: 
(I)rhoro t%oro io an inoonsistency, aa we aay, botween 
prooept and examplo: wheregin other wordsgit can be chown that the 
prooocitions implied in our actions are innonsistont with the 
propositions atating how NTO ought to act in such a situation. It 
is important 4%'Po reiterate what has been said beforo, that vo can 
only talk of inconsistency *#here whatwo may call the "theoretical 
belief" implicitly containn an injunction that such a belief ought 
to be acted upon. Thus a politician way stato that he bolioves that 
. 
all men are equal and yet act in such a way as to iTrply 9by his 
actions, that they are unoqual. We cannot however charge him with 
inconsistency unless he has stated, not merely that all m, 3n are 
equal but alao that they ahould. ba treated as equal under all 
circumstances. Tt is true that we often describe such conduct as 
inoonsiatentsbut this is bocause we assume that the statement of 
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some principle necessarily implies that such a prinoiplO is 
to 
be acted upon. And thisof coursedoos not follow at all. A 
politician who sincerely believes in the essential equality of all 
men may yet 'boliove with equal sincerity that in the, present, 
I 
circumstances it will not help the *depressed* classes or races 
if their right to equality is insisted upon and forced through 
by legislation. 
(S) Another kind of praotioal inconsistonoy oan be desoribed 
thus: In situation X wo act in accordane-3 with principle A-in 9 
situation Ywhicli, in till relevant respectStis the same as situation 
X we use an entirely different principle of aotionvB. 
Though unprodictability of b6havioUr'is often regarded ' 
as coming under the hoading of "inconsistency" it is important I 
to note again the point that thero are occasions on which 
unprodiotability of conduct is actually a sign that a certain 
principle of action is being carried out faithfullY - the 
principle, namoly. to act unpredictably. 
When a. person aots very difforontly in aituations that 
are similar any one of the following interpretations of his 
behaviour are possible; 
(a) fie may iiave a olearly defined prinaiple of aotion 
1. For a principle of thin kind to bo successful it is, of courseq 
imperative that others should not know that we are using itl 
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which he faithfully carries out in some situations, but fails to 
"live up to" in other instances. 1lere it is not & question of 
having a different principle ol" action in each situationobut rather 
I 
of acting on it on one occasion and not acting on it in anotlaer. 
(b). ýIe may not have any principle of action at alloand 
is therofore influenced "by whatover factors happen to bo dominant 
at the time. In casos like the3e, we say that a porson is acting 
irrationally only if the situations in question involvo serious 
and important lasues. 7le argue that a person, a rational porson, 
ougat to, try to work out some consistent line of 'policy. Thus vie 
C%O'T do expect a por8on to show any grgat consistency of action Výhilo 
on a holiday at the beach: it is not surprising if his actions 
r'Oem to be governod by no particular policy. But we would expect 
.a parent to havo some principle of action in respoott3aYlto'what 
actions of his children are punishable. ani what -, mthods of 
punishment zhould bo used. 
(o). He may not bo sure what pOliCJ to adopt for situations 
of a certain kind, and to that Oxtent tend to change policy or 
modify it in tho light of later experience. No inconsistency is 
involved hero. though we often do describe a person's actions as 
inoonsistentmhen, he does change or modify policy in this way. 
- (d)lle may have no prinoiple of action, in the sense of 
moral. principle, and thus weigh up eaoh situation entirely from. the 
I. The question arlsoe herowhether any two situations oan bo 
similar in all "rolevarit respects", and if so, Vhat N70 mean by 
this 
, pliraze. 
Thur, a person may formulate a principlo of action 
to thO effect that hn luill not give any money to beggars at 
t1io door. 14o carrios out this policy with the firs"to few 'beggars 
Vno OOTMO to Ids dcor, but, later in the week, gives money to a 
beggar Who diffore&ý in no ooviouz way from tho others. 0no would 
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point of view of his own interesto. Yrom t'he point of viONT Of the 
onlooker such a parsonts conduct might seem quite unpredictable- 
and inconsistent -especially as the person concerned is not likely 
to announce publicly that he does act entirely from selfish 
motives -but insofar as ho has a principlo of' actionnamelythe 
principle of self-intereat. and applies it oonsistently, then his 
conduot, lio,. vovor doTplorablo morallyicannot be describod, in torms 
of tiie criterion of oon-Astency, as Irrational. 
(o) lie may not roalise thst 13ituattom which are 
different in some rospocts are really aimilar in all relevant . 
reupoctn. lf this is the case then what appear to be inconsistencies 
in conduct are really caused by an inability to grasp the facts 
of a certain situation or situations properly. Very Often it is 
a failure of tho iuagination which is responsible for our over- 
looking basic similarities in situations. Thus a child who is 
gentle with hor baby brother may be quito cruel to the cat, and her 
parents may wonder at this strango inconsintency. only to find 
later that the child had not roalised that cats coilld suffer pain 
too. 
sa tlý6-r-era re. Yoi if we include-in tho Ya an inconsistency hera. Yo 
total situation the ipersonts foolings or general state of mind at 
the time of action no might hava to uay that tlie situation was 
really different in. this case: for P)xamplo. the person miglit be feeling in a very cheerful rrame of mind that morning. It might seem 
easy enough to got rovnd. this point Iby asuerting that subjective feelings should not be included in the data of the "aituationw, but tho difficulty is that these fenlings often affect our judgm-! nt 
Of t1ho "external" facts of the *ituati'on. If we moet a boggar Vailo 
we aro f6oling in a good mood wo might tend to regard hiri in a favourable light. to notice his good points only -we Yatclit ovan porsuadi oursolves that he is not reallY a beggar at all. Thio being so, cur only hopa, oftnn. of nailing a porson doNm witil the char, 7o of inoonsistoncy in to get hir 'to define 11in tf)rms most precisoly: tO state t for oxample. what sort of Persons lie regards. as beggars and so on. 
(3)Vao above point brings us to the third kind of 
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Practical inconsistenoy. namely, where we are not prepared to accept 
the logical implications of our practical rule of action. 
In'-ponsistoncies of this kind are verj frequont. Wo are 
all liable to state dogmaticallY VOrY general rules of actions 
only to find that the rule, if carried out consistentlyhas 
awkward implications which we had not at first realised. In 
parttoular we are often forced to enlarge the field of application 
of a prinoiplo in away which wo do not ralish. Tho principle may, 
as it weregrecoll back on ourselves -we may have to includo 
ourselves. or "our'side" in the "list" of thinj 
principle oan be applied. It is indeed one of 
of the principle of Oonsistanoy to show that 
which acem valid when atatod in general termn 
modification when their-full implications aro 
Is to which the 
the inain functions 
principles of action 
ray require 
revealed. 
I. Often, of courso, there is nothing wrong with the general 
principle itselfbut merely with the way in which it is stated. 
The crystallization of complicated ethical principlos into pithy 
political slogans is especially dangerous in tilis connootion. "Mud 
to take'a topical examplo: the slogan "no forcible repatriation 
of prisoners" was bandied about during the conflict over the 
Korean prisoner of war issue, as though it were a perfectly clear 
and self-evident ethical prinoiple. Yet, if interpreted litorallyt 
it opens theway for any prisoner, who so chooses, to seek 
asylum with the enemy -including those who have committed 
traitorous aots during their imprisonment. Moreoverlif a prisoner 
can claim asylum on the grounds that he does not approve of 
communism and is not prerared to fight for it, does not the 
$are reasoning apply to the prisoner who does not like 
capitalism! And if it is wrong to force the hater of capitalism 
'to return to the democracies of the West, are we entitled to 
force him. to fight for the defence of capitalism 
, 
in the 
first plaoo! No doubt aom. o of theaq difficulties could be resolved,, but the slogan. as it standshas, dangerous political implications 
'which no country is probably prepared to accept, - 
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5. To have now briefly summarisod the kinds of situation in 
which, using the principle of consistency as a criterion, vie may say 
there is a prima facie case for azoorting that the action in 
question is irrational. It is necessary to stress that it is only 
a prima-facto caso, for in any given situation where a parson is 
apoarently acting inoonsistentlygor indeed is actually'provod to 
have acted against the principle of conaistenoyit might be argued 
that novertholess hin action was a rational ono. Thus for somewhat 
the same reasons as we outlined in the case of tho principle of 
accordance with the facts it can be shown that it is by no means 
always in our own interests to conform strictly to the principle 
of consistency. Not only do we not necessarily suffer any 'bad 
consequences if we act on beliefs which are solf-oontradictory or 
are inconsistent with one anotherpbut it can bo argued that the 
person, who is too concerned with consistency is often less able and 
ready to deal with the practical affairs of life. Moreovorgas has 
often been pointed out, a high sense of intellectual integrity 
,, 
inasmuch as in this matter sometimes lends to much unhappiness, 
it prevents us from accepting aS true, beliefs which we would 
liko to accept, and which othors, less concernod with consistanCYt 
accept without rosorvation. ii0v often dowe find ourselv, 38 
envying the person for whom these "trivial questions of 
consistency and inconsistency" are of no, groat consequence* 
Of oourse it is, in genoralgtruo to say that it is in 
our interants to conform to the principle of consistency9though 
the oorrespondenoo between conformity-to the principle and the 
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state of one' a 'welfare is not as close as in tho case of the 
princiD. Le of "accordance with the faots". The mathematician would 
not got very far if he did not conform striotly to the principle of 
consistency; and thi parson who, in practical affairs, throws 
consistency to thevinds is not likely to succeed for long in any 
of his enterprises. Novertheless, in so far as we cannot always 
oquate conformity to this principle with 'what is conducive to 
our interests" it is not possible to say that the use of this 
principle as a aelf-evidont criterion of rational action depends 
ultimately on the fact that our intnre8ts are 'best served by 
conforming to it. Nor can we assumo, when there is a conflict 
between our happiness and conformity to this principle, that the 
principle of consistoncy is tho superior criterion of rationality. 
This position is only tenable if we hold that9in some sensep 
the principle of consistency imposes a moral obligation on us so 
that we fool under a nocessitY to conform to it even if it 
is not 
in our interests to do so -thatlin other wordsothe pritorion 
Of 
consistency has an authority which the princiolo of happiness 
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doos not posso3s. And this brings me to tho next point. 
6. When we say that it is rational to try to aot in 
aacordanco with the principle of consistency it is doubtful 
vhether wo havo in mind tho thought that it is in our intorosts 
J. j am assuming hero that moral obligations really have the 
-authority, which they seem to have, and that it is rational 
to 
give duty the priority over desire. This problem will bo dincusseA- 
later, in ohapterV-F( It is not ýqarcha? )s necessary to point out that 
even if we accept that we have an obligation to tr,,,, to conform 
to the principle of consistoncy it is not therefore necessarilY 
rational for us to act on this principle in every instance. 
In some cases the prima facie obligation to conform to the prin- 
ciple of consistency may be confronted with another obligation 
with superior authority, 
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to conform to this prinoiple. If we wore asked why we consider It 
rational to conform our actions to this principle we should 
probably regard the question as meaningless -we would say that 
it was "celf-evidont", that it was part of what we mean by the 
term "rationall. And, as we have junt. saidtt is unlikely that 
the question of tho relation of this principle to our happiness 
would enter into our mind when we wore making this statement. Indend, 
in theory anyway, we should probably be prepared to assert that the 
question-of happiness was irrelevant -that whon, for instance, 
we modify an argument because it has boon shown to contain a 
contradiction *we do so simply because it isýcontradictory, and we 
feel under a necessity to try to remove the oontradiction. Later 
on, it in true, we might be led to loave the argument as it stands 
becaus, ) it is in our interests to do so, and we might ba prepared 
to dofend such-a position as being a rational ono9but this would 
not alter the fact that the immediate response to the 'presence 
of a contradiction is a feeling that it ought to 'be rosolved or 
the argument given up. 
This is tantamount to saying that ve have a prina facto 
obligation to try to oonform our actions', to the principle of 
oonsistoncy, and that it is an essential charnateristic of a' 
rational being ýhat he should feel under the necessity to try to 
rosolve a oontradiction whenever lie is aware that one is present. 
7. This whole question of the obligatoriness of the 
prinoiple of consistonoy will bo dealt with in detail when we 
consider the general problem of "the obligation to act 
rationally in chaptor IX, and thero we shall argue that there 
in a oonse In whiah we can regard the obligation of consistency 
an the fundamental obligation-JAamI wish to make only a few 
comments an the common sense attitude to this obligation. 
In thoory. as wo have said, oommon sense doos Soom 
to accept the notion that we have an obligation of this kind. but 
in practice its attitude is somewhat ambiguous. This is in part 
due to the fact that, in general, common sense ic confused about 
the general problem of moral obligation, but there are more 
, pecific reasons too. Vor one thing it is sometimes the caue that 
when we sa'y to someone "you ought to be more consistent" we 
are implying not so much that they have an obligation to act 
consistently as such, but rather that they oulfit to be consistent 
so thatsay, thoir friends will not bo inconvonienood by. their 
unprodiotability. The roal obligation lics horo -i. o. tho consider- 
11 ation of the interests of the friends. 
The importance of this point is that it loads us to 
scrutinizo more olosoly the common sonso position in roapoot to 
thin matterjand when we do so it seeThs to be less obvioUS that 
common sonse does a9cept the idea that the prinoiple of 
consistenoy has per so an obligatory foroo, Thero would seem indeed 
to be a certain susp4cion of the idea of consistency"' for 
its own sake". The saying that "constatenoy is the I'llob9oblin 
125. 
of small mindsv is quoted with approval; we become impatient with 
the person who tries to bo"too logical", or who worries too much abouL 
what we think of as "more inoonsistencioal. "-lieroas wo. might Say 
that it was irrational for a person to maintain, say, a religious 
belief which was obviously based on a falsohood. wo do not so 
readily condemn a person for irrationality if his religious beliefs 
contain certain inconsistencies. 
These observations do not, of course, necessarilýjdisprove 
the former contention that we do accoptlin principle anyway, the 
idea of an obligation to conform to the principle of consistency; 
'but they do, at least, tend to show that vO givo tho obligation 
a law ranking in the soale of moral values. Ve tondoin particularv 
to think that it is wrong for a person to be too fastidious about 
"more intelleotual consistenoy", especially if this fastidiousness 
I 
leads him to nogloot more important duties. 
I. Ono can think of at least two reasons for this bias against 
over-conoorn with intellectual consistonay. First, in many oases 
the really important thing about a theory or belief is w1hothor 
it works. A scientist may realiso that there is an important 
inconsistency between two hypothesos, oach of which seems true, 
and may be worried about it; but from the common sense point of 
view the important thing would be that each of the hypotheses 
works, that itýdoes its job. The scientist would be condemned if- 
he wasted too much time trying to reconoile the two, instoad of 
getting on with the practical applications of the hypotheses.. 
Socondly, where we firmly believe that a certain sot of 
beliefs is correct we often try to got round the difficulty of 
inconsistencies between them by asserting that though we cannot 
ourselves roconcile them yet we believe, in faith, that there 
is a solution to the problem. Thus the Christian, 'whon confronted 
with the problem of undeserved suffering. rill often say 
that there is an answer to the problem, but it is beyond 
human undorstanding. In cases like those the obligatoriness of 
the principle of consistency is formally rocognised, but our 
obligation to apply it is evaded by. ploading "invincible ignorance". 
( sc-C OAC) 
I 
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'We uhall be concernod later (in ohapterýlj ) to olarify 
the common senspe position andowhero necossary, to modify it. We 
may anticipate to this extentlhowevorby stroosing the point that 
common sense does seem, in genoraloto underestimate the importance 
of the principle of consistency and to overlook the extent to 
which all human intorcourso does depend on the a3sum. ption that 
, men will feel somo obligation to conform to the principle of 
consistoncy. It is not merely in the field of tho intellectual 
pursuit of knowledge that this principle occupies a basic position; 
everytime we discuss an7 problem or try to persuade or teach 
somebody to accept some particular belief we are assuming that 
all concerned are prepared to abide by the prinoiPle of consistency- 
? 4oroover there is a sense in which, as Nvo. shall soo, 'thO principle 
of oonsistency plays a fundamental role in all moral questions. 
This is not to say that in every'givon situation in 
Which an apparent contradiction is present it will bo our actual 
obligation as distinct from our -prima facie obligation to try to 
resolve it. Often there are, indoodgmore important obligations 
pressing on us at the time, Bo that we have to postpono the attempt 
tcýeal with the contradiotion'. But even if this be tho caso, or even 
if there are oocasions on-which we think that a set of beliefs- 
are true notwithstanding apparent inoonsistencios 'between them, 
the fact still remains that it is an essential aspect of can's 
In respect to this latter point we must note that tho apneal to 
"faith" does not really roloaDo us from our difficulty. Tho arg'umont 
that "if we know more we would see thore was no oontradictionlisp 
in offootlan admission that one or both of our boliofs is partly 
false. In other words, we have to admit tiiat if two beliefs are 
contradictory then they cannot both be maintained an true in t, 10 
form in which they are stated. 
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rationality that he should fool constrained to conform to tho 
principle of oonsistenoy. 7natever he may finally decide to do about 
it in any given situation in which a contradiction is prosentt 
we take it for granted that, as a rational beingothe 'presence of. 
a contradiction will cause a sense of "unoase"qwill give rise to 
a feeling that something oiip-, h to be done about it. 
I 
.L Al dI 
C. TIAPTrR 
T TI ECRITP, R10 IT 0fHAPPINr. S S. 
I. 
1. In this chapter I wish to consider tho applioation. of 
the principle of the 'greatest good" in so far as it is used as 
a criterion of rationality in those situations where the question 
of our moral obligations either to ourselves or to others is 
not relovant, or in any case not immediately so. In other words, 
we are concerned with the question as to what the rational course 
of action is whenover, being faced with a number of possible sources 
of satisfaction, we have to decide which desire or complex of 
desires should bo satisfied. And, of course, so long as moral 
questions do not obtrude themselvos, tho answer to this problem is 
a very simple and obvious ono, namoly, that we should choose to 
satisfy that dosire or complex of desires which will bring us 
"the greatest good". In, this contoxt, the, expression "greatest good" 
is best translated into the'less ambiguous though ec4gilly vaguo 
term "happinoss". 1hus we consider it rational if a young man 
ancrifices the prospects of imvediately high wages in ordor to 
train himself for a profession whi6h, in the long run, will, it is 
thoughtibring him greater satisfactions. 
2. There is a sonse in which the idea of "happiness" may 
be oonaidered the most fundamintal to the concept of rational 
1. Wo are postponing until chapterXI oonsideration of the -ý-rodb! OM 
whether we are ever justified in thinking of any choioe of 
aotion solely in terms of our own happiness. We are taking for 
granted hero that there are some situations in which the question 
. of our 
duties to others is not relevant. 
action -that is1whothor we are considering the effect of ou'r 
actions on ourselves or on others we tend to think that the 
crucial test of tho rationality of our-actions is that they 
should lead to happiness or to the greatest happiness possible in 
the circuris'tanoos. Even if we qualify this statement, as wo do, 
by saying that we should not seek happiness at the expense of 
moral and other values, it still remains true that we find it 
difficult to accept the notion that an action can be really 
rational if it does not -in the long run -result in an increase 
in happinoss. As we shall soe later oommon'sense finds it 
a very "hard pill" to swallow that there might be an absolute 
conflict between the claims of*duty and tho claims of happiness, and 
will do everything possible to avoid accepting such a-oonclusion. 
In the same'way, when we are considering how we should try to 
influence others in the matter of their moral standards or their 
general cultural and intellictual standards we tend to assume 
that an improvement in these standards will not be detrimental 
to their chances of happiness. If in any given oase, we think 
that our influence in these directions will-rasult in a 
loss of happiness, or, rathor. in an absolute loes of happiness then 
we usually think it wrong to pursuo our course of action.. Te 
may think that the intollectual standards of a primitive tribe 
could be considerably raised, but if we think that by so raising 
these standards we are going to upset the traditional way of 
life Which has given them security then we hesitate before 
taking the required action. Similarly, we hesitate before wwrocking" 
the religious faith of an old porson because we feel that ho is 
I "ýý 1") . 
incapable of recovering from the knowledge of the true facts. 
. 
In short, whatever other values the "good life" miglit be said to 
consist of. common sense asserts that it must be a happY life. 
Another way of putting the same noint is to say that 
common sense tends to think that the most satisfying reason of 
all for aotionthe onowhich is tho most self-evidently reasonable, 
is that tho action will produce hanpinoss. Even in regard to the 
moral field9whero oftonvo seem, to b^ doaling with obligations 
which c. ahnot posoibly bo interpreted in terms of their conducivenoss 
to the groatest happinossroommon sense does tend to apply some 
kind of utilitarian formula as the toot of the rightness of aotiors, 
As Sidgwiok puts it: "Few vill deny that happiness in an ondat, 
'which it is thought ultimately reasonable to aimo. if I can say of 
any action that it makes me haplior. it soons that no further 
reas y doing it. 3 . pn need 
bo given for r 
It mifflit bo questioned whother, in fact, common sense 
does give sqch prominence to happiness as a criterion of ration- 
ality, and this is a question which we shall deal viith later in 
this. chaptor, but here it can bo pointed-out briefly that some. 
of the objections which one hears rained a; ainst the idea of 
happiness an a satisfying and reasonable end of conduct have 
their origin in cortain confusions of thought regarding tho 
nature of happinoss itself and the moans Vaereby the state of 
happiness in to be obtained. Ofton we find that the objection is 
not against happinoss'as such, but rathor against, say, the seeking of 
I. Soe chapter X for discussion of this point. 
0,, -OP-Cit. lpý. 64. 
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one's own happiness to the OxClusion of the happiness of I 
others; or against, say, the identification of happiness with 
-a kind of lifewhich we regard as morally undosirnable. And these. 
objections, perhaps legitimate in themselves, lead us to think that 
happiness is not per so an end at which we ought to aim. Happiness 
becomes associated with selfishness orwith ploasuro -seeking 
or with something olse which we disapprove of morally. 
3. When we say that a porson acts rationally if he chooses 
that course of action Vhich will givo him an increase of happiness 
the term "rational" rofers not only to the intrinsic desireability 
of happiness as a stato of being but also to tho fact that the 
person conoorned, in order to pursue his oourse of actionphad to 
control his immediate impulses, reason out consequences etc. -in 
other words had to engage in aotions-which we think of. as 
specifically human, as specifically belonging to a being who 
possossoe roason. Thus if a lad resist$ the temptations of an 
immediately hieri-paying job we praise him, not rarely because he 
has thought in long -range terms -in t,,, rms of happiness rather 
than of'immediate ploasures -but, also because he has sufficient 
control over Mmsolf to resist the immodiate tomptationiSimilarly, 
if a porson, faood with a complicated problem. refuses to take 
the most obvious way out whioli suggests itsolf, but tries to 
work out in detail the Offoots of oaoh possible alternative 
course of action on h'to general well beingiwo praise him ttfor 
having acted rationally not moroly booauso he haspagaintthought' 
of happiness rather than of some immediate interestlbut also 
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because his close and accurate reasoning out of the problem has 
demonstrated that he is a man who in capable of controlling his 
actions by the judgments of reason. 
This point isworth noting, for-it is sometimes forgotten 
by those who raise moral objections to tho pursuit of happinessp 
that the suocessful attainment'of happiness often dependstin part 
anyway, on the ability of the person concerned to resist immediate 
tomptations, to control natural instinct s to engage in patient 
reasoning, and finallypto accept the judgments of reason and to 
modify his douires so that thoy come into conformity with the 
actual possibilities of tho situation. In other words the 
achievement of happiness can bo, thouga it not always is, a moral 
achlovement also. 
4. In respect to the. prinoiple of happiness as a criterion 
of rational action there are tliroo main problems to be discussed: 
firat, whether there can be an absolute conflict botwoon the olairs 
of happiness and the claims of duty, and if so what the rational 
course of action should be in such a situationpecondly, whothar 
in fact happiness is the desireablo end of aotion which it Seems 
to be; thirdly,, whother it is. rational in the sense of practicable 
to pursue happiness deliberately -to make happiness a deliberate 
aim in lifo. The first of th-9se problems will bo dealt with in 
chapterli the latter two in thin chapter. 
Before we can discuss any of these problems, however., it 
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is necessary to say something about two questions which are usually 
taken for grantedsviz. 0 the que8tion of what we rean 
'by the term, 
"happiness", and the quontion of whatwe mean when we say 
that 
"so and so was motivated by Ur-O thought of happiness". 
AmbiguitY 
in our use of the term "happiness It in eithor or 
both of these 
contexts(i. e. whorowe are talking either about 
happiness in 
general or about happiness as a motive) is responsible 
for come 
of the confusion of thought whicil one asnociateg 
with this Whole 
problem of happiness as a criterion of rational action. In particUlcm, 
we have to be Oar6ful not to oonfuse, thO idea of happinessp 
considered as a state of being, with happineSs, defined in terms 
of the things which we consider will give us or will produce this 
desireable state of being. I 
llaýpiness, of courselis one of those words which Boom 
'urpososqbut which are clear enough in meaning for practical D 
noverthelous impossible to define in 'precise torms. Any definition 
which we formulate is bound to be vaguo. For all that, it is 
possible to say, with Dome prooisonossovilat we do not moan by 
the torm, and in so doing to differontiate clearly betweon 
happiness and other states with which it can be easily confused., 
The great difficultypin defining Ijappinoss)IS to avoid, 
on the one hand)the purely formal definition which tells us 
1. 
nothing and which 'begs all the important questions; and on the 
other to avoid dof ining happiness in terms of those things which 
1. Thus, sae AristotletEthioa Nioon. achea, ýtrans. Roos)IOJ)5b-: -Presumably 
howevor to say that happiness in the chief good seems a 
-platitudo. and a clearer account of what it is iB still desired. " 
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I we think are necessary to happinessor which will produce 
happiness. In this latter case we not only (3onfuso the end with the 
means, as pointed out abovolbut in identifying certain activities 
or certain possessions with happiness we oPen ourselves to the 
obvious criticism that other people seem to obtain happiness 
through quite different raeans. It would indeed be impossible to 
state either what the minimum conditions of happiness are, or to 
give any particular recipe for happiness which would be offootive 
for all persons. 
The nearest we can get to a satisfactory dofinition of- 
happiness sooms, to nepto be the following: llappiness io a state 
of being in which we enjoy an indefinitely prolongod feeling of 
pleasureable contentment. It cannot be denied that this definition 
is vary vaguo. It is also somewhat formal in characterpthough 
loss so than the definition of happiness as *the chief good". 
An objection might be raised here. viz., that our defin- 
ition, far from being formallin really of a highly controvorsiAl 
nature.. It might be argued, for instancogthat the idea of 
"indefinitely prolonged pleasureableness" would seem boring if 
not repulsive. to many It is in meeting a criticism of this Yind, 
however, that the formal character of the definition becomes 
apparent, for, of course, the term "contentment" can be employed 
in such a way that the defenders of tho definition always-have, 
as it wore, tho last word. All we need to say in that, if we are 
1. This s rather like Sidgwiok's definition: "---the moat pleasant 
o. onsciousness conceivable', lasting as long and a3 uninterrupt, ýdly 
as possible. " 
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repulsed by tho-idea. of "indefinite contentment" then we are 
probably thinking not of the state of happiness as such but of 
some particular state of consciousness which we associate with 
happinoss. -For example the idea of"contentment"may bring to "And 
thoughts of a quiet, uneventful life and wo may rightly say that 
a life of this kind would be very boring. But of course the 
state of contentment cannot be associated with any particular way 
Of life. It iotby dofinition, quito simply a state of bein g which 
cannot be boring or unploasureable. 
Although our definition is vague it is not entirely 
trivial. It does emphasise tho'point, obvious enough to common sons"), 
though not always to philoso phers, that the state of happiness, 
'whatever else may be said about it, is at least a pleasureable 
stato, and is desired because of its pleasuroablnose. This obvious 
Point has sometimes been obscured by moralistic dissertations on 
the path of duty being, the only way to happineso, and also by the 
fact that we sometimes sentimentaliso about the psychological 
benefits that result from actions of an'heroto naturo. Thua 
'90 somotimes hoar statements of this kind: "tho martyr who suffers 
for conscience sake enjoys true happiness". This statement only 
makes sense if it is interpreted to mean that the martyr will 
enjoy truo'happiness as a reward for his saorifice; it cannot 
POssibly make sense if it is interpreted to moan oithor that the 
martyr enjoys happiness in contemplating the actual martyrdom, or 
that he enjoys the process of being marýyrod. Aristotlo puts 
the matter bluntly: "Thosowho say t1hat the victim on the rackpor 
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the inan whw'falls into great mi3fortunes in happy if hcl is good. are 
v-, hothor thoy mean it or not, talkin-I!, nonsenso. 0 
7. Our dorinition also prevonta us from ancoptin; the 
position, f-oquontly hold, that it iz poasible to bo happy without 
at the time boing oonsoiously aware that we are happy. Many 'fables 
and wise sayings turn on thin, point, vit, of tho olusivonowi of 
happiness -that it in not until we hrive lost our happiness that 
wo aro avaro that. we had boon happy. 
The fao-L of the matter is, howevorl thRt all plonsuroablo 
states have thin ono thing in oor. mon, viz., that thoy are consoious 
otatoo 'of being. A state of boing cannot'be pleasureablf) unless it 
is felt as plouGureable at the tire of exportenoing it. This is not 
to oay, of courso, that it could not havo benn pleanureable had tho 
person concerned "boon ablo to approciate it. 
In making thic point we do not moan to imply that wo 
have to bo self-consciounly aware of the oxporiance aB ploasurosble 
in tho zonso that we are oontinually romtnding oursolveS that 
"this is a ploaaurcable exporioncoll. Such an intorprotatiOn wOuld 
cancol out, not onlj thoso Pleasuroable axnorienono which are no 
intonso that thoir oxInt; )nco is inoompatible with roflootive . 
thought, but would al3o raiso till kinds of difficulties in resneat 
to the 'way in *hloh animals exporionce pain and ploasuro. What, wo 
have to distinguish "b9twoon is tho consciousness which to merely 
tho fooling that or Vhs) knowledgo that we are nxpertancing oloa-11IM-, 
and th-'e introspective oonsoibuanous which onables us to analyse 
1-OP-ocit. 1163b. 
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vhat kind of ploasuro wo aro fooling. 1t is only the first of thoce-, 
which 13 a neconsary-prorequis Ito of our oxporlencing ploasuro. 
The Point is 17011 made by Sidgwick: "Still it seems to be a fact 
that any very powerful fooling roAching to the ýull intensity of 
which our connalousnons in normally capablo is commonly diminished 
by a contemporanooun stroko of cognitivo offort: and indeed it has 
often bonn noticed as a difficulty in the way of exact observation 
of our omotions that tho objoct oognised sesýmm to shrink and 
dwindle in proportion ac the cognitive ragard grows keen and eager# 
HOT t1hen are we to reconatle t1jis with the propoaition ftrat laid 
down that pleasure only exists as we aro consoioue of it? Perhars 
we may say that in so far as nere consciousness of present feeling 
is conoernedgapart from distinct roireaentativo oloments9tho 
cognition cannot diminish the fooling of which it Is an indisDon- 
sablo and imeparable conditionibut in Vhat we call introsnective 
cognitionwe go beyond tho present fooltng. oomparing and clasuify- 
ing it with pa3t fnolings, and tho effort 
' 
of reprouenting and, 
comparing those foolinge tends to deoroaso the mero procontative 
oonsciousnosu of ti-le oloas-i2re. l. 
We can only concludo then that whon pooglo talk of 
their not having been aware they were happy until they had lost' 
their happiness they moan oithor: (a) tilnit ths)y na. T roallso that 
the conditions for happino. 00 wore prosent at t1lin formor timov 
could they havo but realtnod it; or(b)tha, t tho former stato ScOms 
blissN1 compared with what they are auffering now, 
It 10 truatof course), that vo cre ofton unable to grasp 
the potentialitins for 'happiniss inherent in a situation until thi 
aituation has irrevocably altered -we are oonstantly Innrning 
wisdom when it is too Into to profit by it. But admi3sion of thi3 
does not alter the fact that wo cannot bo hnpPY UnlOOD NYO are 
conacious of boing to. 
'-OnO Of tho roasonawhy we approve or this pnradoxioal dectrino rogarlin, g t, jt) olusiveman of hap? )inens 13 t1lat -wr_, ale#ayu tond to idoallso tho past -to remembor only the Ploasureable inoidentst or, if ve r, ýcojjoat the Unplefisant incidentu, to viow them in 11 way 'which nUR31sts thoy wero not roally so , all. unplomaAnt aftor 
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It is,! think, r)nssiblo to give =are content to the 
idea of happiness by the indiroot mothol of diatingui-ohing it 
from othor ploasureablo states. 'ge can use two critoria here. In 
the first place the atate of' happiness has a moro permanent 
quality than otlter pleacurfý-able states. Ploanuroo which are 
associated with spooli'lo objects -the pleasures of eating, 
drinking oto h. avo a detrkrminate time liTait which can be asue. -Ml 
and predictdd with some aoouracy, but in contract to thO_aOphappinoi,,; s 
is of indeterminate duration. Or rathoroto Put t1le ratter more 
procisoly, it is only 1)000iblc to bo happy ifrat tho timOlWO 
feel 
sure that tho conditions or happiness will remain stable. AnY 
insecurity in týis respect ruins the fooling of happiness. So far 
as specific pleasureable states are concerned tho knowledge of 
a time limit does not diminish our plonsura in any dogrootand in 
some cases may hotghton. it, but if we could have pro-Xnowledge that 
our happiness was to oomo to an end In tho near futuro thon it 
is reasonably co'rtain that our happinoss wou14 end there and then. 
Of course wo all know that happiness is a vulnorable stato which 
can bo destroyqd at any moment by factors beyond our controllbut 
this indnterminate knowledSo -like tho Xnovlodgo that we will 
ultimatoly die -noed not ruin otir happinoss 
adopt tho right aýtitudo to it. Howovor, this 
tho precariousnose of human happiness in a 
from specific knowledge of the how and 'whon 
happinnoo. In othor words ve r.. uzt fool suro 
purposes, our happiness is secure. 
if we are able to 
general awaroneco, of 
very different thing 
of the ending of our 
that, for all practical 
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The second critorton is olosely related to the first. 1t, 
is that whereas mout ploauureable states are associated with 
a apocific activity or group of activittes, happiness seems to be 
the product of a complex situation in which a wholo range of 
deuiros of very difforing kinds are satisfind. Tilia boing so the 
fooling tone of hap*. pineus is bound to be moro diffused than in the 
caae of more Specific satisfactions mo3t of which have a pronounoM 
hedonto tone of tnoir own. 
There are com, ) duricuitten about thin critorion which 
ve can mention very briefly.. In the first plIICO 'WO 00"130ti'MIS use 
the term "happinous" to douorib, ) a pldasuroablo stato arising 
from a apocirto satisfaction. Thus we watcn a mnn engrossed in his 
meal and we say, "well, hela happy anyway". Tn a case like this 
we may simply be using the term carolosolyston the other hand the 
1280 of the'torm may indicate that we think the porson to 
; njoying 
not merely the specific ploanuroo of eating but also, satiofaotions 
of a more general and complex naturo. Tho fact is that there are 
a number of pleacuroable activities which have the pawer not only 
to produce their own charaotoriatio oatisfactions, 'but also to 
produce a moro general feeling ýf well-being Which is not pormanont 
enough to be called happinoss, but which, perhaps, could bo called 
a *moment of happinossO. Thus for ono person music is not simply 
a matter of pleaoant aounds, but Is also a means whereby he can 
enter into a world of peace and coronity; for anothor, a, walk in the 
country mig4t have much the sarao effact. And these objects may be 
used for these purposes rather than for their own specific 
oatisfactiona. 
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Secondly, it is somotimos tho cane that happiness SOOms 
to result from tho occurronce of some major pioco of good fortune, 
so that we say, "I datemy happiness from suoh and such a tima". 
Thus a man might claim that it was the winning of a fortune 
which roal! y gave him the chance of happiness. 
In cases like., thlose, howevertall that we aro really 
asserting is that this particular evont -orovided the 
final 
condition or the nPoessary condition for the achievement of 
. 
happineaa. lge cannot intend to imply that tilis good fortune was. 
in itself a sufficient condition. 
9", .I now wish to say something about the moaning of 
the 
term "happiness" when it io used in expressions Vaich assert that 
happiness was the motive of the action. As we shall see the term 
is used more loo sely here and covers a wide range of meanings* 
Sho firat point to note to that happinoss, ' defined as 
a particular state of being. is not in itself an effeotivO mOtivO 
of action. The idea in general of a state of pleasureable oontentmerl 
no doubt appoals to ua -and in that sonso wo,, 'desire it(je. would 
like to enjoy it)- but the notion iS too vague and elusive for it 
to compete with more concrete and immediate desirou. When, thoroforo, 
we say that we are moved by the thought of happiness we usually 
have in mind the thought of something more specific and realisable 
than the vague notion of a state of contentment. The various 
possibiliti, lo, which suggest themselves can be nummarised an 
follows: 
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(a)Sometimes,, whon we say we are moved by the thought of 
our happiness, wo mean only that we are moved by the thought of 
what we want to do as distinct from what we oug4t to do. Ilappiness 
is made cynonomous with desire. This is too loose an employment of 
the term, and does not distinguish between being moved by what 
Butler calls particular passionsýtand being moved by the more 
general idea of oness well being. 
(b)TI, ore froquently. we mean that we are moved by thO 
thought of_*hat will give the greatest pleasuro. We choose to do 
X ra'ther than 
.Y 
beoauso we think X will give us greater pleasure. 
It is not at all obvious that the principle of the. 
greatest plesouro is to bo regarded as always equivalent to the 
principlo of happinens. For instanco, if we are trying to choose 
between two specific activities -say, crioket or boating- aa to 
which would give us the griatest ploasuro it seems somewhat 
extravagant to say that we are here thinking about our happiness, 
Even in rospoot to choices betwoon immediate pleasure and 
distant pleasure wo have to differentiate between those instancos 
in which we aro concerned with specific ploacures only -whother 
to oat the extra cake and suffer indigestion later -and those 
instances in which the choice ve make is likely to affoct'our 
life as a whole -e. g. whether to concentrate on sport now or 
forego the pleasures of athlectic famo in order to make sure of 
a Successful career lator. It is only in the latter ease that 
we can roally talk of being motivated by tho thought of happiness, 
In this connoction it is intoresting to note that in 
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situationa where we do have to choose between the long-term 
interest, and the iTaxodiate plousure, our only hope often of 
countering the impact of the immediate pleasure is to concentrate 
in the imagination on some particular pleasure which we shall 
enjoy if we adopt the long-term policy. 1-Ioncapthough our motive is 
the thought of our general woll boing or happinoss, tho actual 
conflict takes the form of a contest botween two opocific pleasures. 
k 
(c). Sometimes, our oonoorn with our general well being 
arises not from any particular situation whore a conflict arises 
between immediate pleasures and long-term interests9but rather 
from a general and vague foeling of dissatisfaction. Tedocide. 
to 'wlook into the matter" and to find out what is wrong. Thus we 
talk of a person being moved by the thought of happiness ifoin 
a "cool momentj he tries to discover what his gonaral -well-being 
" Consists inff "-what objects give him the most satisfaotion9what 
away of life" would be mont satisfactory, and so on.. 
This more intellootual. approaoh to the problem is 
comparatively raregand it is even more rare to find a pornon 
actlially attempting to carry outpas a practical poliCYpthO 
theoretidal principles formulated in these "cool momonts". It is 
against this particular interpretation of the happiness motive 
with its implied assumption that a direct and systematic 
attack can be made on the problem of happiness -that the viell, 
known wparadox of hedonism" argument in directed. 
-4 
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(d). Occasionally the vague general notion of happinoss 
is given sensuous content by the fact that we think that the %may 
to complete contentnent is to be found in a particular vray -in the 
possession of cortain objecto, or the experiencing of certain 
feelings, or in the chance to lead a certain kind of life. Our 
problem then becomes the practical one of finding the means to 
satisfy these particular decires. Whereotheng we are moved by 
the thought of "key, desires" of this kind we may be said to be 
motivated by happiness. 
In general it is probably true to say that though every 
, ran destres to oxperienco the state of happineaSothO thought of 
happiness as such is neither a common nor a powerful motive in 
human affairs. Zven if wo 'intorprot the happiness motive in the 
Mo st concrete manner possible -i. e. as the problem of discovering 
which of two possible courses of action will, in the-long runlgivo 
us the most pleasure -it is by no moans clear that the vast 
majority of'mon are. -in'fact, capable of deciding such 
.a 
question 
in those particular terms. Thus, suppo3o a man is trying to discover 
whether he will, in general, bo happior if he accepts the offer of 
a highly paid but very exacting job rather than stay in his secure, 
but modest and rather dull position in the Civil Servico. 1n coming 
to a decision he may have to weigh against one another such complex 
factors as borodom, seourity, tho wishes of his wife, hard work, 
responsibilities to childrenand so on. This in itself would be a 
formidable task but if, as Is usually the case, the task is 
undortakon Without any clear principles to guide the investigation 
then the possibility of a right decision boing given would seer. 
remote. In actual fact, Vh9re such difficult alternatives present 
themselves the docietvo factor, as often or not, is likely to bo 
some, particular desire which happens to exert a powerful influence 
at the crucial moment. Often when we are faced with an important 
decision we decide, as we oey, to be rational about it and to weigh 
up all the relevant factors coolly with a view to our general 
interost. But soon we got bogged down with the complexities of the 
Problem. and baffled by the mimber of unknown factors with which 
wo, havo to oporate. We may not be sure what our dosiros reallY, arej 
or Whether we desire this more than that, or what t1lo possibilities 
in the situations aro. In the ond ve take a gamble, or deoide the 
issue in terms of tho particular factor which at the time 
most important. 
The truth in that it is only tho person who has thought 
a good dnal about the problem of happiness in "cool" moments who 
is likoly to be able to use tho principle of greatest pleasuro 
(or any other mode of the happiness principle) with any effective- 
ness. Unje6swe have a sound knowledge of our potontialitina and 
, vreaknossos, of the relative strengths of our denirengand, morooverg 
a sufficiently Nvide exporienco of the world to give us a vorking 
knowledge of what is or is not possible, wi! k cannot break down 
the very general principle of happiness into those rulo-of-thumb 
principles of action vhich alone enable us to analyse a complex 
problem into factors which are manageable. 
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10.1 now 'Wish to deal with aomo of the criticisms 'which 
are made againat the idea, that happine8s can be regarded as a 
rational end of action. and In particular against tho idea that 
it is rational to make happiness a delibarate aim. 
First. 1 wlsh to examine tile view that happiness is not 
in itGolf a dooireable stato of being; thatvin othor Nvords, it is not 
3ensible to doeire it, for in doing so we aro really do3iring 
somothing we donPt really want. This argument9when stated 'baldly 
like thistseome so obviously fallacious that it may be doubted 
whether, in faot, it is ever used. But one does indeed hear moralistic 
sermons 'Whoso main tenor is along tiiose lines. Tho argument takes 
various forms, and in each oaso it is possible to deal with the 
main oriticiam briofly: 
f ýa). Jt is said that wo should quickly got bored with 
happiness. 
'To have already dcaltIffita this point. Wo nend only 
repeat here that the argwnont confusoo the end with tho means; 
it aosumoi3 that happiness., is synono.,, nous Nvith a particular way of 
lifo. 
(b). Tho abovo argument may bo modifiod thusloAt iS in the 
nature of man to get bored with any state of being he enjoys for 
a long time -the ploasuro loses its savour. Thorofore happiness is 
an impossible state of being. 'We are asking for an impossibility 
when we try to find happiness. 
In answer to this vo can make these two points. First, 
this argument oonfuses happiness with more spocific pleasureable 
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states. Prosur, ablytin "planning" for happiness we would make 
allawanoes for this tendonoy to boredom; we would try to arrange 
things so that wo were nover. depondent on any one kind of 
pleasure for our general well being. 
Secondly, in so far as some pleasures are more durable 
and intense than othors; and in so far as some ways of life are 
found to be moro satisfying than otherstthon this critioism 
would still leave scope for actionn directed towards the 
maxi-mising of pleasuroable states. 
. (C). Sozr, oti'mos the argument against happineon as a 
destroablo state of being taken a moral form-sit is ansertod that 
happiness is not an endwhich would seem desireable to a man of 
good moral sonsitivity. 
It is diffloult to know what argumonts of this kind aro 
really intended to prove. The following interpretations are 
ponsible. 
(i). It is morally wrong to pursue onots own happiness. 
This POintof course. is quite irrelevant to the 
question whether happiness as such is a state of being which is 
worthy to be donirad. 
(ii). It morally wrong to mako'happiness our main aim - 
there are othor ends which have greater value. 
Again. oven if this wore true, it does not in any way affecr- 
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the point that happiness is por so a morally dostroable state 
of 'being. 
Uii)-Solftetimss the argumont roat3 on a confusion between 
end and mea, na. It is assumf., d that those who seek happinoss will 
be, what. we call "pleasure neekers*w. people who spend most of their 
time pursuing trivial or even morally disreputable satisfactions. 
That this argument do-In not touch the question of happiness 
itself is sha= by the fact that those who use thin argument often 
go on to assert that the only way to happiness in by the path of &I 
duty. 
(iv)Tn sonne cases the moral argument againat happiness 5 
is not diroctod against the state of happiness as such but rather 
against our boing preoccupied with tho thought of happiness 
when wo ou3ht to be concerned with doing the right thing for its 
own sake. 'llius we criticiso the man who follows the precepts of 
hie religion for tho nako'of tho reward in heaven. 
(v) Occacionally the argumont is dirootod against 
"pleasureablo states" as suoh. It in said that the essence of 
happinoes being the idea of prolongod pleasureablo consciousness 
such an end would have no attraction to a morally sennitiVII 
man. Pleasiire, in other words,, is of no valne in itsolf; hny value 
'which may room to attach to it doospo only by virtile of tho 
activities from which the 'ploasure is obtainod. Thuo if a person 
derives pleasure frona listening to good munic we may congratulate 
hir. on his good taste or hie good senee of values, but in doing 
so we are referring not to the pleasure but to the munic. 
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This is the only moral argument vhioh is directly aimed 
at the state of happiness itself. and it seems to me obviously false, 
It is not deniod that wo do differentiato botween 
one pleasure and anothor by reference to tho moans whoreby tho 
pleasure is obtainod. We say that the nan who gots ploanure from 
listening to Bach has a better musical taste than the man who 
gets pleasure from listening to jazz; or we say that a man ought 
not to get pleasure from inflicting pain on animals. -But this in 
no., way contradicts the assertion that pleasureable consciousness 
as such is desfi-nable on its own account. Indond tho abovo argument 
can be used in such a way that it disproves the point which it 
was intended to make. For -, Ye could say that the value of pleasure 
as such is not in question when we say that "this or that, pleasure 
is'bad"; all that we are roferring to is that the means enereby 
t1ie ploasure is obtained are morally bad, 
More POsitivOl. Y we can point out that there are oases 
I 
in which 'pleasure is derived fron. activities whioh arep as it 
were, noutral so far as values are conoorned. Thoy are not morally 
-bad, but neither have they any claim to distinction either from an 
aesthetic or a moral or an intellectual point of view. Yet, from 
a common sense point of viewtwe oortainly do regard tile pleasure 
obtained from those activities as a good in it3elf, Thuswhilo 
one would not rate the pleauures of sun-bathing high on the scale 
Of possible ploasures, nevertheleas it does seem excessively 
contrary to common sense to argue that the pleasure qua pleasure 
has no value at all. 
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If this moralistic argur-ent wore true it would be 
difficult to eiplain the enjoymient wo dorive from watching the 
pleasure of children. Nothinggindood, seems more good than the 
innocent laughter of a child, or the raptures of a child on 
Christmas morning. 
U. The above, then, are domo of the argrim. onto which are used 
to prove. that in ono way or anothnr hapPinOcs is not a doslroablO 
state of 'ýelng and that theroforo it in not an a end'' to be 
aimed at. 
novi Wisla to doal with thoso argurentS WhOED main 
purport is to shor. that It is not rationallin the sense Of 
practicable, to make the thought of happiness an actual mOti'VO 
of action. In Other words it is the argument that wo cannot achiovo 
hapntness by mtking happiness a deliberate aim. 
These argumnnts fal. 1 into two oatagoriezpthO socond of 
Which is the mors important. SomOttmOs the atre 
I 
an is laid on the 
fact that the actual conditions of happinesS are largely beyond 
our control; zecondly9the strOSS is sonotimm. s laid on the fact 
that thinking about one's happiness Sets up psychological barriers 
which make it impossible for us to achieve 'happiness. 
In respect to the first of these araumonts a few brief 
comments only are nocessary-Tho argument consists in trying to 
show that happiness is not a state of boing which we can command 
at will since its existenoo dopends on faotora which are largelY 
'beyond our control. Not only do we require reasonable environmental 
1.3ea E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking, psO2 ff. for a 
good discussion of this point. 
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conditions -economic security, opportunities to satisfy basic 
neods, intorenttng work, lot3ure etc.., -but hereditary factors also 
have to be favourablo -we nood a sound physical constitution, 
certain temptýraraental qualities, normal appearance and so on. 
Sometimes we can altir these to suit our intorests. but vory often 
these factors are beyond our control. Luck, in other words, 'Plays 
a very largo part in dotermining whotAer Vo 3hall achieve happiness 
or not. ' 
The strongth of these factors can be admittod wiýhout our 
having to admit that it to therolfore impracticable to make some 
IlAnd of systematic attack on the prololom of happiness. For ono 
thing it is o"jviously rational to control or to modify those 
conditions, whero it ia ponsibla to do so. If the oxtornal conditions 
aro so unfavourable-that complete happinoon cannot be obtained WO 
can at least try to got tho mayimun, ploacuro out of the situation., 
Secondly, thin arguront ovorlooks tho A that tl'*o "Oct 
achiev, irrient of happiness depends au much on thO attitude we adopt 
towards the limitations imponed, on us by environmental and heredi- 
tary factors as on those factors thomoolvoa. lt can 'be readily' 
granted that tho, external factors can bo so heavily weighted 
against us that happinocs in any dogroo is clearly imposcible. 
A man sentenced to solitary confinement for life is hardly likely 
to achiovo any kind of contentment, oven though he be a saint. At 
boot 110 rliglit exporienco odd momento of corenity. But it is ' 
nevertheless poGsibla to overcome unfavourable conditions by 
adopting an attitude of cheefful. resignation concerning the 
things we cannot enjoy, and. of intense appreciation towards the 
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things vie can enjoy. And In so far as our attitudo towards these 
conlitions which are imposed on us ia within our controlxand can 
to some extent affect our oliances of happiness, then, in, that measurn 
1 
it is practicable to ain, at happiness as a doliborate policy. 
12. The psychological argumentusually known as the"paradox 
of hodonism is . nuoh more importoant9not only in that it is more 
pai-jet-rating than the above argumant, but also because it has 
exercised a groat influenoo. Tndeedin oriticismo of hodonismit 
Is usually taken for granted *that this argument dolivors a 
cOmPlOtOlY eA 'factive, blo-ff. 
ThO paradox of hedonism argument Le usually dirocted 
against what we may call the "ploasure-seekor", but in oo far as 
it is valid thon its main point is also relevant against the 
"happiness-eeaker" The Wrgurient is stated in many forms, but its 
general import is clear enough and can be summed up thus: iiappiness 
is not the kind of thing which ve can obtain by directly aiming 
at it. As soon as we try to achieve h&ppiness by some kind of 
deliberate policy wo find that -go bocome over-preoccupied with 
our own states of mind and this sets us a psychological barrier 
to happiness itcolf. Therefore the only way to achieve happiness 
in by aiming at somothing other than happinose. We must become 
absorbed in things for their own sakes, and then -pirhaps -happiness 
MaY follow as a "by-produat". Or, to* put ti,. o point more precisely: 
1. It may bo qunstioned whether these "attitudeslr-are within our control. Arp. tjjO)V not, too, dotoralljoa "oy temporamontal and ot'her V factors? This view is only tenable, j think, on the asý3umption that vie have no freedom of choice at all. Cortainly, if -ý. o do think we have some freedom then itwould Seem to lie here, viz. in the attitudo ro adopt to the fact of our being determined in all other ways.. 
the best way to achlove happiness is by forgetting all about it. 
Thero is so much obvious truth in this famous argument 
-indeed the "by-product" theory of happiness is now almost 
regardod as platitudinous - that it miMit seom that anY oritioisms 
which could bo brought against it would bo trivial onlY. What I 
wish to show. ho-wever, is not that the theory is wrong )I asithat9in 
its usual formit tends to over-state its case, and by so doing to 
give the misleading impression that happiness as a possible state 
of boing cannot bo made the subject of rational investigation. 
i 
First of all, let us state the valid-points in the theory 
(I)The theory oorr, ýctly emphasises that it would be 
impossible for us to be happy unless we were interested in 
something other than our own happiness. We must have an interest 
in things for their own sake. As 4utler puts it: llappiness or 
satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which 
are by nature suited to our several partioular appetites, passions 
and affeotions". 
(2) The same point can be stated negatively if wo 
assert that as a general rule those who are too much interested 
in themselves -in their own states of mind- are unhappy. 
In this connection, howovor, it in important to bo olear. 
as to what is cause and what is offoot. goralists are inclined to 
use the above observation to prove their oontention that the 
self-contred man suffors In the long run for his sino, as if to 
1. Op. 01t. P. 
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suggest that preoccupation with the self and its problems is 
I always the oause of unhappinces. But while this is sometimes the 
case -that is, that tne unhappinoss is the direct product Of 
a self-centred attitude of mind -it is also true that such a 
preoccupation with the self is often the effect of unhappiness 
-jhose cause lies elsewhere. It is, after all, the normal state of 
affairs for a person to have many "intorosts". 
As we shall sco thia point is Of SOMO importanc6 when 
we come to criticiso the paradox or hedonism argument. 
(3)FurLher positive support for the dootrine is to be 
found in the oommon observation that -people who lead unselfish 
lives are often very happy. In thinking anout the happiness of 
others they gain their own happiness. 
This argument oannot, howevortba pushed too far, for it' 
is also true that peoPlo'whOm we think of as " selfish" are sometimE$ 
happy, or at least as happy as seems possible in thia world. So 
long as his selfishness does not take a neurotic formbut is the 
selfishness of the ordinary man of average moral sennibilitYpthen 
with some luck our "Selfish man" may well achieve a kind of 
happiness. In other words, the world is not so arranged as to make 
happiness an inevitable reward of the "rigAteous ran". It seems 
to be much more frieddly disposod to the very average man who, 
gifted with a choorful disposition and a shrowd sonse of his 
Own interests, does not worry over much about the finer points of 
the moral law. 
is. So much for. the valid T)oints in the thoory. Beforo 
154. 
criticising it. it is nooessary to point out two arguments which 
sometimes got confused witli the paradox of hedonism argument but 
which are really quite distinct. The first we have mentioned just 
before: namely, that happiness is unattainable by doliborato planningý 
because most of the conditions of ha"npiness are beyond our control. 
Whether this is true or not. it h6s certainly no bearing on the 
truth or falsity of the paradox of'hedonism theory. . 
The second is the argument that t6 state of happiness 
is inoompatible with reflective thought about one-s. stato, of 
happiness, a theory whichlas wo'have soentleads to the popular 
paradox that we are only aware of having been happy when we are 
no longer happy. We have already oriticised this theory, but even 
if it were true itwould have no bearing on the problem of the 
right means to happiness. 
(1)The main fault in the unual statemonts of the paradox 
of hedonism argument is that the expression "thinking about 
one's own happiness" is not prooisely dofined. It is not. made 
clear that there are two ways in which this expression can be 
interpreted, and that it is only in respoot to one of them that 
the parad'ox of hedonism argumont is valid. 
(&)We may think about our happinesspor unhappinesspin 
the sense that we are constantly aware of and worried about 
ournolves -about the "state of our soul"; so much so that we 
have little time for tho ordinary pursutts of life. Such a highly 
introspeotive'state of mind may involve little actual thinking, 
in the strict sense of the term. and may actually be a bar to 
it. In any oase, it is against this *neurotic" preoccupation 
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with the problem of one's own hal, )Piness that t1le paradox of 
hedonism argument is most effective. 
(b)On tha other hand we may thInk about our hapDinoss 
in the sense that we make it a habit to review our life oritically 
from time to time to find out in what resnoota we oan arrange 
things so that wo secure greator hawiness or make the happiness 
we enjoy moro socure. 0r, it may be thn case that an experience 
of unhappiness may lead us to examine our way of life more 
carefully in the hope of disoovering what it is whioh is oausing 
US to feel Unhwopy. 
Now here there in neither a neurotic preoccupation with 
, one's own states of mind, nor any question of a 
dangerous over- 
indulganoo in self-analysis. What we have is. firstltho belief that 
it is worthwhile on occasion to subject one's way of life to a 
thorouen oxamination, and second, the belief that it is sensible, 
when confronted with the experience of unhappinesasto analyGe 
one's attitudes and the total situation as it affects one in as 
cool and objective manner as possible. What we may discover as a 
result of these periods of self analysis may well be that we have, 
indeedobeen thinking about ourself too muoh, but the point to note 
hero is not the particular recipe that we disnover but the fact 
that rosults,, conduoive to our general well boing)oan be found 
from such analycis. 
Now in respoot to thts kind of "thinking about onosolf" 
it seems to me that the paradox of hedonism argument is not 
effectivo. Indeed, one could say that the paradox of hedonism 
1 IS 6. 
argument is itself the produot of reflective thinking about 
the problem of happiness. 
I (2). The second fault in the paradox of hedonism theory 
., stems from the point 
obscure the fact that 
effect of unhappiness 
instanoo, very worried 
more likely to become 
no pressing worries, e 
made above: it is that this theory tends to 
"preoccupation with the self" is often the 
rather than tho cause of it. If we are, for 
about something, or in bad health ) we are 
far 
"wrapped up" in ourselves than if we have 
njoy good health etc. 
. It is true that the habit of self-andlysispevon when 
applied intelligontly, can sometimen-load to the more neurotic 
introspective. "thinking about oneself" which we have criticised 
above. But this is the kind of hazard which we must risk if'wo 
are over to achieve anything. To ovor-emphauiso the danger is to 
fall into tM fallaoy of oondemming a thing because it oan be 
abused or because it can lead to results not intended. 
The fact of the matter isas Butler pointed outgthatwo 
do not suffer from too much "self-love" but from too little. Or 
perhaps it would bo more accurate to say that what we suffer from 
is the superficial self-lovo whichAssuos in selfish conduct and 
in a conoentrition on our own problems, and whose ill-effects can 
often be overcome only by a more searching analysis of 'what our 
happiness consists in. It would, be idle to deny that the cause of 
I 
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unhappiness lies often in factors beyond our control9but sometimes 
it is to be found in a lack of self-knowledge. Wo do not understand 
ourselves well enough: what it is we really dosiro, what our 
limitations are and so on. And knowledge of this kind can only 
be obtained by some kind of process of self-analysis. In other words 
our chance of happiness may often depend on our being willin9p 
occasionally, to spend time in thinking hard about the problem of 
happiness. 
*0 To have now covorod the two main ObJoctions to the 
idea that happiness is a rational principle of aotion. We have 
seen that the state of happiness per se is one which any rational 
being would wish to enjoy; and we have tried to show that there 
is 
a sense in which it is practicable and indeed nooossary to 
aim directly at happiness if we are to achievo it. There remains 
the moral qUostionthowever, whotherigranting that the state Of 
happiness isas a state of being, morally desireabletwo are morally 
Justified in making our own happiness an aim in lifo. Andlof 
coursesthis question comes to a head in those situations in-which 
there appears to be an absolute conflict between our own happiness 
and our moral abligations. To, shall, however, postpone these quOStiOns 
until-the final chapter. 
1. It is to be noted, in any oasothat the paradox of hedonism 
argument is not relevant to those oases in which the happiness 
motive takes the form, either of the desire to discover which 
of two particular courses of action will bring the most pleasure, 
or the desire to achieve a certain object or state of affairs 
which we think, as a result of past experience, will give us happinoss. it is only rolovant to the third interpretation 
given above. (pj4-Z) 
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1. We have now examined the prima facie criteria of 
rational action. The question may bo asked, however, vhy we havo omit-ýý, 
-ed from the list what would seem to bo the most obvious criterion 
Of allsviz. p "that which is in accordance with roason". Certainly 
Yflien we are dpoortbing a rational action we often use the term 
reason in some such expression as the above: we say that the action 
was "based on roanon", or that "so and so was moved by roasonyvand 
so on. 
2. There are two reasons why we have not aoceptod the 
prinoiplo Of "acoordanoo with reason" as a oriterion of rational 
action. Tho first is the extreme vagueness of the term "reason" itsr. Aj- 
Thus we may mean by "reason* either a "motive" ("he seemed to 
have no reason for doing that"); or "common sense"(You can do 
anything you like within reason); or "faots"("his theory is lbased 
on sound "reasons"); or "right view of things"("YOU must make him 
see "reason"); or rhappiness"(ho was tempted to give in to his 
passions but in the end, "reason" won the day -he realised it was 
against his true interasts); or tho faculty of reason("animals 
have no roason"). This being so it seems better to avoid the use 
of a term Which can be as ambiguous as thisthe more so as 
it can be shoim that the expression "according to reason" when 
Used as a principle of rational aotionlis'analyseable into one 
or other of the more precise criteria which we have already 
examined., 
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3. The 0006nd objection follows on from what has just been 
said: it is that the expression "accordance with reason" or 
equivalent expressions tend io give the misleading impression 
that the only actions which are rational are thosewhose motive 
is reason, using that-terr. in its strictest sense as referring to 
the faoulty of reason. As a matter-of faottan we shall seo shortly, 
it is difficult to givo any kind of sensible interpretation to 
the view that "reason can be an original motive of action" -unless 
of course we define reason in very broad terms - and on the whole 
common sense takes the view that the main function of reason is 
to be a guide to our desires. We reason in order to satisfy our 
desires. But this predominant view of common sense tends to become 
confused booauso of tile ambiguousness of the term "reason" in 
such expressioni. as, "based on reason""moved by roaeon'loto-Thuswe 
sometimes contrast the rational man with tho irrational man by 
saying that the formor allows his actions to be controlled by 
reason whereas the latter allows his actions to be dominated by 
his passions, and this vague way of stating tile position can easily 
load to the view that the rational man is one viho is notivated 
by reason as distinct from desire. In the same way, whon we talk of 
a conflict botween reason and desire we sometimos tend to talk as 
if this were a conflict between conflicting motives-It may of 
course be so, but it cannot be taken for granted that such a 
conflict really does take place. Often what we really moan whon 
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we talk of such a conflict -and this, of course was Hume's main 
point in his'famous discussion of this problem - is that there is 
a conflict between an immediate desire(or "violent passion") and 
our general interest or happiness 
Becauseýthis confusion in respect to the definition and 
functions of reason it is therefore necessary to stross what might 
otherwise seem too obvious to montion, viz. that desire as such 
is a good reason for action. To be moved by the thought of a possible 
satisfaction is, indeedone of the two main reasons -some would 
say the only reason -for acting at all. Nor does this desire have 
to be associated in any particular way with the faculty of reason 
for it to qualify as a rational motive -i. e. it is not necessary 
for us to be able to prove that the desire has its source in reason 
in the same way in which we might say that sex desire has its 
source in the sox instinct. Any desire at all, qua desire, has a 
prima facie claim to be regarded as a rational motive of action. 
J 
Similarly there is nothing intrinsically irrational 
about our allowing our actions to bo controlled or even dominated 
by a particular Passion. The decision to allow a particular passion 
to dominate the scene maygin fact, be irrational -it may, for instance. ) 
be impossible to satisfy this passion, or in satisfying it we may 
cause ourselves more pain than ploasure in the long run. But we 
cannot, out of hand, condemn a man 'because his actions are 
ultimately motivated by some strong emotional foroogany more than 
we can say that a man is necessarily acting irrationally if his 
response to a situation is, as wo say, *omotional". It is one of the 
/ 
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dangers of an over emphasis on thn role of reason in human actions 
that it can lead to an unnecessary suspicion of the emotional and 
1 
%passional" aspect of life. 
It also follows from what has been said that we have to 
be careful not to take for granted that vhen we say "so and so 
acted rationally* that this is equivalent to saying *80 and so 
acted according to reason or according to the principle of reason 
It depends entirely on the definitions WO give to the termspareason 
and *rational' as to whether we can properly regard these express- 
ions as equivalent. Obvioualy we could define "reacon" so broadly 
that It is made to cover all the criteria we have listed as criterm 
of rationality, or we could restrict the criteria of rationality 
to those principles which seem to be closely connected with 
reason in the strictest aense of that term -say, to the principles 
Of consistency and accordance with the faots. But prima facie it 
seems as though it in possible that the term "rational* would 
normally have a wider connotation than the term "reason"lao 
that itwould be proper enough. or might be proper enough to say 
M 
e7 41TRUS the rationalist might accuse the religicus man of being 
dominated by his emotions if he admits that he finds in his 
religion great emotional comfort. or that lie first became interested 
in religion through a desire to oxnerionce mystical omotion. But 
Of course there is nothing irrational about these desires as 
Such. Thore would only be a prima facie case for accusing such a 
person of irrational conduct ifwe thought he was allowing these 
desires to aloud his judgment an to the true facts. No doubt this 
is Often the point which the critic intends to make, but he 
BOTOtimes gives the impression that he susnects the emotions 
as suchpor that he thinks it irrational for a person to desire 
something which he personally does not find at all attractive. 
Thus critics of the Coronation sometimes seemdd to be saying 
that it was irrational for adult people to enjoy ceremonials 
Of this kind -a oriticismtincid-ntally, which could be levelled 
at our enjoyment of dramal 
that a person acts rationally and yet does not act accordingtto, 
reason. Thus we might hold that, in certain circumstanoespa parson 
is acting ratibnally enough if he dods what is for his own 
happinessland this, evon though he is acting agat. nat reason in 
the sense of acting against the principle of consistency. Similarlyt 
in the field of morals we may sometimes appeal to the rational 
principle of tlie groatest good to justify our acting against 
the principle of accordance with the faotsa principle 'which 
might justifiably be regarded as having its source in the faculty 
of reason. 
Howovor that may be. it cannot be doubtodI think, that 
the term "reason" is too vague to be used as the operative term 
for a critorion of rational action, and that, the various aspects 
Of the concept of rationality are best covered by confining 
ourselves to the criteria given above. 11everthelese, wo cannot 
leave the matter t1here, without further oommenttfor the obvious 
question arises as to Vhat relation there is between reason in 
the striat and more philosophic sense of tho termU. o, -as 
referring to the faculty of reason) and rational action in 
general. 
To this queetion there Seen. f to be two possiblo 
answers: Pirst, that the funotion of reason is to be a guide to 
I tho passions(and"passions" is hora dofinod to moan "that which 
moves to action", including both desires and -moral obligations). 
In other words, roason has no power of its own either to initiate 
action or to control it. Reas on only comes into play when sor"O 
desire has moved us to actionjand its purpose is to ChOW Us how 
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our desires can bo satisfied orwhere neceusary, how our obligations 
can be 4fulfilled. Though roason has no power of its own to move us 
to action it may. however, indirootly influenoo us in the'direction 
of some passions or against others by judging which ends are 
practicable and which are not, by showing that an object has 
certain qualitiou which we had not known boforo, by demonstrating 
%that this or that action will have such and such consequences 
and so on. In other words reason may modiatoly influence action. 
Ultimately, howovor, the springs of action aro not to be found 
in reasm. 
On this view of the funotions of reason it would be 
hold that a porson acts rationally if he accepts the judgments 
of reason, but it wouldtalso be held that in certain circumstances 
it might be rational(i. e. in accordance with the prinoiple of 
happiness) to ignore the judg'ments of roason. In any case we are 
quite free to choose Vnethor to accept the "advisew of reason 
or not; reason cannot exert any constraining power over us such that 
we feel we ought to obey it whether it is in our interests to do 
so or not. 
The second interpretation of tho function of reason is 
that reason can be an original motive of action in its own right, 
and not merely a servant of the other passions. This interpretation 
takes either or both of two forms. 
(a)Reason exerts a constraining force over us. In other 
words we have an obligation to obey the judgments of reason, and 
IThis, or oourse, is in general the interpretation of the funati0ii- of reason given by HumO. It differs from his point of view onlY in the fact that we have accepted the idoa, of moral obligations as motives distinct from desires. 
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this obligation is itself an aspect of the functioning of the 
faoulty of reason. I 
Two quostions aro obviously involvod here: first, whothor 
we have such an obligation; and socond. whother the source of this 
obligation is to be found in the faculty of reanom-, 
(b). Reason, pDovides an original m. otivo of aotion in 
that it is the source of or gives rise to a particular desire. 
What thin desire is, how it is to bo*defined -those are questions of 
some diffioulty; but provisionally wo may describe it as the "desire 
for knowledge for its own sake". 
Common sense seems to affirm both the instrumentalist 
view of reason and the latter view, viz. that reacon is a motive 
of aotion in its own right -though tiie first is easily the more 
CoTmontand certainly the, less ambiguous. Tt is possible thatp 
on analysistiia second of the interpretations will prove to be but 
a confused variant of the first. Thus, though common canoo talks of 
"putting oursolves'under the control of reason" and of a "confliot 
between reaoon and passionO it may bo that thia is really only a 
metaphorioal way of speaking, and that what we really mean, as Hume 
suggests, is that there can be a conflict betwoon"calm"and "violent" 
passions. 
Then. againothough wo Gometimes talk as though reason 
prompts us to seek knowledgo, to ask for 
things. at other timosve argue as though 
uoarohing after knowledge is that we may 
satisfy our deaires. Knowledga is a means 
in itsolf. 
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the why and the how of 
the only good reason for 
the more effectively 
to other onds, not an and 
Now it is vith the interpretation of reason as an original motive 
of action and, in particul-ar, with that asPOct Of it which 81,9908ts 
that reason is the source of its ovin desire -that we are 
conoorned horeThere are no spooial difficulties associated with 
the view that reason has a funot'ion as a guide to the passions; 
but many puzzling problems arise if we suggest that reason itself 
can be interpreted as a passion. Thus, if reason gives rise to its 
own desire wo have the possibility of a conflict between this 
"desire of reason" and otnor desires*we Taig7ht even have a conflict 
between such a desire and our general interest, in which case 
we would have the seemlnýly paradoxical position of a porson'n 
being moved by reason and yet acting irrationally In the sense 
of acting against his general good.. 1n such a oasýreason would 
be a "violent" passion. And one can imagine even stranger 
paradoxes resulting from the admission that reason can provide 
a motive, of action in its own right. 
1C(. 
In this chapter I shall deal only with the theory that 
reason is the source of a particular deniro; in Chapter ix r 
shall examine the view that reason can exert a controlling powor 
over our aotions by means o4h. 1 a moral obligation whose Gouroo is 
to be found in the faculty of reason. 
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7. In dealing with any such quention as, "Is reason a motiv) 
of. aotion in its own right" wo are b,: undgimmediatolysto come uP 
against the objection that the queation is not a proper onelsincog 
in using faculty terms like A roason*vWe can simply bog the question 
by defining the Ifaculty term to, suit whatever vi 
. 
Ow we wish to 
support. Obviously, if we define reason as the faculty which prompts 
us to soak to know the "how and the why" of things then it is 
Self-evident that reason is an original motive of action. 
Point is given to this aharge by tho faot that Ilumet 
in resp'eat to his handling of this problem, has boon criticised 
by Reid and others for bogging the question in this way. Thus 
Reid, in his polamic against Ilumols doctrine of the relation of 
reason to tile pansions, continually stresses the point that Hume haS 
delib-orately excluded from his definition of reason that which 
was inconvenient for his purposes: 
"Mr. liumo gives-tho name of passion to every principle of 
action in the human mind, und in oonsequencoa of this, maintaina that every man is, and ought to bo led by his passions for if' 
we give the name of passion to every principle of action, in every degreo, and give the name of reason solely to the power of discerning the fitness of means to endo, it will be true that the 
use of roazon is to be subservient to the passions ----. The contrary maxim maintained by Mr. Humo can only be defendedby a 
grosu and palpable abuse of words. From the roaning of the word reason he must exclude the most important part of it by which we 
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are able to discern and to pursue what appears to be good 
upon the whole. 
This particular kind Of objection cannot be met withouL,, 
our making a short diversion from our main topic in order to 
dofond the use of faculty terms in general. 
8. It is fpashionable today to make fun of the old 
fliculty psychology, but I think it is possible to dofend the use 
of faculty torms, providod they are eTaployed with. care. 
The central objection to faculty psychology is, of. 
course', that when we use faculty terms we tend to SuPPOOO that wo 
are describing or disputing about empirical facto when really 
we are simply discussing rattere of termi'nologY and definition. 
We may bogin, safely onough. by using a name or some other symbol 
to stand for a certain class of actions, but then, inevitablYt 
we begin to talk as though the symbol stood for an existent. The 
PSY0hologist, say, decidis to use the lottor "g" to stand for 
something called general intelligence, and hn defines-what kind 
Of-intelliggent actions are to be ascribed to this "9" faotor. But 
soon he starts arguing as though "g" existedoand as though general 
intelligonoo, or rather acts of general intelligence were the 
product of-this "thing" namod "g". 
Now it is claimed that it is from this main error that 
all the vell-known dangora of faculty psychology spring. In 
particular the following threo points are often madezPirsttthat 
1. Esnays on the Powers of th,.! Human ? find VýI. -2ý zt"i - : Z%et-- 
Soo alno, J. Laird jlumW a Philosophy of Human liature, P. 9,03. 
in using faculty terms we tend to over-simplify our descrintions 
of human actions by the attempt to assign the cause of every 
action to one or other of the faculties in our faculty schemata; 
second, that we tend to juggle with the facto if they seem to con- 
flict with the "tidineas" of that schemoothird. that we tend to 
define the fnculty terms in suoh a way that we oan prove whatever 
we wish to prove. 
Thi3 is not the place to give detailed answers to those 
objections, but in general the answor to the critict of faculty 
Psychology would seem to me to proceed along these linas: 
First: It seems to be, in fact, impossible to avoid the 
use of faculty torms. All that seems to happen is that one kind of 
faculty schemata gives way to anothor, Certain terms or certain 
systems prove to be no longer useful and a now set of faculty 
terms take their place. Even those who are most concerned to 
avoid falling into the errors of faculty psychology tend, in 
unguarded moments, to employ their carefully defined terms in 
exactly the same way and for exactly the same purpose as the 
faculty 'psychologists and philosophers use thoirs 
'pu 
lhe reason for this apparontly inovitablo tendency to 
slip back into faculty ways of thinking isj think, a vory simple 
one, viz., that it is much moro convenient to dencribe and 
explain hurnan behaviour in terms of facultien than in any other 
way. It is more conveniont, for instanco, to say: "John Smith will 
pass that examination because he has a good memory"gthan to say, 
as we are taug'at to do now, "John Smith will pass that examination 
because ho shows a strong tendency to romembor facts more easily 
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and fpr a longer period than do most other peonle. 
Seoondly, *while it is often the case that it is less 
misleading to say John Smith did this or that, instead of saying 
that it was his "reason" or his"conscience" or his "yromory" 
that did it or was responsible ror it (and this'is particularly 
the case vhere the causes of the action are so coTnpley that they 
cannot easily be assigned to any one faculty), navertheless it is 
often necessary to refer to faculties in order to explain why 
such and such a thing was done or why such and such a thing 
happened Thus if John Smith pas3es his oxaminationjand someone 
exprenGes sur-prise at hoaring that he did so we may reply by 
saying, "his good memory got him through -he remembered all his 
lecture notes T)orfeatly". 
Third, none of the dangers which we associate with 
the use of faculty terms are inherent to that nothod of exposition. 
So long as we are aware of these dangers and undorstand clearly 
the limitations of faculty tO rms, we are not likely to over-simPlirY 
Thore is nothin; C or to twist the facts to suit our faculty achemata, 
wrong in our talking as if faculty torms such as "memory", 
"intelligence%imagination" ete. reforred to real existonts,: - 
provided that we realise that there is little or no empirical 
evidence to suggest that there aro any "physical compartments 
I 
corresponding to these faculty divisions. Tho physical sciences 
do not hositato to use concepts such as "other" if it is 
convenient to do so, even though thero is much doubt as to Vnether 
I. It would be begging the question, however, to assume that there 
are no physical woompartments" corrosponding to our faculty 
divisions. Indeed there is some evidonco to suggest that tliero 
may be such a physical basis* 
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ttto term refers to any actual thing. 
It is more difficult to find an ýffeotive reply to 
the charge that the use or faculty terms in an argument alwaYS 
exposes one to the danger of a patitio principti. Since the 
definition of a faculty term must always. in the nature of the case, 
be somewhat arbitrary. is it not then always possible that we 
siýall define our terms in such a way as to make it easy to prove 
VIriatever it is we wis. a to prove? 
I 
We must differentiate here, however. between the caae 
where the proof of our theory really depends on the definition 
baSinningtor on of the faculty term which we have stated at the 
the assumptions underlying that definition; and the case wherep 
assuming a certain definition of a faculty term to be accepted 
as the'right definition, we proceed to show that the particular 
theory we have been advocating neoe,., sarily follows from this. 
Thus if we vish to prove that reason is an original motive of 
action itwould obviously beg tho quostion to dofine roason 
as "the faculty which moves us to desire knowledge for its own 
sakeft. But if we take some common censo c)r widely accepted dofinitic>q 
of reason and try to prove that there is some particular desire 
which is " linkedO with reasonvas so defined, then we have not 
6ommitted any logical fallaoy. Even, as a matter of faot, if we 
dooided that the usual definitions of reason were Inadequate, 
and rooommonded some other definitionwhich made it more easy 
to show that reason is an original motive of aotiongwo should 
not be guilty of a Petitio prinoipii so long as we did not use 
171* 
the definition to prove our argument. Our caso would rest simply 
on the adequaoy of the reasons we wore able to bring forward in 
support of our definition. 
9. We may now come back to our main problem, viz. whether 
reason is a motive of action in the sense that it in the source of 
a particular dooire. 
I propooo to define reason as the intellectual facultY 
by which conclusions aro drawn from a given statoment or set of 
statemonts. On this definition we can ausort dogmatically that the 
operative principle-of roason is the priziciPl() of non-contradiction, 
From our point of view this definition seems to be 
the most usoful for the following reasons: 
First, it approximates closely to tile comron sense 
view of the faculty of reason. 
Second, it states., as it weretho ilinimum powors of reason. 
I. The significant difference from the common sonse view is that 
we have not allowed for the possibility that reason has intuitive 
functiono. Comrion sense doos soom. to hold that roason gives US 
self evident truths; or rathor it is the faculty by means of 'which 
ve are able to intuit self evident truths. 
I have not included this idea of the powors of reason in 
the above definition for these two reasons: rirst, that it would 
lead us into diffioultýphilosophioal questions far removed from 
our central theme. Thus. to mention briefly some of the diffioultteS'- 
The intuitions which we most oommonly'think of as the work of 
reason are, ka)tho so-called self-okident truths of mathematics; 
kb)oortain fundamental a priori notions -for instance, "that 
every event has a causo; (o) certain fundamontal moral axioms 
e. g. it is wrong to take pleasure in'inflioting pain. Butgas we 
know. the Interpretation of each of these classes ofoself-evidont" 
truths is an extremely complex task.. Thuathe "Self-evident" 
truths of mathematics might be hold to be tautologies only, in 
which case they are all explainable in terms of the singia 
intuition which we describe as the principle of non-contradiatict%. 
As for the a priori conceptions which seem to bo ir. plJoit in 
all knowledge there are, au we know, very great differences Of 
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It may well 'be the case that the functionn and po-wera of reason 
range over a much wider field than is suggosted by the above 
definition, but at least this definition gives powers to the 
faculty of reason which Yrould have to bo included in'any 
definition of tho term. 
Third, it fOllcms from what has juut been said that we 
are less likely to beg the question in pursuing our enquiry if we 
dofine- roason in this rostricted way. ObviouSlY it is more difficult 
to provo that reanon Oan bo a motive-in its own right on the 
al>ove definition than it would be on a definition granting wider 
powers. Indood the abovo definition scoms tO suit thO instrumental- 
ist interpretation of the function of roacon moro than any other. 
opinion both an to the interpretation of these a priori principles 
and as to their source. Thenin respect to the t3o-callod noral 
axioms we again face obvious difficultiostfirst, whother there are 
any such axiome, and secondly, if t).,. oro aro, whather it is reason oro. 
moral sense which is tho source of thene moral princiPlos. Co=, on 
conse itself neems sorewhat ambiguous about this latter oo. nt, and 
often appears to use tho torm, "roason" as more or less equivalent 
to "moral sense" or to "conrecience". 
11 wocondly -and following on from VIAS last point -wo do 
not wish to prejudge the issue about moral intuitions. Cortainly, 
if we show that moral distinctions aro "given" by reason this 
does not necessarily prove that when we are moved to action by 
tI'O thought of a moral obligation we are moved by reason. The 
question as to which. faculty discerns moral factsand the question 
as to what movee us to, action whnnwo try to Fjot morally are 
distinct, though it seems reasonable to assume that they are 
closely rolated. And it would seem to go somoway t`o 'proving that 
reason is an original motive if we could show that reason gives 
us moral distinctions, espeoially an vio commonly think that the 
more thought of something's being morally right gives us a motive to action. However, T 'want to postpone consideration of these 
questions until chaptorTI1. 
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10. Before going on to discuss the question of how reason, 
as definod thus, can be an original motive of action there is 
bno preliminary point which requires to be olarifiod. -It'is 
sometimes implied, in discussions on this problem, that reason 
might possibly be a motive quite distinot in kind from either 
motives of desire or motives of moral obligation. And this vIOW 
is encouraged by tho fact that the problem is often discussed 
in terms of the Humean statement of the contrast between passion 
and reason -passion as the moving forcolroason as-the instrument 
which we use to find means of satisfying our passions. It is thus 
thought that if we are to show that reason is a motive of action 
then we have to distinguish it clearly from passions or desires; 
if 'we do not then we shall either make nonsense of the problem 
itSelf, or elso give tho oaso away to the Humean viewpoint. 
To all this we must emphaoiso what we have stated 
1 
oarlier that, prima facio, thoro appear to be only two kinds of 
motive which can move us to action, viz, denire and obligation. 
Ultimately. whenevor we act, as distinot from "behave"twe do 00 
either *bcoaude we want to natisfy some desire or beoause WO think 
we have a moral obligation to do something. No other possible 
reason for action can be given. Thereforo when we discuss the 
question whether reason is a motive of action this can only be 
interpreted to mean that we are disouesing whether reason can 
be a desire or, a moral obligationgor both. And this, in turn, is 
1.1 say "prima facie" because it would bo held by some that 
moral-obligations are analysable Into desires of some kind or 
other. 
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only'a shorthand way of asking whether there is any particular 
desire or obligation which we can link with the faculty of 
reason in much the same way, say, as we link the dosire for relatims 
with the opposite sex with the sox instinot. In other words is there 
some motive of action which we would not experience if it wore not 
for the fact that we "possess" reason. 
To some extent the above point was grasped by the moral 
philosophers who argued, as against H=e's point of view, that it 
is reasonýwhioh moves us to action when we are moved to do what is 
morally right. though their argument was vulnorable to the extent 
that they wnre not precise enough in their use of the term "reason, " 
and did not distinguish between the problem of what faculty it 
is which discerns moral facts and the problem of what it is which 
moves us to do what is morally right. But it did not seem to occur 
to them that reason might be the source of a particular desire 
which competes for our attention with other desires. 
I. It is odd that Hume, 'Who was so concerned to show how 100SIDlY 
the term "reason" is used by other philosophors, has nowherelso 
far as I know, given a precise definition of the fa0ultY Of 
reason himself. The nearest vo get to a definition in the Treatise 
is in the passage boginning, "Roason is tho discovery of truth 
and falsehood. Truth or faleehood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the real relations of idoaagor to real 
existence and matter of fact"(Op. cit., p. 458). Tho vagueness and 
general unsatisfactoriness of this definition, even from the point 
of view of Hume's own position, has often been commented upon. In 
this connoction see D. D. RaphaolTho Moral Sense, ps 51-62. 
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Now, as I have mentioned bofore. common sense sometimes 
seems to talk as though it is reason which prompts us to seek 
knowledge for its own sake, though at othor times it implies that 
knowledge is sought for utilitarian purpoods only, or perhhps 
in order to boast about our intelligonce, knowledgeability and so 
on. 
It is impossible to discuss thq pros and cons of this 
question,, however, until we have made it clear as to what'wo mean 
by the term 4knowledgew. Prima facie it would certainly Boom to 
be 'the-oa'so that there is little connection between reason as 
defined above and the desire for knowledge. 
Whonwe talk of the desire for knowledge we may meano 
at least, any one of those three things. Firstgtllo desire to have 
Porsonal experience of somothingkand in particular of certain 
emotions). Thus tho young artist may say that he requires 
greater knowledge of tho world before his painting can become 
maturegand in saying this he no doubt thinks primarily of 
experiencing at first hand a wider range of emotions'-he wishen 
to experience all that life can offor. 
In respect to this interpretation of the desire for 
knowledge we oan say at onoe that it iaýobvioucly impossible 
to show that it is in any speoial way connooted with roason, 
as 'we have def inod it. 
Secondlytin desiring knowledge we may desire what we 
may describe as"factual information". 11oro we are concerned with 
that kind of curiosity vhioh is, perhaps, exemplified most 
170. obviously in the delight whioh people take in "quiz" programmes, 
or in the insistent questioning of children. 
There does not seem to be muoh doubt that we do desire 
knowledge of this kind, and desire it for its own sake. Wo enjoy 
finding out the names of things, whether. suoh andsuoh exists, how 
such and such works oto, and this quite apart from any possible I 
utilitarian service such knowledge miKat porformoor quite apart 
from any desire to boast of our knowledge. We are simply ouriousp 
as we say, to know the facts. 
lHume, in the chapter dealing with "CuriositYpor the love of truth" 
seems to me to be quite wrong when he suggests that "the 
satisfaction which we oometimes receive from tho disoovory of 
truth proceeds not from it, morely as such, but only as endow'd 
with cortain, qualities". Among the qualities which he lists arej 
the pleasure we receive from exercising our mental faculties and 
from beingýsuccessful, and tho-practical benefits of knowing the 
true facts. 
It is probable that he was misled hero by his general 
tondency to underestimate the role of the "particular passions". 
He didpizi theory, allow for these passions: "Besides good and 
evillor in other words, pain and ploasure, tho direct passions 
frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct which is 
perfectly unaccountable ---", but in practice he usually tried to fit the passions intoýhis general utilitarian sahome, espeoially 
whentas in the present caso, it might have been dangerous to 
have interpreted the passion as a motive in its own right. Thus., 
to admit that tho "love of truth" moves us by itualf, quite 
apart from any of the qualitins assooiated with it, is to admit 
something which might well prove to'be the "thin edge of the wodge" 
so far as Hume's doctrine of the function of reason is concerned, 
the more especially as he elsewhere defines reason(admittodly, in 
a very vague and loose manner)as the "discovery of truth". 
The odd thing about this chapter on the "lovo-of-truth" is that if Humefs interpretation of ouriogity in right then it 
casts a somewhat cynical light on the first sentence with which the chapter opens: "But methinks ive have been not a little inatten- tivo to run over so many different parts of the hum4n mind, and examine so many pansionspwithout taking once into the consider- ation that love of truth which was the first source of all our enquiries" 
The fact is that Hume seems to be somewhat confused as to how he should interpret the passion of curiosityand, in 
particular how to fit it into his general schemata of human 
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The problem is to account for this kind of curiosity. 
obviously it would bo impossible to find tho. source of this motive 
in roanon, as defined hero. If we describe the oporating principle 
of reason as the law of, non-contradiction then it might, be 
possible in some oases to show that our desire for factual 
information arises out of our awareness of inconsistencies in 
something we have hitherto accepted as true. Thus a child may, como 
to be aware of certain inconsistencies in the stories she has 
been told regarding her baby. brotherts birthpand this may prompt 
her to enquire more closely about the *facts of life". But while 
the principle of consittency is the "trigger" which sets the 
onqatry going, tho desire to know the true foots cannot itself be 
explained in terms of this principlo. And, in any caso, thoro are 
many instances where our desire for factual information is quite 
spontaneous and is not prompted Into action by the awareness of 
oontradiction. 
If we do not place the source of this desire in reason, 
how olso are wo to aacount for it. Wo oould, no doubtp explain it 
in terms of some inborn propensity -an instinct of curiositY - 
but thi's is one of those oases in which to explain something in 
terms of an instinot is more or less equivalont to saying not4ing 
at all. All that we are roally doing is giving a name to the desire 
and asserting that it is an original motivo which cannot bo 
explained in terms of any other motive. Tho reference to an 
passions. He more or Ions admits that, it is a difficult passion to 
interpret: ---"it is an affection of so peculiar a kind that it 
would have been impossible to have treated of it under any Of 
those heads which we have examined without danger of obscurity 
and confusion". 
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instinot would only be fruitful ifwe could show that our. 
intellectual curiosity -our desire to know, the facts -was in some 
sense a development of a moro primitive curiosity such as we find, 
perhaps, in the exploratory activities of the higher animals; org 
again, that it was related to primitive mants fear of the unknown - 
that just as primitive man felt that if he could give a name to I 
thing then it no longer had complete power over him, so now, whonovor 
we want to know "the facts" we are boind driven by a sub-conscious 
desire to "tame" the world by virtue of our being able to nameq 
classify, givo the "how" of things and so on. Butpof ooureogoven if 
nuoh thoorio6 have an initial plausibility it would be impossible 
to prove that, thoy were true, or that in themselves they gave a 
OOmPlOte explanation of intellectual curiosity as we are 
acquainted with it now. 
lHohbes is particularly interesting in respect to this whole 
problem of curiosityand it is Instructive to compare his brief 
account of the matter with Humols. Ho dofines curiosity as "the 
desire to know why and how" thus, I think, broadening its scope 
to include not only the dogirefor, faotual information but also 
what I should call "th^ desire to undorstand"(coo later). Ho 
carefully distinguishes curiosity-from reason, though he thinks 
they are similar in so far as they are both peculiar to man. C--suoh 
as is in no living creature but man; so'that man is distinguished 
not only by his reason; but also by this singular paosion from 
other animala"). In'making this distinction Hobbes was of course 
influenced by his view of reason as an instrument of the paosions. 
Curiouity, thon, being an active foroo, could not be linked with 
reasonobut rather brought under the general heading of passion - it is & "lust of the mind". 0ne could havw wished. thoughthat 
Hobbes had considered whethor there was any particular relation- 
ship between reason and curiosity the more so as he claimed that they were both distinguishing characteristics of man. - 
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The only other poscible explanation for our desire 
for factual information is that it is a desire which has 
developed out of intellectual activities which-onco had a puroly 
utilitarian aim. In other words man originally desired knowiedge 
onlyfor the sake of satisfying his passions, but gra4ually 
he came to have a delight in pursuing knowledge for its own 
eake. This may well be a true account of the matter but there 
is 
no Particular reason for accepting it as true except in so far 
as we are prejudiced against the whole notion of knowledge for 
its own sake. 
We rust leave the mattor thorogthore boing no need for 
us to pursue it at any length sinoogunless tnis kind of curiosity 
can be shown to be connected with the faculty of reasongthe 
problem of its origin is irrelevant to our central theme. 
12. A third interpretation of tho desire for knowledge 
is summed up in the expression the "dosiro to undnrstand". On this 
account of the matter whatwo are desiring in not so much the 
facts as such -or, more procisely, we are not intorestod merely in 
odd scraps of information -but rather we desire to find a 
coherent explanation for things, to obtain a significant and 
intelligible oxplanation which; vill relate the mass of phenomena 
into some kind of system and render our experience meaningful. 
Spinoza apparontly seomod to think that tho dosiro 
to understand had its source in reason or was "part" of reason: 
"The essence of reason is nothing other than our own mind in so 
far as it clearly and distinctly understando; honoo that which I 
1 -ý5 00 ý 
desiro "on governed W reason is nothing, but to undorstand". 
Though this is vory vague9this statement does seem 
to be a possible answer to the problem we have boon d1scussingp 
though admittedly it is difficult to soo, at first glance, how 
the doniro to understand could arise from the faculty of reason 
48 we have dofinod it. 11owevor, whon we seek for further elucidation 
of S. Pinozass position we find that he is not really saying that 
we desire to undorstand for its own saketbut rather that we 
desire to understand in order that we may live virtuously, which 
for b3pinoza. moans "doing those things which (we) know to be of 
primary importance for our lives and which therefore we desire 
most". 11once his theory concerning the function of reason does 
not really differ radically from Humes. Roaaon, whothor It be 
defined as the desire'to understand or in any other waylis a 
guide to the passions. 1t shows us how we can live in the most 
satisfying way possiblo; or, how to satisfy those desireo which 
are of the greatest importance. Thus we find Spinoza saying, --this 
desire to understand is the one and only foundation of virtuot 
nor shall wo desire to understand things for any other end". 
And again, "For us to act with absolute virtue is nothing 'ttbo 
but to act in accordance with the dictatoo of reason -to-,, liveg to porsist in our own essence(all of which moan the samo)in 
seeking what is useful for us. 1 
I. All these quotations are taken from Chapter V, Reason and 
Conduct in Hume's treatise -R. M. Kydd. In this chapter Yrs. Kydd tries to counter HumePs 
doctrine of reason as a slave of the passions by quoting Spinoza' interpretation of reason as the Odestre to understand". Unfortunatel\l h6r treatment of this problem seems to me thoroughly confusedvand 
at no stage of her argument does she really convince one that Spinoza provides an answer to Hume. Indood the quotations from Spinoza merely seem to omphasise the fact that fundamentally they 
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It isvI think, possiblo, however, to show that the 
desire to understand can be an original motive of action -that is 
that we can seek undorstanding for its own sake -and also that 
this desiro can be so interpreted that its source in reason 
both take the same attitude to the role of reason. 
It is instructive to aummarise the argument put for-ward 
by Mrs. Kydd for it illustrates very clearly the dangers inherent 
to this kind of discussion if the operative terms are not defined 
with precision. 
She first describes Ilumols doctrine of the role of reason 
as the doctrine of reason as the "mediate cause of action". Reason 
can acquaint us with facts which will wdotermine the nature of 
those ideas which are at any given time before the mind", but in 
the last analysis it is desire and not reason which is the original 
source of action. 
She then states that "Spinoza also thought that reason 
was no more than the mediate cause of action"9but adds that 
nevertheless he did not underestimate the control of reason over 
the passions in the way that Hume did. And in illustration of this 
point she quoto3 Spinoza : "we easily see the difference between t1'O 
man who is led, by emotion or opinion alone and the man who is 
led by roanon. The former does willy nilly things which he knows 
absolutely nothing about; the latter on the other hand is governed 
only by himsolf'and does only those things which he knows to be 
of primary imDortance for his life and which therefore he dosiren 
most" 
But of course this is just a description of what HUM 
would call the conflict between a violent and a calm passion. flume, 
tootthought that we could control our moro-violent passions by 
thinking of our 'greatest good", or by thinking of the real and 
intrinsic value of objects instead of being carried away by their 
superficial attractivonoss. (Geo Kydd, p. 133 andp. 142). 
Mrs. Kydd then trios to oxpross tho difforonco between 
Hume and Spinoza by saying that whereas for Hume we ro*ason only 
in order to satisfy our dosires, Spinoza claims that wo reason for its own sake. But, when she trios to explain what is meant by 8 reasoning for its own sake" her account of the matter booomes 
very oonfused. She first dofinos it as "dotermining*ourselves by 
reason is an end in itself" which seems an odd interpretation of the desire to roason for its own oake. Ono would have thought that 
a more obvious interpretation is that we enjoy the actual exercise 
of reasoning, a proposition which seems to me true, 
This dotormining ourselves by roason is elsewhere doacribod as the "desire to act rationally for its own sake"pbut whon we enquire Into the moaning of this'latter expression we find again that it really amounts to no more than the desire to be detorminod or to act in accordance with tho t1iought of our greatest good, or tho thought of those things 'Which really make 
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is made plain. Fiimt of all, howevor, wo have to dofino more 
preolsely what we mean by the "dostro to understand". 
I This may be interprotod to moan the desire to find an 
intelligible roa3on for everything that is -to find a satisfactory 
annwor to tho question'"whyff. And this is. no doubt, the sonso in 
which pI oople interpret the desire for understanding whenever they 
for our happiness. Mrs. Kydd herself defines the desire thus: fffor to 
desire to act rationally for its own sake is to desire to enquire 
what I should want to do all things considered". 
It is true that elsewhere she states "that we can 
establish 1py introspection and by questioning others that men are 
often moved to detormine themselves by adequate ideas simply for 
the sake of so dding", nnd this seems to suggest that we dostre to 
be controlled by adequate idoas whether it is for our happiness 
to do so or not. It is not clear whether this really is what she 
is implyingland certainly it is not an accurate interpretation of 
Spinoza's doctrino. I. t would make more 'sense if si-jo, oaid that'vie 
fool undr)r an obligation to determine ourselves by adequate ideas 
whether It is for our happiness to do so or not. 
Pinally, lvlrs. Kydd trios to make a distinction between 
Hume and Spinoza on the grounds that whereas for Hume the main 
task Cf reason is the discovering of the moans to satisfy our' 
desiros, for Spinoza the first task of reason is to give us 
adequate ideas about our desires -to tell us whother this or 
that desire will really give us the satisfaction we think it will. 
But hero again she overlooks the fact that Hume also 
regarded it as one of the main tasks of reason to give us the 
"real and intrinsic valuo"of an object as distinct from its 
apparent valuo("tho light under which it appears to us"). Sho asserts 
that Hume asked no questions about the original motives of actiong 
whereas Spinoza subjected all dasiros to the scrutiny of reason, 
the only desire being exempt being the desire to act rationallY 
itself. But though Hume did not question the rationality of being 
moved by the thought of happiness ho did regard it as rational 
to scrutinise every particular desire from the point of view of 
its oonduciveriess to happinons. And this seems to be very much the 
same position as that adopted by Spinoza. 
talk ofý men being moved by a desire to find "the meaning of life". 
the "truth about reality" and so. on. 
Ile oan dismiss this interpretation as being useless from, 
our point of view sinoo, obviously, it would be impossiblo, to show 
that reason, as we have defined itis the motive force Obohind" 
questions of the above kbid. As a matter of fact even if we accept 
a wider dofinition of ronson it would be difficult to prove that 
it is reason alone which prompts us to questions of the "why" 
order. Whon we seek to "understand nature" in the sense of seeking 
an explanation which will reveal the dosign or purpose "behind" 
the order of events we are usually influenced by other motiVes 
than more intellectual ouriosity. 14otivos of a religious or semi- 
religious aharactor nearly always play a part -the desire for 
signifioance, for a sense of security, and so on. That is not to say 
1. 
that questions of the "why" or der are irrational. In so far as 
they are concerned with issuoswhioh have a very diroot bearing on 
the problem of human happiness then they are at least 'worth asking, 
though we may not think we have very muoh hope of answering -then. 
satisfactortly. But the oomplio, ated strands of motivation which 
together coem to cause those questions to arise Include factors 
whioh'would seem to have little or no oonneotion with roason, on 
2. 
any accepted definition of the term, 
1-SOmOttmes of ooursolin scientifio work, the quostion"why" is 
asked where it Is really quite inappropriate or quite useless. We are not concorned with this kind of "irrationality" in what ve state above. 
2. See note at end of ohaptgr for further oomments on questions of a teleological nature. 
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A second Possible internretation of the "desire to 
understand" is that it is a desire to understand 'how things work" 
-to find the efficient causes of Vhatever happons. This Booms to 
accord closely with the scientist's interpretation of such 
expressions as "understanding the workings of nature" and so on. 
This way of stating the position givos, howevert a 
1 
somewhat inadequate description of the scientist's aim; it GU990sts 
that he is concerned only with particular problems as they arise - 
to find the cause of this event, to describe the bohaviour of this 
Particular organism etc. Thus we overlook that aspect Of the 
scientistos work which is concerned primarily with the formation 
and development of hypotheses which will bring come kind of system 
or coherence into a field of apparently unrelated phenomona. Tt is 
with this aspoot of scientific work that we are interested here,. 
and it is from this point of view that we shall try to define 
the "desire to undorstand", or at least to give one legitimate 
intorprotation of it. 
On this interpretation wa oan describe the desire to 
undorstand in two ways: 
Firat, it is a dosiro for unity, for systom. Idoally this 
desire could only be satisfied when the w1nolo ,f 
Jeld of human 
knowledge had been brought into some all-ombracing unity0but 
in actual fact this desire usually operates only within a 
particular field of knowledge, or, at best , within a field of 
closely related disciplines. Only the p1jilonopher has usually 
concerned himsolf with the establtshing of wider aystoms, and even 
hero it is probably true to say that vory fow philosophers now 
I. Soo W. H. Walsh, Reason and Exporionco. P 14. 
'would consider it practicablo, or evon porhaps meaningful to 
1. 
try to establish vast motaphystoal systems. 
Secondly, it is a desire to reduce to the fewest possible, 
the number of' -orinciples or laws by which any sot of phenomena 
is oxnlainod. This may. perhaps, be regarded as simply a re-statemont 
of the above intorprotation, and it will be with the first of 
these interpretations that we shall be concerned below. 
It is our proposed task then tQ show, first, that we 
oan be moved by the dosiro to understand(as so intergroted) for 
its own sake; and socondly, that, in being so movodo we are motivated 
by reason. 
13. In asking whether we aro-ever moved by this dosire for 
its own sake it is nocossary, first of all, to guard our position 
by making some preliminary qualifications. 
Pir3t, it is not claimed that this desire playe an 
important role in tho lives of the majority of mon. It may indoed 
be almost ontiroly absont as a motive force in those who are 
prooooupied, with the cares of daily living. 
Seoondly, ovon in the oa6e of those who seem apeoially 
involved in the soarch for kno,. Yledge -e. g. scientists -it is 
obvious enough that this desire is not tae only motive or even 
the chief motivo of action so far as this search for knowledge is 
, concerned. 
All that we oan plausibly argue is that some men are 
occasionally moved to act simply and sololy because they dosiro 
1. ThIs does not mean to say that tho idea of a completely 
Unified GYst0m Of knowledge does not appeal to them. It is doubtfW 
whether we can ever"tilrow off" the attraction of such an idea. 
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to seek for oome, kind of system wý, i. ere none appears to exist. , 
Now it is, of course, always imnossible to prove that 
when a person appears'to bo moved by a particular Dassion he is 
not in fact being moved by some other desire of wilich he may be 
unaware or by the ttiouTilt of pleasure in ganoral. But it seems a 
good rule not to assume that sub-consoious factors arc at work, or 
that pleasure in general is the object of desirotunless there 
are strong empirical grounds for auspecting the *purity" of the 
desiro in the first Placo. And thij3 should be kept in mind vhon 
one considero whothor we roally do dosiro understanding for its 
I 
own sako. 
Firstly, it might bi objocted that v"o aro not roally 
interested in system as such but. only in-the practical bt)nnfits 
to be derived from the establishment of some kind of organisation 
where once there had been chaos. rither we are interested in the 
saving of time and effort which such organisaltion will givo, or 
eloo we believe that certain "utility" by-products will rocult, 
from the ostablishmont of a system. 
To this argument we oan only reiterate the point Whioll 
is u8U&lly made when wo are dealing with the desire for knowlodgo 
in 67(3noral, viz. that it is quite obvious that tho thought of 
possible practical by-products often plays no part in a person's 
search for knowledgo. Indeed it is often difficult to imagine 
that some-knowledge could result in any "practical" 'benefits. 
In the same vay it is oloar enough that the desire to unify, to 
connect up%is often quite unrelated to the thought of any 
Possible practical applications. Sometimes indeed a scientiatisayp 
will pursue a problem long after the practical implications have 
boon exhausted simply because ho) haa soon the possibility of rolat- 
ing the problem to some other problem which previously he had 
thought to be quite unnonnected with it. 
Socondly, it might be said that it io not the idea of 
system as such which pleason us, but rathor-cortain qualities or 
features possessod by the system. If theno are absent then we lose 
interost. In this connection two kinds of qualities are particularly 
relevant-.. (a) qualitios of an aosthetio character; and kb) qualities 
which givo the system teleological signifioance. To deal with each 
of those briefly in turn. 
(a)Tho idea that it is an aesthetic pleasure which we 
are ro6Llly seeking when we try to achieve system seems very 
Plausible bocauselnot only do we prefer the more olegant or the 
more simple of two systems each of which explains satisfactorily 
all the relevant facts, but also we tend to remain dissatisfied 
with any system which is too oomplioated, and this, not Twrely for 
utilitarian roasons, but because simplicity is more aesthetically 
Pleasing. We are always longing for the complote simplicity of 
unity. Nraen ve do not achieve it wo, tend to fool as the small boy 
does when his answer to the arithmetic sum is a most undistin- 
guished fraction. 
This oan all bo admittod and yet at the same time 
we can assert that the desire to rolate, to connect up does 
exist quite distinct from any particular desire as to what 
kind of system we wish to discover. No doubt, as we have said, 
V71s. 
we always hope that any systemWhichwe establish will be 
elegant as well as officient, simple as well as sound, and there is 
bound to be a sense of dissatisfaction if we find that the only 
system which seems to explain all the facts is extremely 
complicated and inelegant. Butwe do not sorap- a 14pothesis 
because it is 'on we are seeking for some Pýý inelegant, nor, Wh 
way of tying together the facts into some kind of system, do we 
necessarily assume that the hypothesis which does the job will 
satisfy any aesthetic standardo. Indeed the demand for system may 
be a strong moving force in someone for -whom aesthetic pleasures 
mean very littlo. At the other extromo)of course ) we 
have the person 
'who has to fight against the influence of aesthetic standards. Thus 
Kepler is reputed to have boon misled at first by his conception 
of the circle as the most perfect figure to which, as he thoughtt 
the movements of the heavenly bodies should conform. 
There is one more point: in respeot to aesthetto qualitirss 
we have to differentiatej think, betwoon the desire for simplicity 
and the desire for aesthetic qualities of other kinds. Tho desire 
for simPlioity oan, I think, be legitimately regarded as a form of 
the desire for system. It would be foolish to assume thatin factV 
the proper hypothesis to explain any sot of phenonema will alwaya 
conform to the ideal of simplicity, and in some cases we may have 
to resist tile temptation to "twist4 the facts to suit the simpler 
of two hypotheses; 'but -the desire for simplicity is nevertheless 
linked very closely with the desire for system. 
(b) In respect to the objection that it is not more 
system as such which we desire, but a system which satisfies our 
desire for some teleological explanation of our exporionoo of the 
world, we need only give the briefest of answors. It need not be 
donied-that, for some, the only kind of explanation whiah is really 
satisfactory is one which answers the question "why". Evon if the 
scientist were able to oxplain everything that is,,, by means of, a 
few simple principles many would remain dissatisfied with this 
type Of eXDlanation given in non-teleological torms. But it is 
equally true that, for some, the achievement of the kind of system 
which scientific explanation can give is a source of des,., p satis- 
faction. And ono-may also noto that it is possible for a person 
who is satisfied only with teleological system so far as "ultimate 
explanations* are concorned)n9verthelean to find satisfaction in 
tho achiOvOment of system of any kind within a more restricted 
field of knowledge. The religious ran who finds all scientific 
oxplanationa of the "univoree" quito unsatisfying may yetpas 
an amateur naturalist, obtain groat satisfaction from reading 
of a hypothesis which satisfactorily rolates, say, the behaviour 
of migrating birds to cortain variations in weather. 
14. It is obviously more difficult to prove that this 
desire for system is connected with the faculty of reason than 
to Drove that the desire exists in its own right. 
The theory whioli I propose to put forward is that the 
dosiro for aystem is the positive expression of the motive whioh 
prompts us to try to remove any contradiation In an argument or 
2) 
between two theories 'whenever we become aware that such a 
oontradiction oxists. Just as it in a sign of "reason" in a person 
to b-i worried by the presence of contradiction so it is a 
sign of the oporation of roason if he tries to show that 
phenomena 'whioh seem unrelated are really part of a coherent system, 
It is not poosible logically to deduce the deniro for 
37stom from the fact that we are moved to try to rocolve 
particular contradictions an they appearpbut it is possiblo to 
show that the two motiven are so closoly relatod as to make it 
reanonablo to suppose that they have their source in the same 
faculty. 
(I)It would bo agreed that Cho ideal exemplification of 
reason at work (reason, that is, as defined here) is in the disciDlAnAl, 
of mathematics and logic, ý flaw the appeal of those disciplines' liOD 
very much in the fact that they give us scope for the construe- 
tion of SOlf-containod systems within which overy "part, ", can be 
shown to be necessarily related to every othor part. 11or is this 
viow outmodod. i. f we take the modern interpretation of rathematios 
and logic as being the correct ono, Even if we grant that the 
primitive propositions. of logic and geometry are not self-evident 
truths about' roality but simply "convenient assumptions", novertholess 
the conotruction, of alternative logical and geometrical systems 
gives roasonvido scope for its employmont. Its demands are satisfied 
in the building up of a oonsistont body of propositions on the ioasiS 
1.4167--this motive is to bg describad is a problen, which we 'will doal with lator. Goo chapterIK * 
101. 
of certain accepted asnumptions. 
(2)Tho motive which prompts us to try to remove some 
contradiction often gives waY imperceptibly to the desire to 
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relate to unify. Thus the appearance of a contradiction in a 
theory, or of an: inconsistency between two hypotheses may lead us 
to search for some wider systom or frame of reference which will 
not merely enable us to overcome the inconsistenny but bring 
into 
relation a wider range of facts. The appearance of an inconsistency 
is often the starting point of a more fruitful hypothesis or 
a more far reaching system of thought. 
In this conneotion it should be noted that it is not 
merely the presence of an inoonsictonoy which conatitutes a 
thr'eat to any hypothobis or theory we have formulatedbut alSO 
the presence of facts which cannot be accounted forgor of 
phenomena which cannot be related to one anothor. Thore to always 
the possibility that the only explanation to fit thooe facts or 
the only hypothesis which can rolato these phenomena will prove 
to be inconsistent with the more general hypothosta or explanation 
which had so successfully covered all the other relevant 
phonomona. Thun the desire to achieve systemand. to extend this 
system to cover a wider and wider area of phenomena can be viewed 
as an attempt to-avoid all possibility of contradiction arising. 
So long as thore Is one fact vhich cannot be accounted for by 
a hypothesis (even though an apparintly minor faot), so long as 
one branoh of knowledge seems to be quite unrelated to another 
branch then reason cannot root -the possibility of contradiction 
, 
'" t' 
1 
In; 3. 
always oxists. 
Lastly. if we are prepared to admit that the desire 
for system doos exist quite apart from any utilitarian consider- 
ations as to the practical value of system then to what faculty 
or "instinct" are we to assign it, if not to reason. Of oouranwe 
can dispense with faculty descriptions altogether and simply assert 
that the deoiro for system is an original motive of human actionj 
but in so far as we are concerned with faculty divisions thon 
it 
certainly does neem much more reasonable to place the sourco 
of this desire in manys reason than anywhere 01130. 
Ill. 
15. If we accept the notion that reason gives-rise. to a 
specific desiro, viz. the desiro for system, then some interesting 
questions arise as to the relation between this desire and the 
general problem of the rationaliiy of our oonduote 
First of all lot us oonsider the relation betwoon this 
"desire of reason" and the rational desire for happiness. Wo have 
already noted that the principle of happiness is used by common 
sense as a criterion of rational aotýon. Now, in seeking happiness, 
we way be led astray either by mistaken judgments as to the 
facts or-by being tempted by some immediate passion to turn asido 
from the course of action which we know it is in our real interests 
to pursue. There are some desiros -we may call them, with HUMOV 
"'violent" -which are particularly liable to operate against out 
happiness in this way, but it is common experience that almost 
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any desiregiven certain circumstancescan load us astraylmaking 
us prefer tho lesser to the greater good. Thus it is a conceivable 
Poo sibility that reason. considerod as a desire for systompeould,. 
in certain circumstances, bocomes, a violent passion conflicting 
with our general good or happinoss -in other words, 'be an 
irrational deniro, or, more accuratolya cause of irrational conduct. 
This seems oxcessivoly paradoxical largely bocauso 
we tend to u3e the terms "reaaon" and "rationalw as being 
oquivd lent iný, moaning -that is, the term *reason" has a much wider 
connotation for common sense than it has in this particular 
contoxt. Hence, to common sense, it seems a contradiction in terms 
to say that a person was "moved by reanonw and yet acted 
"irrationally". 
Nevertholoss, whan wo havo dofinod our torme more 
oarefully. tho paradox disappears and our view no longer apDears 
contrary to common sense. It is true that common s, ense does not 
think of a conflict botween reason and happiness in the sense 
doscribod abovomainly because tho desiro for systom, b9ing a 
weak dosiro in most monis not usually thought of when we are 
considering the dangers of an "exceso, of reason"; but, in other 
vaYspoomton aensoýdoes regard reason as being a possible 
threat to happinoss. In dealing with the principle of accordance 
with the facts we noted that there wore occasions when it was 
considered quite rational to ignore the judgments of reason; herog 
it is Sufficiont to note that though in genoral common sense 
regards reason as a "friend" -a guide and adviser -it also 
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thinks of reason as a possible onemy. we are warned that we can 
have "too much reason", or that "we should not allow reason to 
dominate our life to the exclusion of omotion", and so onjand while 
the term, "reason" is used here more loosely than in the context 
described aboVeyot these statements indicate that common sense 
is aware of the fact that man's roaoonglike any other faculty or 
propensity, oan be employed in a way that is detrimental to 
happineGo. 
Whether, in fact, tho desire for system over becomes 
a danger in this way is a very difficult question to answer with 
any confidenco. It is possible that where it does appear to 
be a dominating motivo, other motive forces are also at worklusing 
this dosire aS a means to the satisfaction of more fundamental 
desires, but it is not inconceivable that, for some minds, the 
desire for system could, given certain circumstancoatbeoome a 
violent passion upsetting the balanco of life. 
16. A paradox, or apparent paradox, that has more interesting 
imPlioations is to be found in the statement that reason in its 
GxOCUtive capacity may'be Incapable of carrying out tho plans or 
fulfilling tho demands made upon it by reason considered as a 
dosiro. 
An objoatton may be mado to this statement on the grouncb 
that It is introducing ambiguity into our notion of reason to 
talk'as if reason could be both a desire and the instrument by 
moans of which the desire attempts to satisfy itself. 
This objection seems important. only if we take the 
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faculty theory of the mind too literally and suppose that there 
must be a oorrosponding physical structure for every specific 
activity. As a matter of facthovevoravon if. wo do assume that 
faculties have a physical basis we do not need to assume also 
t'hat the structure is simple -that any particular physical 
structure can only bo linked to onq specific activity. To can use 
the example of instincts to illustrate tho point here. It in 
commonly thought that an insUnat propir consists both of an 
innate propqýsity or drive and aloo of certain rofle'x patterns 
which-are "geared" to thts drtve. These reflex actions carry out, 
an it weretho"instructions"of the propensity. Tn the caso of 
instinctive creatureG -the '? rý -00t 
infallible, 
., 
ear mechanism"is alm 
but the mechanism can break down if the onvironment changos too 
drastically, or if either the propensity or tho reflOX machinory 
is in some way defective. Now there is no'clono connection in man 
between his innate propensities and any one set of reflox patterns 
-man in not tied to any rigid patternýreaott 
. 
ons in ordor to 
satisfy hin -6asic needs. But in tho case of Some Of these basic 
needs man is equipped with the essential rachinory roquirod for 
the expression and satisfying of the innate "drive". T)iun when we 
talk of the "instinct" of sox we include in that concept both 
cox desire and the moohanisms by which that desire finds expression. 
'"here 13 nothing extraordinary, thorofore, about including 
under the concept of reason a certain desire and alno an 
instrument by which the desire tries to find satisfaction. The 
unique featuro, of oourse, about the machinery of reason to that 
it ia at the disposal of all other desires as vell. 
I 
-J . 
17. We must now state more procinely what we moan when we say 
that the machinery of reason may not be capable of fulfilling 
Vne demands made uppn it by ýeasou, considered as a dosiro. 
This could be interpreted in Vne following ways: 
(1) That in some particular case our actual reasoning 
ability was not suffictont, to achieve the system dosired. Thero 
was nothing inherently impossible about the task, but -wo were 
simply unable to find the right answers.. 
I (B)That, in a given caso, our reasoning ability was 
sufficient to satisfy our demand for system but that we did not 
employ the roasoning instrument efficiently -0-9. we were careles3 
a 
in our roasoning, or did not pursue tho chain of roanoning With 
sufficient pertinacity. 
(3)That the demando made by reason were of'ouch a kind 
that the human roasoning instrument, an suoh, was quite. ineapable 
of satisfying thom. 
I 
It is this last possibility vhich is, of relevance herot 
though we oannot do more than touch on the problem briefly sinoo 
to deal with it adequately would lead us into somo of the 
most difficult issuos in philosophy. 
In oaying that the human reasoning instrument is 
incýpable of answering the questions prompted by roauon, considerod 
as a motive of aotion, wo may mean one of two thingstFirat, that 
the questions cannot be answered because they are not proper 
I 
questions Neither human reason nor any other instrument could 
give us an answer for, in faot, there is no answer to give. Sooondq 
17. 
that the questions are proper -it is possible to think of some 
meaningful answer being given to them -but that human reason 
is incapablo of discovering the right answor, or porhaps even to 
suggest possible answors. 
In respect to the first of these two interpretations 
we can be reasonably sure that the point made in it is not a 
rolevant one so far as reason, in the-sense in which it is defined 
here, is conoerned. It is possible that if we define reason in some 
broader sense then we can show that it does tend to prompt us to 
ask questions whioh, whon carefully analysedgaro seen to be 
meaningless. And from this point of view we might perhaps be 
Justified in saying that there is a conflict within reason itself 
- reason in its analytic mode disciplines reason as the force whioa 
movos us to seek the answer to certain questions. 
But if reason morely prompts us to oook for aystem then 
it is difficult to see how such a task could ever bo a meaningless 
one. Of course if what we seek is not merely tile establishment 
of a not-work of relationships, but a system which will satisfy 
certain requirements -especially requirements of a teleological 
nature -then it is possible that the desire which moves us to 
tr. v to satisfy these requiremonts will lead us to ask quoutions 
whioh are meaningless. In itn purost form the deniro for system 
is not concerned with any one partioular tyPe of SYStOm to the 
exolusion of others. Each situation is approachod, as it were, with 
an open mind, the problem being to find that hypothesis which 
will link up the various factors in the simplest way possible. But 
of courso, in practice, we u3ually have a bias towards Gome particJOC 
loc. 
kind of nolution -we approach a situation thin)LIng that only 
a certain kind of hypothe3is will really satisfy us. And it is here 
that the dangor lies. Either we try to "forco" the facts to fit 
the thoory. or olso our desire for a oortain kind of-oxplanation 
moves us to ask quostions or to propound thoories v'hich are 
really without any significance. Thus the desire of a religious 
I 
person to. prove that thore is a "designo in everything that happens 
may lead him either to Impose fantaotio interpretations on the 
facts, or else to suggest hypotheses whichthough thoy appear to 
offe'r an explanation, are really non-significant in that they are 
the kind of hypothesos for %Yhioh,, no oonocivable diaproof 
1 
aould bo found. 
13. In those cases where the questions seom significant but 
whero the reasoning faculty appears to be incapable of providing 
answern ve havo to difforentiate between two kinds of situation. 
In the first the questions ara of the typo which Beer, to be 
aatsido t*he scope of reasoning altogether -that isgit is not 
so much an incapacity of the roasoning faculty which forces us 
to admit failure but rather an inability to find. any other Taeans 
olanaworing the question when It is clear that reasoning alone 
cannot do so, or that the mothod of reasoning in quite inappropria-te. 
Thus we may feel thht no amount of reasoning will ever convince 
someone that a particular painting is beautiful if he har, no 
"fooling" for visual arts in the first placo. Tho question of 
beauty is not one which can bo settled, by reasoning from a 
given set of rulos. It. is not a question of any inadequacy n 
1-SOO PS 9,76-278. 
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our reasoning cape, city; it is rather that the problem is not one 
which should be de, alt with by the faculty of reasonGimilarly, 
assuming that the question, ODoes God exist? " is a proper onetwe 
may argue that it is not a question which can 'be settled by 
reasoning. Reasoning may help us to dispose of certain untenable 
Positions, or to clarify what we. moan by the question but, 00 we 
may arguo, the problem of GodPs existence vif it is noluble'at 
all, could only be solved either by some intuitional prOO000 or 
by some revelatory experienoo.. 
Now it seems clear enough that vio typo of questions 
'O, rompted by tho dosiro for system do not como into tho abovo 
catogory. In trying to"impose" somo kind of order on the "givon" 
ve may be setting ouroolvea a task vhich to beyond our reasoning 
capacity, but the task is not ono which it is inappropriate to 
handle by means of tho faculty of reason, or in which reasoning 
would play only a very subsidtary rolo. Other qualities besidne 
roasoning capapity may be required -imagination for instance - 
but the attempt to order data into some kind of system is one 
Which reaeon Is eminontly equippea to-handle. And this leads me 
to the next point. 
Sometimes roason may set tasks which are proporly 
onough dealt with by the Inctrument of reasoning but which 
T)rove, in faot, to be beyond the powers of tho human instrument. 
The task is too complex for us to handle with ease. 
Now in this sonne I think it is true to say that 
Sometimes reason, dofined in torms of tho denire for system? 
200. 
set4tasks beyond, the capacity of the reasoning instrument. And in 
some cases we ray feel reasonably sure that the demands will never 
be fulfilled. But there is nothing particularly paradoxical about 
this. It is true of other desires also that they make demands 
bur power to fulfill. It is, of oourse. not irrational to 
feel such desiroa; we are acting irrationally only if we waste 
tire trying to satisfy a desire which is obviously inoa. Dable of 
satisf action. 
19. It is only, tho,. n,,, in this 1%st sense that vie oan talk of 
some kind of oonflict "within reason itself", and even so 
woonflict" 
is a rathor. -misleading term. It is true that if we define reason 
in a broader sense than we have done then more puzzling 
paradoxon soom to arise -it has sometimes boon suggeatedtfor 
instanoo, that it is reason Whioh oauses us to ask questions which 
are really meaningloss, or that reason leads ua astray by appearing 
to bo oapable of answering questionsWhioh, though propor, are 
nevertheless quite beyond its scopo. 11owevor that ray be, these 
more profound questions need not concern us here, sinooon our 
interprotation, the source of the diffioulties would-not be in 
reason itself but rathor in those desires which try to tt Use" 
reason for purposes outside its rango. 1hat Is not to GaYlof 
course, that these questions are not important, flaffover we define 
roason the fact remains that we still have to deal with the problem 
that the human mind seems to ask questions to which no kind of 
satisfactory answer can be given. Theso questions seem legitimate 
onOUgh and yet when we try to answer them we come up against 
baffling problems -our minds*'beat the atr". Tt. is in so far'as 
we try to deýal with the problem in faculty terms -to arnortion 
tho blame, as it were, -that tho problem is not our concern hero. 
For, as we have Just said, we have argued that the source of 
these questions - we may, perhapa, conveniently label them. 
" motaphysical quostions" -is not in roason, but olsewhnronotablY, 
in tho dosirn- of the human boing to find a significance for his 
place in tho univorse, a"moaning" for his life. 
Note on toloological nuictionv. 
It ia sometimes said that the question "why" is an 
irrational quf? stion, a relic of primitivo anthropomorphism.. 
The 
following brief comments seem apposito here: 
(1)This criticism is only applicable when the question 
"'whY" is asked in a cortaLn kind of context. Sometimos9for . instance, it is more or less equivalent to tj, je quostion "hOW`. VT0 
askj"w4y did the light fuso"; we want to know the cauoe. Again, in 
trying to explain the behaviour or conduct of creatures who 
are capable of acting from purposo -and in p., irticular of ran -it 
'would be considered sensible enough to ask wwhyw thin or that was 
done -to ask for the motive or tho purposo of the action. 
(2). Tt is when we ask for a "why exýolanation" for things 
in general -When, for instanoo, vo say that noientifto oxplanations 
Of the universe are not ultimately satisfactory, that only a 
teleological explanation would ontisfy tho mind -that tho above 
criticiam Deems more relevant. 
(3jYot what dooo the crittoior. really amount to. It is 
not enough to say that the question "why" is primitivo; one can 
never really explain away anything -by rovealing its origins. Nor is tho charge of anthropomorphism as relevant as it sooms. Thoro 
iu a sense in which all thtnking must 'be anthropomorphic -that is, 
we can only think in terms of our own oxperionco. Cortainly it 
would be oresumptuous to assume that the Nvorld is nxplioable 
in terms of purposes which are similar in overy way to human 
purposes, juut as it would be presumptuous to ao-.. uro that the 
universe to ordered for man's bonofit, but there dooo not api3oar 
to '00 anything nonsensical pir so in asking whothor thore may not 
be a teleological explanation for the universe or in stating that it is only ouch an explanation that one would find satisfactory. 
O2. 
(4)'When we ortticise questions of the "why" order as 
irrnttonal 'vie can mean one of two things: 
(a) That it is obviously the case that there is no 
"purpose" behind the order of eventn; thore is as much evidonce of 
lack olk' design as of dosign. 1horofore. when. we persist in wanting 
a teleological explanation we are simply shutting our eyez to the 
ýfacts. 
(b) That the qunstion "why" is , 
moaningless because there 
is no conceivable way of putting any answer we give to it to a 
test. Providod vie word our theory carefully we can give almost 
any answer we like to tho teleologioal question and be certain 
that it cannot bo disnroved. 
In answer to theso two points wo can nay this: 
. (a)Whilo it may be clear enough that the universe does 
not conform, as it wore, to any of the "orthodox" pattorna(cay, 
to the ido 
'a of rule 
by the Christian God), it would be begging the 
question to assume that no possible teleological explanation 
could 'be truo. Indoodpan unbiased appratsal of the evidence would 
800m to suggest some kind of dualistic explanation : that wo can 
most satisfactorilLy understand the world by roferonoo to the idea 
Of Son. 0 final cause 0xPressing itself throughor even in spite of, 
brutooformloss matter. 
(b). The second critictsm abovo, if just9would be relevant 
if we actually tried to find an answer to the teleological question 
- we 'would be engaged in a fruitless pursuit. But this would not 
mean tnat the question par so 'wan meaningless. It in not contradto- 
tory to say at one and the same timo, wno possible answer could 
be Fi'Ven to this question, but nevertheless the question itself 
is QUtte legitimate". 
(5). On the other hand, orities of the teleological 
approach are on firmor ground if they assert marely that the source 
Of thO question "why" is not to ba found in reason, or not in 'reason 
alone.. Ihose who do assort that It Is reason which prompts the 
Tue3tion "why" have to account for the fact that, for Some minds, 
Who teleological principle has no appeal at all. 3omo 3oientintat 
for instanoo, soem to be porfoctly satiofiod with the kind of 
undorstanding of nature which soionoo can givo us. 
Tho bias towards one kind of explanation rather 
than anovier is probably caused by a numbor of factoro, many of 
tliem emotive. Thts is not always roaltood by those v1io condemn, 
toloological modes of thoug)ht. Thus the less co. Dhizticatod 
evangelists for positivism are uqually unwilling to admit that their ohoico of meaningful criteria has boon to some extent 
conditioned by emotive factors. 
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I. 
In considering the question of the relation between 
moral action and the concept of rational action we immediately 
come up against a difficulty which did not confront us when we 
were concerned solely with actions whose motive is come desire. 
The difficulty is this9that while common sense aocopts in princinle 
the idea of duty as a distinot and ultimately good reason for 
action, in practice it often soems to waver in its loyalty to 
tnis Drinciple. And this hesitancy in practice ic reflootod in 
the scopticiam of the more reflectiVO man about the VnolO notion 
of a "categorical imperative" whioh we are obliged to obey whether 
we vish to or not. or whether it will be for our happiness or not. 
Thus, though we should think it nonsensical to ask 
"why should t do what I desire to do? " we do not think it 
nonsensical to ask "why should I do my duty? "We see no point 
in asking what we mean when we say that "to desire somothing is, 
prima facieto have a good reason for acting", but we do feol it 
necessary to question the meaning of the statement that "duty is 
a good reason for action". 
Of course'the quontion, "why should I do my duty? " from 
one point of view is a meaningless quostion. In so far as the 
term "duty" is used at all we are stating that there is something 
which "oujýat to 'be done" -thoroforo in any given case in which 
we know there is something which we are morally obliged to do 
it seems meaningless to ask, ""Y ought we to do it". What we are 
really saying is, "why ought I to do what I ouglit to do? 7 
Sometimen, too, the question "Why ought I to do my duty" v 
when stated in a -oarticular, contextpis really only a looSO 
way of asking, 'Is this really my duty? "What we are quostioning 
to not the idea of duty as suoh, but whothor we really are morally 
obliged to do this or that particular action. 
There is, howover, a very general sense, in which it 
f. 
seems proper to ask the question, "why ought I to do my duty"jand 
that is wher'e we are concerned to know whether the notion of 
duty itself "makes sense". We are not denying that we are moved by 
something we call "duty", and that when we are so moved we 
experience 6, omething which seems quite distinct from the feeling 
of boing moved by "deeire". What we are inclined to question is. 
whether . the "feeling" of authoritylof a claim on U0, which the 
experience of being under a moral obligation always involvespis 
really genuine or not. 141ght, it not boin a sense, an illusory 
"feeling", tiie product of social oonditioning? Perhaps, if we could 
trace back th6 origins of the notion of duty, wo vould roalise 
that there Is nothing very mysterious about its "authorit. Y" 
after all; that, indeed, we are not really under any necensity 
to do what we call our "Auty", except in so far as we want to 
do itgor find it in our interests to do it; that, in other wordsp 
the only ultimately good reason for doing something is that 
'we think we'shall satisfy som8 desire in doing so. 
It is with questions of thin kind that we shall be 
I 
ooncerned here. 
2. Au wo havo. saidthe ordinary'unreflectivo man doos not 
question, in principle, the Idea of duty. "Ihnre are several reasons 
for this, which wo can only montion'briefly. 
Firpt, ve always tend to take for granted whatever to 
"natural", and as a sense of duty seems to be natural to man -i. e. 
is a characteristic of all normal men -it is simply aszumed that 
there is nothing to quostion. Secondlythe ordinary man alvays 
tends to emphasiso the social utility of thO idoa of duty, and to 
argue that. we can only reap the benefitS of living to-gother as 
a community if everyone does his duty Thirdlyothe fields of 
denire and of duty often overlap -we desire to doviat wo ought 
to do. Fourthly, there is the widely hold beliof -often no more than 
a superstition -that tho man who does his duty vill not suffer 
for 
it "in tho long run". Given this beli0f. tho"ating" of tho oatogor- 
ical imporative is removed, and the problem of what the rational 
course of action is Vhon the claims of duty and happiness conflict 
no longer a real one. 
That the doubts of the more roflecti'VO man do findp 
however, an echo in common sons'o is shown in Goveral ways. Thus, 
though in thoory we accept duty as a good roason for action - as 
a satisfactory motive -yet, in fact, tho term wmotivo"vin ordinary 
spooch, is more or less equivalent to the term "desiroll. For 
06. 
instance. When we ask . "what was the motive behind his action" 
we nearly always think of some dostro, not of dome moral obligation. 
Similarly if we aro explaining an action which was donepsayp 
because someone had promised to do it, we may say "he, did it 
because he had promised to do sow. but wo are much less likely 
to say "the motive for, his action was his obligation to keep a 
promise". 
Now th6 is a linguistic point onlypand perhaps not too 
much should be made of itibut language habits often reflect 
deep-seated attitudes of mind, and it is possible that in this 
case the rectriotion of the denotation of the term "motive" to 
desiroo, only indicates that common sense thinks of desires as the 
ultimatemotive forces -or rather"unconsciously"thinks so, since, 
of 0ourso9moral obligations are officially accepted as good' 
reasons for action. 
I. Thore seems to be a similar confusion in Hume. In the chapters 
in which he discusses tho role of reason in conduct he assumos 
that the cause of any action is always, inýthe last analysis, 
a destre(cf. R.? A. Kydd, op. cit., p. 104). But in the Third Bk. of the 
Troatiso he arguos as though moral obligationswere also 
motives of action. "Worality --- is supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent 
judgments of the undorstanding. And this is confirmed by common 
exporienoetvhich informs us, that men are often governed by their 
duties ---"(Op. oit*#p. 4C7). This contradiction may be only apparont, howover, for 
it could be argued that Hume interpreted moral obligation 
simply as a special kind of desire(i. e. ý, whon we are displeased "after a certain manner" at the neglect of an action wo say vo liof under an obligation to perform ii). 
'That Hume was not entirely happy about this definition 
of moral obligation and about his goneral'interprotation of moral action is shown by his strenuous andeavours to "explain 
away" the"oughtness"of the artificial virtues such as justice. 
9,7D 7 -ö ' 
Then, too, *while it is the case. as wo havo just montionod, 
that the ordinary man tends to assume that in some. way or. othor 
the dutiful man will ultimately be rowarded, it is also'truo that 
this belief is by no moans held with firm conviction -in our more 
reflective moments we have many doubts about it. And the point to 
note is that as soon as these doubts become at all pressing we 
tend to become auspicious of the whole notion of duty -we question I 
the validity of the claims of duty to over-rido the claims of 
personal ha*opinoss. This suspicion of the concept*of duty may be 
hold. moreover, by a person who is altruistic in conduct and not at 
all Dreoccupied with his own happinens. flo may fool that though it 
is not very admirable to make the pursuit of one's own hapninoss 
the chief aim Of lifO, yet nevertheless the question of one's 
happiness is of groat importance and not to be set aside easily. 
Duty han'to make out a case for itsolf, and thistit in thought, 
will be difficult unless it can be shown that, in some senBo, the 
man of duty will be justly rowarded. There is something odd about 
accepting the notion of an absolutely binding categorical 
imperative if at the same time we believe that the world is 
completely indifferent to moral values. 
Finally, we may note the auspicion with whioh the 
ordinitry man views the idea of "duty for duty's sake". 11o doubt 
this is in part duo to tho fact that he mis-intorprots the 
expression -he thinks that what ia being advocated is a "theirS- 
not to roason whyO attitude of mind -but there is also an element 
of mistrust of the notion of duty itsolf. The mantfor instancep 
-' S 
who is of a"naturally" generous 'and kihd, disposition is contracted 
favourably with the man Vho does things merely from a sense of 
duty, and so on. 
3. It is when the ordinary man reflects carefully on the 
notion of duty that these vague suspicions become clarified and 
attempts are made to "explain away" the whole concept of duty as 
it is normally understood. That there is a persisting tendency 
in this direction is shown, I think, by the renewed attempts by 
philosophers(and usually by what we migilt callg"common sense 
philosophers) to analyso the duty motive into some kind of 
deniro motive -to show that it ultimately derives from dosiregor 
that it is just a speoial kind of desirejor that it is alw, YB 
in our interests to do our duty, and so on. 
'We oan state the objeotion to the conoept of MAY in 
two waysthe one being oomplemontary to t*jj6o other. 
(1). Tho concept of duty, interpreted in its strictest 
fom(O. g. by Kant) does not make sense unles3 we presuppose that 
the world is ruled by some friendly, moral God of the Christian 
kind. In avorld interpreted on purely naturalist lines, the idea 
of a moral imperative binding on us whatever the effects on our 
hapDinoss seems quite out of place, and this for two reasons. 
First, that the notion of an imperative seems to presuppose the 
existence of something other than ourselves to which we owo, as 
it were, a natural obedience -which has a clear claim ovor us. 
Secondly, since we only have a duty to do what is morally righto 
it seems evident that the notion of duty' presupposes the 
idoa that there are objective values, that in any givon situation 
there is a particular course of action which is the right course. 
Now, it is argued. in a "naturalistio" world noither of 
these conditions apply. It is meaningless to talk ofusomothing"p 
in such a vorld. to which we owe obodiencogao it is also meaningless 
to talk of the existence of objective valuos. Indood, if we rogard 
the world purely from the point of view of scienco, then it Booms 
quitoIndifforont to our taoral values. Only the presupposition of 
a moral God oouldvas it were, save the day. Such a presupnosition, 
it is aaid, givos moaning to tho idea of a categorical imperativet 
forms a baois on which to build a theory of objoctive value6jand, 
above all, provides the only assurance that the man who, does his 
duty will not suffer in the long run for it -that, in other words, 
there is no ultimate olash between duty and happiness. 
A more positivo attaok on the notion of duty 
is 
I 
taken by'those who assort that the "fooling" of being bound by 
a moral obligation is the product of. social oonditioning. Originally 
men woro'moved by"natural" impulses, some social and altruistiop 
others anti-oootal and aolfish. Society, hov,; ovo, r, could not be 
given a stable foundation unless the naturally social impulses 
of man were strengthened by sanctions which would doter the anti- 
social man and encourage the social. Thua certain actions of 
groat social value came to bo invested with strong emotional 
qualities -taboos were attached to certain actionsgrewards 
given fI or othors oto. Eventually, howovor, the utilitarian basid 
of moral codes was forgotten and certain moral principles 
took on an almost mystical 3igniftoance. Nlen came to feel that 
they must obey those principles even though they would not suffor 
any external punishment if they disoboyed, and even thouIR: h, in 
certain circumstances they might not see any good resulting from 
their obedienco. lhus was born the idea of the categorical 
imperative. 
liow it is easy to see that this explanation of moral 
obligation is in effect an attempt to"explain away" the whole 
notion of duty, to show thatwo are, in'a sense, the victims of an 
illusion, 'though a soci ally valuable illusion,, whonever we act as 
though abs'olutely bound to do some action we think right. And it is 
Significant that this social conditioning theory is usually hold 
by those who do not accept any kind of theological interpretation 
of the universe. 
In the following section I propoce to discuss the 
above two theories but before doing so it might be advisable to 
state that the point of view taken hero is that the. onlY fruitful 
starting point for discussions of this kind is to accept as 
given, as a matter of plain psychological fact, the uniqueness of 
the experiinoe of being undor an obligation. It may voll 'be possible 
to prove that tile experience of obligatoriness in, in some sonsev 
illusory, that the being bound by duty is not what we think it iSp 
but prima facie we must accept as a ditum of experience that 
the feeling of being under an obligation is different in kind 
from the feeling of being moved by a desiro.. In other vorda, if 
a porson had nover h'ad the expe . rience o. f being under an obligation 
we should find it impos3ible to describe the experience by 
211. 
reans of an aj%alogy with any other kind of exportence. 
Similarly ve must accept an given that wilatevor else 
may be said about the motive of duty it at leant carrion an 
authority which no motive of desire can claim. In other wordsit 
is a plgin psychological fact that when we are confronted with 
a conflict between duty and desire. tho motive of duty always 
exerts a peculiar force which we can only doscribi as the forco 
of wauth6rity"-it claims precedence over desire. This is not to-, 0 
say, of courso, that it necessarily has more power than destra. Verj 
often desire proves to bq the stronger motive. 
An attempt to oxplain or explain awaY the concopt Of 
duty which doos not accept the abovo as data of oxporienco is, *I 
think, open to thi charge of bogging the question. 
5. The view that the idea of moral obligation makes sense 
only within tho framework of some kind of religious interprhtation 
of the univorse is, of course, a challenge to the doctrine that 
the sDhore of morals is quite autonomous and that the fundamental 
concepts of morality cannot be explained or, justified in terms of 
non-moral conoopts. And it is in this lig7ht thatwo must discuss 
the question. 
First of all. lat us summariso 'briefly the points in 
favour of a theological interpretation of the concept of duty: - 
(1) On the presupposition of the OxiStenco of a God of 
the Christian kind a plausible explanation can be given for the 
existence of a sense of obligation in man, though the concept Of 
2 V3 
- 
obligation itself oannot 'bo defined in 
Fterms 
of3 theologtoal 
terms for reasons which we ahall noto shortly. 
1hus it could be said that God has "givon" man a 
conscience so that when he is tempted to act contrary to vfhat 
he knows to be right he experioncO3 a, sense of obligatorinoso. God 
"speaks" to him through his conscionoo. Whether this soems a 
plausible explanation or not will depend largely on whether one 
acoopta belief . in God as a reasonable bcliOfpbut given this 
presupposition then the above -thoory soome to me Bomowhat moro 
convincing than the usual run of naturalistic explanations. 
(00). Acceptance of tho idou of a Christian God-guarantoos 
that tl'iore will be no ultimate conflict botween duty and 
hapniness, thue removing one of the greatest diffioultiOs confrontiný 
the aefender of morality. 
I 
Admittedly the prosuppoSition of a 
Christian God raisos diffioulties Of its own -0.9. in respOOt 
to 
the problem of evil -which may ooom more imponsible of Dolution, 
but these aro outside t1le scope of our discuBSicn. 
(, 3). Religion providos sanctions whioligif tiley are 
accepted as roal, oncourage pooplo to do what in right and to rofrdUN 
from doing what is wrong. Theso sanctions usually provido a more 
effective spur to moral behaviour than any sanctions imponod by 
the state. 
On tho othor hand It noods to bo notodthough tho point 
I. As Sidgwick points out: 'RWhon a man passionately rofusoo to 
believo that the wages of virtue aro dust, it is often loss from 
any private rookoning about his own wag-no than from a disinter- 
ested aversion to a universe so fundamentally irrational that 
good for the individual is not ultimately identifidd vith 
universal good" (Op. Cit., p. 463). 
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is obvious anough, that a beliof in religious sanctions is not 
nebosaary for the performance of onaps duties. Indeed it in 
often the oase that duties are performed without any thought of 
external sanctions of any kind. 
(4)Finally, bolief in a God of the Chriatian kind gives 
a goneral sense of purposo and security to life which makes it 
more easy for us to perform our du. ties, and in general undertake 
difficult tasks. Evon though we could show that the moral fteld 
is quite independent of the religious, it would still be true to 
say that religious belief provides tile right psychological 
environment for the growth of a morally vigorous life. The problem 
which the thorough going and honest naturalist must always face 
is the pajohological one of being over come by a general lassitude, 
a sense of moaningleasneso. With no guranteo that the moral valuest 
for Which he is prepared to sacrifice everythingthave any root in 
the univorseho must always be tomptad to give the struggle up, 
especially When the indifference of the universe makes itself 
I 
apparent in como porsonal way. 
e. All thn above points may bo granted and yet it may atill 
be questioned whether we need to presuppose some theological 
intorprotation of the univoroe in order to make sense of the idea 
6f moral, ololigation. 
(1). The Pirst point to note here is that we oannot 
deduce the moral "ought" from any non-othical prominspoven though 
that premiss be a statement as to the existence of come God. The 
statemont, that a God of suoh and suoh a kind exists and that HO 
will punish those who do not obey His con. -mands -such a statomont 
might make us conform to the moral law; it would not, in itself, 
make us think we ought to oonformpunloscothat isove already 
thought %, o ought to obey God. It might be thought that the 
proposition; God existslneoossarily implies the propocition 9 
#we 
aro morally obliged to obey God", but this is, not so. It is 
conceivable that God might be the kind of Being whom we would 
fear but could not rospoct; and, indeod, the history of mankind can 
be viowedpfrom one point of viow, as the history of the failure of 
SUCC030ive Gods to satisfy the moral aspirations of man. Even if 
I 
the God we believed in 'was a God Whom we thought we had a moral 
obligation to oboy, it would not be possible to deduoe the d'oliga- 
tion to oboy from the fa'ot of His existence. . Our sense of O'bligation 
to Him would bo based not on the faot that He is God, but rather on 
the fact that He is a God of a certain kind -that Ile has attributes 
of vhich we approve. 
140 doubt we oould argue that we would not approve of' 
these qualities unless God htmoolf had creatod in us tile abilitY 
to appreointe moral attributos, but this io a quite soparate iss"Oi 
and must. not be confusedwith the quoaticn of the 109ic&l 
derivation of the ooncept of obligation. 
(2). f,, 3imilarly, the content of our moral code -our 
particular notions of what is right and what is wrong -cannot be 
deduced from any proposition an to God-Ir, existonco unless 'we 
add the further proposition that Godts commands ought to be 
obeyod. The independence of the content of our morality from any 
theological presuppositions. is shown by the fact that the moral 
ri r- 
. l_ 4i.. 
intuitions of those holding the same religious doctrines may 
differ quito radically in a given situation, whereas it is also 
tile case that a sceptic in religious matters may novertheloss 
have fundamentally the same moral standRrds as the religious 
boliover. Of course it is true that what we believe so far as 
religious doctrines are concerned vill affect our views as to 
what is morally right and wrong. The Muslim thinks it morally 
right to have more than one wife; the Christian thinks it is wrong. 
The village atheist who is converted Will probablY ohango'his 
opinion as to the rightness of drinking intoxicating liquor. 
But 
this does not mean that morality is donandent on a boliof 
in God. 
The non-roligious person can justly claim that his moral views 
are based on certain fundamental moral intuitions. And it is 
interesting to note in this connection that though the religious 
personowhen asked to justify his moral views, oan plead that 
! 'is obligation is simply to do what God oommands, or what tho 
Biblo or the Pope oommands, in fact he usually tries to defend 
himself by appealing also to certain moral intuitions which he 
assumes that all rational beings regard as true. The Catholiolfor 
instance, tries to show that his roligion's prohibition of birth 
oontrol is based on the fundamental axiom of respoot for lifegor 
I 
of the saorodness of the human personality. 
1. -Lt is sometimes said that the roligious sceptic does not realiso 
the debt owod by society to religion for the formulation and 
maintenance of moral values. A pagan generation inherits the 
moral code of a religion without acknowledging the source. 
But the evidence seems to me to point as much the other 
, way, namely, to the debt which religion owes to the scoptic 
for his pioneering work in the field of morale. Thus, in the last 
contury iitwas often the non-churahman Nvho led the way in 
(, 3). The view that the duty motive requires some kind 
of theological backing in order to be made intelligible istin 
part, a Droduct of a certain confusion as to what we moan wnen we 
talk of a moral obligation having a "claim" on us. or of conscience 
having "authority" over all dooiros. It is somotires thought that 
we are referring to something "outside* us - to a Moral Law, to 
God - to which we must render obodionoo, andwhich has tho power 
of life anddeath over us And the inforenoo is drawn that if no 
such "outside* authority 6xists then the whole structure of morality 
collapses and we are free to do as we please. 
Tilis view'is encouragod by several factors. Firattour 
knowledge of what is morally right and wrong is first taught US 
in the form of commands from parents and teachers, and suitable 
rowards and punishments are attached. Secondly, as adults we are 
very much aware of the legal, social, and in the case of religious 
peoplogthoologioal sanctions imposed for any known breach of 
certain moral ruies. 1,11oreover, ovon if we have lost any belief TO 
once had in religious doctrinns, morality in usually taught to 
children in the context of religious balief, and hence we find 
that, unconsciously, we are influenced by the thought of possible 
religious sanations. Thirdly, the term "duty" has come to be 
associated with unpleasant tasks which we would much prefer to 
leave undone were it not for the Gocial pressures which force us 
progreenjue social loglislation, and in this century the devolopmont 
of moral sensitivity in such matters as the treatmont of criminals 
and animals has coincided with a decline in roligious belief. 
The religious man of ton counters the above argument by 
saying that the sceptic Is merely pointing out implications in 
/, 0 religious doctrines which thr) boliever has overlooked. This Tray be so but it still re'mains true that the sceptic's moral views 
'were not themselves based on any religious doctrine. 
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to oonf orm. Also , we often use the moral "ought" in referring to 
actiona which. privatoly. we think to be quite unnecessary or even 
wrong, but which we feel must bo porformed because of custOmpfEdlY 
tradition, and so on. 
As against this approach to the problem of inoral 
obligation it has to be emphasised that the only moral reason for 
doing our duty is that we think the dutiful action to be the 
right action -a feeling of approval munt, bo arousedooither at 
the contemplation of the action itselfvor at the thought of the 
Ih results which we hope the action will produce. '" is is not to say 
that we can define "right" in terms of foolings'of approval-, itAS 
not celf-contradiotory. for instancogto say that we feel approval 
of 'what iswrong. But it in an ossontial characteristic of our 
thinking anything to be right thatWe should have a fooling of 
approval. This fact Is obsoured, partly beoauao, we come to'take 
certain right actions for granted(e. g. we may keep promisos, as a 
matter of course); partly. bneaui3o we sometimes do the "riffat thing" 
merely because it is accepted an right, and not bocause, we oursolven 
have given a "full-blooded" assent to its rightnoss; and partly 
becaudo tho performanoo of a dutyýsomotimes invol've'3 us in 
I 
tho 
performance of actions which in themsolgos aro distaoteful, or in 
the denial of oompating desires. 
We can put the above point in another way by saying that 
the Only Clain. which duty, as duty, makes on us is the Clain, that 
wo should try to do'What is right. But t'his, vhen all is said 
1. To-may actually have a feelin g of repugnance at the thought doing the dutiful act(e. g. the thought of hanging a murderer) and yet morally approve of tho action(we &13 
. prove of 
justice being done, or of potential criminals being detorrod). It is easy to confuse these two feelings. 
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and dono, it a claim, we make on ouroolves. It 13 we who. in the last 
analysis. have to decide what is the right course of action. it 
is we Th o decide what criteria we should use for determining 
what is morally right, and it is we alone who ultimately have the 
choice as to whother to act in accordance with what we know to be 
right or not. In othm. r worda, in so far as we try to act dutifully 
we are voluntary agontsand nood not look beyond ourselves either 
'for the criteria of riTlitnoss or for tho source of thowill to 
act dutifully. This fact is overlookod, as we have said abovot 
'bocau3c in so many cases wo soom to bo acting*against our will" 
when we do our duty. Morality is soon as so,, rothing which in imposed 
on us by somoono oleo -by God, or society -and we 
long to bo free 
Of its shacaon. 11once. w1hon, a person coa3es to believe in God his 
first thought often is, "now I can do as I pleaso; novi I know thatý 
all this business about duty is really'a shamw. but, of ooursetho 
soon finds out that there aro still things which arouse his 
moral fervour -that, for inotanco, when ho soos an animal being 
cruelly treated ho still uays tho action is wrong and still 
fs-, ola rovod to try to prevent furthor oruelty. And he would think 
it strange if somoone oaid to him, "you need not bothor any more 
about things like that, no-w you no longer believe in God", for the 
fact is'that ho wants to prevent tho recurrence of the cruelty- 
the intuition of "rightness" Is in itself a good enough reason 
for action. When vo think we ought to do something wo are not 
I. Evon if we say that the source of our atandards is in God this presupposeoas we have said 'before, a prior intuition that 
VO ought to obey God. 11-his Intuition cannot -prima faoie, anyway be tracod to God. lt is we who decide vhat God or Gods are 
worthy of our obedience. 
1r, 
of course always "filled with pleasure" at the contemplation 
of the act to be donalany more than we are always, pleased to do 
those. things which are necessary for our happinessbut in so far 
as our only motive in doing the dutiful action in that it is the 
right action then it is true to nay that it is an action which 
we want'to see done, even though we have no desire to do the 
action ourselves. or to do it at that particular time. 
The voluntary nature of the dutiful aot is shown most 
clearly in the moral actions of those who do not acoopt the 
I 
possibility of theological aanations. The religious ran aometimOS 
wonders why the non-religious man should bother about duty in 
situations where no external social. sanctiona can be appliedpbut 
this reveals a total misunderstanding of the nature of the moral 
motivo. 
0, From the point of view taken hero, then, it is as 
irrelevant to say that the idea of duty only makos sonso within 
the context of theological beliefs as it would be to n. ako the 
same assertion about dosire. This is not to any that duty and desire 
Ic are really the camo; nor is, to say that questions of theology have 
no rolevanoo to the problem ofthe existence of moral motiV013 
in man. But it has to be accepted as a fact about ran that he is 
moved by the thought of what is. right just as much as he is moved 
by the thought of some dosiro; and it is a fact which has to be 
taken into account when we are attempting any general explanation 
of the universo. To may think, of'course, that a theological 
explanation of the existence of moral motives is moro plausible 
than any other, just as we may think that we need theological 
assurance as to the friendlinoss'of the universe to our moral 
values to provide us with the necessary psychological backing 
for the performance of difficult duties. But to say that we require 
to accept the above propositions as true before we have any 
rational justification for allowing our actions to be influenced 
by duty is really tantamount to saying that we cannot rationally 
justify our being influenood by anything at all until we have 
explained the motive in terms of some metaphysio, In their own way 
the experience of beauty and the experience of love are as 
mysterious as the experience of moral obligationtbut we do not 
think a person is acting irrationally if he allows himSOlf to 
be influenced by the desire for love and beauty bof6ro he has 
tried to explain them metaphysically. 
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7. The points made above have to be kept in mind whon 
we consider those attempts to explain the characteristic feature 
of the duty motive -its claim to authority -by showing that 
it has developed from a complex of simpler ideas. F. xplanations 
of things in terms of their supposed origins need not necessarily 
be attempts to "explain away"pbut very often they are. It is taken 
for granted that what is being explained is, in some sense, not 
real", that we are the victima of an illusion if we take them 
at their face value, and the purpose of the explanation is to 
emancipate us from the hold they have over us. Thus the Freudian 
tries to release us from the superstitious belief in God by 
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showing us how the idea of God dovelopod out of the Ohild-parent 
relationship. But, of course, we beg the question if we use this 
kind of oxplanation as a proof of the illusoriness of whatever 
it is that is being oxplained. Other evidence 13 roquired in the 
first place to show that some belief is possibly false; only 
then is the explanation in terms of originn of much value. 
And this needs to be remembered when we are discussing 
attempts to explain thq concept of 'duty by shvAring the origin 
of the"idea. Very often theories of the origin of the idea of duty 
are used, tp prove the contention that the concept of duty as vie 
understand it now does not stand for anything "real" -that we 
are, as it wero, the victims of an illusion when we fool that we 
"must" do our d%ity come what may. But this is to beg the question 
unless we can bring forward other evidence to support this 
contention. Nor will it be sufficient, as we have soon above, to 
argue that the idea of. duty is quite out of place in a purely 
naturalistic universe. Tho. only kind of evidence that would be 
effective would besay, reliable testimony as to the existence of 
certain tribes whose membors were totally lacking in any 
understanding of the idea of obligation; or experimental evidence 
to show that if a child were brought up in a certain way then 
the idea of moral obligation would never occur to him. 
With these warnings in mind, lot us glance briefly at 
I. Explanation3 in terms of origins have often boon critioised. (see Carritt, -Lho Theory of Yorals, p. 17). Ono of the commonest 
errors hero is the supposition that the maturo state of 
a thing is of less significance than the most primitive -thatt in other words, the end must be interpreted in terms of the beginning and not the other way round. Shis suppoattion may be truo. but it should not be taken for granted. 
some of tho attempts to explain We concept of duty by reference 
to its supposed origins. 
Of these, tho most famous in undoubtodly tho social 
contract theory which. in its most sophisticatod form, offers not 
so much a historloal, as a nociological and payallologioal 
oxplanation. 
The sootal oontract thoory of the development of moral 
concepts is too well known to require description hqroo-out bofore 
commenting on it it is necessarj to make one or two distinctions. 
First, ve havo to distinguish botween the idea of obligation as 
suoh-and particular obligations which we are called upon to fulfill, 
It is, obvious'enough that social conditioning playa an important 
part in the determination of what we think it our duty to do; it is 
not so obvious that the notion of duty itself is the product of, 
sooial conditioning. 
Sooondly, we have to distinguish botwoon th6 faOt of our 
being able to understand tho idea of obligationgand the fact Of 
our capability to porform a duty when we know that we have one. 
Againtsocial training may well help us to perform our dutiespor 
to Perform particular duties with somo readinesspbut it is not 60 
easy to understand how the idea of. obligation itself can be the 
produot of sooial training. 
Now the usual critioism of the sooial contraot theory of 
obligation is that it prosupposoo the very thing whose origin and 
development it is supposed to explain. If all tho mombors of the 
original society wore prepared to trust one another to abide by 
the covenant then presumably the idea, of an obligation to keep 
promises war, already present in the members before the society 
was ostablishod. 
This particular criticism islhowevervonly completelY 
effective against those social contract theories which stross tho 
binding force of the covonant, but it is possible to formulate 
a soctal contract theory in which this difficuIty appears to be 
overcome. All we nood to postulato are the following factors: 
1. Humo was awako to this point: "This convention is not of the 
nature of a promisoofor even promises thomeolvoOlas we shall Boo P 
, 
laterarise from human c'onventions. It is only a-gonoral sense 
of common interest 
Though Hume presents the subtlest form of the contract 
theory, it is obvi. ous that he finds'difficultY' in oxnlaining 
away the fact of "obligation". He thinks that the origin of such 
"artificial virtues" as Juntico. and promise keeping is self- 
interest, but realisos that something more needs to be said if 
we are to account for the fact that we feel obliged to act 
Justly even when it is not in our intorests. Sometimos he seems 
to suggest that it is just a matter of oonditioning-gthen he 
says that "for the sake of our reputation" it is wise to' fulfill 
those obligationc; bu't he roalisos that even thisýloes not take 
us far onOUgh, so he adds that there must be "something" in 
our nature to vhi0h paronts, oducationalisto and politicians 
can appoal: "For if nature did not aid us in this particular it 
would be vain for Politicians to talk of honourable or dishonourableopraisevorthy or blamoablo -thoso words would be 
Perfectly unintelligible -, " Then againvin another passage, ho states that the 
artificial virtues have t%vo foundations: "that of interest 
when men observe that it is impossible to live in society 
without reatraining themselves by rules-, and that of morality 
when this interest is once observed and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the poace of society-=" 
He thus tries to show how we may come to fool the same pleasure at an act Of justice as we would naturally fool at witnessing an act of kindness, but he never clearly 
'31 a how this feeling gives rise to. the idea of obligation, alnlýmoro than in his analysis of the natural virtues he shows- how the feelings Of pleasure and pain vhich we associate with acts of virtue and vice give rise to feelings of obligation. 
4. 
First. that men are aware of the advantages of commLunity; secondly, 
the realisation that these advantages could be more securely 
obtained by a system of rules, with suitable punishments for the 
breaking of tho Tnlles; thirdly, a natural desire on the part of the 
members of the community to be well thought of-, fourthly, an 
educational system which teaches the basic rules of the community 
as absolutely binding principleS founded on roligion; and lastlYs 
a timo-span of many generations so that the original utilitarian 
basi! S 0 f-tlieso rules is completely forgotten - givon all these 
factors. 1 say, and it is possiblo to give a plausiblo explanation 
of the origin of the idea of obligation. There is no particular 
reasonthowevor, why we should accept it as truetunlese thore-ts 
some concrete empirical evidence to support the thoory. It is only 
if we assume that the idea of obligation requires to be OnxDlained 
away" that the above theory takes on an air of plausibility. Witliout- 
this assumption it seems much safer to adopt the more convincing 
organic theory of the development of the state, viz. that the state, 
as we obsorvo it now, is a nitural product of a slow development 
from family life, through tribal' organisation etc. -that the basic 
factors which contribute to the stability of tho state, including 
the factor of moral obligationlaro all present in tho life of a 
family group. Cortainly, the community exporienced by human 
families would scarcely seem to be possible unless the mombors 
had some idea of duty. 
Ono awkward implication of the nooial contract theory 
often overlooked by its Oupportors, viz. that if its account 
Of tho idoa of obligation is truo thon Iwo really have no Obligation 
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to oonform to the rules of society if it is clearly not in our 
interests to do so. Why, for instaned. should we sacrifice our 
lives in warfaro if we can avoid doing so? To imagine that 
these rules are absolutelj binding is to fall into the error 
which the social contract theory trios to oxpoue. 
Evolutionary theories as to the origin of tho idea of 
dutyare not so common, though they are in some ways more plausible 
in that they do not depend on the supposition of a historical 
break between man, living a non-political lifegand man, living as 
a member of a fixed society in which ho, has rights and obligations. 
The basic theory would be that somehow or other)in the course of 
the evolutionary struggle) creatures of a man-liko kind came to 
be influenced by the idea of obligation. The welding Offootwhioh 
this idea produced proved of great value in the struggle for 
existoncotand those creatures whoae groups were bound together 
by obligatorj ties triumphed over their onemies. Thus the typical 
human Society was mado possible. 
Theories of this kind have awkward implications for the 
ffnaturalist" who has perhaps formulated such a theory in order to 
explain away theAdea of duty. For if we ask how the idea of 
duty could ever arise in the first 'place in oroaturoo who had 
previously had no conception of it then can only reply in one of 
two ways. Wo can say that it was part of the design of some Godt 
or we can say that it was the product of some chance combination 
of circumstanoos. The naturalist would obviously settle for the 
latter conclusion but in doing so he roal'Ly contradicts his other 
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assertion that tho idon of duty does not make sense in a 
purely naturalistic world. For, of courso. ho would now have to hold 
that the idoa of dutyas we undorstand it, was a product of 
natural forcos; that. implicit in all that had gone before, was this 
idea of moral obligation, roquiring only a favourable conjunction 
of forces for its birth. Moreover its success as an evolutionary 
weapon vould almost seem to indicate that "nature" was on the 
side of'morality -that it would be at our poril, if we frond 
oursolves from its bonds. 
TV. 
10. Sometimes we attempt towexplain way" the difficulties 
which we suppose to be inherent in the notion of duty by intorpre- 
ting duty as a special kind of desire. It is not denied that the 
duty motive is different in certain important respects from all 
other motives; v'nat is denied is that it is Oomrjetoly different 
in kind from motives of desire. 
Thus liumo seems to combine with his social contract 
theory the view that obligation is a special kind of desire. Tho 
latter view explains those obligat 
. tons based on natural aentimcnts, 
the former explains how we come to feel obliged to act in 
accordanoo with tho 'artificial virtuos". 11umo nowhere gives a 
precise definition of what he means by moral obltgationpand the only 
passage where he does appear to 9Lve a definition is so vague 
that different interpretations are ofton given of it. In brief 
1. ThU6 130o Kydd, op. cit. ppl67 for a rathor unusual interpretation. 
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hir, point of view can be summed up thua: (a)Tho torm"pleasure" 
covers feelings which differ from one another in many respects - 
thus the pleasure ve obtain from listening to music is very differ- 
Ont, frorm the pleasure of sun-bathing. Thorefore in stating that 
morality can be interpreted under the general heading of pleasure 
and pain we are not necossarily denigrating its statuo. (b)All 
morality ultimately dopendo on our sontimentston our capacity 
to experience cortain feelings of pleasure and pain when we 
contemplate certain actions or states of being: wto have the sense 
of virtue is nothing but to fool a satisfaction of a particular 
kind from the oontemplation. of a claraotor. (o)Tho sense of 
obligation is derivative from these peculiar feelings of 
satisfaction. It arisoB whenjor some reason or othorp we do not 
wish to perform the action which we approve of as the right 
action: "All morality depends upon our sontiments; and when any 
action or quality of the mind Dloases us after a certain mannertwo 
say It is virtuous; and when the noglect or non-performanoo Of it 
displeases us after a like manner 'we any that we lie undor an 
obligation to perform it. (d). Thorefore the obligation to do 
Something can be interpreted as a peculiar kind of desireo 
No doubt other variations of this view could be put 
forward, b ut wo noed not summariso them for they are all oxposed 
to the samo criticisms. 
First, thore is the queetion. of appropriate terminology. 
Even if it could be Shown that the duty motive could be adequately 
interpreted as a Speotal denire, it would be quite m1sloading 
80 to describe it. The oharactoristiowhich Beta it apart, viz. 9 
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its claim to "authority" not merely makes it different from. other 
desires. but by its very nature ofton brings it into oonflict ývith 
tliem. It is true that desires may come into conflict with one 
another, but what makes tho conflict between duty and doSire(ordinartly 
so called)unique is that duty alviays claims precodence in such a 
conflict. To call duty a special kind of desiro tonds to obscure 
this, fundamental, fact. 
Second, if we interpret "rightneas"gas Hume has doneo 
in terms of feelings of approval of a partioular kind9then while 
we mfdht be able to show that it waa necessary to haVO these 
feelings of approval bofore 'we could havo an obligation to do 
anything, we could not derive the idea of obligation from thom, nor 
define obligationby referonoo only to them. As Hume himself has 
pointed out in another context, it is one thing to aay that an 
action is right(i. e. that I approve of it in a certain way); it is 
quite another to say that it is obligatory. 
Of course if we define a right act quite simply as an act 
which ought to be done, than the abovo criticism does not applypbut 
such a criticism would not holp thoao who, like Humetara attompting 
to interpret duty as a kind of deoiro. It merely shifts the problem 
one stop further baok. 
Lhird -and this is really only a re T -atatement of the f irýt 
point above -when wo think we have a duty to do something We 
fool that the question of vhethor we desiro to do the action 
1. See Xyddop. cit., ps. El-54. 
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or not is, in a sense, irrolevant. If the action is right'then it 
ougj"It to be done whether we desiro to do tt or not. 7von if. as a 
matter of fact, %ve always did, in some sanso or otherdesire to 
do the action which we ought to do. and ovon if it could be shown 
that tho desiro was the oporative-motivetit would still be 
misleading to say that duty was just a special kind of dosire. 
What wo should have to say ia that it is impossible to do 
what in right unlossat the namo-time, wc desiro to do what is 
right I -a propoaition whioh seems to Tre to be obviously falso(unlew 
that isvie beg the question by defining Idesire" in a very 
special and unusual way) 
I 
I. Somotimes it is said that what moves us to do our duty Nvhon 
it conflicts with our interests is the desire to avoid the 
pain of a "bad oonscience". If this is taken literally then it 
is really an admission that we think duty has a claim on us; 
'but often what is meant here in either cnat we are worried 
about the possibilities of "being found out"Oor else that we 
fear religious sanctions Tho person who doon not believe in 
the idea of duty at all', but nevertheless finds it impossible 
to free himself from the superstitious fear of acting non-morally 
couldOI tAink, legitimately talk of doing the accepted thing 
from a desire to avoid being pqstorod by"Musory" feelings 
Of guilt. 
Another theory is that what moves us when we do 
our duty is tho desire to do our duty in gonoral. Wo aro moved 
by the idealised imago of ourselves as a man of duty. 
It is truo, I think, that thio motivo uometimOD 
Plais a part in helping us to do difficult obligatory tasks. But 
it is not nooossary. Sometimes we do the right thing simPlY 
because it is right. Wo must distinguish, in other wordatbotweon 
doing something bacauso it is right. and doing it bocauso we 
desire to do what is right. 
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12. Tho thoory that tho motivo, of duty in really only 
a speoial. kind of,,, doeiro has the merit. howeverof drawing atten- 
tion to t1io point, Vaich we made earlier, namely, that it is quite 
wrong to suppoob that the chief difference between being moved 
by a desire and being moved 'by a moral o"oligati, on is that, in the 
former case the source of the motive power is "within" oursolvest 
whereas in the latter case we are constrained against our will 
to do opmething we roally do not want to do. The fact is that in 
so far as we act from a sense of obligationtand are not doing 
the right thing morely booause we foar publiO opinionjor foar 
religious punishments, otc. then our aotion is an entirely voluntary 
one. Tho souroe of the moral a0tion is as muoh "within us' aS 
in the case of any dosiro, and though in any given case we may 
wourse'? the being bound by an obligation this would not alter the 
fact that wo think the obitgation ought to 'on fulfilled. It 
constitutes a superior reason for action. It inpof coursepimPOssibln 
to define what we mean by "superior rouson" in this 6ontoxtsbut 
in so far as we havo all exporionoed the oonfliat of desire and 
duty wo know what is meant even if we cannot oxpress it in words. 
This truth is obsouredau -we-havo said boforo, by tho 
fact that we tend to asnociate the idoa of obligation with legal 
or roligioua nanctionspand also by the fact that in many cases 
where wo are callod on to do our duty we are not roally conv inced 
that tho action will produce any good, or we think that the 
sacrifice demanded of us is out of all proportion to the good 
expeotod. Thus tho youth who has boon taught that ho must alvays 
keep his promises suddenly finds himself in a position whore he 
thinks it vould do more harm than good to keep his promise. 
Nevertheless he finds it impossible to throw off the effects of 
his childhood trainingand the result is that he tends to become 
thoroughly confused about the moral problem in general. 
A correct perspective on the problem of the nature of 
duty can only be obtained if we think in terms of those instances 
in which we are thoroughly convinced that a certain course of 
action is the moral] 
. 
ýright course, and yott 
I 
because of a conflict 
with a competing dosire, wo find it difficult to do what is right. 
In such cases there is no doubt at all in our minds as to vhat -we 
ought to do -as to which is the superior reason for action -and 
ýhiS applies even though, in faot, Nve find the temptations of desire 
too strong to withatand. A daughter who knows that she ought to 
care for her agod mother does not feel she is being imposed upon 
from"without", though she may think she is unlucky to be faced with 
such an obligation. The circumstances aro imposed against her will; 
the dutiful act is a voluntary response to the situation. 1f9in 
circumstances of this kind, we refuse to accept our obligation, ' 
we do not really feel that we have struck a blow for froodomg 
that we have ov . orcome the"guilt o4omplex" and asserted our 
right to express our nature freoly. on the oontrarytwo feel 
that we have denied expression to a fundamental aspect of our 
nature, And the more sure we aro of the rightness of the action, 
the stronger will be our revulsion if ve allow ourselves to be 
driven along by our desires. 
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1. The rationality of the common son3a attitude to the 
question of duty may be attacked from anothor anglo. using the 
principle of accordance with the facts as the criterion. of. 
rationality., Thus it might be said that the common sense position 
in respect to moral questions is based on two assurptionsgboth of 
which can be shown to be falso. The two avsumptions arelfirst, that 
we have freedom of the will, at leftat, in thOSS situations in which 
we have a duty to porform; and seoond, that thore are objective 
moral standardsothat morality is not just a matter of private 
feelinga, personal taste. and no on. 
We now try to deal with each e)f these ast3uTfiptionag 
reserving our main attention for the sodond. 
Before we do so, howover, thero is ono logical difficulty 
to note. If the whole id*ea of moral obligation is to be attacked 
on the grounds that it iB based on falso assumptions then there 
would soom to bo implied in such a criticism tll&t we Ilave an 
obligation to oonform our actions to the facts. We assume that once 
the falsity of these assumptions havo -been pointed out POOP10 
will feel obliged to take up a different attitude to the question 
of morals. Butof courso, to assumo this would bo in offoot to 
accept the very idea of obligation t1he rationality of 'which WO 
wore concernod to dispute. 
r2hO only way out of this difficultypso far an I can see# 
is to take tile view that in this particular case it will make 
for greater happiness if we modify or cliange our position so as 
to bring it into conformity with the facto. In other words. the 
rolevant criterion of rationality would be the principle of. 
happiness rather than, tho principle of accordance with the facts. 
It would, I thinkbe difficuli-to prove that it would 
alwayn make for groator happiness to give up the assumptions which 
underlie tho common 3onse position in respect to morality. but 
at loast Such a theory avoids the logical difficulty mentioned 
above. 
TI. 
rr 
%, 0 It is, a co-m-monplace of philosophic thought that "Ought" 
iT, Pli0s "Can". Wo cannot bo obligod to do an actionlnvon though 
we know it to be the right aotion, unless wo are capable of 
doing it. Thus wo may agreo that it is right to send roney for 
relief 'work among earthquake viotims, but if wo aro unemployed and 
pennilor, s then that particular action is not obligatory for us. 
The problem in whether this wosortion neod involvO us 
in the vexed froowill icauO. It is obvious that up to a certain 
Point we can deal with the "ought implies oanw principle on a 
level at which the freewill problem in not really-relevant. This 
is-tho casoj thinkat the following throe lovolB of interprot'ation 
(a) A person is not morally obliged to do oomothing 
which iu cloarly boyond hin physical or mental povera. 
kb)A, pcrson is not morally obligod to do something if 
he is not physically free to do it(i. e. if 110 in. forcibly restrainý, d 
from doing it by external factors). 
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(c)tj, porson is not moral%r oblignd to do a right oction 
if he has a prior obligation %vhtoh Olashos with it. (a. g. if a 
peraon has pramisod to give his surplus monay to the mission fund 
lie may not fool froo to withdraw the promise in ordor to givo tho 
monoy to rnfugeo victims. -whose cause he rogardn novertheless as 
a pressing ono. ) 
It is when wo come to oonstdor tho paýoholOgWal 
forces which rootrain us from doing what wo think WO ought to do 
that wo ents)r tho territory v`hlioh ju unually oovored by tho freowill 
controverey. as well as involving ourselves in diffloult praotical 
quostione. The foliowing inatanoos illustrato till point: 
(i) A porson io not raorally obligod to try to do a 
certain action fron, a particular desire since it ia w3supiod thnt 
I 
wo cantlot command motives at will. Wo may havo an obligation to 
givo assistanoo to our mothor-in-law. And emn an obligation to 
try to do Go cheerfully. but wo oannot havo an dbligation to 
dnatrn to help her. 
(ii). A porson to not morally oblignei to do nomo action 
if ho han an iwrinciblo rovulsion of fooling at tlie timaht of 
doing th-i action. Thus a person may think it. right to kill a 
voundod and wafforing animal and yit, boi unable to do the act. 
I 
J. Tharo is ono motivi 'Whioh 'Wolý r., 113t 3UPPOSO N70 IIaV0 -in SOMe cases 
anyway -the frondom to bf) movnd 'by or not, viz. tho rotiVO Of 
duty, otherwico the 'whol, ) prinotplo which ia oun. m. ed up in the 
expreauton "ought implins can" falls to tho ground. ýhen we daY 
that we oannot have an Obligation to do oonething frov a dortain 
motive we aro aasumin3 that dosires are tho only motives of 
action. 
Ona of tho waakno3sec in the leas sophistioated emotive theortem 
of ethic3 is that a Olear distinotion is not made botween 
vio roýoltng of revulsion at the) thought of an act, and the 
I 
-_ . 
(iii)A person in not morally obliged to refrain from 
doing some action Vnich he knowa to bo wrong if he cannot rosiat 
the dosire to do it,. 
, Now 
itis obvious enough that from the oommon sense 
point of view (and ofton from tho legal too) it is often very 
difficult in casoiý such as the above to know whother a person 
could have done other than lie did -, Whether the psychological 
barriers woreýroally insuperableiWe find it difficult even to 
formulate clear guiding principlosiBut what we are concerned 
with hore is the fact that in so far as we regard Viose psycholog- 
ioal forces as relevant data in the assessment of a person's 
moral obligations t hen we', do seem to 'be involving ourselves in 
the freewill issue as that is ordinarily understood; Thoreforewo 
I 
have to, say something to moot the oriticism, that the idea of 
duty rests on an assumptionwhich isnft true& 
It would bo easy to answer this oritioiGm oither by 
saying, as many modern philosophers doothat the freewill problem 
is a bogus one#or else by asserting that the problom cannot be 
solved ono way or the othorand that therofore tho dofenders of 
the common sense view of duty aro entitled to assume as a mattor 
of faith that we do have froewill. But, without trying in any sense 
to solve the freewill questionjit seems necosoary for us to 
Bay something more by way of defence of the common sense viO7i 
feeling of disapproval which accompanies the thought that the 
an act should not be dono. Yet it is clear enough that there are 
many thingswhichemotionally, wo should find it very difficult to do and yet which, whon ve think about the question calmlyowo 
realiso it is quite proper for us to do. Likwise there are many things which we fqel attracted to do(perhaps they are Inota of an altruistic nature) but whichton reflection #we roaliso we OUght not to do. 
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In brief the following points may be made: 
(a). Nnien we have a choice between alternative courses 
of action we have a "fooling" of froedom. And this is a universal 
experionce. Even those who on doctrinaire grounds do not believe 
in freewill cannot avoid fooling that they have freedom on 
somo occasions. Of course this feeling might be an illusion, but 
we cannot bog the question by assuming that it is. The onus is on 
the determinist to give a plausible explanation of how such an 
illusion could arise. Tl. qo fact that tho defender of froowill cannot 
givo'a satisfactory inte)lleotual account of his faith -cannot. 
even give a satisfactory definition of "freewill" - is not in 
itself significant. The same position is to be found in rospoot 
to other fundamental "instinctive" beliefs such as our boliof 
in our own identity, our belief in tho oontinued existenoe of 
material objects when not perceived oto. It might indeed be said 
that the task of philosophy, or one of its tasks is to try to 
give a reasoned intillectual account of t1looo boliofs. But if VO 
I 
fail in such a task we should, not therefore assume that the belief 
is false. 
(b)lt Seems impossiblo'to avoid the assumption of 
freewill uben we are dealing with our. follows in the practical 
affairs of life. Sometimos we can fool confident enough that a 
person has not acted freoly. but we find it impossible to act 
on the asgumption that no one ever acts froely. We cannot-of 
course argue that a dootrine is true simply bocause we cannot 
1-See W. T. GtacooThe Problem of Unreasoned beliefs (Mind, Jan. 1945) 
. for an Interesting discussion of this question. 
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avoid assuming that it is truo, but again the onus is on the 
doterminint to show how a false belief like this could become 
an integral part of our daily conduct. 
(o). It could be said that we are arguing the wrong way 
round if we dismiss the whole notion of obligation because it 
implies the false belief that we have froewill. Would it not be mom 
reasonable to argue that the fact of duty is itself the strongest 
argument for freewill? Cortainly'our awarenese, of being free agents 
is always most acute When we are faced with a difficult conflict 
betvoon a moral obItgation and a desire, Though 'we may be inclinodo 
when observing the actions of others, to stress deterministic 
influences, we fool most uneasy about placing the blame for our 
own moral failures on, say, our heredity or our early environment. 
And tho moro sensitive we are to moral values tho loss inclined 
we are to excuse our failings by arguing'that we liave no freoiill. 
kd)Usually the determinist point of view goes hand in 
hand with a naturaliatic interpretation of the universe in general. 
Just as it is thought that the idea of duty does not make sense 
in a naturalistic world so It is thought that thero is no room for 
freowill in such a world. 
I But if we adopt the modern view of the significance 
of the scientifio kind of oxplanation then it is doubtful whothor 
'we can argue that scientific theories as to the nature of the 
1. It is soTretimos said that we can adopt moral attitudes of 
praise and blame even thoughwo do not believe in froewill. We 
can use them as practical techniques for encouraging or 
discouraging social and anti-sooial"bohaviour respoetivoly. But 
it is often overlooked that those techniques could only be 
effective if the porsons to Vaom the; t were applied really did 
accept responsibility for their actions. 1f no one believed in freewill they would lose their power to influence action. 
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universe have any relevance one way or the other to the froowill 
problem. It is only if we take what we think of as the IgthC. 
attitudo to the task of science, viz., that the task of science. is 
to discover the laws of nature by which ever., thing can be explained., 
that we seem to treapass on the ground covered by the 
philosophic problem of freewill. And it is interesting to note 
in this connection that such a vlow of science is, really a by- 
product of religious faith. Originally the scientist thought of 
his job as one of discovering the laws by which God governed 
the univorseand his faith in the possibility of diccovering 
those laws was part of his general religioUs faith. Later the 
scientist tended to shed his religious belief but continued to 
maintain hit belief in the, idea of nature operating according 
to fixed laws. Parallol to this development was the development in 
the way in which the freewill problem van troated. At first it had 
been essentially a religious problem -how to reconcile man's 
froodom with tho existenco of an omnipotent, omniscient God; lator 
the problem beoame one of rooonoiling tho idea of man0s froodom 
with the existence of a universe conceived in terms of mechanical 
models. It was not until this century that the naive philOGOPhY 
implied in loth. C. science was adequately criticised by the 
scientists themselves, though of course the difficulties inherent 
in such a view had been dealt with by philosophers long bofore. 
The above points seem to me to be of Sufficient voight 
at least to dispel the notion that the concept of moral obligation 
can be easily explained away by attacking the doctrine of freewill. 
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I now wish to deal with the view that the notion of 
duty implies of nocossity the idea that there are objective 
moral standards and therefore must "wither away" if it can be 
shown-that in fact thero are no objective moral standards. 
Certainly, th, ý common sense attitude to the question of 
moral obligation does seem to involve the assumption that there 
are objective criteria by 'which to judge of the rightness or 
wrongneS's of any particular action. Whon we ilay that we can only 
have a duty to do what is right we do not mean by "right" that 
which 'we happon, as a matter of porsonal, taste, to approve of. Wo 
moan that we ought to do that which is "really" right, that which 
is right whether we hap"n to approve of it or not. And this common 
sense view would seem to reveal itself most clearly in the efforts 
we make to persuade others that this or that moral principle is 
valid or that this or that action is right. The fact that, wo argue 
with others about moral questions and are concerned with the 
problem of getting agreement as to tho fundamental prinoiplos of 
morality -this in an indication not merely that we regard it as 
of practical importance to eatablish unanimity, but also that we 
find it difficult if not impossible to tolerate the thought that 
contradictory opinions an to what is right can both be true. 
It is thorefore a mattor of donsidorablo importanoe to 
oatablish whether this common sense assumption is justified or 
not. 
7. Before we disouss this matterthowevor, it will be 
nicessary to deal with one preliminary criticism. It might bo said 
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that our interpretation of the common sense position is only 
valid in so far as *we are thinking in terms of unsophisticated 
common sonso. Among the better educated ordinary men and women 
there is, on the contrary, a widespread 'belief that moral judgments 
are purely relativo; that what we believe to bo morally right is 
la; ply dependent on the way we have boon brought up and the 
environmental circumstances in which we are placed. 
In answer to this criticism wo need not dony that 
the ordinary man's point of view has been affected considorablY 
by the discoveries of anthropologists and others as to the wide 
variations in moral standards that exist botween one community 
and another. Wo can admitmoreoverthat the evidence of these 
differences is often used as an argument for the 'view that there 
are no objective standards of morality. Nevortheleas it is by no 
means clear that fundamentally the common sense assumption 
of objectivity has been modifled What the more sophisticated 
ordinary man might hold an a matter of theorotical dootrino is 
one thing; vhat as a matter of faot he tends to assume in his 
actual conduct is another. On tho whole tho assumptions implied 
in a man's conduct are a more reliable guide to his actual boliefs 
than what he propounds as an amateur philosopher. 
In this connection we can make theno fow points. First, 
it is necessary to make tho obvious distinction between an 
actionts being right, and its being thought to be right. Tho 
knowledge that the moral judgments of other pooples varJes 
from our own may make us less conf idont in asserting that Our 
Jud'gments are true, but we may still believe novertholoss that 
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where there are oonflicting opinions as to what is right, they 
cannot all be true. Eithor one of them is truo, or none. 
Beoond, though ve may reooncilo ourselve's quite easily 
to differences of opinion about moral questions whiohwe do not 
regard an fundamentalNve find it difficult to accept the fact that 
differences on fundamental, or what we regard as fundamental 
moral questions are simply a matter of personal taste. Thus it may 
not worry us very much to know that some people practise T)olygamyp 
and we may even be prepared to excuse actions which "shook"us 
(e. g. cannibalistic practices) if it is clear that some understan- 
dable motive such as economic necessity forced the natives into 
such praotices, but if we find that a person does not accept SOMO 
moral principle which wo think of us fundamental then our 
benevolent neutrality drops away. Tho Englishman who believes 
with great conviction that it is vrong to inflict gain on animals 
for one's own pleasure is not likely to say that the Spaniard 
who loves his bull fighting is equally entitled to hold that 
it ia morally justifiable to inflict pain on animals for pleasure. 
110 will say that the Spaniard is wrong, that his moral judgment 
has been corrupted by social traditions etc, 
Third, tho ordinary manif presood to defend his view 
that there are objective standards, would probably reply that 
this objectivity is only apparent when we consider the views 
of those persons who have reflected carefully on the moral 15r; Pnoi-plos 
they have been taught an children. Such porsons are able to dig 
down beneath the surface of rerely conventional morality to the 
moral intuitions which provide the true foundation of all moral 
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conduct. The views of those who accept as a matter of course the 
morality of the society in which they are roared are really of no 
importance from the point of view of the question being discussed 
here. The problem can only be dealt with offoctivoly if we confine 
our attention to those who have attempted to subject conventional 
morality to reasoned oriticism. And the common sense faith is 
that at this reflective level the truly objective moral principles 
emerge very, olearly. 
8. ý Granted this common sense assumption, thon, the question 
immediateiy arises as to what we mean by "objective" in this 
context. 
The simplest answer to this question is that we mean 
that in any given situation thoro is a certain course of action 
Vnich is the right aotion. Wo may not know what it is, but at 
least we know that actions based on contradictory propositions 
as to what is right cannot both be true. 14oreover if the same 
situation were repeated then the action which was right the 
first time would of nocossity be right tho second tima. 
This is an important statomont in so far as it strOBBOD 
the point that when the ordinary man says that something is 
morally. rilfat or wrong he is not merely evincing his feelingslor 
stating a porsonal preference for one kind of action rather than 
another; he is intending to make a moral judgment, a statement 
'Which can be true or false -ho intends to say something about 
a certain kind of fact. Tho trouble with the above statement of 
the position from our point of view isghowovor, that it is too 
formal. It does not give any content to the idea of objectivity. 
Vrhat. for instanoo, do we moan by "truo" when we say that molral 
judgmonts can be either true or falso. 
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Three posstble answers 8uggost themselves. Either ve, can 
say that it is God who establishes the 'objective standards; ort 
secondly, that the fundamental principles of Troralityare 
objective because they are based on reason; or, thirdlyt tilat when 
we refer to objective moral standards we moan simply that thoro is 
agreement among all normal men regarding the fundamental prinoiplOa 
of morals*. Wo shall deal with each of those in turn. 
9. 'We have already mentioned some of the diffioultieS that 
arise when we tr: y to mako morality dependant on the supposition 
Of 'the Oxistonce of a certain kind of God. 1lero we shall summariso 
briefly the arguments which can be brought fo-rward against the 
I idea that the torm #Objeotivity" when uood in morals onlY nas 
meaning within a theological context -that it ic only by reference 
to God that wo can establiah an objective atandard. 
(i)Thore is first of all the praotioal point that tho 
introduotion ar theological prosuppoqitione involvos U3 in 
di3putoo or an even more oontroveralil and difficult nature than 
those whioh aro involved in the moral argument. 1f, thoreforol 
it is possible to give a satisfactory interpretation ofwhat'wO 
mean by lobjootive moral standards" without introduoing theological 
questions it would obviously be wiser to do so. 
(ii)Seoondly, to : 3ay that all moral standards derive 
from'God prosupposes the prior intuition that wo ought to obey 
whatewor God oommands. We oannot, howover, dorivo this obligation 
from the faot of God without begging the quostion. Evon iflas a 
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matter of faot, our knowledge of what is right and wrong had come 
to us by means of como divine revelation vhioh ve had accepted as 
authentio, it would utill not be true to say t1lat tiiese standards 
were acoepted as morally binding booauue of their divine origin. 
Unless they seemed to us to be trite per so we oould not regard 
them as morally binding. though we might feel bound to submit to 
them for prudential reasons. 
, ýiii) It is pirhaps making the above Point in another 
way to say that one of the criteria we use in deciding between the 
claims of rival Gods is the criterion of moral worth. Thus we are 
inclined to think that a more plausible case can be made out for 
the existence of the Chri3tian God because of the suporior etýiO 
assooiated with the Christian rovolation. It in not sugýgested that 
this is a good reason for 
a God, but the above point 
boliovers,, when discussing 
standards, ore inclined to 
ono. If you once accept th 
everything else follows. 
accepting the idea of the existence of 
is worth raking if only because rolielous 
the question of d1bJeotive moral 
ouppose that tAn problem is a. very simplo 
9 proposition that God exiats, then 
we grant that it is God who is the source of 
all moral atandards then it seems logical to suppose that he has 
made man in such a way that man can know what those standards are, 
and judge his actions aocordingly. rhus we might argue that man's 
conscience or moral sense intuits the will of God in these 
mattere. But if this is so then, for practical purposas, we do not 
need to bring God into it at all in our discussion of the meaning 
of objectivity. We Gan say that wh9n we talk Of objeotive moral 
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standards we moan simply that they are standards common to all men. 
Even if we introduco the complicating factor of "original sin", and 
hence argue that inanfr. moral oonse hau been corrupted)wo could 
still hold that manpotentially. is oapable of knowing what is 
rilErat; that indood even tho most unregoneraie of men can be brought 
into some agreement about moral questions if, by some nwans or I 
other, they are able to rid themselves, if only tompararily, of the 
distorting (Iffoots of self-interost, prejudioo oto. Dut this view 
of'tho mattpr does not differ significantly from the view taken' 
I 
bY the non-religious person who argues that all men would agree 
on moral questions if thore was agreemont about the facto and 
if 
it was po3siblo for them to consider the situation dispascionately 
without ai'lowine self-intorest to influenco them. 
10. We ahall now dimuss the view that when 'we talk of moral 
Judgments as being objective we mean that they are based On reason, 
and not on feelings vhich may vary from indivtdual to individual. 
If this interpretation is correct then we could say confidently 
that all rational beings have fundamentally the same moral 
standards, and we would not require to confirm this by empirical 
observation. This is, no, doubt, tho point stressed by Huno whonlin 
a letter to Hutohoson. he writest *1 wish from my heart I could 
avoid concluding that aince morality, aooording to your opinion 
as well as mino, is determined merely by pentimonttit rogards only 
human nature and human life ----if morality wore determined by 
reason that is the samo to all rational beingsibut nothing but 
Oxperience can assure us that the sentiments are the same. 1. 
I-Quoted, D. D. Ra,. DhaeloOP-0it. tP. 36- 
246. 
This interpretation can be critioisod on the following 
grounds: 
(i)Ftrat, this is one of tho oooasions on whioh tho 
critiod, of faculty psychology would be justified in arguing 
that it doos not really solve anything to say that moral judgments 
are founded on reason since everything turns on the definition 
we give to, reason. Obviously it would be easy enough to defino 
reason in such a way that it would then become platitudinoun to 
say that it is reason which discerns moral distinctions. 
(ii)Pollowing on from vhat has juat boon saidgit is 
important to note that in any oase9whatover tho definitionwo 
give of the term "reason", it iE3 futilo. to look for the same 
kind of necessity in moral judgments that TO find in mathematical 
judgments. In the etatoment from Hume quoted aboVOPHumO QeOmB to 
imply that if morality were founded on reason then moral 
intuitions, 
would have the samo kind of certainty as we find in mathematical 
judgmonto -all normal rational beings would. immediatoly recognino 
their truth. But of course mathematical judgments are analytic 
only. They are true by virtue of logical laws and in themSolVOG 
do not tell us anything about the world though they may happen 
to be applicable to the world of exporionce. Moral judgments on 
tho other hand aro synthetio. We may disagree about their importq 
but it can scarcely be denied that the,. statement "it is wrong 
to hang war criminals* is difforent in kind from the statemont. 
"two and two equala four". If, then, -wo are to hold that moral 
judgments are neooseary their necessity must be of another kind 
from that which we f Ind in mathematical judgment3. It IS Self- 
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obntraclictory to sav that two and two Iooa not equal four because 
it follows from our definition of those terms that two and two 
mUst equal four. But It is not celf-contradictory to say that 
cruolty is right or that it io wrong to keep promises. No logical 
law is broken if we make these asoortions. We cannot therefore 
argue that moral judgments are basod on reason because they can 
be showh to, be logically necessary.. 
(iii) We could assert that all moral judgments are 
ultimately dependent on a few basic moral intuttionswhioh are 
given by reason. No reason needs to be given in support of their 
truth since thoir truth is self-evident. 0noo those intuitions 
have been Presented to, uB in suoh, a way that their moaning is 
cloarwe givo'immodiate assent to them. 
This. of ooursois really only a statement of 
faith; the empirical evidenoowould neemoprima faoieýto be aGainst 
it. Wo might say that it is a necessary prosupposition of all our 
thinking about moral matters that there diould be agreement on 
I 
certain fundamental axiome, but this in itself would not prove that 
ýhero to in fact such agrooment. 1 think it is truo that, as a 
matter of psychological faot, we cannot but think that there are 
objective standards of morals, and this is clearly sliown0as we 
have m6ntioned befor*sby the fact that when vO are sure that 
something io morally right we cannot conceive of the opposite 
being right. We can logically think the opposite to be true, and 
am assuming here that an analytic proposition is one rhiCh 
io true or false in virtue of logical laws only, If any other 
proposition claims to be necessary then its nocessity zust 
be other than logical, 
The enormous practical achievements of mathomatics 
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ve can of courao conceive that another Person should think the 
OPPosito to be truo, but we cannot, psychologioally, conceive 
Of the opposite 'being true. If we think that cruelty is wrong 
we cannot psychologically imagine how in any sense at all it 
could ever 'be right. But to say this doos not really help our 
enquiries. It is an important psychological fact about man 
that he finds it necessary or seems to find it necessary to 
make this presupposition but we cannot infer from this that 
moral Judgments are based on reason. 
I 
(iv). A point to note vhich is often overlooked is this: 
if we suppose that it is reason which judOOS of right and wrong 
then we cannot assume that this kind of reason is necessarily 
the same for all rational beings(unlene of oourae we bog the 
question by dofining a rational boing an ono who POSSOBS05 this 
kind of reason). Ili the quota. tton from Humo's lotter given above, 
it is olear that Hume is giving a vory restricted dofinition to 
reason. 11e to thinking of It as the faculty which in employod in 
demonstrative reaconing, the oporative principle of which is the 
law of non-oontradiotion. Thiu 'being so he fools safe in assuming 
that the Judgments of reason are common to all rational creatures. 
But if 'we widen the scope of reason to include judgvontO Of 
right and wrong then it is by no means so obvious that those 
judV, ents will nooes3arily be the same for all rational beings. 
have tended to make us overrate the Importance of logical necoscitY per co. But of course propositions of tho roDt trivial and even nonsensical nature can make a olai-, -n to logical neoeosity. 11hat iS important is not the logical noconsity of any proposition in itSOlf but rather the faot that wi feel undor a nooessity to accept as true what can be shovii to follow logically from promises acooptod as true. I 
q4g. " 
In so far as thay are synthetic Judgments then the possibilýty 
is always there that the intuition of one rational being will 
differ from that of another. 
(5). Fitially. it is by no means obvious that common sense 
accepts tho view that moral judgments are based on roason. It is 
true that ve often seem to imply that they are. To say that a 
certain moral principle is self-evident, or that a parson is 
"lacking in reason" if ho cannot See that some 
. 
fundamental moral 
principle is true, But the term Oroason* is used very loosely 
hore -often as a aynonyn, for conscience or moral BenGO -and if the 
ordinary man vero quostioned about this he would probablY prefer 
the latter ter. va. His preference would be due to the fact that he 
assooiates reason moro with tho intelleotual activities of man, 
, whereas he thinks of moral judgments as always involving some 
emotion. Toloreover, we are acoustomed to think that a ran may be 
rational in the sense of "being able to reason correctly"tand yet 
insane, in the sense of "being warped in his moral judments". 
I. Moral philosophers have boon anxious to show that moral distinc- 
tions are based on reason so that they could prove the objectivity 
of moral standards. If. however, wo sot aside this influencing 
factor and examine the problem on its own meritalthon it does 
SOom that this in a case in which the usual faculty divisions 
break down. Wo cannot easily make out a case either for reasonj 
or a moral sonsevor for feelings in goneral. -taken by themselves that is., 
Perhaps all we can say to that when we make a moral 
Judgment, "the Vaolo man" seems to bo "behind" the judgment. 
The approval which we giveý, *or which we oxparionco in the presence 
of a right action is an expression of our whole being. 
o. 
It in to be noted here that even if we do not regard 
moral judgments as being based on reason it miglit still be -possible, 
to hold that moral judgments are objective in the sense of being 
common to all men. We, could hold. for inatanoo, that all ren have 
a moral sense whichwhen uncorrupted p delivers Judgments which 
are true for all mon. Or we could say that moral judg-ments are 
ultimately basod on feelings which are common to all men. 
For the above reasons,, tlien., it Goems to me unsetil3faOtO"Y 
to discuds the objectivity of moral judgments in terms of the 
I 
question whethe .r reason to the source of moral distinctione. 
This 
jr, not to say, -aowaver, that reasonteven wj'10n interproted 
in thO 
atrictect sonseldoes not influence us in our judgmonts of right 
wrong. It is clear'enough that it dose so indirectlY in so 
far as 
it determines questions of fact and definition; 'but 
I 11OPe to 
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show later that it exerts a more direct Influence by forcing us 
to confcm or to trj to conform to tho principlO of oonsistenoy 
in all our moral judgments. 
We now oome to the third possible intorprotation of 
tile 00--a-mon, sense b,,, ltef in the objootivity of moral juagmontolviz. 
that all morality is ultimately based on certain moral intuitions 
-whether given by reason or a moral sonse 13 immaterial - which 
are Common to all men. The truth of these intuitions is self- 
evident, *and the truth of all particular moral judgments(i. e. aD 
to what so and so should do in Dituationt X) is to be ju4ged 
bY their oonformity to these ba81C moral truths. 
Thin is the interpretation whioh'gives us, I think, 
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the oentral oore of the common sense reaning of the expression, 
11 
"objectivo moral ntandards', Tho point 'we must now disouss is 
whether it in true. 
(i)Tho first point to note is that it is obviously not 
true in th--3 form in whioh it in stated above. It is a mattor of 
oommon observation that men differ greatly in their moral 
Judgmonts,, and in the principl6s whioh they hold to be fundamental 
in the, moral field. The comr. on sense view must be taken then to 
mean that all men would agree about moral quootio no 
I 
if all disagree 
-ments about non-moral factors were first resolvnd. 
kii)When we say that differenoes on moral questions 
aro roally caused by differenoe3 about tho factspthin roally 
covor3 a much wider f iold than ve usually think of whon wo talk 
about tho facts. Thus, to take a ooncrete example-SuPPOSO the 
1.1n this connection wo should ", rhRps note the futility of those 
discussions botween rationalists and non-rationalists an 1.0 
, whether disputes about morals are rially concernod-with moral 
questions properly so-callod, or about ompirioal facts. 7hO 
rationalist thought that if he could nhow that we really do 
dispute about moral questions and give proofs and inferences 
about our opinions then this viould prove that morality is 
founded on reason, 'Bat, of cource, the fact, if it is a faot, th&t 
we dispute about moral quostions does not in. itsolf prove 
anything about the source of moral judSmontaIndood, tho more it 
could be shown thatwe really do dispute about moral intuitions 
the more it would tend to prove that moral judaments must 
be based on feelings whioli differ from individual to individual. 
'go arguo enough about questions of taDtobut we do not got very 
far because there are no itindamental prinoiplen on which we are 
all agreed. 
On the other hand whon the non-rationalist says that 
the diGputes are only-about the facts, and that there is no 
disputing about moral queationspor no, he tends to think that 
he is thereby placing moral Judgments in a special category 
quite distinct fromtuaygo0iontifio Judgmonts. We cannot argue 
about morals bocauuo vitu just a question of taste", but N7o can 
argue about empirical or log'ical Judgments bocauso theso are 
( 
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argument is about the way we should treat negroes. we firnt of 
all c6noorn ourselvos 'with the "factual" questions. But these may 
include any one of tho following constdorations: 
(i)Are negroas reallY inferior in intelligonOO? It 13 
quest ions of this kind that Nve usually think of when we talk about 
factual disputos. 
(U),, ),, uoations of definition.. 'ciat do we moan by 
"equality 
of man"? ) 
(iii)Probloms of implication: lf negroes have qualities 
x, y, z, and we desire to troat them in 'suoh and suoh a way, 
how are we to go about it? Wllat aro the implioations so far asocayg 
our educational policy is conoornad? 
kiv). Quostions of authority**Iu tho Popo really infallible 
when he speaks ox cathodra on morals and faith? 
Quettionn of this kind are of groat importanco)for 
"infallible authorities" are ono of tho chief O&uoes of differmns 
in moral beliefc., 11on will ofton aot against their own natural 
moral faelings simply bocauso they acoopt the ruling of SOMID 
authority. 
kv)Paychologioal tluontions: Are 'we being influonoo'd only 
by solf-interest? Do vie believe this beoauso we really tilink it 
in truo, or have we boon just conditioned into thinking it to be 
truo? Is so and so normali or insane? 
based on reason. what those critics tond. to 'iorget is thal !F 
scientific mattora too we) ultimately como up against propositions 
about which we c4nnot argue -thoso may bo-about certain sensory 
Perceptions, or about fun, lamontal criteria. Tho fact is that in 
any field at all we can only discuss profitably within the 
context of some framework adoqpted 'by all. Wo may accept the basic 
propo3itions, aa we say, for tho purpoaos of the discusuion, or it 
may just happen to be the case that we all do, in accept them as true. 
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In any given case thon, in which we f ind that thero to 
disagrooment about rhat ought to be dono tho diffioultios In 
the way of discovering vhý-ther the disagreemont is really a non- 
moral. one would soiým to be immense. Voreovor, thoro would appoar 
to be ondloss noopo for introducing quostion-lbegging arguments. 
Thus we oould vory easily beg the quostion whonovor we deoide 
to dismiss comeone as abnormal or insane merely because he does 
not appre'Oiate a moral claim which is obvious to the majority. 
And thioleada mo to, the next point. 
(iii) Since the belief in the objectivity of moral 
standards is a pronupposition which we find It POYO110109ilOally, 
difficult to avoid making, we will tend to accept it as true "no 
matter what". Even though the qvidenoo in piled up against the 
belief wo shall always find come loophole to enable us to maintain 
it. And without doubt we aro aided in this by the faot, just montionnod, 
that in any given oaso it would be impossible to provo that 
differences in moral Judgments did. not have their source in non- 
moral faotors. How can we know for certain viiether anyono is really 
being motivatod by self-interest vhen he accepts some doctrine 
'which wo find morally repulsive? Ilow do we draw. the lino botwoen 
moral lbeliefs whiah we have 'beenloonditioned" to accopt and those 
which we have carofullY tiiought out for ourselves? And so on. 
It is not thoroforo possiblo to prove beyond roasonable 
doubt that this presupposition is false; tjjq most wo could hope to 
do is to show that thero is considerable evidenco to suggeSt th&t 
it in false. And the beat mray to do this would be to take the 
qfA. 
objectivist# n case where it would appear to 'be atrongest and 
try to show that even here there are '6asio differences which 
cannot easily be explained away as boing differences over non- 
moral issuee. Thue ve might try to chow that even among men of 
similar cocial, badground and of roughly Oqual intelligonco there 
appoar to be fundamental difforoncos in moral Intuitions. 
Thin vo will now try to do. 
1101. Among educated p9ople brought up in western European 
traditions thore aro, of course, many differenoos of view on moral 
question6pbut two moral problems seem to ine to be particularly 
significant from the potnt of view of the genoral question being 
discussed hero. Pirst, the problem of our attitude to anirals; 
and nooondlyltho problem of our attitude to the dootrino that 
all men are of equal importanco. 1ge oannot, of courseldiDOUSS thOSO 
Problems per 30, but it doas'snem, to me to be apparent that men 
V ay agroo on vany other moral inaues may yet differ radically who m 
on these. 
The Englishman who oaren for his horses and dogs with 
almoat as much zoal as he oaros for his children is morally 
shookod at the attitude, say, of a cultured Spaniard to animale. 
And Within onn aooial group thoro may be almost as great 
difforences of view about tho ir-portanco of animals. 0no man 
is definite onough about tho neco3nity for the humane troatment 
of animals but novortholoss is cluito clocr in Ilia own m, Ind that thoy 
are inferior boin,:; B whom WID Call 1180tif wO wishp ontiroly for 
2 IV; 5. 
our own cdnvenionoo; anothor person feels that our obligations to 
animals extond beyond the attempt to prevent thoir suffering 
unneceasary pain. 
I What cauces persona -o4en within the sar. o family group - 
to take up very differing moral positions in respect to behaviour 
to animals? Religion 1: 5 nometimes an important factor -tho Catholic 
is taught that man is lord ovor all tho beasts -and obviouslY 
s6cial tradt. tions also play a part. But jenen we have allowod for 
al"I this we still sesm to be left with thID faOt that aomo POOP111 
feel a sense of obligation to animals which othersowho have had 
an almost identioal sooial and roligious trainingodo not feels 
The same sort of thing oan bo said about tho obligation 
to troat men as of equal Importanoo. In the Went, we havo been 
taught to pay ilp servico to the dectrino of tilo )qualtty of ran, 
and moot of us would theoretically assent to this fundamental 
tenet of domooracy. But among thoso who have reflected moSt 
careful-ly on this doctrine we find sharp differoncon of opinion. 
Some think that the doctrifio can only be given moaning within a 
theological context, and that there is no clear intuition to thO 
Offect that all men are equal. Indend, they oaygif ono regards theý 
matter di3pas3ionatoly without bonofit of theological rreDUPPOS- 
ition thon it aoem3 evident that there to almost an much difference 
bot-ween, say, a Shakoupeare or a Nowton on tho one hand and 
a moron or wompty -hoadel" young pleaeuro 3f3oknr on tho other, as 
there is betwnnn the poorest typos of men and the most intelligOnt 
1356. 
of animals. Indeed one may find a greater community of fooling 
with an animal than one does with certain kinds of human being. 
Again, it 13 argued, one can find no criteria -outside of a 
theological dontext -which will give us a clear-out distinction 
between man and the animals. 
The conclusion then is that we have no prima facie 
obligation to treat all men as of equal worthtor as being equally 
entitled to all the benefits which society may providetthough 
of course we may find it politically useful to talk -or even to 
act - as though all men are equal. 
As against this approach we find others who claim that 
they have a clear moral intuition that all mon ought to be 
treated as of equal worth. It is, thoy say, an intuition for which 
no reason can be given since it is one of the fundamental 
moral intuitions from which moral intuitiona of a more concrete 
nature are derived. 
13. Hore then we soom'to find two exanples of fundamental 
moral difforoncespand no doubt others could be adduced. For instance, 
we do seem to disagree about the relative moral worth of the 
various intrinsic" goods". Some think that satisfactorr personal 
relations is the chief good tOWhioh all others ought to be c, 
8ubordinato; others again thinkwo ought to pursue beauty or 
knowledge first; others again think our ohLef aim ought to be 
the achievement of oommunion with God. And of course it follo'98 
that our actions -what we think is the right thing to do- will 
be influenced by these value judgments, 
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If what we have just boon saying is true we should 
then have to conclude that the common sense presupposition of 
objective standards in morals is not based on the faots. And in 
so far-as this presupposition sooms to be an integral part of the 
common sense notion of duty then it would follow that we should 
have to suspect the idea of duty itsolf. Certainly we should have 
to reconsider the whole question of moral teaching and moral 
persuasio'n, our pedagogic practice hitherto having boon based on 
the assuýpiion that men can be brought to agreement on the 
fundamental moral axioms. 
1. In faot, a belief that moral standards are subjective would not 
make quite as much practical difference as might be supposed. 
In the first place it would still be of groat practical importame- 
to obtain agreement on moral questions, so that we would be , concerned to find any moans which would help us achieve this 
agreement. 
Booondly, though it is often said that we cannot argue 
about matters of taste the fact is that we do. For Instance we 
try io improve a person's musical taste by placing him in 
situations vinero he will hear classical music at its most 
tuneful and appealing lovol. Wo only givo up tho task wl,. en we 
are convinced that he has some structural defoct(e. g. is tone don; 
)) 
or Is just being stubborn and prejudiced, * 
Thirdly, even if a person cannot coo that he ought to do 
something we can often persuade him that it. is nevortholeDD in 
his intorosts to do it. 
Fourthly, wo can make sure that all the non-moral causes 
of dWoronoos are cleared up. 
The main differences between the oubjootiVist's 
approach and the objectivist's would 'be: 
Pirst, that the former would only concern himSelf 
with those moral differences which he thought it was of 
immediate practical importance to resolvowheroas the latter 
would be concerned to show that none of the apparent differences 
in moral judgmontswero really due to basic differences in moral 
intuitions. 
Second, the subjectivist would be more inclined to 
apneal to self-interest as a motive for doing the right thing. 
Moreover -if he were consistent-he would find it difficult to 
use the weapons of praise. and blame with any real conviction. 
¶8. 
It is possible that we might be able to got round 
this criticism by showing that though common sense is wrong in 
supposing that moral standards are objeotlvo, novortheles8 there 
is still a sense in which we can say that we can have a moral 
obligation to do what is right - right, that is9by our own 
personal standards. But this partioular defence is likely to 
lead 
us into so many difficulties that it would be wise to avoid 
using it iý we can possibly avoid doing so. FortunatelY there 
is 
another way of meeting the attacks of thO subJOctiviOtO 
that iSj 
I think, more satisfactory, and thisVO shall consider now. 
14. There is no doubt. I think, that the content of our 
moral codes -the rules by which we try to dotermine what 
TO Ought 
I to do in any given situation - is very much determined 
by subjective 
, 
factors, i. e. by factors which vary from individual t. o 
individual 
and from-sooiety to sootety. And this is shown by tlis faot that 
it 
is oxtremely difficult to think of any'one-moral principle that 
is, in fact., accepted as binding by all men. 
Even the, defenco which isýofteri used by objectivistst 
viz that the differences are due to social conditioninggis in itseli 
an admission that moral codes have their source in factors Which 
soom to be extremely vulnorable and insecure. Indeedgfrom a 
practical point of viow, it would often 'be very difficultgif not 
impossiblo to say vhat was a "natural* intuitiontand vhat was 
1-Of 0ourseleven for an ObJOCtivist, it would still be true to say 
that our actual obligation is always to do what w .e 
think to 
be right. "we cannot have an ob"Ligation to do what is tight unless 
'we are able to appreciate that it is right. But this is a 
different point from the . one made above, 
r 
a "conditioned intuition"-, 
But though this much muot be granted to the supnorters 
of the subjective view, this doeo not necessarily mean that we must 
give up completely the idea of objectivity in moral standards. 
In the first place ve can safely assume, I think, that the 
experience of, "being under an obligation" is common to all men. 
Even if we try to explain away the oxperionoo as boing in come 
I 
sense illusory we at least know what people are talking about 
'when they use words like 0 duty" and"moral obligation". Wo should 
regard' a', person as abnormal in a fundamental sense i: C he had never 
exporienced the fooling of boing under an obligation. 
Socondly, even if we aro sceptioal about the whole oonoept 
of duty it is almost impossible for us to avoid assuming that 
, 
there is at least some principle which we ought to accept as 
bindin g. Thus, as we have pointed out abovo, thoso 'who oritioisO 
the idea of objectivity in morals on the ground that this 
presupposition is not in accordanco with tho facts take it for 
granted that when this truth is pointed out those who support the 
objective view will feel bound to give it up. Similarlyowhon 
Mr. Ayer states: "Given that a man has certain moral principles, lwo 
argue that he must, in order to be consiatont, roact morallY to 
certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot argue 
about is the validity of these moral principles. We merely praise 
1 
or oondemn them in the light of our own feelings" -he is assuming 
that all normal human beings will at least feel under an obligation 
to be oonsistent. Tho fact is that ordinary social life -all 
l. LanguagogTruth and Logic(Ist. Ed. )P. 167. 
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intellectual discussion for that mattor -deponds on the acceptance 
of obligations of som. q kind or other by those taking part in the 
life of the society. And this leads Ee to the noxt point. 
Whereas mo3t of our obligationstan Hume says, '"follow 
the common and natural course of our passions" -i. e. have their 
1. 
roots in some particular feeling -and are therefore liable to 
vary from individual to individualtthere are two obligations 
which seeri to be bound up with the faculty of. roason rather 
than 
'with any particular emotion, and which therefore we may assume 
to 
be common to all rational beings. These are the obligation 
to 
conform to the faots'and the obligation to conform to the principle 
of oonsistenoy. All men capable of reauoningive may assumalwill 
sometimes feel the binding force of these two principles. 
This 
aspoot of the matter we shall consider in the next ohapter9whoro 
we shall try to show that the principle of consistency is the 
more fundamental of the two. Here our task is to consider briefly 
the relevance of these two principles to the general quostion of 
objectivity in morals. At first glance it would coem as if the 
acceptance of these two apparently formal principles would not 
take us very far. How could we deduce the content of any objective 
moral code from them? But we oanvI think, demonstrate that these 
0. principles -and particularly the prihaiplo of oonsistencY -can 
bo 
employed in suoh a way that it becomes possible to iron oUt 
many of the individual differences in moral beliefs. 
1, I am not suggesting hero that we can define our moral obligations 
in terms of those foolings. The point being made is simply that 
the experiencing of certain feelings is often necessary before 
'we can know what is our duty. 
(31. 
15. In tho field of scientifio enquiry we are accustomed 
to the idea that sensory observations require to be checked by 
certain objective tests -i. e. tests, or rules accepted as valid by 
al eienti3to. And even on the common sense level we use certain 
criteria for determining a genuine sensory observation from 
one which we suapeat to be illubory. Thus we chook om sense 
against anothor -in particular wo use the more reliable sense of 
touch to test tho observations made by tho more unreliable sense 
of vision. Now the point I wish to make hero is that we can use 
the two principles listed above to check on the validity of 
those moral principles which we take for grantodoor of those moral 
intuitionowhich we experience in particular situations. just as 
our senses tend to lead us astray in the field of scioncefSO I 
0. ur foolings, sentiments etc. are liablo to lead us astray in thO 
field of morals. '; Ie find it difficult to distingulDh 'between 
quasi-moral feelings and genuine feelings of obligation; ve are 
often unable to tell whether we really think a certain moral 
prinoiple is right or whether we have been oonditioned to think it 
right -and so on. 
Now in the task of applying somo kind of objective 
test ki. e. a test accopted by alL mon)tlie principle of consiotenoy 
a, 
plays a key role. Tho principle of conformity to the facts is 
important in so far 4s it forces us to try to make sure that 
we have a relevant knowledge of the facts before oomihg to a 
moral decision -and in many oases this is the key to differences 
1 
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in moral valuation -*but it cannot 'help us if we are finally faced 
with an actual difference in moral intuitions. It is atthis 
point that the prinoiple of consistency makeD its major contribution. 
And in the following ways: 
(1). It may be pointed out that a oortain situation B 
is exactly the same as situation. A in which we consider it right 
to adopt a certain course of action. Wo are thus forced to give 
up the principle or else apply it in this now situation. Ofteng 
for instanoo, we would be very upset if someone else employed 
tactics against us which vo think it right to employ against 
othors. Tho merchant who 'believes in free, competition considers 
it rigat to withhold goods from-the market If they are in short 
supply so that the price will rise. But ho does not always realise, 
that, according to the same prinoiplo. tho worker is entitled to 
withhold his, labour(i. o. go on strike) if his labour is in groat 
demand. 
(2)Somotir. on we aooopt a prinoi'ple aa absolutelY 
binding in all circumstances and then we are forced to admit 
that there are certain circumstances in wl, joh we would think it 
right to violate this prinoiple. Thus a Catholic may say that his 
objeotion. to euthanasia is based on the absolute oommardthat we 
must never take human life. When it is pointed out that his Church 
nevertheless supports war under oertain ciroumstancos he is 
forced to modify his statement of the principle. 
1. Thus supporters of racial theories (e. g. Iiitler and Dr. L&alan) 
are not prepared to state that their views are based on a direct 
intuition. Tiley try to support them with documentary evidence of 
a Suppooedly scientific kind. In doing so they expose themselves 
to damaging oriticiSm. However, they can usually evade critiolUm 
by applying their own special orttoria for dotermining-vIiat c1re- 
-tý%P- -ýaLTCS - 
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(3). In some oases we are not aware that some prinoiple 
of action which wo accopt an binding is. in-all essentials. similar 
to another prinoiple whioh we think to 'be wrong. Thus the 
principle which the United. States has rocently put forward that 
prisoners of war should not be foroibly repatriated would seem, 
prima faoie, to bo similar in many rOsPectB to tho oldor prinoiple, 
now no longer acoopted, that a ran should not be forcibly consotipteCL 
into the aýrmy.. 
(4. )Whon we assert some very general prinaiple of 
ih0 morality to,, be' true -e. g. that we should do unto others w atw 
'would-like them to do to us -we are not always aware of all 
its 
implicati, one. Whon we are confronted with some of t1lose, implioationS 
we are often placed in tho awkward-dilemma either of giving up the 
general n-rinoiple, or else of doing something which WO feel to be 
wrong in the particular-situation. Our obligation to try to act 
consistently forces us to try to resolve the difficulty. 
Using the prinoiple of oonsistency in the ways montioned 
above we can both introduce come kind of order into our own 
thinking on moral questions and at the same. time help to iron out 
differences between ourselves and othero. "7ery oftongfor instance, 
we discover that our differences are verbal only., as a result of 
employing this principle. A and B may appear to hold radically 
opposed moral principles of a goneral nature, but when each 
is forood to admit oertain implioations of these general prinoiples 
they realtse that. in faot. there is not really so muoh differonoo 
between them after all. 3imilarly, Vnen 'we oome up against what 
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seems to be a fundamental difference of opinion we can sometimes 
carry on the argument nevertheless by forcing our opponent to 
face up to some of the implications of his moral beliofs. We argue 
with him on his own ground,, as it were, hoping to drive him to 
conclusions which he finds unpalatable. 
it. In order for thin principle to be used effectively 
two conditions must be satisfied. It must be accepted that we 
have a prima facie obligation to oonform to the principle of 
oonsistenoy-pand, secondly, those using it, and thoso"on whom it in 
used" must be at the roflective level of moral conduct -that is, 
they must have given some thought to t1le question why they consider 
this or that action to be rightor'this or that principle to be 
morallY binding. 'It might be said however, that oven so the principle 
of consistency is too intellootual-a weapon to be effective on 
its own in bringing men to an acceptance of objective standardo 
of morality. Moral problems are too bound up with the emotionst 
With factors of self-interest and prido, for us to bo able to 
think cold-bloodedly about the moral principles which move us 
to aotion. This may be grantod, as a practical diffioultypthough 
it does not detract from the value of the principle of consistency 
in those cases in which it is possible to achieve some degree of 
wcalmnoss of thought*. But it may be noted, ac a partial answer to 
the criticiam, that this same prinaiplo oan often'bo apPlied 
dramatically so as to atrike at -the conscience of a porson as 
'Well ae at his roason -orgmore accurately, so as to arouso his 
moral emotions in support of the diotatoo of reason. Thus the 
motliod used by Nathan the prophet to drive home to David the 
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enormity of his sin was. in effect,, a dram. atic aDPlication of the 
principle of cons is tenoy. Whnre perhaps, the principle of consistency 
would be least effective is in respect to those implications -of 
general moral principles whose validity can be recognised not 
so much by' a process of intellectual r oasoning from those principles, 
but rather by a kind of intuition which stems from a finely 
developed sensitivity to the subtle nuances of personal relations. 
A person, may believe very strenuously in the Christian doctrine 
of love and, do everything possible to, follow through with all 
the rule-of-thumb implications of the doctrine. But if he is 
by nature lacking in good taste and tact then all the reasoning 
in tho-world will, not really help him to know and to practise 
the more subtle implications of his beliefs. 
We may conclude , then)by asserting that though common 
sense is ptrhaps rather optimistic in supposing that the fundamen- 
tal axioms of morality are common to all men, and does not fullY 
appreciate the many factors which contribute to such a wide 
variance in moral beliofs, yot there are good grounds for bolieving 
that at least the obligation of consistency is common to'all 
rational beings. And though this may apnoar to be rather a formal 
ptinaiple yet it can play an important part in forcing men to 
subJeOt their moral intuitions to critical analynis. There is no 
guarantoo, of courso, that this principlo, if applied rigorou0lV, " 
bY all mon)would in fact iron out all difforencos-of opinion in 
F 
1-Second Book of Samuel, Chapter 12. 
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moral questions. In the very nature of the case we could never be 
certain that men miglit not have radioaliy different moral intuitions. 
The subjectivist, howevor, cannot take much comfort from this 
admission, for his case fails even if it is possible to assort 
only that there is one moral principle common to all mon. We have 
suggested that the principle of aooordanco with the facto and the 
principle of consistency are indeed prima facto obligations 
acceDtod by all rational beings; and it is difficult to Goo hOW 
the subjectivist himself can put. forward h in ov7n case unless 
he accepts them an binding prinoiples. It is nox our task to 
consider them in more detail. 
9,07. 
HAPTF, R Ix. ,, 
THE0BLIGATT0N TO ACTRATT0NALLY. 
1. 
In this chapter I propose to discuss whother, and in 
what sense'-we can be said to have an obligation to a. ct rationally. 
Prima facio there would certainly seem to be a case for assorting 
that, we do have such an obligation - we tell someone that he ought 
to be more rational, or we blame someone for acting irrationally - 
but the problem cannot be discussed with any prectsion unless we 
a8k, not the vague question, *'Have we an obligation to act rationally 
but rather, "Have we an obligation to conform our actions to this 
or that criterion of rationality? ". When our onqUiry is formulated 
in this 'way the two criterla which seem obviously relevant are the 
principle of accordanoo with the facts and the principle of 
consistency. In respect to the principle of the greatest good 
we should note that in so f*ar as this is used in a moral context 
i. e... as a criterion of rightness -then the jasuos raised are really 
of a different kind from those which we intend to discuss here. 
In thin case we are taking for granted thatwo have duties to 
perform and we are concerned with the question whother tho 
principle of the grontest good is ever a aritarion of rig-latnens, 
or indeed whether it is the only criterfon of rightness, N; Ilat we 
are conoorned with here is whether we havo a oartioular duty, viz. 
to act rationallyj and grantod this as our problem it neemS clear 
that the relevant oriteria are the two given above. In other words 
1. See next ohapter for disoussion of this problem. 
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when we tell someone that he ou3ht to act more rationally we 
usually mean that he ought to base I-Lis actions on the facts, or 
that he ought to examine the facts more carefully before actingp 
or that he ought to, be morg consistent oto. Sometimes , 
it is true, 
the, assertion, "you ought to act more rationally" is equivalent 
to the statement, "you ought to think of your greatest good"(i. e. 
your ultimate haDpinoss)but in Vaese cases it is by no moans clear 
whether the "ought" has a truly moral foroo. Cortainly we think It 
irrational for a person to act against his own happiness just for 
the pleasuretsay, of satisfying an immediate desirepbut common 
sense balks at the idea that we have a moral duty to pursue our 
own happiness, 
Before we disouns the principles of acoordanco with the 
facts and of consistoncy. we might perhaps glance briefly at this 
common sense suspicion of tho'notion that we can 'be under an 
obligation to pursue our ow n' h_appiness, 
It is easy to undorotand how this suspioion arise0oln 
th'e firsi plaae common sense tends to associate tho idea of duty 
'with unploasant tasksoo that it seegis'silly to say that we have 
aýduty, -to pur-sue something whiah we want. But, of coursovit is not 
at all necessary that wo should only havo a duty to do what we 
do not want to do; if it is morally right to do cometilizig then 
it is our duty to do It whether wovish to do it or not, 11onco if 
it is ever right to do that whioh we think will be for our 
greatest good then it oan be said that we sometimes have a dutY 
to-pursue our own happinens, 
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Secondlytoommon sense tonds to oonfuse the question 
whether it is ever right to think in terms of one' a own greatest 
good with two other questions: (a) whether one should prefer one-' a 
own 'happiness to that of others where there is a oonfliot,, and(b) 
whother one shouldin genoral, make the pursuit of one's own 
happiness the chief aim of life. one can give a negative answer. t. 0 
the latter two questions and at the same time consistently assert 
that it is sometimes right to determine a course of action by 
reference ýo the principle of onoPs own greatest good. Thus. on the 
assumption that. one is entitled to a holiday once a. yearoor that 
one is entitled occasionally to a few hours of pleasure and 
rolaxation, then, it seems not only rational, but also morally right 
to consider the various possiblo choices in the li#ht of one's 
groateut good -to conaid, or not only what will givo the groatos't 
immediate pl6aouro but also what will produoo tho greatest 
satisfaction in the long run. 
Certainly if we conaider the quostion of the application 
Of thic prinoiple within the contaxt, of situations of this kind 
that iswhere tho happiness of others is not direotly relevant - 
then tt seems clear enough that we consider it morally superior 
to organise onefs actions co that one achieves the greatest 
PosGible satisfaction instead of allowing one's choices to be 
determinod by chance factors and short-term 04 Idnrations. As we 
have said before, the achievement of happiness -even if only for a 
short period - is oometimes a sign of moral worth. 
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hothor wo have an obligation 3.1 now. propose to discuss w, 
to conform to tho facts. 
At first glance it would certainly seem to be tho case 
that common sense azoumes that wo have such an obligation. Thun 
we take it for granted that before we come to any moral decision 
'we Ought to exaýiine the situation carofully to disoovor all, the 
relevant faots, and,, as we saw in the lant ohapter, oven thosowho 
dispute tho validity of the ooncept of duty in goneral havo a 
difficulty in avoiding the implication that we have a duty to 
ccnforml, toýtho faots. Similarly, whonever wo tako part in any 
intellectual discussion it is taken for granted thatwhon it is 
shown that our assortions are ba3od on false judgments of the 
faots we shall feel under an obligation to nodify or give up 
our point of view. Thengtoo, whon we blame someone for allowing 
himself to bo moved by a more prejudioe, or when we exhort people 
to face up to tho facto it, seems to be impliod tilat we have an 
obligation to try to conform our actions to the facts. 
When we look mor+losoly into the matterillowevergit 
is not so clear that these common sense statements necessarily 
imply that we have an obligation to conform to the facts as such. 
For one thing the "ought" which is used here is sometimos 
hypothetical only. What we are saying, in offeottis "if you don't 
conform-to tho facts then this or-that will happen to you"As we 
havo isaid beforogoommon sense tends to assume that. in the long-rung 
those who base their aotions on falsehoods are bound to Buffer - 
they are like the man who built his house on sand. 
271. 
Then, too. in many cases in which we insist that a person 
012L7ht to conform to the facts what 'we are really concerned with 
is son. 0 other moral issue which we are certain can be resolved if 
only people oan be brought round to agreement about the facts. Thus 
if a person has based a oertain moral attitude on boliofswhich 
we know to be false and refuses either to acoept, the faOts 
t. 
or to change, his attitude when lie is forced to admit that it was 
based on tals6 Judgn, entstour moral censure is directed not so 
much at the refusal to conform to the facts an such but at the 
motives which prompt him to retain moral attitudes which he knows 
are not justified. Wo blame him for being swayed by self interest, 
or for allowing his actions to be gcvorned by prido, 'and no on. 
Whore no suoh. ulterior moral issuos are involved we are muoh 1003 
likoly to insint on tho obligation to conform to tho facts. 
Finally -and most importantly - in all the situations 
in which we seem to stress the obligation to conform to tho faoto 
I 
it will bo foundtl think, that there is an implied agreomont 
among those taking part in the situation that they will abide by 
the facts. In othor wordn it is ultimatoly a quostion of consistonoy, 
of remaining true to the rules or the principles which are 
accepted as operative in the situation. Thus,, Wnen we take part 
in. say, a soientifio dobate wo aro aocepting by implioation tho 
rule that our arguments should be based on the faots, and ifj 
when the debate is going against us, wo assort that the facts are 
really irrelevant then we are open to t1io charge of inconsistency. 
tho same waywhen we argue from a oot of promison, a0conted ao 
0 
true, wo aro bound by the rule of consistoncy not to tamper with 
thooe promises in order to make any particular argumont WO are 
putting forviard moro plausible. 
If we analyse all the oasoo in whioh we seem. to be 
asserting that there is an obligation to conform to the faots 
we shall find, 1 thinko that the operative obligation is really 
one of consistenoy. 0r, to put It another waylif we have not in 
any sense agreed to abide by the facts then it is diffioult to 
see how we can be obliged to conform to thom. 1f a man decides 
that in some particular case he would rather act as if the facts 
vore 'different from what he knows they are we may thinkho is 
foolishothat he is bound to suffer in the long run, but we could 
scarcely say that ho is morally bound to conform to the facts. It 
is true that many sermons are preached against those who live in 
a world of make-believe instead of facing up to the facts, but 
the main point of such sermons is not the sacrodnoso of facts as 
such but rather tiie bad conso I quenoes that result from a persistent 
ignoring of"the facts. 'Fven there it is by no moans certaintas'wo 
have pointed out boforo, that it is alwayn a 'bad thing to act 
as though the facts were difforont. An element of"mako-believe" 
Deems to be essential to all normal living. 
4. The principle of connistenoy can also help us to 801VO 
one of the puzzling aspects of the criterion of accordance with 
the faota. We have stated before that this principle implies not 
only that it is rational to examine the facts before coming to a 
decisiontand to act in conformity with them when they are knownt 
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I but also Chat it Is r4tional to be determined by objective-critoria 
when we are trying to discover vhat the facts are. 1n other 
vords,, vo would be said to havo, acted irrationally ifin assessing 
the faots. we had been influenced by purely subjoctivo factors. 
I'Tor the difficulty with this application of the principli 
of accordance with the facts is that it is relatively easy to show 
that what we mark off as "facts" is always in part determined by 
factors wixich miglit well vary from individual to individual. Tho 
comm-on. sense viewpoint hero is. of course, extromely naivo, Tho"taots" 
are things which impinge on us from *outside" and are as they 
are whether w+bserve them or not. The ordinary man, in holding this 
viewpeortainly grasps the point that the realm of the factual 
cannot be just a matter of subjective datomination, but he doos not 
realise the extent to which what wo call tho real is relative not 
only to the kind of sense organs vio possess but also to the 
categorial modos of thought by means of which we interpret the 
material of sonso. We come to nature with certain roady -made 
que0tions which to us. seem the only, proper quostions; tho phenomena 
of sense becomes the "real' only after it has passed through 
a framework of a priori principles which we aosume to *be the 
only true principles. Yet it is not difficult to prove that 
the ultimate criteria by which we order and interpret the data 
Of sense may differ from one oiviltsation to anotherand may 
change to some extent with changes in the environment or in the 
1 
Dhysical and psychological needs of man*What kinds of experience 
1.3oe C. I. Lewis, The Mind and the World-Ordor for an interesting 
interpretation along these lines. 
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we regard as real and what kinds as illusory, what evidonoo we 
are prepared to accopt as valid, how much evidence we require for 
prooftwhat importance should be given to this or that causal 
1 
factor - the answers we give to these quastions will vary 
acoording to the presuppositions we omploy. Even the so-oalled 
"hard fact* -that which so asserts itself that we cannot but 
admit its existence -may dissolve when interpreted according to 
certain criteria. -phy3ioal painfor examplotwould seem to be a 
hard enough fact but SoTno Doople have denied that it in real. 
If, thon, it bo granted that our judgments of the factual 
are always influenced by subjective faotors, how cAn we possibly 
say that we have an obligation to think objectively about the 
factagor an obligation to submit to thn commonly accepted criteria 
for dotormining the realm of the factual? 
It might be said that thAG is really an unimportant 
question cinoo, for all practioal purposeclour differonoes over 
facts are not so much due to the employment of different criteria 
an to oxistenoo of different levels of kno*wledgo and to oonfusionn 
over meanings of terms. The physical structure of man and his basic 
needs being to all intents and purposes the same all over tho 
wOrldothe common sense criteria of tho factual is likely to 
be tho same oven in oivilisations which differ groatly in their 
I. Philouophios of history in the grand manner arn particularly 
liable to the criticism that they are based on some subjOctivO 
criterion of the importance of thin or that oausal factor. - Toynbee, for instanco. has obviously been influonced by his 
Christian beliefs in his "kinder" interpretation of the cyclical 
view of hintory. Once a historian has docidod "what presuppositions 
ara. valid-it is actonishing how easily he ic able to make the 
facts fit the theory. 
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philosophic and religious foundations. 1t is only in the higher 
reaches of thought that the question of the -Drasuppositiona 
underlying our knowledge of tho real booomos relevant. 
This. however. is not an entirely satisfactory position 
to take for though it is true that there is usually a very 
general agrooment an to the criteria to be used in determining 
the factual ve do come across instances in which there are 
genuino ditferenoes of opinion on this sooro. Thus when wo discuss 
questions such an: Is tolepathy a fact? "vor "Cnn peoplo bo cured 
of cancer by faith? " we soon find that men may have radically 
different conoeptions of the "real" or the "possible". And it does 
not seem sufficient to argue, in such casee, tliat tiie criteria 
used by the majority aro'the true criteria. 
Again, it might be said that our objeotion to misoonceived 
since what we have a duty to do is to avoid allowing known 
subjeotive factors to influonce our judgments of thn facts. To 
cannot have a duty to reject subjective nrooupposittons Which we 
do not realiee to be subjective. 0r, to put thin point in another 
way: there is a very groat difference between intorpreting the 
facts according to preoupnositions which we believe to be true, 
and taking up an attitude that we will only admit as factual 
whatever suits our conventenootand it is only in the latter case 
that the question of acting against the Principle of accordance 
with the facts arises. 
The difficulty with this point is that even when we 
are aware-of the possibility that our judgments of the facto may 
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be affeatod by subjective faotors. it. is diffioult to know how 
we should discriminate between subjective factors which are 
justified and those which are not. Sinco it Is imposeible to avoid 
interpreting the data of senne by means of pro-concoived prinpiples 
how can we roully discriminate between one sot of principles and 
anotherýIn come circumstances there might evon be a justifioation 
for arguing that we should decide the facto according to our own 
desiros -the facts aro simply what wo wish to be faots, ln science 
we are accustomed to the idea that a hypothesis is "true" if it 
works -if ve,, oan prediot the behaviour of phonomona by meano of 
it - and some Philosophers have argued that many of the fundament- 
al cormon aonse presuppositions have a pragmatio basis. Thenotoo, 
'what are we to make of those presuppositions which we insist on 
believing an true even-thoughton our own admission, the evidence 
soems all against themViany of thoso presuppositions whichwe 
bolieve "no tatter what" are of a metaphysical nature or 
of religious significance -e. g. that the universe in controlled 
by a God friendly to man, that we have froewill -but presuppooitions 
of this kind soom to be found in all departments of knowledgoo 
Thus the sciontist may accept as a matter of faith, and not vorely 
as a useful hypothesia, tho belief that the universe is 0. unikie-a 
System the laws of which are discoverable by man, And such a belief 
may act as a spur when he is confronted with what appear to 
be insuperable difficulties. Indeed the value of these presupposit- 
ions is that -paradoxioally enough -they prompt us to sot about 
disoovering ways and means of proving their truth, and in this way 
VS 
inorease our store of knowledgo.. In one sense it is true enough 
that inýorder to gain knowledge we must learn to ask Nature the 
right questions, "but it is equally, true that signifioant, results 
can ofteft be achieved by trying to "force" Nature to svield uP 
I 
answers to the questions we want to ask. 
61 The way out of the diffioultY is. not to demand that 
ever7one should use the criteria accepted by the majority in 
their judgments of the faots, but rather that they should be 
consistent in their uso of the oritoria they do adopt. In particular 
this moans: 
(i)That in the course of any particular discussion ve 
should keep to one set of critoria. Thus if we are asserting that 
telepathy Is not a fact -using as our criterion the principle 
that 'whatever cannot be explained "scientifically" is not a fact- 
we. are obliged to maintain this criterion of the factual 
throughout the argument, or else give up the original assertion. 
(ii)II'liat if we use a sot of critoria in situation A 
, 
then we ought to use the'same criteria in situation B Which is 
similar in all rolevant respocts.. 
(iji)That If we do'fino tho factual in a certain way we 
should not deny the right to others to define the faOtUal 
according to the same criteria. Thus the soiontiatt who finds it 
technically useful to assume, aay, that the other is a fact cannot 
really deny others the righi to assume, say, that God Ja a fact if 
thoy, find it Psyohologically-useful to do so. 
1, The p ositivists have criticised beliefs of the "no matter what" 
kind on the ground that they are usually formulatod in such 
21 , 7-13. 
In respect to the presuppositiona which we refuse to 
accept as false no matter how much evidence is brought forward 
I 
against themwhat can to required of us is. first, that we state 
clearly on what grounds we hold them to be true, and secondlyothat 
we do. not shift theso grounds in a way that conflicts wtth the 
principle of oonsistenoy. or deny to others the right to use the 
same arguments in defence of their prosuppositions. Thus if a 
pofson claims that the truth of a certain presupposition is 
grounded in an a prIori intuition he cannot then prooeed to argue 
as though this presupposition is an explanatory hypothesis of the 
type of all Goi, entifio hypotheses -t, o. forumlated to account 
for a certain number of observed. facto, and on the basis of which 
further facts can 'be predioted. It is when "no matter what" 
beliefs are interproted as though they were explanatory 
hypotheses that they are exposed to the criticisms which positivistS 
and,, others bring against them. 
7. Thue. while It isI think, true that we are not under 
an obligation to accept any given statement of fact no matter how 
SOlf-ovidently true it may seem to everyone else, vo can only 
escape frora this obligation by being prepared to maintain 
our Own criteria of the factual in a consistent mannor. as dencribod 
above. Even if our only oriteriZie ono' of convenience -a fact is 
a way that it is im 6-63ible to falsify them, WhilO this is true it 
does not seem to me to follow that propositions otating those 
beliefs are without signiflodnoo. Thoy play too important a part 
in human thought for us to dismiss thom as meaningless. Rathor it 
would seem as though tlie positivist's criterion of significance 
is too narrow(See abovo). 
whatever wo wish . to be a fact -then we cannot consistently deny 
to others the right also to apply Vae same criteria if it suite 
their convdnionce. And, as ofton av not we would find that we 
suffered most from the employment of such an arbitrary criterion 
of the factual. And the same applies with any other freakish 
criteria that we might employ -the task of, maintaining the 
criteria consistently would u3ually prove too groat. Sooner or 
later we would find ourselves "slipping in" a more cormon sense 
critorion in order to got us out of difficulties. 
-I In miaking this point we are asnuming9of coursogthat 
the 
normal man will feel under an obligation to oonform to the 
principle of oonsiztenoy. lt is this vhjch we shall havo to 
oonsidor now. 
III* 
Prima facie there certainly cooms to bo a case for 
saying that we do havean obligation to try to conform to the 
W principle of consistenoy. If we confront a person with some 
inoonsiatency in an argument lie has been propounding or with an 
inconsistency between his moral bolief and practice ve exPOOt 
that ho vill'feel under an obligation to try to do something 
about it. Beforeve can take this for granted., however, one or two 
POSSible criticisms have to be met. 
First, it might be said that oonsiStOnOY for its Own 
eake is not an ideal whioh we are under any obligation to pursue. 
When we aay that we are under an obligation to conform to the 
principle of connistenoy what we really moan is that we are 
undar an obligation to try to achieve some good which can only 
be obtained if vo do conform to the principle of consistency. 
Thus we say-that someone ought not to chop and change their 
principles of action so much because it rakes it very difficult 
for othors who have to deal with them; or we say that someone 
ought to give up one or other of two contradictory beliefs 
which he holds to be true because, in the long rtn, ho is bound 
to suffer if he doesn't. 
It is in lino with this criticism that common sonso 
should stress practioal inconsiotencios rather than theoretical 
inconsistenoies, for the bad effects of tho former are more 
apparent tlian those which result from inconsistencies in the 
theoretical field. Of course, in principle, common sense accepts 
the notion that it is a wgood thing" to make one's beliefs 
consistent with one another or to give up an argument that is 
self-oontradictory; moroovor common. sonse is awaro that tho whole 
prooess of reasoning is ultimately depondent on our conforming to 
I the principle of non-contradlotion -but, for all that, common 
sense tends to be suspicious of the person vho is too much 
concerned with consistenoy, and is inolined to take the lino that 
so long as a person is happy in holding certain boltofe then it 
does not matter very much if they are not consistent with one 
another. It is onlywhen such beliefs are likely to lead to actions 
of'which we disapprove thatwo try to use the prinaiple of 
oonsistonoy an a waapon. ' against the person holding them. 
I In reply to this criticism we should note that while 
38j:. 
it may be true of the obligation to conform to the principle of 
oonsistency, as it is of other obligations. that we would not 
consider ourselves bound by them if it could bo shown that no 
good, or more harm than good, resulted from our fulfilling thom9yet 
it is quite misleading to say that what we mean when we assert 
that-,, we have an obligation to oonform to the prinoiple of 
consistenoy is that we 0ought, to bring about a cortain reault 
Which we consider good", It is surely clear enovgh that whon, sayp 
a person is confronted with a contradiction in an argument he 
has boon ý)utting forward and immediatoly feels obliged to 
modify or give up the argument he is not thin*cing in torMI3 Of 
any particular good that will recult from his action. Tho pronenoo 
of a contradiction is in itself suffioiont to cauoe the fooling 
of obligation. 1-To doubt there are circumstances in which wo do take 
circumstcýnces into acaount, or consoquenoes into account bofore 
deciding whothor, in faot9to conform to thO principlo of conaistency, 
but the same can be said of all obligations)and this annortion in 
nowiso contradiots our -rprevious assortion that tho obligation to 
- aonfornk to the prinoiple of consistency 6annot be analysod into 
any othor moral obligation or oombination of moral obligations, 
A second criticism of*tho obligation of consistency 
follows on from What has just boon said. It might be said that 
ti-ore are many situatione whore we are oonfronted with an 
inoonsistoncy of some kind and where we definitely do not think 
we are under an obligation to do something about it. 
Thia criticism oan bo dismissed In a few vorda. It rosts 
on a confusion between what Ross has tqrraed "prima facie duties" 
and our actual duty in a particular situation, It may indeed. be the 
case that in some particular situation our actual obligation will 
be to ignore some inconsistency which has ariaon and to put all 
our energies into some other task which has a prior olaim, but to 
say this does not deny that there is a, prima facie obligation to 
conform to tho principle of consistency. 
When we stato that we have an obligation to conform to 
tho principle of consistency this cannot bo taken to moan either 
that we have an obligation to think consistently or an obligation 
to achieve COTISistenoy. sinoo in both thGG0 Ofts0s the task may 
b3 boyond our Powor. A person cannot. foroo himself9for instancooto 
think consistently if he is constitutionally incapablO Of 
pursuing a long chain of reaaoning. Similarly we may be aware 
that thero is a contradiction between two beliefs vrilJoh we hold 
to be true and yet ba unable either to find a way of reconciling 
them or of giving up one or other as untrue. The Chriatiantfor 
example, is unable to reconoile God's omnipotence with the 
existence of undeserved suffering. If he is honeat he admits that 
thore apDoarn to bo a contradiction and that ho can find no 
solution of the problom. 1le usually finds a way out by saying that 
"if he know more" then the apparent contradiction could be resolved% 
I, It Should-be noted thai vihen tho-Uh-ristian, states that if we know moro about God and His purposes we would realtse that there is no roal contradiction ho is, in offect, stating that 
One or both of his 'boliofs: (a)that God in all powerful and all wise and good; (b)that men suffor unjustly -are false. And in fact when Christians do make some kind of intellectual 
attompp to solve the problem they usually do so by modifying in some way one or other of, these beliefs. Pither they try to Show that all suffering is desoryed, or elso they argue that 
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The obligation to oonform to the principle of consistency 
to properly interpreted to mean only that)whenovor we are confronted 
wIth a contradiction in our beliefS then we have a prima facie 
obligation to trv to i-esolve t1te oontradictidn in some WaY or othor. 
It is not neoessary to oxpand this in detail since wo havo alreadv 
covered this ground in Chapter'ULbut there in one point which 
should be discussed ), )riefly and that is viiether we can be naid 
to have an 
, 
obligation to try to relate beliefs w1ji0h seem to bo 
unconnected as-well as an obligation to trY to resolvo inconsin- 
toncies of which vo are aware. We noted before that tho desire to I 
achieve ayuten, could bo regarded as a positive expression Of thO 
prinalple'of consiatenc7, and there is no doubt that some feel a 
compelling urge to try to ralate their various beliOft into a 
sati3fyingly colhorent'systom. But it is doubtful whethorwe have, 
in factoan obligation to try to aohiovo aystan. as ouch. It is true 
that We often oriticize a person for keoping his beliefs in 
I 
Oviater-tight" compartments -we oritioieOtsaylthO BOtOntiBt for 
keeping his scientific viows quite apart from his religious ViOWn- 
but Nve usuallj do so only vehen we think thore in an inoonsistency 
'between one set of bollofs and another whicli wo think ho ourht 
to have examined. 
Sod Is not omnipotent in tho sense that He oan do anything at all. 
,,. 
From this point of viev, thon, wo cannot strictly say of 
two opposing boliofs that thoy can both bo shown to be true if 
only we had groater knowledge. From a common sense viewpoint 
such a statemont is quite meaningful, but for philosophical 
purposes the statement needs to be given greater 'precision. Thist 
howovor. is, often an extremely difficult thing to do without 
involving ourselvos in making asi3erttions which take us further 
than ve had intended. Tho Chriotian who trios to make somo 
tentative -statemont towards a solution of the problom of OVil 
usually finds himself committing some horesy. 
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Though, howeverv it ray not be the caso that WO II&VO 
an obligation to try to link up our belinfs into a cohoront 
s. vst0m, it is trueI think, that tho obligation to conform to 
the principle of consistency includos not only the notion that 
we ought to try to resolve any contradiction of which we become 
ý=-rejbut also the notion that we ought to examine our boliofS 
carefully to see if there aro any important inconsistoncios in 
them. And nowhere does this seem noro important than in respect to 
the fundamontal as3umptions on which we base our actions or the 
fundamontal assumptions by which we seek to qxplain our experience 
of the world. But, of course, onoe we do this we are inevitably 
led on to attempt to achieve some kindýof systematic unityg 
especially if we dinoovor that there are inconsistencies 
between varioýis assimptions which we had hitherto taken for granted. 
The fact thatat this levellit is 'probably impoesiblo 
. 
to 
aohlave a"satisfying unity does not abnolve us from the task of 
trying- to do what we oan to remove, at loastg the worst inconsiston- 
cies in our fundamental beliefs. 
10. Now wo made the olaim in tho last ohaptor that the 
obligation to oonform to the prinoiple of consistanoy is an 
obligation which is accepted as binding by all mon)and we 
indicated thota that this could be asserted with somo oonfidenco 
b0oause it was an obligation whi0h seemed to have its souroo in 
, reazon. 'We must no* deal with this point in some dotail. 
. 11 The idea of obligatoriness itself oannot be dorivod 
from reason, uniess we dertno reason in some rather unusual waY. 
Given. hoviover. that all men understand the notion of dut7tand have 
the calpacity to experience the-state of being under an obligation 
-and this seems a reasonable assumption - thon what things we 
think it our duty to do or to refrain from doing will depend 
on the waý inWhich we are influonood by onvtronmental and 
constitutional factors. A child who has bo3en trained to treat 
animals gontly is, nore likPoly to feel aome senSe of obligation 
toward I ra'ani-male than a child who has been trainod to b,, )lievo 
that animals are brutish cr"atures with little or no capacity to 
oxperiencle pain as we understand it. 31milarly a person of 
-acute sensibility and of a hiChly sympathetic nature will 
very often b6awaro of obligations which the avoraj; o man may not 
even understand lot alone bo airara of'. But while men differ in 
the strength and range of their feelings and emotiont oithor by 
nature or as a result of. their upbringing they are aliko in the 
fact that they are able to reason. though,, of coursolthe dogreo of 
ability varies from individual to individual. To reason however 
iS$in effect, to be subject trio'oortain princioloo and in particular 
to tho principle of non-contradiction - we vould not be able 
to reason at all if wo were unable to appreciate the constraining 
POwOr Of tho principle of consiatonoy, 0r, _to put tho point in 
a different way-bit is inconceivable that a person who "possoases" 
reacon could bo confro7jt-ed with a oontradiationgoaylin an 
argument he is propiouhding and not immediately feel that he ought 
to do something about it. This being so it does not seem too 
extravagant to uay that the obligation to conform, to the 'orinciplo 
of consistency is closoly tied up with reason -that just as , 
coo. 
we would not have an obligation to do certain things unleso we 
were firot capable of experiencing certain amotionsgoo, we Would 
not understand tho obligation of connistanoy unloss we 
"possossed" roanon. 
9 
11. There are two possible arguments against this point 
of view. The first is this: if the obligation of consistoncy is 
a "produot" of roason then thero ought to be a olooe oorrelation 
betwoon the degree of strength of our reasoning ability and 
the power with which we are affected by the obligation to 
conform to the principle of consistency -but is theroill faotp 
a close correlation between tho two? Is it not the CaSO that 
the man of high intelligence is sometimes quite unacrupulouu in 
his USO of reason whereas the man of very average intolligonoo 
may nevertheless be greatly concerned with the problem of 
reSolving any inoonsistoncies of which he io aware? Thon, too, 
a Person may worry about inconsistencies in one particular 
field of knowledge or action and not bo in the least doncernod 
about inconsistencies in another field of knowledge or action. 
This criticism rests on a confusion betwoen two 
Points: Virst. whother the awareness of'a contradiction nooossarily 
gives rise to the notion that the contradiction ought to be 
resolved; 'a: n'd second, whether, in fact, a porson will always try 
to resolve a contradiction when he realiaes that one in present. 
Itlis Oýly tho first of these two quostione with which we are, 
really concerned here and the point which we have made is that 
the very Oheart" of reason is to bo found in this sensitivity 
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to the presence of contradiction --An this feeling that the 9 
contradiction must loo rosolvod. Any being who "possesses" reason 
will know vhat it is to experience this "oughtneas" in the 
presence of contradiotion. It is another question altogether 
whother. in any given oase, he will actually try to do something 
about it. This would depend on many factors - whother there was 
some other prior obligationtho strength of competing desires, 
the -training one had received in the formative years, an4 so on. 
It is indeed possible that there in, in fact, a very loose 
correlation between tho dogreo of intelligence and the strength 
with which the obligation to consistency affects one -on the 
Whole highly intellignnt peoplo nnem to be worried more by 
inc ons io toile infj than those of poor intnlligonoo -but it would 
bo extremely difficult to prove the point one way or tho other, 
Tho appearance of a close relation ray be duo to other factors 
for oxampla, to the fact that children of good intolligenoe usually 
receive a more thorough training in subjects in which reasoning 
and the more severe intellectual disciplines play an important 
part. Hompovor that may be the question is quite distinct from 
the first one mentioned above. 
Týe'seoond ariticiom is this; the obligation to'conform 
to the principle of consistency is not grounded in roason as 
suoh; ifý-wo are looking for a source of the obligation then 'We 
f ind it in the practical sphere - in our general sense of obligation 
to the oomimunity. Te realiso that the welfare or the communitY 
depends on our general rellability and on the fact that our 
I, 
conduct in anj given situation is more or loss prodictable; thus 
arises the notion of an obligation of consistencyta notion which 
has boonaa it werp, *carried over" into the sphoro of logical 
reasoning from the field*of adtion. This sooma to be the point 
Thioh C. I. Lewis is making in tho following passage: lf we inquire 
'what it'm-3ans to -bo rational, the reply is likely to be givon in 
terms of our. tradition of wentern thought, by aome roforenoo to 
inforence and logical validity. But perhaps we should do bettor to 
consult our own sense of oursolves, and we should then find an. 
answer intormsý of our capacity for foresight and the direction of 
our action by it ---- rationality in this sense is not derivative from the logical. rathor it is the othor way about. The validity 
of 
, 
reasoning turns upon and can be summarised in terms of 
consistoncy. And 0ohaistency is, at bottompnothina more than the 
adherence throuThout to what we have aoceptedlor the non-aoceptanco 
now ofwliat we shall later be unwilling to adhoro to: 1. 
Apart from the difficulties always attondant upon all 
. no of 
ito aupposod originw, attempts to oxplain something in terr 
we may noto the following objections to tho above oriticism. 
I 
(a)It sooms to bo suggected in the above intorpretation 
that what wo meanWhen ve say wo ought to conform to the principle 
of consistonoy is "that we ought to oonform for the oak* of SOMO 
good which will rosult". We have already critictood this inter- 
pretation; all we need say here is that though It may often be the 
oase, in the practical spherogthat we havo in mind thb oonsequonaes 
of' our action whenve consider whothor we have an obligation 
to act consistently, it is rarely truo that we think of oonoequences 
vhOn we are confronted with a contradiction in tho thoorotioal 
field'-or not immediately anyway. Tho fact of contradiction is, in 
itself sufficient to give rise to the obligation, 
I. An analysis of Knowledgo and Valuationt p. 480. 
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(b) Tt is not certain whothor an abnoluto and oloar 
distinction can be mado botwoon the '4practloal" and. tho 
"thooretioal", so far as this particular tasue in conoornod. 
Whot'hor it is a quostion of a self-oontradtatorj argumont, or 
of inconoi3tonxien L-otween two ballofsor of an inconsintanoy 
I>Otwoon the anuu"ptiona undIrlying our aotiona in nituation A 
and tho asaumpttons underlying our actions in a similar situation 
Bptho impact of the prinoiplo of ooncistency ooems the samo - 
we aro confronted with the samo moral obligatim' 
what- sormoti-mes oonfuses ua liere is oiat ve do not 
diffornntiate clearly. vithin tho no-callod praotioRl sphoreq 
botveon the aituation in which 'wo are confronted with an 
inconsistenoy between two or more arcum. ptiorm on whioh we had 
boon basing our autions, or an inconaistonoy botwoon, %iiatwe say 
we believe and what our actions soom to indioate vi bolim, 
and the attuation in whioh wo simply do not "livo up" to our 
beliofee - in which,, through lack of *will-?, powor* or bnoause of 
strong tomptations we fail to carry out tho policy of action 
'we be, )liovo in. rn both thoue kinds of situation wo tond to say 
that a poroon is acting inconsistently or boing inconstatent 
but ar, wo'llavo pointod out boforo it is only in tho first tYPO 
of situation that t1he question of an obligation of connistenoy 
to . roloviint. , ---- 
-., I. 
ko) Whilo it is no doilbt true that, from the co=on 
senso point of vtow, the obligation to conform to the princirle 
of coneistoncy is most important in VIOUO caGOO in wliioh 
"praoticale issuos aro involvod, ýwe-cannot infer from this that 
the source of the obligation is to be found in the practical 
sphere rather than in the theorotical. All that we oan infor from 
such a statement in that. in goneral. tho average Kan is more 
conoerned with the prnotical problems of daily living than ho is 
with knowledge for its own aake. And this preoccupation with 
the "practioal" often ceems to affoot his moral sensitivity to 
the problem, of inconsistencies in the theoretical field. A person 
of unquestioned moral integrity so far as his relations with 
other people are conoerned may often, for instancepbe quite 
careleso about applying tho prinoiple of consistenoy to hie 
religioun or political beliefs, or about applying it to hic 
handling of the facts in genoral. Intellactual integrity is 
a comparatively rare thingand -without doubt this is in part 
the result of a laok of emphasis on this aspeot of moral bohaviour 
in our educational eystem. 
IQ. In one sense, however, the above oriticiez -viz. that 
tho source of the obligation of consistency is to bo found not in 
reason but in the "practical sphere" -doos givo a good amphasist 
ar., tila t is that it tetds to stress the fact that t.; Ie principle 
of consistency is not morely an intollectual tool by-means of 
which we are ablo to colve probloms, but is a moral princiPle 
of'vory great practical importance. We havo already noted. that 
critics of the traditional view of moral obligation tend to 
overlook the fact that thoy themselves assume that we have an 
Obligation to conform to the facts and to the -principle of 
oonsistency. 'But It is true also that there has been a general 
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tendency to underestimate the importance of the obligation of 
consistency. '"Lhis obligation is presupposed in all argumonts; by means 
of the principla of consistency we are able to check on the 
valid. ity of our moral intuitions; progreas in knowledge often turns 
on the awareness of contradiction and on our feeling under the 
noccosity to do something about it -but more than this, the stabil. Ity 
of socidty in some measure rests on the faithfulness of its members 
to this principle. One has but to reflect on the matter to roalise 
the chaos that would ensue if men did not recognise any obligation 
I to try to conform to the principle of consistency. But, thent if 
thoy did not recognise the obligation they would not be m6n in the 
normal sonse of that torm -they would not be rational beings. 
*1 d 
HAPT «M 
THE, RELEVAITCF OF THE CRITERION OF Vir GRrATEST 
GOOD TO TTTr, PROIlLrT,, y OP MORAL ACTTON.. 
1. 
1. We have accepted the principle. of the greatest good 
an one of the common sense criteria of rational actionpand we 
have already discussed the application of this principle in the 
field of desires. liow, junt as we nay that a man acts rationally 
if he choosos that course of action which will give him the 
greatest pleasure or bring him ultimate happinesolso it would seem 
to be in line with common sense to say that whonwo are 
considering rhat our duty is in any given situatioqvo ought to 
choose that course of action whioh we think will produce the 
greatest good (whatever we may mean by that oxpronsion). Cortainly 
it seems paradoxical to say that the morally right action might 
be one which we think will produce less good than some other 
action which it is within our power to do. And this interpretation 
of the common sense position is borne out by the fact that vhOn 
the average man is asked to say vhat he means by a "morally right 
aotion, his first answer is often some variation. of the 
utilitariali formula; -a right action is onn which produces the 
greatest good, or the greatest good of the greatest number. 
Fhilosojýaersthawevor, havo sometimes questioned the 
Common nense view on this matter (or ratherlwhat appears to be the 
view of reflective common sense) and havo put forward various 
O3. 
arguments to show that the prinaiple of the greatest good is not 
really relevant to the disoussion of what constituteS our duty; 
or, that if it is in some sense relevant it is nevertheless not 
valid as a criterion of"rightness". It is therefore of some 
importance to show whether, and to what extent, the common sense 
view can be justified. If it cannot thon we are faced with 
the pr"oblem that one of our oriteria of rationality is not 
applicable. to a very wide and important area of human aotion. 
24, The first argument that we must consider is that we 
oannot define *right" in terms of our principle. To quote Ross: 
""Being right means being an act productive of the greatest good, 
producible in the oirourstanoosO -10 it not plain on reflection 
that this is not what we mean by right, even if it bo a true 
1 
statement about what is right, " 
', low important is this point in so far as our main problem 
is concerned? When we say that "right" oannot be d(, fined in terms 
of consequences we are simply stressing the fact that wo do not 
necessarily come to regard a certain course of action as right 
I 
as a result of working out its possible oonsequonoesonor do we 
nýqessarily think of the consequences of an aot when we aosert that 
it is.,. right. As Ross puts it; "It seems clear for instance that 
when an ordinary man says it is right to fulfill promises he is 
- 
I' fl, 
1. The Right and the Godd -Sir David RossvpB. 
It is to be noted that we do sometimes mean by "right"t productive of good consequences -o.. g. when our choice isgas we iffaY, between two Ovils. or when the situation is so complicated that We 
cannot be guided by one of the accoptod moral axioms, To say this however does not entitle us to define "rightZ', in utilitarian terms. 
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not in the leant thinking of the total consoquono0s Of such 
an act. 
But we oan admit this. and yet at the same time assort, 
without contradiotionothat an ultimate criterionjif not the 
ultimate criterion, of rightness. is to be found in the prinoiple 
of the greatest good. In other wordseven though wo may not 
always,, or even mostly think of consequences when we judge a certain 
aotion to be right nevertheless we would o0ase to regard it ac 
the right aotion if it oould. be proved that. in the circumstanoon, 
it would, produoe less good than some other aotion. Whatover other 
oharacteriatics a right aot might possess it at least must have 
the characteristic of boing productive of tho bout pooniblo 
Consoquences in tlie, ciroumstanoeslf we do not ofton aotually base 
our actions on a calculation of such oonnequenooo -as wo do not, 
for instanco, in nearly all cases in which we keep promiseaptoll 
the tritth, refrain from ofealingland so on - it is because we 
take it for granted thatoon the whole, thebo prima faoio right 
actions will produce tho best oonsequonoos. 
3. Even this statement of the position would be disputed 
by some. It might be hold, for instance, that while it seems 
self-contradictory to say that a right action might not 
produce any good orrnight produce moro evil than good, it in 
nevertheless not self-contradictory to say that an action is 
right even though it does not produce the best possible 
consequenoes. And in support of this we oan bring forward oxanP100 
1.0p. Oit. ) P080 
which show that we sometires think an aotion right even though 
ve are. fairly cure that it will not produce the greatest good 
in the circumstances, Thus: 
7, P5. 
In a shipwreck there is only room for one more person 
in the last lifeboat. and two men are loft waiting for a place. 
One 'in a sciontlet, speoialising in medical research in which fie3d 
he has already made important discoveries. The other is a young 
man of very average intelligence and poor moral oharaoter. The 
captain knows that it would 'be better for the world in general 
if tho, scientist were spared rather than the young man but 
nevertheless fools with complete conviction that what he ought 
to do is to ballot for the place, and thus give each man an 
equal chance. 
In reply to this point we can raise the following 
obJeotions: 
must not be assumod'that what we intuit as rightq 
while placed in the moral obligation situationgis nooosoarily 
right. Critics of the intellectual'approaoh to moral questions 
i. e. that we can come to know what to our duty by a process of 
reasoning in whioh'-wo apply general rules to particular i3ituationsp 
-have tend6d to overestimate the value of "on the spot" dooisional 
and have consequently Oplayod down" the influence of external 
factors on such decisions. We shall oomo back to this point 
s4ortly but hero it is sufficient to point out that in a case such 
as we have instanoed above the captain might well have boon 
unduly influenced by customary morality ( the code expected of him), 
or by a sub-oonsoious awareness of the difficulties which any 
alternative course of action would have involved -and If he had 
boon able to refloot afterwards "in a cool momont' he might well 
have realised that what seemed certain at the time was really by 
no means clear', and straightforward. 
(ii)We migl, -Lt put the same point another way by saying 
that if the consequences of our aotionjor what we think will be 
the o6nsequenoes could be observed an olearlY. as the immediate 
factors in the situation then our decision as to the right course 
of action milErat, well be different. Thus if the oaptain could have 
boon confronted with some'vivid representation of tile oo4soquonces 
of . sparing 
the scientist-'s life tile emotional impact might 
have beenýsuffioient to offset the force of the emotive factors 
I 
present in the immediate situation. 
kiii)We noe, d not. however, ooncorn ourselvos with theso 
conjectures for it is true to say, I think, that in evory case in 
whioh we allow oursolves to bo determined by comb moral intuition, 
oven when it appears that in so doing we will not produce the 
greatest good)we do afterwards, if criticised, try to justify our 
ýI 
action by claiming that "in-the long run" it would bo justified 
in terms of oonsoquonces. 'A"his justification takes many forms: 
(a) Sometimes we say that it is so'diffioult to foresee 
all the oonsequencos that it in safer to weigh up the issue in 
toms of known short-torm faotors and thus allow ourselvos to 
be dotorminod by t1jo accepted rules governing such a situation. 
A variation on this theme oan be summarised as 
follows: It might seem probable that course A will produce the 
best consequences but there are so many chance factors which 
MAY upset our calculations that it is wiser to ignore the question 
of consequences and trust to the usual rule followed in 
Esuch eiroumstances. 
Now it is obvious that these arguments do not 
2 
necessarily imply that the principle of the greatest good is not 
a criterion of rightnoss; thoy merely assort that in some cases 
it, is visor to bo guided by, oertain acoopted rules as to What 
should or should not be done in situations of a certain kind than 
to attempt to assess the oonsequonoes of alternative oourses of 
aotion. 
(b) We may justify following the stook response in 
situations vhere'it soems probablo that an unusual oourao of 
action might produce the better results by arguing that it is 
essential for the welfare of sooiety that the validity of the 
usual prinoiple of aotion be uphold. In- other words, we are really 
saying that though the unusual oourse of aotion seems to be the 
one which will give tho best results nevertheless "in the very 
long run" the best oonsequonces will result from a rigid 
adherence to the accepted rules. 
Thus we sometimos think that it would be bettor, for 
everyone ooncornod if we humanely ended the life of dangerous 
lunatios)but this apparontly reasonable proposition is usually 
countered by the argumont. that the principle of tho sanotitY of 
the individual is too important in the life of a sooiety for 
1. 
any exoeptions to be allowed. 
111ume, as we all know, used this argument to defend acts of justico 
'whiohoin themselvos., were contrary to public interest: 
"Though in one instance the public be a sufferer, this 
momentary ill is amply compensated by tho steady prosecution 
of the rule, and by tho poaco and order,, whioli it establishes 
in the community" (op. oit., P. 497. ). 
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(c). We somotimea defond actions which seem not to be 
for the genoral good on the grounds that we have faith that 
ultimately the action will justify itself in torme of consequonces. 
For obvious reasons this argument is usually developed within the 
context of some religious faith which guaranteos that the 
right consequences will rocult from aotions based on faithfulness 
to cortain, ir-mutable moral lprinaiplOS. 'Illus thooe who argue that 
there are o ertain "absolute" moral prinoipleý vhioh hold under 
all aircumstanoesirrespootive of the apparent oonsequonoes) 
nearly always fall back on "faith in God" or faith in a "moral 
universe" to Justify their adherence to these principles in 
circumstances where, to ordinary common sensetthoy produce the 
wrong reault. For instance the pacifist who claims that it is 
wrong to take human lifo under any oircumstanoes always has 
difficulty in presenting a reasonable case for his point of 
view unless he Oa116 in"divine aid: Even when a person has lost 
his belief in a God, belief In the moral nature of the universe 
lingers on and affeots his attitude to moral quostigns. He tends 
to have a superstitious fear of breaking-any of the"moral 
absolutes" in which he has been brought up evon when his common 
sense tells him that he ought to. The consoientious youthpfaoed 
with a situation in which it seems right that he should toll 
a liefeels that the whole moral structure of thinga iS 
crumbling -he feels that the universe ought to be-suoh that 
truth-telling will alwhys ýrodiico the' right oonsequenoeS. 
1-IR--this conneation it isI think, signifioant that utilitarianism 
as a moral oreed was most widely aocoptod in tile last oentury 
among those VhOpin some degree or othorphad broken away from 
29. 
It seems to be tho case then that on rofloction we do 
always try in some way or other to juatifv our moral actions in 
terms of their consequences even though there night, have boon 
no thought of consequences when the action was dono. And this 
means; in-offoot. that, wo do regard the principle of greatest good 
as a criterion of all right actions. 
TTT. 
46 A further attack on the principle of greatest good 
might be made on the grounds that it is a purely formal oritorion 
-that in fact it is n6t a criterion which we can use in determining 
what wo ought to do. 
This. oritioism takoo sovoral forms. The first is .. 
that it is not a practicable oriterion because it is impossible 
to oaloulate with any acouraoy what tho consoquemes of our 
actions will be. Even if we could estimate the immodiate 
consequences and decide with assurance that one particular course 
of action was the right one we could never bo certain that tho 
'long-range IN oonsequenoes would not ahow our dooision to have boon 
wrong. 
In answer to this point we should note, first that 
most exponents of utilitarianism have roadily granted that there 
are enormous difficulties In the task of calculating consequonoes, 
but they have nevorthelose insisted that the attempt must be 
made. And, indood, if we state the oaoe clearly we shall realise 
orthodox Christian bolief. Onoe we have ceased to "believe that 
,, 
Our'"on, the spot" intuitions are the voice of God we seem inevitabl7 to be attracted to some form of utilitarianism- 
I 
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that our obligation oan never be to assess the full oonsequenoes 
of alternative courses of action. but simply to try to weigh up 
the consequences so far as we can Predict them. Our decision might 
well prove to be the wrong one, 'but in so far as we make an effort 
to assess the consequenoce then our duty has been dono. The same 
Point can be made, of courso, about intuitions of rightness which 
are experienced in the actual moral obligation situation. We can 
never be certain at the time whether the intuition was a genuine 
moral intuition or not, but it ic our duty to be guided by it 
nevertholess. 
This point having been made cleartwe should noto that 
there are many situations -and often of the most important kind - 
'where vo have no choice but to attompt to base our decision on a 
calculation of consequonces, In other words, tho situations are 
suoh that there sooma no ponsibility of our boing guidod by 
'some direct intuition of rightnesa. 
(a) Sometimes there is a clash between two or more 
basic axioms of morality. We are faoed, say, with a choice botwoen 
tolling the truth or keoping a promice. and we have no olear 
1 
intuition as to whioh should be preferred. 
1.1-t-Is interesting to note hero that though there are rany dutien 
which seem self-ovidont -promise keoping, telling the truth oto. - 
there is much difference of opinion as to the relative strengths 
of these duties -as to Chair order of importanoe. No doubt 'we 
usually think of the duty to preserve human life as having 
precedence over other dution, but oven here it is possible to 
think Of circumstances in which we might think it right to 
give some other duty a priority over the duty to proserve. life. 
And 'when we como to consider the other "prima faciew duties 
we do not seem to have any clear intuition as to their order 
of importance. 
(b) Sometimes the situation is so complex that there 
is no chanoo for any one intuition to dominate the field. Thusp 
except for the*absolutoopaoifist or tho a absolute" patriot the 
problem of what to do or rather of what one ought to do in the 
event of war breaking out is so baffling that it seems ridiculous 
to try to solve it by wkiting for some clear intuition. 1f one' 
does try to do so the odds are that one will simply be motivated 
by whatever factor happens to 'be most influontial at the time. 
\ In a complex situation like this one can of course 
decidethat no rational methods of enquir7 are possible and 
that therefore the only thing to do is, to follow the conventional 
course of action, On the other hand one may decide that the only 
sannible thing to do is to work out whioh of the various'alternat- 
ives soems to offer the beat chanoes of at least produoing 
moro good than ovil. Inevitably, in try, ing to analyse tho. various 
possibilities the issuon have to be siTnplified and only fairly 
short-range considerations taken into account, but this may still 
seom. proferable to leaving the matter to bo decided by convention. 
I 
1.1n the last war for instance most poople-who made any 
attempt to justify thoir participation in what amounted to 
mass slaughter did so on the ground that even national 
annihilation was preferable to a Nazi dominated world. No 
doubt this 3implified the alternatives and glossed ovor some 
vory big moral problems, novertheleas it was a rethod of' 
approach which commended itself to most thoughtful mon. Tt is, 
impossible to say how wo possibiy arrivo at tho conclusion 
that a Nazi world would be worso than national suicide -actual 
calculation would seem to play verý little part. It would 
, seemvironically enough, to be a question of intuitions or a hunches" -but, if so. it is an intuition about oonsequencesp 
about matters of faot, and not a moral intultion, 
'A 
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(0). Another case ih which it is necessary to calculate 
consequences before we can know what we ought to do is whoro 
the rule of action which we think it right to follow in 
certain circumstances is conditional on certain results 
being obtained, If the rnsulta are not obtained or if they fall 
below a certain minimum then we are no longer bound by the rule. 
Thus. in the field of diplomaoY, it mijýht be thought rightpin the 
interests of poaoo, to pursue a policy towards a certain nation 
w1hich it is thought will tend to make it cautious in undertaking 
military adventures. The diplomatic experts, howovor, keep a 
constant watch on the effects of their policy so that the moment 
itýeases to have the desired effect and, sayo results in the 
suspected nation re-arming more vigorouslygit can be scrapped or 
modif ied. 
Many of our duties fall into this class. 
These then are some of the types of situation in whioh 
it seems necessary for us to attempt to calculate consequonoes 
in order to know vhat is tho'morally right course of aotion. Thoro 
one moro point to note, however, and that is thht tho dootnion 
to scrap the utilitarian method is itself often based on 
a calculation of oonsequences. Thuo)aftor we have made somo 
disastrous attempts to 'base our moral actions on the principle 
of tho-greatost good, irrospootivo of w1hether this led us to 
aot, contrary to tho acoopted maxims of aooioty, we ray examine 
these maxims anew and come to the conclusion thatgon the vhOlOp 
actions based on them produce the beat consequonces. In ooming to 
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such a conolusionliowover, we shall perforce have used the very 
mothod wo are seeking to discredit, for it is by no, means self- 
evident thht the various prima facie duties will in fact always 
bring about the bost consequences if fulfilled. 
5. The second main criticism of the principle of tho 
greatest good as a 'practical criterion of rightness is that we 
cannot come to know what is the morally right thing to do by 
a process of argumentv and in particular by a process in which we 
try to appl F, somo general formula to particular situations. We 
can only know what we ought to do by an act of apprehension 
mado in the actual situation itself. 
This point of view has boon most foroibly argued by 
Prichard in his papor, "Does Moral Philosophy Rost on a Mistake? " 
Thus; "The sense of obligation to do, or the rightness oflan 
action of a particular kind, is ab3olutoly underivativo or 
immediate - ------ %Tho negative side of all this is, of courso. that 
we do not come to appreciate an obligation by an argumont, i. o. 
by a process of non-moral thinking, and that, in partioular, we do 
not do so by an argument of which a promise is the ethical but 
not moral activity of approciating the goodness either of the 
act, or of a consequence of the not. * ------- If ve doubt vhother 
there is really an obligation to originate A in a situation B, 
. 
the remedy lies not in a process of general thinkingbut in 
getting faco to face with a particular instance of the situation 
B and then diredtly appreciating tho obligation to originate A 
in this situation. " 
Thore are really several points involved here, oach of 
which requiroo separate treatment. 
In tho first place, there is a opocifio criticism 
ai. med at the use of formulae whioh have a reference to an 
end. 1t, is said that wo can only have an obligation to do some 
action or to refrain from doing some action; that we can never 
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havo an obligation to aim'at something or to try to achieve SOEO 
Ond, And this argument is thought to-apply to the instanoes in 
which we use the principln of the greatest good as a criterion 
of rightness. 
Yet. from a common senso point of view, it seems sensible 
enough to say that so and so fools that he is under an 
obligation to'holp to bring about the kingdom of God on earthpor 
that so and so fools it his duty to try to overthrow the 
Communist regime. No doubt, in notual practicepthese very, general 
obligations merely provide a kind of moral framework within 
whioh partioular duties to do this or that are laid upon us, 
but nevortheloss it does not seem nonsensical to talk, of our 
having suoh obligations and indeed they may exeroise a strong 
influanco on our conduct in particular situatione, 
141oroover, if we cannot have an obligation to try to bring 
about certain consequences how aro wo to decide what we ought*to 
do in those circumstances in which there is a clash betveon 
prima faoie'duties and no clear ifituitive guidance is forthcoming. 
Of course, in these situations, our obligation is alwdys in the 
last analysis an obligation to do soTgo particular thing, but 
in so far as this obligation is based on a calculation of 
consequences then there is an implied obligation to help bring 
about theso oonsequenceso 
Two objeotions are raised against this interpretation 
of, t'he common sonse position. The first is a logioal ono. It is 
said that if. 'Wo havo an obligation to bring about a cortain 
305. 
state of affairs, thin is* tantamount to -saying that "something 
ought to exist* or *somothing ought, not -to exist" 9which ist 
strictly spealt -ing. nonsonse. As Prichard puts it: "For we can no 
more either think or a3sert of something which we think does 
not exist that it ought to exist than we can think or assort 
anything else about it. Of what does not exist we oan think and 
assert nothing at all" 
This pointsthough sound. is not really very important. 
It indicates merely that the common sense 'way of describing, 
the aituation is too loose. We odn got round the difficulty by 
saying that when we state that somethtng ought to exist we , 
really mean; (a)Such and such a state of affairs if it existed 
would be good; (b)thereforo we ouglit to try to achieve it. 
Or, if we ntill find this too, loose we can always 
I state it in the negative form: Thic state of aff.. airc is badq 
therefore vo ought to-try to change itor we ought to try to 
abolish it. Thus vo migilt say of somo slums: thooo ought to be 
abolished and modern flats put in their plaoo. 
If it be asked how we derive a moral ought, from the 
statement tWit such and such a state of affi-irs is badthe only 
reply we can give is to say that we in fact do. Just an the 
sight of a man torturing an animAl gives rise to the feeling 
that we ought to stop him, so the sight of plums gives rise to 
the feeling that we ought to do whatever is in our power to 
have them demolished and better housing put in their place. 
1. Moral Obligation, p. 11. 
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The second objection is more important. To quote 
Prichard again; wThO general conclusion reached is that the 
, 
re 
cannot bo anything at Vnich ve ought to-aim in actionpthe 
ground for this conclusion being that to aim at something is to 
hayd the desire of it as oiir motive and there cannot be an 
obligation to have a certain motivew 1. 
This point is elucidated in another pas3age: *But 
by "aiming at something X" or whaving X an our aim" we mean 
"having X as our purpose", and by, 'having X as our purpose" we 
nean "havingthe desire of X as our motivoO, i. e. being moved to 
act by the desire of X, so that the statemont, "I ought to aim at 
X" will mean, "I ought, to be moved to act by the desire of V. 
Slie question, thereforo arises: Can'a statement of this form be true 
if the term "ought" be used in the moral oonse? -And the answer Seems to hale to ba "no", on, tho ground that a moral obligation in 
by 
, 
its very nature'a moral obligation to porform some activity, 
and that thereforo there cannot be such a thing as a moral 
obligation to be moved-by a certain desire, since whatever our 
being so moved may be. it is not an activity. " 2. 
In answer to this oritioism we ray make these two 
points, Fii6i, the statementg" having X as our purpose" does not 
necessarily mean, "having the desiro of X an our mbtiveft. It is 
often the oase that we think we ought to try to aohievo some 
end but havo no desire to do so. Thus a'young Christian dootor, 
after listening to a missionary desoribing the Poverty 
k 
and misery of the masses of India. may fool it his duty to make 
it, his chief aim in life to help relieve, this misory. Yot when ho, 
contemplates what is involved in making such a vow he may find 
that he has no desire to go to India and devote his life to 
the poor there. liovortheless hn considers it his'duty to do so. 
of oourse it is true that in some sonse, the general 
purpose -i. e. the relief of misery -must attraot-himo'but the s4me 
could be said of any obligation. The knowledge that something is 
r, ight is, in itsolf,, a motive to action. And this leads me to the 
l. T,, Ioral Obligationpisj'. 2. Passiml p 12. 
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next point. 
lV__ Evon if itworo true that the statemento *having X 
as, our purpose* meant "having tho-desire of X" as our motive" 
this would, not necessarily preclude tho possibility of 
our having a: moral obligation to aim at X, unless indoed wo think 
it impossible to havo a moral obligation to do something which 
we, in any case, desire to do. It is true that we. cannot have 
an obligatiori,, to desire any partibular end any more than we can. 
have an obligation to think that any particular action is the 
right act. ion; it is also true that we cannot tell anyone else 
that he ought to aim at some end - but'all. this is quite 
consistent with our holding that it is possible both to desire 
0 
some end and at the same time to think, that we have a moral 
obligation to try to aohievo it. The Christian desires porfeation; 
he also thinks he has an obligation to seek perfootion. 
The above criticism was aimed specifically at those 
argumonts in which wo try to discover our duty by considering 
the consequencee of our aotionS or bY thinking of Some end 
vhich we thihk we ought to try to bring about. i 
We can attack the principle of tho greatest good as 
a practical criterion of rightnese, howevorton the general 
soore that it Is never possible to know what we ought to do by 
arguing from genoral prinoiples of any kind. We canýonly know 
our duty by an act of apprehonsion in tho actual situation. 
It Is sometimes said, for examplolthat if ve oould 
discover some formula by which we woro. able to tell which acts 
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were riglit'thon it would be possible for a person complatelY 
lacking in a"moral sense" to knowwhat is right. But this is 
ridioulous, in, the care way as it is ridiculous for a person'Who 
lacks any aesthetic sense to try to differentiate between good 
and bad paintings by means of some general rules. 
In answer to this' point it can be readily admitted 
that there can be no substitute for the final act of moral 
ýi, 
comprehension -there is no logical leap from the presentation 
of a number of facts or the preaentation of a numlor of arguments 
to a moral oonalusion. 13ut to admit tilis is not to deny that 
some general thinking about moral questions maYCnot] be of 
help, to the person who has a "moral sense" and thorofore some 
experience of Vhat it means to be under an obligation. Just as it 
is the person who takes art seriously who usually studies the 
theoretical principles of artso it it) the person vho takes 
the moral problem seriously who tries to discover the "deeper" 
moral intuitionu which underly the concrete intuitions of 
particular situations. Carritt suggests that one reason, or rather 
a chief reason for the attempt to discover some. goneral formula 
of rightness is 4a desire to esoape the trouble of using our moral 
judgment', but in most oases the reason in to be found rather in 
the puzzlement whioh, arises when we first disoovor that the simple 
3. 
, rules ve had boon taught ac children are not suffigiont. Whon, for 
instancb,, wo aro faced with sorm of the dosperato mora; prolýlems 
I. See E. F. 
- 
Carritt,, Ethical and polit. joal Thinkinglp 11. 
2. Passim p. 11. 
3. Sometimes the reason to a philosophip ono: tho desire to 
intr'oduoe coherence into what zooms to be a chaos of 
particular intuitions. 
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which are the inevitable concomitant of a war situation we 
quickly d*isoovor that no clear guidanco can be expected from 
the common sense rules of morality; nor do we usually recolvo 
any guidance from "im-nediate intuitions" when wo place ourselves 
in the situation Under circumstances such as those it is often 
the person vho has given some thought to the goneral principles 
of, n, oralitY ýho is able to make some kind I 
of moral sense of 
the aituation. 
t 
(ii). It might be granted thht general thinking about 
moral prinoiplei can assist us in coming to a decision in a 
particular oase9buttit might be said, we cannot find out what we 
ought to do simply by applying some general prinoiple, ýGonoral 
principles -e. g. the utilitarian criterion of rientness - are 
too rigid to apply on bloc to'every moral obligation situationg 
and when we allow ourselves to be guided by them we tend to 
act against our own conscience -we refuse to take notico of any 
intuitions, apprehended in the situation. which run counter to them. 
In other words our ultimate guide must be the deliverance of 
conscience at the time when action is required of us. 
This is a point of view whioh has muoh to oommend ito 
and we shall roturn to discuss it 3hortly0but two warning notes 
need to bo mado immediately. Firatgif wo are to contend that the 
knowledge of what we ought to do ie the produot of an immediate 
act of-'apprehension then it is difficult to see how wo" can 
dispute the claim to have approhonded some absolute rule Of 
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conduct which is often made by people. Thus a person'may claim 
that he knows it is wrong to take human life under any 
eiroumstances, and henoe to this extent be able to antioipate 
exactly %Yhat lie ought to do, or at least what he ought not to do 
in certain circumstanoos. lle would know, for instanoopthat he could 
never take part in warfare. or again. a person may assort that he 
knows that aome authority, nay the Pope, ought always to bo oboyedg 
and he may-Olaim that this is an aot of moral insight. Tho good 
Catholic knowi exactly what he ought to do given certain 
oircumat'ancesland though in many oases the teachings of his 
religion are simply taken for granted, nevertheless in so far 
as his conduct ultimatoly roots on a Aoral insight -namely, on the 
insight that the Churoh ought to be obeyed -then it in diffioult 
to , aeo how wo can dony that he is acting in a moral manner. 
Sooondly, though we may agree that the attempt to apply 
general formulae to particular moral situations ofton results 
in solutions which do violenoe to the "natural" moral apprehensions, 
yet it iz equally true that all the evidonce points to the 
dangers of allowing ourselves to be guided only by the 
deliverance of conscience at the moment of impact of the situation. 
What we intuit as the right thing to do is very often simPlY'what 
wo, 4ave been conditioned to intuit; or what inay seem like a moral 
apprehension may, on reflecti. ontpro. vo to be only a quasi-moral 
feeling., In other wordswe do not come to any particular situation 
'with, as iVvero, an Oomptyv mind; we come to it with, certain 
moral assumptions which, in many canes, will simply be the 
I 
"l I 
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assumptions of the society in Vnich we have boon brought up and 
which we may have accepted quite unoritioally. To ignore this 
obvious fact in stressing the 8immodiateness" of moral knowledge 
is to shut the door on any attempt to introduce some kind of 
rational control over our moral actions. 
7. Though it may woll be true that the ultimate data of 
morality aro to be found in the immediate moral intuitions 
which we apprehend in this or that particular situationthe 
rational man cannot be satisfied to lot the matter rest thero. 11is 
awareness thaýt the intuitions of one man may differ from thoso 
of another in the same kind of situation; that the dolivoranoos of 
his own conscience may conflict in a bovildering vay; tha't he has 
often mistaken in the pastfoolings of a quasi-moral character for 
gonuine moral insights -all this wil-1 lead hi .m to search for more 
abiding moral principles which will-introducO Some stability and 
coherence into the moral life. Even if he is not concerned to 
build up an elaborate theoretical system of morality, ho will be 
moved, aa a rational being. by the obligation of consistency to 
eliminate As far as possible the mbst blatant of the inconsistenoioS. 
In order to be ablo to do this he will need to reflect on the 
particular intuitions apprehended in actual concrete situations, 
and on the moral axioms accepted by the society in which he lives$ 
in order to find out whether thoro are more fundamental moral 
principles In the light of vhioh the particular intuitions or 
particular axioms'can, be analysod 'and tested. 1t, in in this context 
that one must consider the use of the principle of the greatest 
0 
good. .,. a 
We have seen that it is implied in tho oommon sense 
use of the term *right* that an aotion oannot be right unloss it 
has, at least. the charaoteristic of being productIve of the 
greatest good in the airoumstances. If it can 7be shown that 
some aotion, thought to be right., will not produce the greatest 
good then it ueoms self-evident that it is not actually the right 
action. Ilere then is a prinoiplo by means of which, it would appear, 
we could construct some kind of stable moral eyatom, acceptable 
to all. 1i might be objeated. however, to this that, quito apart from 
the enormous 
i 
practical difficulties of applying the critorion, tho 
principle itsolf is only acceptable to all because it is purely 
formal in charaoter, lVo,, all agroo, in theory, that it is rational 
, to do tho actionwhioh wathink will produoe tho groatost good, ) 
but as soon as wo enquire what we moan by the "greatest goodw 
then all agrooment vanishes; for some the greatost good will 
be the happiness of a oertain privileged seotion of humanitytfor 
others the groatest good will bo found in tho croation, of a 
society where certain values. say of beauty and truth, will reign 
ouprome, for others again, the greatest good will be in tho saving 
of souls for the next worl4. And though it may be the case that 
some particular intorprotation of tho I*greatect good" will 
represent the majority o-pinion, yet it does not seem likely 
that one would got any more agrooment about the "groatost-good" 
than one does about the validity of particular principles Of 
morality. 
I. Tho Oommon sen-se moaning of the greatest good is probably found 
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This criticism is just, -and it is, of couraeg easy to 
sco why. For, in giving content to the idea of the "greatest. good; 
we have to rely on tho Intuitions of particular experiences and 
on the particular rules which we accept as true for our material. 
Ififor instance, we accept t1he principle of equality as*binding 
then in our idea of the greatest good the notion of equality 
would of-neopssity play an important part. For a Nazi, on the 
other hand, the idea of equality would. presumably play little 
or no, part in his conception of the Sro4test good, 
. But though we must aocept tile faot that we will not 
nooessartly achieve objectivity by using the principle of the 
greatest good this does not mean that it doen not have an 
important part to'. Dlaytas complementary to the principle of 
consistonoy, in rationalising our moral bohaviour. We saw in the 
last chaptor how the principle of consi3tonoy could be used 
to help iron out difference's over the facto and aloo differences 
in moral valuations. In the same way we can use this principle to 
help us achieve a more atable and ooherent pattern of moral 
behaviour. Tho starting point of any attempt to do this is found 
in those situationswhero we are awaro of some inconnistanoY: 
Bay, a clash between a particular intuition and aiý.. more 
general principle; or a olash between the moral intuition in one 
situation and the intuition in a situation of 6 similar kind; or 
In the formula, "the greatest good of the greatest number"gor 
moro preoisely, "t, ho greatest happiness of the greatest numberw. 
This is SOmOtimea qualified by the principle of perfoation: i. e. 
the greatest happineus of tho greatest number consistent with 
the attainmont of the hig'aest degree of ýqerfaotion possible. 
But the idea of happiness is the dominant one. 
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a clasli between two Prima faoio dution. The attempt to rosolvO 
nuch trio ons intone i0S forcoo us to trY to find more fundamental 
intuitions by which to Wildo our aotiona; or to try to disoov"Ir 
which. among tho moro general prinalPles Of mOrAlitY 800OPtO4 'by 
us. aro vie principles we accept au bacto and vhich aro 
derivattve. 'Zhus a . ran vho has rogardod thi, * infliotton of 
corp. oral Punishment au wrong on tho grounds that it ia wrong to 
infliot pai ,n on anothor pimon in oold blood may bo forood to 
roaltoo that'there aro nome oircumatances in which it to right 
to inflict pain deliborately. 119 to then forcod to find Dome 
other mason for the strong, and apparontly. moral feolinga of 
ravulaion which he oxporlencos at tho t1iouglit of corporal 
'punishmont', and. in searching for an ndlquate , noral, roacon 
ho 
may bo lod. far afield into oonoid-irationa about tho difforemes 
betwoon non and brutoo, or about the nature of wr: iorAralattons., ani 
so on. Tn thý? aane way a -porzon, rnflncting on aituatt= in 
which thoro has b9pn a olaah botween two nrima faoia duties - 
say. the duty to toll tho trnth and thsi 4uty to hol'o, somoone in 
dintroas - may como to tho oonclusion that ho muct ; Llwayfj tell 
the trixth, whatever tho consequencee-, or aSain, hr) may decide that 
each situation must bo judgod in torm4 of which oourso of action 
will lead to the loast-auffering to tho3o immidiAtelý affoctod. 
But whatover the docision his undorstanding of tile moral 
Problom will bo. doopinod, and hie knoTlodgo of what things 
roally hava auprfmt) valuo for him will bo clarifiod. 
By this meano thon tho rofflootive manstarting with 
OOncretO Dituationa and aocopted prinoirploowIll tend tO 
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form the concention of a moral idoal "based on a few basic moral 
principles. Thus he might forn, the idoa'of an ideal society in 
which all men will be treated as of equal importance)and will 
receive equal opb6'rtunities to develop their potentialities and 
to seek their happinoss; and Ilia general conception of what he 
ought to do will be bazod on an examination of the means by 
which such an ideal might be achieved. 
Such idoals,, then, givo content to tho principle of 
the greatest good. so that when we are in situations in which 
it is neoessarv to think of consequenoeS in order to know what 
our duty is, wo tend, if we have thought reflectively about moral 
problems at all, to calculate them within the contoxt, as it wore, 
of nuch, an ideal. The Communist weighs up all issues in the light 
of his conception of the classless sooioty, tho Christian thinks 
of the Kingdom of God or of what the idoal T. "an would do in 
similar circumstances. 
We may notgof course, oomo to our idea of the 
*greatest good" by the means I have suggested -i. e. by 
applying the principle of consistenoy to concrete moral doolsions 
and to ao'Oopte'd moral principles. We may accept our idea of the 
"greatest good" from. some autharity, or take it for granted as 
a result of ohildhood training. But the mothodwhich commends 
itself as the rational one io curely the method outlined above. 
8. It is not suggested that we can deduce from any such 
ideal detailed principles of action to cover all possible 
Situationslor that, in any sense, such an ideal can be a 
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substitute for the moral intuttiono apprehondod in particular 
situdtions. The function of such ideals is first, that they help 
to introduce some cohoronco into tho moral life, ana secondly that 
ti'toy 
-of ton provide an 
impetus to action when the 1>3rf ormanco of 
a particular duty seems irksome. The good Communist. bored. by the 
endless round of*oommittee mentingo, is spurred on 'by. tho thought 
of the final goal. At this level desire and duty oomo together. 
In saying that theso formulations of the "greatest good" 
help to introduco coherence into the moral life I am not thinking 
so muoh-of the construction of any theoretical oystom as of 
the fact that if we take time to reflect in gnneral on the moral 
life -to ask what our vocation in life ought to beor, what 
things 
, we valuo mont, and no on - then we are more likely to come to 
each particular situation proparod with some gonoral policy of 
action which, in itself, will often help to clarify puzzling moral 
issuos. The man who rolies, for moral guidance, entiroly on the 
accopted moral prinoiploo of society or on the utterances of 
conscience at the tirao of decision is likely to be quite baffled 
when, as often happens, a particular moral problem cannot be 
solved 'by any rule of thumb methods or by clear and prociso 
intuitions of "rightneasO. Only the man who has given some thought 
to tho moro gonoral moral problems has a chance of coming to 
a rational decision in such circumstances. 
The dangers inhoront. in formulating general lines of 
action ara*obvious. But to argue that we ouclht not to prepare 
any general structure of moral principles for fear that VO Shall 
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pro-dotermino what %a oug4t to do Ln thin or that attuation; and 
Mhus ustirp the funotion of conaoinnoo to to ov, )rlook the faot 
that it ia oqually dangorous to trunt ontiroly to tho gutdanoo 
of tho raoral Intuitionn approhondod whon wo aro "faOO to faclo" 
, with t1ho notual situatIcn. j; o doubt, in the lant analysta, thO 
moral zaný taust bo guided loy what his conscinonoo "tell%* him. he 
Ought to do hero antl now In thia partioular situationbut it iD 
suroly viuo to provido gomo chook on the non-noral fuctore which 
Influence tho judgments of conscionoo. Ana thts oan only bo done 
by somo suah proonso of gonmeral thinking about noral quootions 
as has boon doccrib(Dd abovo. 
On thm wholo the boQt bnlanco is alhruok, poehapo, loy 
k-,. %oping tho poriodo of ganoral roflootion on moral principlee to 
a. minir,, um so 'Iniat tho froo rosponse of tho concotonoo to oncil now 
situation in not inhibited by an unvlOldy thooretioal otruoture 
of thought. But it zooms nicoasary, novortholoas, -if wo aro to 
exert any kind of rational control ovor our moral bahavionr - that 
thorn choUld oacationally bo timosco who. %n wo try to disonrn so., r. o 
oohoront p4ttorn in tho innumorable uttqrancon of consatenco at 
work in concroto oltuations. 
Noto. In saying that it to only when wo aro "faco to face" witli 
a particular situation that un can knowwhethir wo havo 
an obligation to do this or that, it isj thinkovorlooked 
that thoro aro many instanoon in which wo should think it 
necoesary to anticipate the ottuation. by trying to imagine 
, ýYhat wo ahould do if tile situation confronted 11iI. Thung 
in war twimetmost thouChtful people probably ank thamuelvos 
how thej think they ought to Whavo to the enemy if he 
should occupy thoir oountry. Tt is probAbly impossible to 
give a final anowor to such it quoation, an(l actual ox9orienco 
of the situation ray show that wo had 'boon quito off the mark 
in our theorisinga: novorthelecs it would, I thinkobe considered 
irrational not to give nOmO thOUIrat to the qunation loofornhand. 
CI'IAPTr, 'R Xi. 
TT APPTN"SSANDDUTY. 
I. 
1.1 propose to discuss in this dhaDter certain problems 
that arise in connection with the possibility of there being 
an "absolute" conflict br)tvoon onoPs happiness and the course of 
duty. 
To have statod. at tho beginning of thir. essay. that 
ultimately all good reasons for action fall under one or other of 
these two hoads; either vie do something because we think the action 
will enable us to satisfy some dosiro(andvin partioularg enable us 
to achieve happinoss), or else we do soT,, othing- bý. %cause we think we 
are morally bound to do it. Thoso moti. ves are accepted, in principle, 
by common sense as being equally'valid reasons for action. Tho 
problem ariaos, however, Vh9ther thej ever come into conflict in 
such a way t1kat if'a Tran does his duty then he is bound to lose 
all chances of happiness for himsolf. If such a conflict can 
occur then we seem to have a conflict within the coricePt Of 
rational action itself. so that vie are loft without any clear 
Lruidance as to what we ought to do. What criterion of rationality 
should we lise, for inotance, in dotormining-what we ought to do 
in the ovent of such an absolute conflict arising? 
Tho common sonso poattion i-. reapoct to this problom. 
is comowhut ambiguoua. Tn Conoral common cense thinks that w1hore 
thoro is a, confliot bý, -tvf)on hr4ppinoss and duty a p3rson ought 
to 0110080 tho courso of duty. but though it mi. -i-it condemn a 
percon for thinking of hiu own interosts rathor than of hio 
dUtY wq do not, au wo havo notod boforo, say that lie has actod 
irrationally - oapnoially if ho was likely to nuffor oonolderablo 
1hardohip by ficting dutifully. 
.4 Thon again, though we orton oxpoot a parcon to bo 
prepared to loaa hic-lifo in tjjC, C&uso of duty (o. p, in warfare) 
wa roooll from tho thought Uhat the porcon no ancrificing himsolf 
will not in any conso bo rawardod for hia virtuo. Consequently 
thore Is a very widosproad bolief that the wicked roally do ouffer, 
in tho long runtfor their cins, and that the rightoous gain their 
revard. 0-rteh this bellof IS clearly part of a roligious baijor, 
but ovon rhoro it iu not overtly religious, ono ounpocts that 
it ic unconsolously based on roligicua assu-niptior. a. Thus people 
somotimes cay that thougia tho vicked ran proupor outwardly 
, Yot hia oonvoionoe vill worry him so muo'. 1n. that ho won' t bo ablo 
to enjoy his material proppority. Sinco thoro is no very cloar 
ovidenoo that this is inovitably tho caso, one T,, ust uenumo that 
belier to largoly basol 6n a rare -41"undamintal bmlieff as to 
the moral nature of tho) universo. 
The obverv* of all this tz Urs, b-illsfo-tton oxpreacecl, 
that if vattro is no Goal ir thnre. is, no suarentee that juutio() 
will ultimatoly b,, D dono, thon ull momlity falls to the ground, 
and wo cannot oxpoot pooplq to sacrifice thomselvos for dutyps 
7,53 1ý . 
I 
aako. unloau thoir own natural instincts prompt them to do so. (O. E;. 
a mother zacriftoing hercolf for hor ohild). 
TIO 
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%-* Bofore dealing with tho specific problom of the 
possibility 0.1,. '* an absoluto conClict botween duty and happinnusl 
it might be as well to summarise some of tho points which 
can bo mude in reapn. t to tho relations botwoon happinasa and 
duty. In, doing ao -we sliall clear tim way, for the main issue. 
(i) It is not tnovltAblo that hai)pinOGG and duty should 
confltct or that tho"man of duty" uliould inovitably suffer for 
his dutifulnees. .. It Lz aften tho caso that we w4lit to do What 
ve 4now wo ought to do, 4nd indend somq ron may f Ind roal 'happinona 
in devotinE: thoir UNf)a to uOT-. 0 moral and vhioh thoy think thoy 
ouent, to purzuo. T,, ', oroovtr, i-, f onvironmontal conditione are 
favourable wo may nev4r actuallýr b, 3 placod in a situations 
, Whero wo ar, 5 called upon to tooriften a great deal . 10. or dut7l e 
cakw. A politically conscious porzor., living in a 
ordorod st; ciaty, is not Maly to suffer for his political 
Convictions to anything liki tho eame oxtont as ft p^. reon living in 
a revolutionary cituatione 
(U)Though it is truo that wo ought to do what is right 
irroupectivo of tho conuoquonoos to un porsonally, this doos not 
mean that our own happinoss chould not be takon into accountgas 
ono factor among'tany otliors, in nosossing -uliat is right. In prinoWe ý 
that is, ono hauvothor thingn boing oqual, au miloli rislit to 
i: * 
tipappinnsu art anyono olsoý, Ilo doubtfor obvious reasonaptho moral 
man will, in practicl), not tako hia own happine-so intc> considoration 
whon trying to deoidi wliat io right. but thore may voll be 
ciroumutanoes in which it in riGht in practtoo ac well as in 
Prir. OiPlf) to anaort oneto claim to be takon Into aocount. The 
over-mook and humble man *ho io prepared to q1low othors to 
Inco" him for their omi advantaRo may finally decidetin tho 
interoct. of Ju3tice and for tho 04ke of tho moral hoalth of 
thooo explo. iting lhim, to assert his Ov., n rieChts-And a claim or this I. 
kindimada by zuch a porson, can often be highly nftlative. 
(Ilii). Thero are conoeivably circum. stanons in which we 
may consider IFA our duty to oako our own happinoss our ohlof 
morel aim. Tliut3 a person impriconed undor novoro oonditions, 
involving solitary conflnemont, migilt think thnt it van his duty 
to aliow his Faolora that hia"spirlt, oould rise abovo advorse 
eircumstanooo". 
(tv)Wo might I" Oftid tohavo a duty to try to minimiso 
the numVer of oacasione on t1hioh wo do what In right from a 
senso of duty" -i. e. without really dontring to do tho, action, 
It Is truo that we cannot, by an act of will, mako ourselves 
desiro thia or not desire thatbut thore arn various psychological 
techniques which can be employed whoroby wo can como to persuade 
ourselvoc that we liko doing comotjiing W)llOh formorlY WO found 
distattoful. 
Tn the same way wo may find that. too grriat a concontrat- 
ton on duty and on the problom or doing our duty is having 
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doloterious offect on our charaotert'so that oven whon wo do What 
ia right ve aro unablo, oftongto produoo tho good intended. And we 
may docido, in connequencogto rolax our vigLlanoo nomewhat and 
give a rathor froor roin to our dosiroagor at leaet to VIOZO 
doeirou of which we morally approvo.. 
(v). On Vvid other hand the parcon who has cowernod him- 
self too muoh"', with the problem of hic own happinoon may finally 
conclude that it is only by doing lite duty and by ooncentrating 
on the problem of hie o'ýoltgations in goncral that ho has MY 
chanoo of happinoas. As Rnid piits it: "And as no can can be 
indifferont about his happinoss, tho good tran has the consolation 
to know that he cOnsultb Mr. hoppinous most offectually vIiin, 
'without any painful anxioty about future ovonta, ho does hic 
duty". i 
«wo car. -not Intor from tliiti. howover, eitlier that lial). ninnas 
will nocossartly rosult from suoh an omphasis on dutypor that 
a porson will nvýoossarily to unhappy if Ito doos not mako duty 
contral. Thio point, o: r courseraises vio main issuo a tms 
eliapterbut liore wo na: / tr. ake thls ob, -iorvat, ion, vtz, ptlttlt vhile 
a cood rnan(t. o. a man of fine moral consibility) would no dotibt 
find it impofasiblo to bo hapipy unloss ho. gavo full and proper 
attontion to tho pwfor. -ance of his dutios, it scene n(luOllY 
true that a poroon of louc acute morul sonsibility, or whouo 
consoicinae hao boon "dullod" migrilt well achievo Ijappinoss in 
spito of, or oven 'bocautso of hia conbtantly noglooting hiu duty. 
,; Ieoau3o wo find it hard to b9lieve t1lat tht) vioked will nOt 
in cormo senso b-) PlIn'ished for - atns wo tend to ussumo that 
I. P. 2ct. (VoL. 3'. 
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even if is not r, )uni*hod in anothor world lie will at 10-95t 
zuffer th. e .. z)angc of remorse in tliia. But. common obsorvation 
tends 
to show that Valle there are -. ). omo sine which even the most callous 
will feel uneasy -aooutit is possiOle for the man, whose 
conscience is "dulled, " to think almost exclusively in terms of 
his owu intorests and jot suffer no pangs ofromorzo. And if 
ho is-fortunate in extornal oiroum3tances and has the capacity 
to "lose himself" In pur3utta of various kinda then It is likoly 
A. 
that ho will hr. vo a bottir chanco of aohievintr happinoss than 
the man of groater moral intogrity. 
46* To xust now deal with tho problem of an absolute 
conflict betwoon duty and happinbas. And first of all wo need to 
defino more carefully what wo mean by 4absolute conflict". 
That duty and desire can come into conflict is an 
accepted faot of everyday experienoe and raises no partioular 
problems except to those who are conoorned to deny the validity 
? of the concept of duty. Tt is only when the domands of duty are 
such that we*think all possibility of happiness is denied to us 
if we aubmit to the demands that we can talk of an a"bsolUtO 
or Irreconcilaole oonfliot between dutY and liappiness. ThUs a person 
I. In discussing the question whether the "; icked" novitably 
suffer for their sins wo sometimes confuse two -; joints,., firGtj 
wAother the wicked always feel pangs of romorno; and secondv 
whether the viokod lose all chance of happinocx through 
becoming self-controd. In respect to this sooond point we need 
to make & diCtinction betveen "being celfishl(in the sense of 
putting one's own Interests 'before that of others) and "being 
"Oeýf-centred"(in t),,, e sense of 'being preoccupted with one's 
own states of mind). -the selfish man need not necessarily be 
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iray kno, w that he faces the cortaint y of imprisonment for life if 
lie decided to champion a cause he thinks just; orpworse stillt 
he may know that his whole family will suffer irremediable 
disaster. 
Tj-, f,, ý problem t'hen is: 'what is tho rational thing to do 
in circumstances like these? The problem is particularly acute 
when the oiroumstanoes aro suoh that if wo docido not to do our 
duty our moral lapse will either not be disooverod or else will 
be exoused by publio opinion. Sometimes a person is forood to 
do his duty by fear of publio disapproval. Though he dreads the 
connequenoos of doing his duty, he fears still moro the shame of 
public obloquy so that the dutiful course of action really 
represonts the leaser of two evile. But tho position is vory 
different if a man knows that ho will have the sympathy of 
the public if he rofusoa to do what he knows to be right, This 
sometimen happens, for instancotwhon there ts a confliot betwoon 
the actual obligation and a prima facie "natural"obligation. (Tlius 
a man may decido that he ought to allow his children to be 
tortured rather than give information to the enemy. But Public 
opinion would support him if ho deoided that the price of duty 
was too great) And if one wants a good illustration of the 
difficulty with which we are concerned in this chapter. one has 
only to imagine a situation like the one we have just described - 
"Solf-centrod". 1le may have rany interests whiCh "tako-hir, out 
of. himaelf". Actually t1io man who in too prooccupied with quoations 
of duty is more likely to suffor from "solf-centrodnocs"(in the 
sense described above). , 
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that is, -, Afhero a person stands to lose ovorything by fulfilling 
an obligation which, so far as the public is concerned. he could 
safely ignore. 
It is to be noted that our problem does not arise if we 
assume the existenoo of God -or, at loasto a God as defined bY 
Christians. The Christian roligion guarantoes that. ultimatoly, 
the dutiful man will bo rewarded, and though this assuranoo 
leaves many problems unsolved(notably, the problem of undeserved 
suffering)tlieso probloms are not such that we need dtsouss them 
here. It is when we haye no assurance of divine sanotions that the 
problem arises, for, as has boon so often pointod out, it is 
impossible to prove on empirical grounds that thoro is any 
inseparable conneation between the performance of duty and the 
experionce of happinoss. The most wo could hopo to proyo is thatg 
on the wholo, tlie ftgood" man tenda to be more happy than the "bad" 
man; and oven this proposition oan only be plausibly maintained 
if we confine our attention to those well-ordered societies in 
which wise laws are supported by the vast majority of the 
population And rigidly enforced by the police. 
6. Tho issues raised by the possibility of an absolute 
conflict between happiness and duty are sometimes taken to be 
fundamental to the whole question of the validity of the notion 
of duty itself. It is thought to be a ooritradiction at the very 
heart of morality if. on the one handpwo argue that we oughttO 
do What is right(or, are morally bound,. to do it) and, on the other, 
'we state that there is absolutely no guarantoo that justiOO 'will 
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be' done by way of rewards and 'punishmonts to those who fulfill 
their obligations or do not fulfill them. In nartioular), we are 
distressed when we see others suffering for duty's sake while 
those who have neglected their duties got off soot free. 
Thi3 13 the point of view taken by Sidgwick in the 
well-known last chapter of The Methods of Ethics. To quote: wI 
find that I undoubtedly seen. to peroeivegas clearly and certainly 
as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Goomotry, that it is right 
and reasonable for me to treat others as I should think that I 
myself oughtto be treated under similar conditions ---, But --- 
I do not find in my moral consciousness any intuition, claiming 
to be clear and cortain, that the performance of duty will be 
adequa 
, 
tely rewarded and its violation punished. I no doubt feel 
a strong sentiment, apparently inseparable from the strictly moral 
sentiments'prompting me to hope and long that it may be so: nay 
, more, my moral reason 
declares that it ought to be so -whero, of 
courso, "ought" is not used in a strictly ethical sensetbut oxpresso 
the need that Practical Reason feoýls of obtaining this promiss, if. 
it is to be made consistent with itself. For, if we find an 
ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions 
of what is Reasonable in conductowe seem forced to the conclusion 
that they were not really intuitions after all, and that the 
apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason is 
essentially illusory. " 1. 
This way of looking, at tho problom, however, though 
relevant, is not the aspect which we wish to discuss hero. Tho 
point Sidgwiok is making has been dtaoussed beforein Chapter VII 
where we considerod whether the idoa of duty, "mado senno" in 
a world that seemed indifforont to all moral values. what we 
wish to discuss hero is the problem of a conflict between 
two reasons for action, both of which are accepted as being' P 
in themselveso*ultimately good or satisfying as reasons for action. 
In other words we are taking it for granted that we do regard 
the duty motivo as valid. and our problem is simply to find some 
I P. 467. 
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acceptable criterion -.,, hich will enable us to decide between the 
claims of duty and happiness if they should clash. 
7. It does not seem possible to discover such a criterion, 
for we seem to have listed all the possible criteria of rationality 
and nomof them would soom to be applioable to this situation. 
We might tackle the problomgho"wevorlby asking whether one or 
other of these fundamental reasons for action is, in some sense, 
more fundamental than the other -or, more strictly, Viiethe. r one 
seems by its very nature to have a precedence over the other. 
Once Nio put tho quootion in this way wo so,. ý straightaway that 
there can only bo one 4nswor, viz., that the motive of duty has 
a prior claim over all motives of desire including the dosire 
for happiness. In other vords)onoo we aro really oonvinood that 
some oourse of aotion is the morally right oourso then we know 
immediately that it ought to be taken, irrespootivO Of the 
oonsequences to us porsonally. This being ao, though tharo iray woll 
bo a confliot between duty and happinoos in the sense that if we 
do our duty then we shall lose our ohanoe of happinesallwo oannot 
say that there is any contradIction within the conoopt of rational 
aotion itsolf. This would only be tho CaDO if the olaims of duty 
and the olaims of happiness were oqually balancodloo that we 
I 
would have to admit that there was no rational mothod of 
I deciding botwoon. thom, But no ono who has had oxperienoo of 
a serious conflict botween duty and happiness can doubt thatq 
in the context of ouch an experiencet the road of dutY iS the one 
that ought to be taken. And the term "ought' hore carrios with it 
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not only the w0ight of moral authority, but also the authority of 
"intrin'sic reasonablenoss"Te approve of the riglit actiongand of Vie 
doing of the right action., with our "whole being". 
80 This may seem, howeverptoo easy a way out of the difficulty) 
or rather. it may soem as if we have underestimated the seriousness 
of the problem, tho intransigrnt nature of the conflict. Tho follOW- 
ing Comments may therefore be of some help as supplementary to what 
has been said"above. 
In the first place, it is important to note that when we 
question the rationality of sacrificing our happiness for the sake 
of duty it cannot be the sacrificing of happiness per se, which 
is called in question; It , is by no meano-true that we regard it 
as nceessarily irrational for a person to sacrifice his own 
happiness for the sake, say. of the happiness of othore. There are 
rany'situations, indeed., in, wliiah wo might think it irrational for 
a person to be" concerned with his own happineso -e. g. when the 
velfaro of our children is at stake. Te ray "robel" against a 
world in vinioh it is sometimes necessary for a parent to sacrifice 
evor, ything for the sake of his childron, but we do not question 
the rationality of the act of sacrifico. we think it entirely 
"natural* that a parent should put the interests of his children 
before his ovin. 
This being sowhai we must be questioning Vaen we 
demur at the thought of sacrificing happiness for the sake of 
duty is th6 idoa of duty iteelf. Wo are saying, in affect9that 
while we are prepared to caortfico oursolves for the sake of our 
Ix 
children, or our frionds. we do not see why we should be asked 
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to sacrifice our happiness for the sake of "cold* duty. 
And this brings us to the next point. 
P. In making this distinction between what we may call 
*natural claims" (i. e. the claims of ohildron, friends etc. ) and 
the claims of duty 'we are, I think, falling into the error which 
we discussed bofore: viz. of supposing that the main difference 
between desi , re and duty is that desire comes from "within"gas, 
a free oxpreýssion of our naturegVaoreas duty is imposed against 
our will from "without". we maylas it happonsdoeiro to do what, 
it is aesertedpwo ought to do, -but this is irrelovant to tho 
question of the naturo of duty. Tho essence of duty is that we 
are bound to do it 'whether we wish to or not, and it is, this 
"authority over us" Which wo do not like. We do not mind 
sacrificing ourselvos for our children bocauso that is sorething 
*we are glad to do, but we resent being "forcodw to sacrifice 
oursolvos for dutyPs sake. 
'We have already commented on tho fallacy of this way 
of thinking about duty(see psZ(7q) so that we do not noed to 
repoat the arguments hore. Sufficient to say that whenwe do 
an action because it is the right actiongand for no other 
reason than it is the riKht aotionttlion the action is, an 
entirely voluntary ono. It, is as much an exprossion, a free 
'expressionsof our nature as any desire oould be. 
What tends to confuse us here, aa N,; o noted beforelis I 
that the notion of duty bcoomes "mixed up* not only with 
ideas of external sanotiona, but also with concepts of right Vilich 
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we ourselves are unable to give full hearted consent to. Thus 
do not always agree with the moral conceptions ubhold by the 
community in which we liveand yet fear to act contrary to them. 
And this fear is not rnerely a fear of the punishments which 
society can in. pose; it is a much more complex thing than this, the 
psychological analysis of which would tako us far afield into 
questions of an anthropological and religious nature. The point 
we wish to make,. howevor, is that the notion of duty is often 
viewed in the context of those particular duties which we feel to 
be imposed oh us from without. 
106 When wo talk of an absolute confliot between happiness 
and duty, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
situation 4s it was before the particular ooligation confrontod 
us and the situation as it is onoo we know that we have the 
obligation. Now there is no question that instances do occur in 
which it would bo, oorrect to say that the emergence of a 
partioular obligation had ruined all prospeots of a person's 
gaining happiness. Rence, tho person concorned, comparing the situation 
as it now is with the situation that existed before t1lo omorgence 
of the obligation, could say, fairlY onoughothat had it not boon 
for the demands of duty he mignt well have achieved happiness. 
But onoo the situation, the moral obligation situation) 
has arisen then tho moral man must think only within the context 
of that situation -he must adjuat himsolf to the new faots -., hioh 
havo arison, including the fact of his being under, a moral obliratiOn- 
And When ho does t1lis -when lie oeases to pin6 for the "old state 
of affairs and addresses himself whole heartodly to the now 
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situation -than h" right well concludolif 110 is tempted to ignore 
his 6"oligation, that it is the lesser of two evils to do his duty - 
that, in othorwords, ho would suffer more by ignoring his duty than 
by doing it. And the moro a person is impressod by the rightness, of 
the action which he thinks he is obliged to do, the more he will 
fool thatin tho given situationghis own good also is beat served 
by doing his duty. The man of dull moral sensitivity will not, of 
course, come to such a conolusion; butgthengfor him the problem of 
an abdoluto conflict bqtween-duty and happiness hardly arises as 
a practioal possibility. 
It is not then-contradictory to sayton the one hpndpthat 
the claims of duty can deny us the possibility of happin oss, and 
on the other, to say that it may b6 for our greater good to 
do our duty rather than to ignore it. Th, e ftrat statement is 
true if we regard the conflict botween duty and happiness from a 
point of view external to the moral obligation situation; the second 
is true from the point of view of the person piaced in the moral 
obligation situation. In this connection it is worth noting that 
the Droblem of the conflict between duty and happiness tends to 
weigh most heavily on us when we witness the sacrifice of some 
other person in the cause of duty rather than when we ourselves 
aro called upon to mako some considerable saorifice for duty's 
sake. And the reason for this iu, I think, that when we obsorvo 
another porsonss sacrifice we do so, an it were, from the outside - 
we do not place ourselves imaginatively in the situation as it 
confronts him. Aotually, if we could view the matter imaginativoly 
'we would roaliso that the problem of the dutiful man suffering 
for righteousness sake is muoh loss a0ute than the problem of the 
suffering which is inflicted willy nilly on the good and the bads 
the innocent and the guilty. The dutiful man voluntarily places 
himself in the way of suffering; but the other kind of suffering 
is imposed indiscriminately. 
'We havo stated that one of the common sense criteria of 
rationality is the principle of accordance with the facto. Whon 
we vere dealing with this prinoiple before we noted that while 
it is usually in our interests to conform to the facts ihere are 
oocasion6 when we can safely ignore the facts. or when it may oven 
be in our interests to act against the facts. One of the facts 
which men'havo tried to ignore or to explain away is the fact of 
moral obligation, and some have been very successful in their 
efforts to do this -especially in the aDhere of action. 1t is 
relatively easy to Odull" the conscience to the pin pricks of 
duty; it is much more difficult to establish a pililosophioal 
theory which will satisfactorily explain away the concept of duty. 
But even from the purely practical point of view it in doubtful 
whether we can ever completely ignore the fact that we are moral 
croatures, oapable of being roused to action by the thought of 
what is right. Cortainly, the man of reasonably active conscience 
cannot ignore this faot;, Wnen he comes to think about his hapyniness 
the fact of moral obligation i§ a fact which he ignores at his 
peril -it is a fact to which he must learn to adapt his desires, 
as he learns to adapt them to other brute facts. 
The olaims of duty need notlao we have said before, 
over-rido our desires to the extent that we lose all chance of 
happiness -it depends on circumstances whether we are ever faced 
1ý7 
with an absolute conflict botwoon duty and happinoss. But the 
possibility always oxists of such a conflict arising. and to that 
extent we need to 'be prepared psychologically to moot its demands. 
In-the mp. antime we have one clear moraý duty which must appeal to 
, all who are concerned with the issues *which have been raised in 
this chapter : viz. the duty to help create a state of affairs 
where the occasions on -which an absolute sacrifice of solf-interoat 
is called for are reduced to a minimum. 
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